34433

National Library of Canada
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

CANADIAN THESES ON MICROFICHE

THÈSES CANADIENNES SUR MICROFICHE

NAME OF AUTHOR/*NOM DE L'AUTEUR* SIKHUMBUZO MAQUBELA

TITLE OF THESIS/*TITRE DE LA THÈSE* BRITISH POLICY AND SETTLER POLITICS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA 1920-1945: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE of AMALGAMATION WITH SOUTHERN RHODESIA

UNIVERSITY/*UNIVERSITÉ* ✓ UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

DEGREE FOR WHICH THESIS WAS PRESENTED/ *GRADE POUR LEQUEL CETTE THÈSE FUT PRÉSENTÉE* Ph. D

YEAR THIS DEGREE CONFERRED/*ANNÉE D'OBTENTION DE CE GRADE* 1977

NAME OF SUPERVISOR/*NOM DU DIRECTEUR DE THÈSE* Dr. R. C. MACLEOD

Permission is hereby granted to the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF CANADA to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

L'autorisation est, par la présente, accordée à la BIBLIOTHÈQUE NATIONALE DU CANADA de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans l'autorisation écrite de l'auteur.

DATED/*DATÉ* 25 July 1977 SIGNED/*SIGNÉ* SMaqubela

PERMANENT ADDRESS/*RÉSIDENCE FIXE*
648 LEE RIDGE ROAD
EDMONTON, ALBERTA
T6K 0N8

NL-91 (3-74)

National Library of Canada

Cataloguing Branch
Canadian Theses Division

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale du Canada

Direction du catalogage
Division des thèses canadiennes

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us a poor photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30. Please read the authorization forms which accompany this thesis.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de mauvaise qualité.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30. Veuillez prendre connaissance des formules d'autorisation qui accompagnent cette thèse.

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

NL-339 (3/77)

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

BRITISH POLICY AND SETTLER POLITICS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA 1924-1945, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE OF AMALGAMATION WITH SOUTHERN RHODESIA

by

© Sikhumbuzo Maqubela

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE

OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

FALL, 1977

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research, for acceptance, a thesis entitled BRITISH POLICY AND SETTLER POLITICS IN NORTHERN RHODESIA 1924-1945, WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ISSUE OF AMALGAMATION WITH SOUTHERN RHODESIA, submitted by SIKHUMBUZO MAQUBELA in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in History.

R. MacLeod
Supervisor

A W Keppel-Jones
External Examiner

DATE May 16, 1977

DEDICATED TO MY LATE PARENTS AND TO MY
BROTHERS AND SISTERS IN SOUTH AFRICA
TO WHOM I OWE MY EDUCATION

Abstract

In discussing British policy towards the Northern Rhodesian settlers during the period 1924 to 1945, an attempt has been made in this study to explore the various factors as well as the personalities, both in England and Northern Rhodesia, which influenced this policy. Although it became customary by the end of the First World War to describe British colonial policy in Africa as being mainly based on the principle of trusteeship for the native peoples, the application of this principle in Northern Rhodesia between 1924 and 1945 was mostly half-hearted, desultory and, in the end, ineffective. Throughout the period covered by this study, Northern Rhodesia hovered precariously between the sphere of white domination in the south and the sphere of African paramountcy in the north. Not until the setting up of the Central African Council in 1945 did it finally become clear that British policy was firmly set on a policy of binding Northern Rhodesia's destiny with the south rather than with the north. From the late 1920s onwards British policy towards the Northern Rhodesian settlers became largely influenced by the territory's copper production which became very vital to Great Britain's economic and military position as the European powers began to drift towards another bloody conflict.

The first chapter deals with the issue of amalgamation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia from the announcement of the British South Africa Company's amalgamation proposals in December, 1915 to the publication of the East African Commission Report in January, 1929. Particular stress has been laid on the views and attitudes of the Colonial Office, the Southern Rhodesian Government leaders and the Northern Rhodesian settlers regarding the suggested union between the

two Rhodesias. The chapter also discusses the beginnings of settler politics in Northern Rhodesia in 1924 and analyses the political aspirations of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members of the Legislative Council under the leadership of Leopold F. Moore. The second chapter discusses the origins of the conflict between the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesian settlers during the period of the second Labour Government in Great Britain, 1929 to 1931, in which amalgamation became the battlefield.

The third chapter deals with the impact of the depression on Northern Rhodesia's economy and how its political effects helped to drive the settlers and the Colonial Office further apart, particularly with regard to the so-called issue of Africanisation. Chapter four deals with the growing pressure for amalgamation from both the Northern and the Southern Rhodesian settlers and the British Government's attempt to relieve this pressure by sending out a Royal Commission to examine the entire issue of closer union between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. The fifth chapter deals with the response of the British Government, on the one hand, and the Rhodesian settlers, on the other, to the recommendations of the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission whose Report was published in March, 1939. The chapter also discusses the London talks later in the same year between British authorities and Godfrey M. Huggins, the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, on the Report. This led to Lord Hailey's visit to Southern Rhodesia at the end of his African tour in 1940 in order to make a comparative study of the native policies of the three Central African territories in relation to the question of amalgamation. The last chapter examines the change in British policy towards the issue of closer union movement in British Central Africa during wartime culminating in the setting up of the Central African Council in April, 1945.

Preface

This study attempts an examination of British policy towards the Northern Rhodesian settlers from the time of the territory's take over by the Colonial Office in 1924 following the termination of British South Africa Company rule in that year to the end of the Second World War. The specific issue of amalgamation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia, which later broadened to include Nyasaland, has been selected as the basis of this examination because of its significance in Northern Rhodesian politics throughout the period covered by this study. Once it became apparent after the economic slump which hit the territory in the early thirties that self-government was not going to be achieved as easily and as quickly as had been the case in Southern Rhodesia, amalgamation suddenly became a dominating factor in Northern Rhodesian settler politics. It became "an ever persistent issue, sometimes in the background, sometimes in the foreground of the political scene ... until the compromise solution of federation came to take its place" in 1953.[1]

It is the purpose of this study to examine British policy towards the Northern Rhodesian settlers against the background of amalgamation. An attempt will be made to discuss the relations between the Colonial Office and the northern Rhodesian settlers with reference to the British Government's commitment to the principle of colonial trusteeship which was officially proclaimed in the 1923 White Paper on Kenya. British policy towards the Northern Rhodesian settlers will also be analysed in relation to Great Britain's growing dependence on Northern Rhodesia's copper industry from the 1930's to the war period, and the importance of this factor with regard to British policy towards the Northern Rhodesian settlers and the issue of amalgamation.

---

[1] Stewart Gore-Browne, "Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia Twenty Years Ago", The Northern Rhodesia Journal, vol. II, (1954), p. 41.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. R. C. Macleod, University of Alberta, and my co-supervisor, Dr. D. Williams, University of Calgary, for guidance and helpful suggestions in the writing of this thesis. I would also like to thank the Librarian of the London School of Economics and Political Science, London, for kindly giving me permission to consult Sidney Webb's Papers and the manuscript Diary of Beatrice Webb. Similar thanks are also due to the Librarian of Rhodes House Library, Oxford, for allowing me to read the Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, the Papers of Sir John Chancellor and the Correspondence of Sir H. J. Stanley. I also wish to thank the staff of the Public Records Office, London, the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office Library, London, the Royal Commonwealth Society Library, London, and the newspaper section of the British Museum, Colindale, for kindly assisting me in locating useful materials in their possession.

I would also like to give special thanks to Dr. Ian Henderson, University of Sussex, for kindly drawing my attention to his Ph.D. thesis, "Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1953: A Study in the Limits of Colonial Power", Edinburgh University, 1972, Mrs. Rosemary Robertson, for typing this thesis, particularly for her skill and patience in "deciphering" my handwriting, and the secretarial staff of the History Department, University of Alberta, for their generous help during the final stages of this work.

Finally, I wish to thank my wife, Vida, and my daughters, Lindiwe and Zukiswa, for their constant words of encouragement which sustained me throughout the duration of this study. I very much regret the fact that I was unable to meet the numerous deadlines that I set for myself. There

are no bursary or fellowship institutions to thank for financial assistance in connection with the research for this work although several requests were made. For my two trips to England in 1974 and 1975 and the cost of preparing this thesis I relied entirely on the generosity and understanding of my family. I am sure they will be happy to know that my thanks in this regard go to them alone. This enables me to address them in our traditional idiom and say "ningadinwa nangomso".

FOREWORD

When the Union of South Africa was formed in 1910, the general expectation in both Great Britain and South Africa was that Southern Rhodesia (but not Northern Rhodesia) would eventually be part of the white South African self-governing dominion. Although Section 150 of the South Africa Act, 1909, left the door open for the later admission of "the territories administered by the British South Africa Company" into the Union, it is evident from the Colonial Office files that only Southern Rhodesia was actually expected to join South Africa. Northern Rhodesia, it was felt, was more akin to the African colonial dependencies in the north which were expected to remain for some time under the supervision of the Colonial Office, than to the area of white rule in the south. Until the 1920's, little was known by the Colonial Office experts, indeed, even by the Directors of the British South Africa Company, of the exact magnitude of Northern Rhodesia's mineral resources. The Southern Rhodesian referendum of October, 1922 by which the white settlers firmly rejected General Smuts' attractive terms for the territory's entry into the Union, left the British Government in a quandry concerning the future of the two Rhodesias. Its plan for the ultimate political alignment of Northern Rhodesia were left in complete disarray as Southern Rhodesian settlers began to clamour for a "Greater Rhodesia".

When the question of the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias came up for consideration in 1930, following the publication of Sidney Webb's White Paper on native policy in East Africa, the British Government had no ready answer to the Rhodesian settlers' request for a conference on the matter. It took exactly nine months before a reply was issued. Obviously, no policy had been worked out yet since 1922 regarding the future political relations between the two Rhodesias. Up to the outbreak of the Second World War, British policy towards the question of Northern Rhodesia's political destiny was characterised, not only by a lack of any clear objective, but also by a series of glaring contradictions. Basically, the issue was whether Northern Rhodesia was ultimately going to be part of the "White South" or the "Black North". In fact, it was not until the break-up of the Central African Federation in 1963 and the triumph of African nationalism in Northern Rhodesia that this issue was finally resolved.

Although since 1924, following the termination of the British South Africa Company rule over the territory, Northern Rhodesia was grouped with the East African dependencies, it was by no means certain as to which direction her political destiny lay. It was certainly the view of some of the permanent officials in the Colonial Office that the territory's trade and communication links with the south plus the fact that the greater part of its settler population was imbued with South African racial ideas, pointed to an ultimate political alignment with Southern Rhodesia. The indecisiveness of British policy towards Northern Rhodesia is well illustrated in the Government Statement of July, 1931 which remained the governing policy on the subject of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias until 1939. While the statement rejected the immediate amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia, it also expressed the view that the British Government were not opposed to amalgamation in principle.

In the years following 1931, however, the British Government continued to oppose the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias on the grounds that such a measure would be irreconcilable with its trusteeship obligations towards the Northern Rhodesian Africans. Efforts were made to keep Northern Rhodesia within the orbit of the East African dependencies, but they were never successful. Although there was much talk in the Colonial Office and inside the British Parliament about the British Government's commitment to the principle of trusteeship for the Northern Rhodesian Africans as the main reason why the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias could not be sanctioned, it is clear that this was nothing more than glib talk.

The real reason for the British Government's rejection of amalgamation was not so much its trusteeship obligation to the Northern Rhodesian Africans as its great concern about the territory's mineral resources. After 1923 Northern Rhodesia's copper output began to brighten up due to some intensive exploration and the discovery of new mines carried out by the subsidiaries of the British South Africa Company. There was now a growing reluctance by the Colonial Office to let the mining region pass under the control of the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia, particularly at the time when the political and the military outlook in Europe was so uncertain. By the mid-thirties rearmament among the European powers was already in full swing and copper became an essential commodity in the manufacture of war materials.

Up to 1945, the influence of the British Parliament in the determination of policy towards the issue of amalgamation never became a significant factor. Parliamentarians, on the whole, were either ill-equipped or too much pre-occupied with other pressing matters to have any significant impact on the issue of amalgamation. Besides, the intricate details of policy on amalgamation, as on most matters of colonial policy, were generally ironed out well out of the ken of Parliament.[1]

---

[1] This largely explains the constant clamour among the Members of Parliament for a Standing Parliamentary Committee for Colonial Affairs or

[Continued on next page.]

Until the outbreak of the Second World War, the Colonial Office had no difficulty in overriding the wishes of the small and ill-organised Northern Rhodesian settlers as far as the issue of amalgamation was concerned, even though constitutional concessions were made in order to pacify them. From the outbreak of the Second World War onwards, however, the Colonial Office found it very difficult to resist the pressure of the Northern Rhodesian settlers who were strongly supported by the Southern Rhodesian Government under Godfrey Huggins. The British Government's desire to win the co-operation of the Northern Rhodesian settlers while the war was in progress provides the key to the British Government's change of policy towards the issue of closer union between the two Rhodesias (and Nyasaland) from 1939 to 1945. By the end of the war, the constitutional position of the Northern Rhodesian settlers had become practically impregnable. Moreover, their numbers had significantly risen from 10,500 in 1932 to 21,907 in 1946. They could no longer be ignored.

The setting up of the Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia Territorial Conference in 1941, equipped with a permanent Secretariat, was one of the first indications of the new British attitude towards the issue of closer union in British Central Africa, even though it was rationalized at the time as a wartime measure. In the words of one writer, it "provided a forum for the surreptitious airing of amalgamationist sentiment, and its principal effect was to consolidate the bonds

---

[Continued from p. xiii.]
Joint Parliamentary Committee in the 1930's and early 1940's which received support from people like Lord Hailey. See David Goldsworthy, "The Debate on a Parliamentary Committee for Colonial Affairs", Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 19, (Spring, 1966), pp. 191-207. For arguments against the idea of a Parliamentary Committee on Colonial Affairs see Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 388, 15 April, 1943, cols. 1484-1490, Colonel Oliver Stanley.

between the participating countries."[2] Even if the Territorial Conference were dismantled at the end of the war, it seemed unlikely that the Rhodesian settlers would accept anything less than what they had already gained during the war. By 1945, when the Central African Council was set up in Salisbury as a compromise arrangement in response to renewed settler demands for amalgamation, the change in British policy was almost complete. Considerations of trusteeship obligations towards the Africans in Northern Rhodesia, as well as those in Nyasaland, had now become secondary to those of the European settlers whose enterprise was deemed to be of paramount importance for the economic development of the territory and that of the Africans. After all, as The Round Table was later to point out, there were ample precedents in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia of major constitutional changes being made "without any attempt at prior consultation with local African opinion."[3]

Towards the end of the war, British colonial policy in Africa suddenly veered towards larger political groupings in order to create viable economic units to facilitate rapid economic progress and the development of better social services. It was also during this period that the Rhodesian settlers began to stress the economic benefits of closer political union in Central Africa. Up to this time amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia had been advocated exclusively for political reasons. Since 1930, the Northern Rhodesian settlers had never disguised the fact that amalgamation with the self-governing colony of Southern Rhodesia would provide a convenient way of escape from Colonial Office control.

---

[2] Philip Short, Banda, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), p. 41.

[3] Vol. 40, (1950), p. 225.

When the Labour Government came to power in Great Britain in July, 1945, it was heavily committed to a programme of reconstruction and socialist reforms. It thus found it convenient to accept the principle of closer union between the three Central African Territories so as to lighten the burden of responsibility upon itself, provided such union was not in the form of amalgamation. With the growing demand for self-government from the various parts of the colonial Empire after the end of the Second World War, Great Britain, already weakened by the war, was hardly in a position to resist the pressure of the Rhodesian settlers. Joseph Chamberlain's description of Great Britain before the members of the 1902 Imperial Conference in London as "The weary Titan [staggering] under the too vast orb of its fate" seems more appropriate to Britain's position after the Second World War than after the Anglo-Boer War.

British policy towards the white settlers in Central Africa after 1945 must, therefore, be seen in terms of the growing influence of the Rhodesian settlers and the corresponding weakness of Great Britain as an imperial power following the end of the Second World War. The view that the formation of the Central African Federation in 1953 was "Britain's last action taken in pursuit of the old imperial tradition long after that tradition had ceased to be possible"[4], is undoubtedly true. But even more than that, the Federation was an attempt by the British Government to rid itself of its self-imposed responsibility towards its African wards in much the same way, though under different circumstances, as it had done in South Africa in 1910. Under the so-called principle of partnership, Africans in the two northern Protectorates were surrendered, bound hand and foot, to a handful of white settlers. The real significance of the collapse of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963 under the pressure of African nationalism can best be appreciated when one contemplates the fate that would have befallen the Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland had the Federation been maintained long enough to have been granted dominion autonomy.

---

[4] Harry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), p. 7.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page No.

Chapter

1. AT THE POLITICAL CROSSROADS: THE TWO RHODESIAS, 1917-1929. 1

2. THE WHITE PAPER CONTROVERSY AND THE AMALGAMATION ISSUE IN NORTHERN RHODESIA 86

3. DEPRESSION POLITICS AND THE AMALGAMATION QUESTION IN NORTHERN RHODESIA 156

4. THE PROBLEM OF CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA, 1935-1939 241

5. BRITISH POLICY AND THE RHODESIA-NYASALAND REPORT. 316

6. THE AMALGAMATION ISSUE, 1940-1945 391

MAP 486

BIBLIOGRAPHY. 487

Chapter 1

AT THE POLITICAL CROSSROADS: THE TWO RHODESIAS, 1917-1929

The Zambezi River which divides Rhodesia from Zambia[1] has in recent years come to be seen as something more than just a physical boundary dividing two distinct countries. It has generally been viewed as a political barrier, a sort of Mason-Dixon line, between the area of white domination to the South and the area of black rule to the North. "There is good reason," a Southern Rhodesian settler had written in 1927 about the Zambezi River, "to think that it delimits the area in Central Africa nearest the equator which can be regarded as a white man's country in the true sense of the word...."[2] That the two Rhodesias came to develop along different lines was due to a combination of diplomatic, political and economic factors dating back from the early days of the settlement of the two countries.

---

[1] Until 1923 the two countries were separately administered by the British South Africa Company founded by Cecil Rhodes in 1889 as Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, respectively. On achieving her independence on 24 October, 1964 Northern Rhodesia was renamed Zambia, while Southern Rhodesia, after unilaterally declaring herself independent on 11 November, 1965 became known simply as Rhodesia. To avoid confusion and in conformity with official usage during the period covered by this study, the old names of countries and places which have since been changed will be used throughout the text. New names will be given alongside the old ones at the place of first reference.

[2] Ethel Tawse Jollie, "Southern Rhodesia: A White Man's Country in the Tropics", Geographical Review, (January, 1927), p. 89. Jollie, the wife, by her first marriage, of Archibald R. Colquhoun, the first Administrator of Mashonaland, was a staunch opponent of Company rule in Southern Rhodesia. Before 1923 she campaigned vigorously against the Company proposals for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias as well as against Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Union of South Africa. But by 1929 she had become one of the leading advocates of a "Greater Rhodesia".

To Cecil Rhodes, then in pursuit of his quest for an "all red" route from Cape to Cairo, the Zambezi was never regarded as a permanent boundary between the two territories. When the British South Africa Company was granted its Charter in October 1889 its field of operation to the north was left undefined. It was mainly the Company's protracted entanglement in the affairs of Mashonaland and Matabeleland from 1890 to 1898 involving heavy losses in money and manpower, and its reckless investment in Southern Rhodesia in the mistaken belief that it had found a second Rand,[3] which forced a temporary postponement of action with regard to the lands across the Zambezi. These now came to be viewed as something in the nature of a speculative venture for the future. "My plan," Rhodes wrote in 1899, "is to secure all territory before it is gone."[4] What was of immediate importance to him was that a claim had been staked on the lands beyond the Zambezi and had received official recognition from the British Government. He was, however, desirous that Northern Zambezia, which he described as "a good country", should be developed for white settlement.[5]

Although Rhodes never set foot in Northern Rhodesia, he assured the Southern Rhodesian settlers in June 1896 of the extent of the lands awaiting their possession beyond the Zambezi. "Five years hence," he said, "you will say the best of our province is north of the Zambesi

---

[3] Only in 1907 did the Company finally abandon the dream of a second Rand by placing more emphasis on large scale European farming in place of gold mining.

[4] Rhodes to Grey, 3 August, 1889, cited in John S. Galbraith, Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974), p. 204.

[5] Vindex (F. Verschoyle), Cecil Rhodes: His Political Life and Speeches 1891-1900, (London: Chapman and Hill, 1900), pp. 306-7.

River, and the country north of that river you must look on as your own."[6]

Following the conquest and occupation of Matabeleland in 1893, plans were afoot to extend across the Zambezi the Matabeleland Order-in-Council of 1894 by which Lobengula's Ndebele kingdom was brought under Company rule. Had this plan succeeded, a single administration for the Company territories on both sides of the river would have been created. The Jameson Raid, however, fouled up these plans and necessitated a different settlement under which the High Commissioner for South Africa was given supervisory powers over Company officials in Northern Rhodesia, while a Resident Commissioner was set up in Southern Rhodesia to oversee the activities of the Company and to make regular reports to the British High Commissioner in Cape Town. The Company was, however, left to administer the two territories separately.[7] "Had the Order been made applicable beyond the Zambezi," writes one historian, "the history of Northern Rhodesia might well have taken a very different course; a unified administration would probably have come into existence right from the start, and the Zambezi might not have become that political dividing line which subsequently split two territories."[8] With the opening up of

---

[6] Ibid., p. 487.

[7] L. H. Gann, The Birth of a Plural Society: The Development of Northern Rhodesia under the British South Africa Company 1894-1914, (Manchester University Press, 1958), p. 62; Claire Palley, The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965, With Special Reference to Imperial Control, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), p. 325; Robert I. Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in British East and Central Africa 1889-1953", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 2, (1963-64), p. 141.

[8] Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia Early Days to 1953, (London: Chatto Windus, 1964), p. 77.

Matabeleland to the white settlers after the fall of the Ndebele kingdom in 1893, the major part of the Company's capital and investment became tied up in the development of Southern Rhodesia where its major assets were located.[9] Northern Rhodesia, meanwhile, remained virtually a neglected estate until the late 1920's when its immense copper resources began to be appreciated by the Company. By then, however, the early pattern of uneven development between the two Rhodesias had become firmly fixed and almost inalterable.

Jameson's statement, made during his visit to the Rhodesias in 1913, that Rhodes had always "looked upon Southern Rhodesia as a community quite separate from the other Charter possessions"[10] is true only in so far as Rhodes had come to appreciate the immense difficulties involved in trying to develop the two Rhodesias as a single unit. After Rhodes' death in 1902 the Company Directors were inclined to view Northern Rhodesia mainly as a reservoir of cheap black labour and were reluctant to encourage European settlement beyond the numbers necessary to develop the mines. "I am not anxious to see (the resident white population) increased beyond just what will supply the wants of the mining population," wrote Marquis of Winchester to Roland Goode on 3 July, 1909, "I think that may be taken as the policy of the Board."[11] The Company also feared that further European settlement would mean additional expenses as it would be required to provide more money for schools, better roads and other necessary services for the settlers.[12]

---

[9] Ibid., p. 181.

[10] Speech delivered in Salisbury on 22 December, 1913. See Rhodesia Pamphlet, no. 20, 1930, p. 14. Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Library, London. Dr. Leander Starr Jameson, leader of the abortive invasion of the Transvaal in December 1895, was a close and loyal friend of Rhodes. He played a key role in the early history of Southern Rhodesia. In 1913 he became president of the British South Africa Company until his death in 1917.

[11] Cited in Peter Slinn, "The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890-1964", African Affairs, vol. 70, (October, 1971), p. 370.

Only in 1913 did Jameson begin to appreciate the importance of Northern Rhodesia. Until then, he said,

> I thought Northern Rhodesia was really a land to be developed, not populated. I acknowledge we never encouraged it. We were not anxious to spread ourselves. We concentrated on Southern Rhodesia. It was only the other day, when I crossed the Zambesi that I began to see that that policy of the past could not go on; that it was a country that was going to be populated, and not only developed.[13]

By then, however, any attempts to develop Northern Rhodesia on Southern Rhodesian lines were already doomed to failure. Southern Rhodesia, because of its relatively advanced development, had already become a haven of the white settlers. There was already a general talk of Northern Rhodesia as a "Black North", a derogatory term from the settlers' point of view, whose development it was felt should not be allowed to impede Southern Rhodesia's progress towards self-government. Indeed, the Rhodesia League manifesto of 14 November, 1912 had already issued a strong demand for the termination of Company rule over the territory as a first step towards self-government.[14]

Although a suggestion for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias in order to form a "great British community in the heart of Africa" was mooted in 1911, it was not until Jameson's visit to the Rhodesias in 1913 that the matter was vigorously pursued by the Company. In his

---

[12] S. R. Denny, "Leopold Moore Versus the Chartered Company", Part II, The Northern Rhodesia Journal, vol. IV, (1960), p. 342.

[13] Rhodesia Pamphlet, No. 20, p. 14.

[14] A. C. Raymer, Should Chartered Administration be Abolished, (Bulaway: March 2, 1914), p. 1.

Salisbury speech of December 1913, Jameson proposed the "creation of a great British State" which would be "a fitting monument to our founder, whose name our country bears." He warned the Southern Rhodesian settlers against the danger of allowing themselves to be absorbed into the Union of South Africa.

> What is going to happen to this young, vigorous Rhodesian child when it gets into the bed of that large and corpulent mother, the Union? What always happens? In this case at all events all your aspirations are going to be killed, and at the inquest next morning the verdict will be 'overlaid by the Union!'

Jameson also drew attention to the effect which South Africa's racial problems would have on Southern Rhodesia's individuality. "Your identity would disappear in the vortex of their troubles--Asiatic, native and racial," he said. The question of whether or not Southern Rhodesia would ultimately join the Union to rest in her "capacious bosom" was, in his words, "in the lap of the Gods." Before that question could be resolved, he said, South Africa would have to "right its own affairs" first and allow Southern Rhodesia to develop on her own. Nine years later, however, the Company completely reversed its stand and began to press hard "on the side of putting Rhodesia to bed with that large corpulent mother--the Union of South Africa!"[15]

Between 1915 and 1917 the question of the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias became a subject of serious discussion between the Company and the Colonial Office. The Company's amalgamation proposals were first presented in a statement issued in Salisbury in December 1915 by two Company Directors, Jameson and Dougal O. Malcolm, in the course of their barnstorming tour of the Rhodesias.[16] In their statement the two Directors outlined the advantages of a unified administration for the two Rhodesias. These included a fair representation of the Northern Rhodesian settlers in a single legislature, efficiency and economy in administration by doing away with the duplication of various posts and services, and better prospects of attracting immigrants after the war. The matter appeared urgent to the Company in view of the discussions concerning re-adjustment of political boundaries in Africa which were expected to take place at the conclusion of the war. Amalgamation, it was stated, would give the people of Rhodesia a strong voice in such discussions by enabling them to speak out as members of one community. For these reasons it was felt that the amalgamation of the two territories should "be effected without delay." The statement then went on to state that

---

[15] Tawse Jollie, The Real Rhodesia, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924), p. 65.

> Should the people of Rhodesia express themselves in favour of the proposals outlined above, the Board have no reason to doubt that His Majesty's Government would be prepared to give effect to them by means of the issue of an Order-in-Council.[17]

Since "the people of Rhodesia" in this case referred to the white Rhodesian settlers, this meant that as far as the Company was concerned the Africans were not going to be a factor in this important decision.

---

[16] See John B. Stabler, "The British South Africa Company Proposals for Amalgamation of the Rhodesias, 1915-1917: Northern Rhodesia Reaction", African Social Research, 7, (June, 1969), pp. 499-528 for an analysis of the Company proposals and the response of the Northern Rhodesian settlers to them.

[17] For the complete text of the Directors' statement see Public Record Office (hereinafter cited as P.R.O.), C.O./417/574/7706/1916, Enclosure "D".

Andrew Bonar Law, the Canadian-born British statesman who became Secretary of State for the Colonies in Asquith's Coalition Government from May 1915 to December 1916, was outraged by this statement which was obviously intended to convey the impression that the British Government had already sanctioned the proposals or were, at least, favourable towards them. He immediately protested to Jameson through Lord Buxton, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, September, 1914 to July, 1920. "When Jameson spoke to me about the matter," he telegraphed to Lord Buxton, "I did not feel I knew enough about the facts to express an opinion of my own one way or another, but he clearly understood when the question comes up it will be considered by me with a perfectly open mind."[18] When informed of Bonar Law's reaction to the statement, Jameson feigned surprise that the Secretary of State should have found it necessary to cable about the wording of the statement since all that had been intended was merely to convey the Directors' view "of the probable attitude of His Majesty's Government in the event of public opinion in Rhodesia being favourable to our proposals." They had not, he said, intended to commit the British Government in advance.[19] To Bonar Law such methods of conducting business seemed rather unorthodox, but to Jameson, with his long experience in the service of the Company dating back to his dealings with Lobengula, they had become a standard way by which the Company had been able to achieve most of its objectives. It was precisely by such methods that Rhodes had obtained the Rudd Concession and the Charter, the two main instruments in the Company's acquisition of Rhodesia.

---

[18] Law to Buxton, 31 December, 1915. Ibid.

[19] Jameson to Buxton, 15 January, 1916. Ibid.

If the Secretary of State had not yet made up his mind as to what policy to adopt towards the question of the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias, Lord Buxton seized this opportunity to offer him his personal advice on the matter. Now that the impression had obviously been created in Rhodesia, as a result of the Directors' statement, that the British Government were sympathetic to the Company's amalgamation proposals, Lord Buxton advised the Secretary of State to issue a pronouncement indicating the British Government's willingness, subject to due considerations of imperial policy and final approval by the people of Rhodesia, to give the proposals their favourable consideration once all the necessary details had been worked out. According to him, "such a statement should be worded so as to avoid any appearance of imputing to the directors any ulterior motive," since they had, in his view, "acted in good faith."[20] Lord Buxton was, of course, agreeable to the Company's amalgamation proposals and was now trying hard to commit the Secretary of State to his view. As he further explained to Law, he could see no reason why any objection should be raised to the Company's suggestion that a draft Order-in-Council should be drawn up and be placed before the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council for their consideration.[21] Unfortunately, there is no reference to this suggestion in Law's reply to this communication.[22]

---

[20] Buxton to Law, 26 January, 1916. Ibid.

[21] Ibid.

[22] See Law to Buxton, 27 January, 1916. Ibid.

In Southern Rhodesia, meanwhile, public response to the Company's proposals was very cool as both Jameson and Malcolm soon discovered. Jameson found the Southern Rhodesian settlers "mainly apathetic" although he was quick to point out that this was largely due to their pre-occupation with the war. He was, nevertheless, confident that "the bulk of the reasonable people" would find the idea of a united Rhodesia an attractive one even though it "won't put anything directly in their pockets".[23] In Northern Rhodesia they found a more lively interest in the issue of amalgamation among the traders, the civil servants and the farmers in the Livingstone area most of whom were anxiously concerned about the security of their positions under the proposed scheme. The two Directors were, however, doubtful whether those who spoke the loudest against their proposals could truly be regarded as representative of Northern Rhodesian opinion in view of the fact that there were as yet no representative institutions in the territory by which the general views of the settlers could be ascertained. In fact, outside the Livingstone district there were several farmers who were in favour of amalgamation.[24] Among the anti-amalgamationist leaders in Northern Rhodesia were two Livingstone residents, Leopold F. Moore, a local chemist and owner of the only newspaper in the territory, the Livingstone Mail, founded in 1906, and A. A. Willis, a local attorney, whom Jameson described as the main figures who had "for years past played the agreeable role of Village Hampden."[25] What Moore wanted most was representative government or, at least, being rid of the Company.

---

[23] Jameson to Buxton, 15 January, 1916. Ibid.

[24] Denny, op. cit., p. 338.

[25] Jameson to Buxton, 15 January, 1916. P.R.O./417/574/7706/1916.

Malcolm, however, was convinced that although the commercial interests would, "on pocket grounds" oppose amalgamation, the majority of the farmers were likely to support it since they stood to gain from the movement of their stock into Southern Rhodesia. But the greatest advantage which the Northern Rhodesian settlers would, in his view, derive from amalgamation would be direct representation in the combined legislature of the two territories. He was confident that the Company would be generous enough to give them three representatives instead of the two to which they would normally be entitled on the basis of their number.[26]

Throughout the period of its administration, the Company resolutely refused to entertain any representations to grant a separate Legislative Council to the Northern Rhodesian settlers. As Malcolm explained a year later to H. C. M. Lambert, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, this was simply "impossible since the responsibility for the administration of the territory rests with us, and we cannot share the responsibility or the power necessary to discharge it with any one else." The Company's policy, he said, was to bring about the amalgamation of the two territories which would automatically give Northern Rhodesia "its fair share of representation in a Legislative Council for the whole territory." In the Company's view it seemed rather "absurd" to try and set up a "Little White Parliament" for such a vast territory whose small white population was scattered over wide distances. The establishment of such an expensive machinery seemed rather unnecessary.[27]

---

[26] "Memorandum of conversations between Lord Buxton and D. O. Malcolm", 22 January, 1916. Ibid. Enclosure "C".

As in the case of Southern Rhodesia, Jameson was convinced that the sentimental attraction of the idea of a "Greater Rhodesia" would in the end melt away the Northern Rhodesian opposition to amalgamation. "This idea," he assured Lord Buxton, "takes time to grow but I believe it is taking root among the people."[28] Undeterred by this lack of enthusiasm among the Rhodesian settlers, the Company decided to press forward with its proposals. After several delays a "Draft scheme of administration under the proposals for amalgamation of the territories of Southern and Northern Rhodesia" was introduced in the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council and debated from 25 to 30 April, 1917. Although nine of the fifteen members of the Council gave their support to the proposals, the Company decided to withdraw the measure in view of the fact that only three of those who voted in favour of the scheme had been elected by the Rhodesian voters, the rest were Company nominees. The Company rightly took this as a defeat of its proposals.[29]

Drummond Chaplin, the Company Administrator in Southern Rhodesia at the time, took the defeat rather personally in spite of Jameson's assurance that he was not really to blame for the outcome. Chaplin, in fact, blamed both the Elected Members of the Legislative Council and Walter Long, Bonar Law's successor in the Colonial Office, December 1916 to

---

[27] Malcolm to Lambert, 25 January, 1917. P.R.O./C.O./417/577/51421/1916.

[28] Jameson to Buxton, 15 January, 1916. P.R.O./C.O./417/574/7706/1916.

[29] Stabler, op. cit., p. 521.

January 1919, for the defeat of the Company proposals. "The elected members and the Colonial Office between them," he wrote in January 1918, "have blocked our amalgamation scheme, which would have given us more scope. Walter Long has been weak about it, though complimentary to myself."[30] Chaplin never forgave Long for his failure to support the Company proposals. He was convinced, of course, that if the Colonial Office had come out positively in favour of the scheme instead of maintaining a position of benevolent neutrality, the outcome might have been different.

Long, in fact, was quite sympathetic towards the Company's proposals but his position was not an easy one. And as he apologetically explained to Chaplin in December 1917, it had not been a very pleasant task for him to turn down the Company's amalgamation proposals.

> I have a great regard for some of the Directors of the British South Africa Company and of course for yourself; and therefore I would most gladly have agreed to the proposals which were supported by all of you. But my position is this--I cannot ignore the fact that, whether for good or for evil, you have an elective body in Southern Rhodesia. Once you allow a country to elect representatives, it is impossible in my judgement for H. M. Government to ignore the opinions of the elected members or to go in direct opposition to the majority of them. I am confident that to do this would land any Secretary of State in grave difficulties, would impose upon him responsibilities which would I think be impossible for him to bear, and--I cannot help thinking--would create difficulties for the people responsible for government which might be of the most formidable kind.[31]

---

[30] Cited in B. K. Long, Drummond Chaplin, His Life and Times in Africa, (Oxford University Press, 1941), p. 261.

[31] Cited in Long, op. cit., pp. 216-7. It is interesting to note that both Long and his immediate predecessor, Law, were Conservatives.

The fact that Long's letter was written some eight months after the Legislative Council debate would seem to indicate that the Company must have continued to exert pressure on the Secretary of State to sanction amalgamation against the expressed wishes of the Elected Members.[32]

The reasons for the rejection of amalgamation by the Elected Members of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council are not far to seek. The ultimate goal upon which their eyes were already riveted in 1917 was responsible government. "We must keep the goal of responsible government before our eyes," pointed out Tawse Jollie in 1916, "and let the B.S.A. Co. and imperial authorities know that we do so. The time may not yet be--I believe, is not--ripe, but we cannot afford even for a moment to lose sight of the destiny which is our birthright as a British people."[33] Northern Rhodesia, with her sparse settler population and lack of taxable assets, was generally viewed as a territory which was destined to be administered as a tropical dependency. Any attempt to develop her as a "white man's country", it was feared, would involve heavy debt for Southern Rhodesia which would have to be met before responsible government could be attained. Besides, it was generally agreed that the interests of the two territories were fundamentally divergent. Northern Rhodesia's affinities, said Jollie, were with countries "which have no prospect at the moment of self-government."[34]

There was also the fear, often mixed with contempt, of the "Black

---

[32] Stabler, op. cit., p. 522.

[33] Bulawayo Chronicle, 1 September, 1916.

[34] See her letter to the editor of the Rhodesia Herald, 22 December, 1916.

North" which was expressed by Sir Charles Coghlan, the future Premier of Southern Rhodesia, when he complained that Southern Rhodesians were "being asked to take in that black country, full of black men, on terms of equality with white people...."[35] Lastly, the Company's argument that amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia would hasten Southern Rhodesia's attainment of self-government was dismissed by Jollie as hypocritical.

> We are told that we cannot hope for responsible government while our numbers are so disproportionate to the responsibilities involved. And then we are asked to double these responsibilities, and to make haste or our chance may be gone. Who can blame us if we suspect a Trojan gift?[36]

It was considerations like these that led to the rejection of the Company's proposals in 1917, and it is doubtful whether the views of the Colonial Office, even if they had been favourable to the scheme, would have made the outcome any different.

Although the defeat of the Company's amalgamation proposals in 1917 was entirely due to a decision made by the Elected Members of the Southern Rhodesian Legislature, the views of the Colonial Office, though never made public, warrant a close examination since they broadly represent a position which the British Government was to maintain on the question of amalgamation until the outbreak of the Second World War. Despite the Colonial Office policy of outward neutrality, its views, as reflected in its confidential files and in the private correspondence with the British High Commissioner in South Africa, belie the general impression which was current in Rhodesia at the time that British authorities were favourably disposed towards the Company's amalgamation proposals, a view which has even been endorsed by one modern historian.[37]

---

[35] Cited in Denny, op. cit., p. 335.

[36] Rhodesia Herald, 8 October, 1916.

From the time of the publication of the Directors' proposals towards the end of 1915, the Colonial Office showed no enthusiasm for the scheme. It saw no justification for raising the issue at this rather awkward time when everyone's attention was directed towards the prosecution of the war. Until the fate of German East Africa had been settled, it was considered premature to bring up the question of the amalgamation of the Rhodesias as this might tamper with the existing arrangement and, at the same time, hinder British negotiators concerning post-war territorial arrangements. "I hope the Co. will be firmly told that the proposal is premature and that nothing must be done to prejudice or hamper in any way a settlement of the whole of East and Central Africa when peace comes,"[38] minuted Sir George Fiddes, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1916-1921. The Company's main argument that the war had made amalgamation an urgent matter was dismissed as "vague and inconclusive". The real reason behind the Company proposals, he averred, was that the Directors, with an obvious eye on their shareholders, wanted amalgamation "as a means of preserving and strengthening their control, and preventing the possibility of an absorption of S. Rhodesia into the Union."[39]

---

[37] Rotberg, op. cit., p. 142.

[38] Minute of 26 February, 1916. P.R.O./C.O./417/574/7706/1916. According to Gann, Fiddes "was not a particular admirer of the Company," an attitude which he says was "fairly typical of the permanent staff of the Colonial Office as a whole, which was now much less friendly towards the Chartered Company than in the early days." A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 178.

[39] Fiddes' minute of 26 February, 1916. P.R.O./C.O./417/574/7706/1916.

There was also a growing feeling within the Colonial Office which became more pronounced after 1917 as Southern Rhodesians began to clamour for self-government, that Northern Rhodesia was destined to develop along different lines from her southern neighbour. Southern Rhodesia was viewed as a "white man's country", while Northern Rhodesia did not seem likely to be one. "It is vastly a native territory from which a large part of the labour supply for the mines & farms of S. Rhodesia is drawn...."[40] The main concern of the Colonial Office was that under amalgamation all the control of legislation and administration affecting Northern Rhodesian Africans would inevitably pass into the hands of the Southern Rhodesian legislature whose members were generally thought to be unequal to such responsibility. "What evidence has been produced or can be provided that that body is fit to be entrusted with the responsibility for the large native areas?" Although the question of consulting African opinion was considered to be out of question, it was felt that the Colonial Office was their "protector" and was thus "under obligation to see that any change in the administration does not badly affect them."[41]

The general impression that the Colonial Office was in favour of the union of the two Rhodesias, however, remained a source of inspiration to the few in Southern Rhodesia who wanted to see the two territories amalgamated. In response to the Elected Members' resolution of 15 July, 1916 calling upon the Company to defer the question of amalgamation until the end of the war, the Rhodesia Herald assured its readers that the mere fact that Bonar Law was favourable to the union of the two Rhodesias ought to be accepted as a clear indication that "in the view of the experts of the Colonial Office the permanent interests of the settlers of Southern Rhodesia" were not going to be prejudiced by the Directors' proposals.[42] This erroneous impression regarding the attitude of the Colonial Office towards the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias was further strengthened by the utterances of Lord Buxton during his well-publicised tour of the Company territories in June 1916, just at the time when the subject of amalgamation had already become a topic of public discussion among the Rhodesian settlers.

---

[40] Ibid.

[41] Ibid.

Speaking at Bulawayo on 4 June, 1916, Lord Buxton declared that

> after careful consideration of the matter by the Secretary of State, it does not appear to him or to me that any Imperial interest is affected by the [Company] proposals, by which I mean that no Imperial interest would be affected by amalgamation on the one hand, nor, on the other hand, by leaving matters as they are. And I may say at once that the Imperial decision on the matter will be dependent on the decision of the people of Rhodesia themselves, so far as it can be ascertained.

If the Rhodesian people desired amalgamation, he went on, the British Government would not stand in the way, and neither would amalgamation be imposed upon Rhodesians should they express themselves against it.[43] In a subsequent address to the residents of Livingstone delivered on June 28, he made it clear that the views of the Northern Rhodesian settlers on this matter would be subordinated to those of Southern Rhodesia. "In my speech at Livingstone," he wrote to Bonar Law regarding his Rhodesian tour,

---

[42] 18 July, 1916.

[43] Bulawayo Chronicle, 9 June, 1916.

> I made it clear that the settlers in Northern Rhodesia, even if their views generally were opposed to Amalgamation, must not expect those views to prevail against a strong expression of opinion in Southern Rhodesia in favour of it, although of course representations from any sections of the community in the North and South would be carefully considered by the Imperial Government before their sanction was given to the scheme.[44]

Buxton was obviously willing to sacrifice not only the interests of the Africans to the altar of the British South Africa Company, but also those of the Northern Rhodesian settlers as well.

There is no clear indication as to why the High Commissioner chose to make a pronouncement on so controversial a subject without any prior consultation with the Secretary of State, for it is evident from the confidential files of the Colonial Office that there had been no "careful consideration of the matter by the Secretary of State," as Lord Buxton claimed in his Bulawayo speech. In fact, the Colonial Office first learned of his pronouncement from a Times article of 8 August, 1916--Lord Buxton's own account of his Rhodesian tour was sent to the Secretary of State in two despatches dated 18 and 19, July 1916.[45]

The immediate reaction of the Colonial Office to the High Commissioner's statement was one of astonishment. "I do not find either in the Confl fls or in the private letter attached," minuted H. C. Lambert, "any justification for Lord Buxton's alleged statement that the Imperial decision will be dependent on the people of Rhodesia." He pointed out that such a statement would be hard to justify before the House of Commons since the so-called "people" of Rhodesia consisted of a mere handful of about 30,000 white settlers in Southern Rhodesia and less than 3,000 in Northern Rhodesia against 1 1/2 million Africans, half of whom lived in the latter territory.[46] It was generally felt that "by blessing or seeming to bless" the Company proposals, Lord Buxton had gone much further than any communication from the Secretary of State seemed to warrant. As already pointed out, following the publication of the Company proposals in December, 1915, Lord Buxton had advised Bonar Law to issue an authoritative pronouncement indicating his willingness to favourably consider the amalgamation proposals but Law made no reference to this suggestion in his reply. It is, therefore, likely that the High Commissioner may have taken the Secretary of State's silence to mean consent.

---

[44] Buxton to Law, 19 July, 1916. P.R.O./C.O./417/576/37180/1916.

[45] Desp No. 478 and 483. P.R.O./C.O./417/576/37175/1916.

The most objectionable part of Lord Buxton's statement from the Colonial Office's point of view was the implication that the fate of the African inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia was going to be decided purely on the basis of the views of a handful of Rhodesian settlers. As Lambert pointed out,

> The people of S. Rhodesia, although we have given them Elective Institutions, have never been considered fit to have Responsible Govt, largely because 3/4 million blacks cannot be handed over to 30,000 whites. How then can the destiny of more than another 3/4 million be left by HMG to the small white minority to settle? If HMG were really to disclaim responsibility & trouble were to follow they could not claim as they did in 1906-7 in case of Natal that Ministers were responsible. For in Rhodesia nobody else, not the Leg. Council or BSACo. but the H.C. & HMG are ultimately responsible.[47]

The question posed in Lambert's minute in fact was to remain a crucial one in the consideration of British Government's policy towards the whole question of closer union between the two Rhodesias during the Inter-War period.

---

[46] P.R.O./C.O./417/577/37512/1916.

[47] Minute of 11 August, 1916. P.R.O./C.O./417/577/37512/1916.

The arrival of Lord Buxton's two despatches giving full details of his Rhodesian tour deepened the Colonial Office's concern about the possible effect of the High Commissioner's speeches. Lambert was now convinced that the matter could no longer be hushed over with a private letter as had originally been contemplated. He suggested a despatch which could later be expanded in a private letter "demurring to the statement in the despatch." As he pointed out, "we can hardly leave on official record (which may someday have to be published if amalgamation goes thro') such a complete abdication by H.C. & S. of S."[48] What seemed to make the High Commissioner's speech even worse was the view that "if the white minority (say 3,000) in N. Rh object, they must expect to be overruled, apparently assuming either that the black 3/4 million will be overruled (which is already frightened) or do not matter."[49]

In his reply, Bonar Law politely informed Lord Buxton that while it was true that the opinion of the people of Rhodesia must certainly weigh heavily in the balance in the ultimate decision on the matter, the High Commissioner and the Secretary of State could not "in view of the existence of a very large unrepresented native population be guided entirely by this opinion."[50] Lord Buxton was not, however, quite satisfied with this pronouncement and, as he later pointed out to Walter Long, Law's successor at the Colonial Office, he could see no objection to the Company's amalgamation scheme "from the point of view of the natives either in Southern or in Northern Rhodesia."[51] Nevertheless, he asked the Secretary of State to furnish him, for his own personal guidance, with a note of the views of the Colonial Office regarding the question of native policy which, "even if the weight of European opinion were decidedly in favour of Amalgamation, would be affected by Amalgamation and would require to be considered by His Majesty's Government before they consented to the scheme."[52] In his reply,[53] based almost word for word on Lambert's minute of 28 January, 1917,[54] Long set out the main reasons why the Colonial Office considered it injudicious to sanction the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. His letter is of special importance in view of the position which the British Government was to maintain on this issue until it finally caved in to the inexorable pressure of the white settlers after the end of the Second World War.

---

[48] Minute of 23 August, 1916. P.R.O./C.O./417/576/37180/1916.

[49] *Ibid*.

[50] Law to Buxton, 31 August, 1916. *Ibid*.

Long's appraisal of the Colonial Office's stand on the matter was based on three main considerations. Firstly, Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia were, geographically and historically, two distinct units which even the Company had found it necessary to administer separately. He pointed to the lack of an adequate system of communication between the two territories, other than a single railway line across the Victoria Falls, which seemed to render government from a single point practically impossible. Secondly, there was the paucity of the settled European community in Northern Rhodesia, coupled with the overwhelming preponderance of the African inhabitants, which appeared to indicate a Crown Colony form of government for the territory. A similar view had already been expressed by Jollie in December 1916, but in less flattering terms, when she pointed out that

---

[51] Buxton to Long, 22 December, 1916. P.R.O./C.O./417/579/2861/1916/1917.

[52] _Ibid_.

[53] Long to Buxton, 27 February, 1917. _Ibid_.

[54] _Ibid_.

> The geographical and other affinities of Northern Rhodesia are with countries which have no prospect at the moment of self-government, and present fundamental, racial, climatic and other differences from the countries south of the Zambesi.[55]

Amalgamation, in Long's view, would only mean the extension "to this large native area" of a system of government prevailing in Southern Rhodesia where the Executive was numerically in the minority. And as Lambert had observed in his January minute, no constitution was as difficult to work as one in which the Executive was in a permanent minority in the Legislature, adding that there were numerous examples of this throughout the Empire. He referred specifically to the turbulent history of Natal before the grant of responsible government in 1893 as the case in point.

An even more frightening experience out of the history of Natal than the perennial constitutional deadlocks of the 1880's was the 1906 Zulu rebellion[56] which, according to Long, furnished a clear illustration of "the inherent danger of entrusting to a small white minority the control of a large native population." In the event of a similar conflict occurring in Rhodesia, he said, the position would be even more difficult than was the case in Natal. There the British Government, as Lambert had stated in his minute, "would not be able to shelter behind Responsible Ministers," as they had done in Natal. Moreover, as the Legislative Council in Southern Rhodesia continued to grow in power--as it inevitably would, a situation might conceivably arise where the Elected Members might attempt to force upon the British Government a native policy which was entirely unacceptable to them. In that case the British Government would find itself faced with a difficult choice of having either to yield and accept the consequences, or of refusing to yield and thus precipitate a constitutional crisis.

---

[55] Rhodesia Herald, 22 December, 1916.

[56] For a detailed and scholarly study of the Zulu rebellion see Shula Marks, Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970).

The third consideration which appeared to rule out any possibility of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias was bound up with the big question concerning the ultimate destiny of the two territories. Southern Rhodesia, Long pointed out, would in the course of time attain self-government and might then decide to join the Union of South Africa. Northern Rhodesia, on the other hand, with her sparse settler population--Long saw no likelihood that this situation would ever change--seemed destined to remain "a native territory." To bind her to Southern Rhodesia did not, therefore, appear to be a prudent step. "Is it not unnecessarily mortgaging her future," Lambert had asked in his January minute, "to tie her up with S. Rhodesia?" It is interesting to note here that what was being contemplated by the Colonial Office was not just a line of division between the area of responsible government to the south, and the area of Crown Colony rule to the north, but also the area of white supremacy and that of black rule even though the logic of the latter development was hardly discerned or discernible at the time. In outlining the Colonial Office position on the question of amalgamation Long was, however, careful to point out to Lord Buxton that this did not necessarily mean that he would in all circumstances be opposed to the Company proposals, but merely wished to indicate the existing difficulties against which he could find little to offset except a saving for the Company. In fact, A. D. Steel-Maitland, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies from May 1915 to September 1917, saw the amalgamation proposals as nothing but a sly manoeuvre on the part of the Company to prolong its rule over the Rhodesias[57] by cutting down its administrative deficits through a unified system of government.

The rejection of the Company proposals by the Elected Members of the Southern Rhodesian Legislative Council relieved the Colonial Office of the necessity of having to state publicly its own stand on the issue. This, however, left uncorrected the general impression created on the Rhodesian public by the Directors' Statement of December 1915 and, more particularly, by Lord Buxton's utterances during his Rhodesian tour of June 1916, that the Colonial Office was favourably disposed towards the Company proposals for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias. Thus in his interview with Sir E. J. Harding, Permanent Under-Secretary of State in the Dominions Office, on 20 March 1931, J. W. Downie, the Rhodesian High Commissioner in London at the time, referred to Lord Buxton's declaration of 1916 as having been made "on instructions from home."[58] Similarly, when in December 1935, the Bulawayo Chronicle published excerpts from Lord

---

[57] Minute of 31 January, 1917. P.R.O./C.O./417/579/2861/1916/1917.

[58] "Note of talk between Harding and Mr. Downie ... on 20/3/31". P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/21/1931.

Buxton's statement, Sir Hubert Young, then Governor of Northern Rhodesia, appears to have accepted the view that the British Government had in fact committed itself in 1916 to the view that the question of amalgamation was entirely dependent on the wishes of the Rhodesian settlers.[59]

After 1917 amalgamation as a political issue was replaced by the more immediate question concerning the future of Company rule over the two territories and, as far as Southern Rhodesian settlers were concerned, the choice between self-government and union with South Africa became the main topic of discussion. The ruling by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in July, 1918 on the dispute concerning the ownership of the unalienated lands in Southern Rhodesia in favour of the Crown made the Company more eager to be relieved of the burden of administering the territory now that it had been deprived of its major asset in Southern Rhodesia.[60] It now began to push for the entry of Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa where it felt its financial interests would be better taken care of under Botha and Smuts than under a government of farmers and "bush' politicians in Southern Rhodesia. At the same time the Company now completely abandoned its goal of an amalgamation between the two Rhodesias--unless it were immediately followed by entry into the Union. "I am very doubtful as to amalgamation," wrote Philip Lyttleton Gell, the Company's President at the time, "because we do not wish our mineral, land and railway assets (in N.R.) to pass under the control of the Southern Rhodesia Legislature."[61]

---

[59] Young to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 15 January, 1936. P.R.O./C.O./795/82/45104/1936.

[60] For a discussion of the Privy Council decision from the Company's point of view see Long, op. cit., pp. 230-245.

[61] Gell to Malcolm, 5 January, 1920. Cited in Slinn, op. cit., p. 369. See also Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 85.

The Company's plan for Northern Rhodesia was embodied in a memorandum prepared by Malcolm which was submitted to the Buxton Committee appointed in March 1920 to determine the feasibility of responsible government for Southern Rhodesia and to advise on the future of Northern Rhodesia in the event of Company rule being terminated. The "Malcolm Plan", as this scheme came to be known, envisaged a complete dissolution of Northern Rhodesia as a separate entity by means of a three-way partition, which, to borrow Ian Henderson's expression in reference to a similar scheme proposed by Sir Hilton Young in 1929, would have created out of the territory something resembling "a medieval bishopric".[62] The central portion traversed by the railway line comprising the mining area, the Livingstone district and the area east of the Kafue River, was to be merged with Southern Rhodesia. The northern section lying between the Belgian Congo (Zaire) and Nyasaland (Malawi) was to be placed under the Imperial Government and administered as part of Nyasaland, while the western section comprising the Barotse and Kasempa districts and the area west of the Kafue was to form a "native territory," or "a sort of Basutoland" (Lesotho) which was to be administered as part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate.[63]

The Buxton Committee, however, found itself unable to express any opinion on this proposal other than to record the view that Northern Rhodesia had no essential homogeneity, either in population, geographical features or history. In its view there were large questions of policy involved in the Company's proposal and until the financial position of the territory had been considered and the views of the settlers ascertained, no advantage would be gained by considering these issues at this juncture.[64] However, in his despatch to the British High Commissioner in South Africa, dated 22 December 1921, Winston Churchill, Secretary of State for the Colonies, February 1921 to October 1922, pointed out that if in the event of the grant of responsible government to Southern Rhodesia it became desirable to include the railway area of Northern Rhodesia and the Tati district in the Bechuanaland Protectorate, this could be done under the Colonial Boundaries Act without the necessity of a special provision in the Letters Patent.[65] No immediate action, however, was taken on this suggestion and it was left to the new Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir H. J. Stanley, to report on the possible partition of the territory as soon as he had had time to familiarise himself with the situation. It was not until 1 June, 1927 that the Governor was able to submit his views to the Colonial Office on the matter,[66] but by then a number of important developments had already taken place which made it necessary to review the whole question of the future relations between the two Rhodesias from an entirely new perspective.

---

[62] "Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1953: A Study in the Limits of Colonial Power", Ph. D. thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1972, p. 79.

[63] See P.R.O./C.O./795/11/X4586/1926; Gann, op. cit., p. 187.

---

[64] Cmd. 1471. South Africa. Second Report of the Committee appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to consider certain questions relating to Rhodesia. August 1921, p. 3.

[65] Cmd. 1573. Southern Rhodesia. Despatch to the High Commissioner for South Africa Transmitting Draft Letters Patent providing for the constitution of Responsible Government in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, and other draft Instructions connected therewith. January, 1922, p. 5.

[66] See his confidential "Memorandum" in P.R.O./C.O./795/40/35663/1930.

One of these developments was the Southern Rhodesian referendum[67] of 27 October, 1922 in which the Rhodesian settlers turned down by a margin of 8,744 to 5,989 votes what was considered by most accounts to be an attractive offer by General Smuts to the territory to enter the Union as a fifth province.[68] As a result of the referendum vote Southern Rhodesians opted for responsible government. Although there was some skepticism in some quarters at the time about the finality and even the sanity of this decision, the verdict of 1922, as later events were to show, was both decisive and irreversible in its effects on the relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, on the one hand, and between Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia, on the other.

As far as South Africa was concerned, the Southern Rhodesian referendum marked an end to her aspirations to expand northwards across the Limpopo River.[69] Since the creation of the Union of South Africa in 1910 there had always been a strongly held belief that it was the "manifest destiny" of South Africa to expand northwards to form a "Greater South Africa" in much the same way as the original Thirteen American Colonies or the Canadian provinces had expanded westwards. In Smuts' view this "Greater South Africa" was to comprise "any part of the continent of Africa south of the Equator."[70] Besides the incorporation of the three High Commission Territories, Swaziland, Basutoland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate, the first major step in this expansion was considered to be the incorporation of Southern Rhodesia.

---

[67] For an analysis of the referendum see J. D. C. Drew, "The Four Southern Rhodesia Referendums: Their Organization and Social and Political Background", The National Archives of Rhodesia and Nyasaland Occasional Papers, no. 1, (June, 1963), pp. 42-57; Hugh Wyndam, "The Rhodesian Referendum", The Empire Review, vol. 37, (January 1923), pp. 46-54, and M. A. G. Davies, Incorporation in the Union of South Africa or Self-Government: Southern Rhodesia's Choice, 1922, C. 58, Pretoria: Communications of the University of South Africa, 1965.

[68] For Smuts' terms see The Round Table, vol. 12, (1921-22), pp. 910-11. The offer of 10 seats in the House of Assembly to Southern Rhodesia was viewed by the Executive of the Nationalist Party as both excessive and unfair to the four Union provinces conveniently forgetting that in 1910 the Orange Free State had been given 17 seats which was far in excess of what she was normally entitled to on the strict basis of her population. See The Times, 12 August, 1922. In her book, The Real Rhodesia, published in 1924, Tawse Jollie dismisses Smuts' offer as "a very ingenious piece of window-dressing". In her view "Rhodesians were practically invited to enter the Union as party spoils" for the benefit of Smuts and his South African Party.

[69] The whole question of South Africa's failure to extend her boundaries since 1910 is discussed in Ronald Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion 1908-1948, (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972).

It was in anticipation of these developments that Section 150 of the South Africa Act, 1909, had made provision for later admission into the Union of South Africa of "the territories administered by the British South Africa Company," while Section 151 made a similar provision for a later transfer to the South African Government of the territories "belonging to or under the protection of His Majesty, and inhabited wholly or in part by natives...."[71] but in 1910 Southern Rhodesia accepted only a customs union with Scuth Africa.

The Company's attitude towards the Union was one of wait-and-see, a position with which Coghlan was in entire agreement. Although he returned from the National Convention with a firm conviction that Southern Rhodesia's destiny lay in the Union, he was not too happy with the South African Constitution, particularly its over-centralization. He wished the Provincial Councils could have been given more power and jurisdiction.[72] Drummond Chaplin, the future Administrator of Southern Rhodesia who was then a member of the Transvaal Legislature, expressed himself in full agreement with the Company's standpoint. As he pointed out to H. A. Gwynne, editor of the London Standard, "it would be disastrous" to bring in Southern Rhodesia into the Union at present.

---

[70] *Ibid.*, p. 26.

[71] For the text of the South Africa Act see the Appendix in Edgar H. Walton, *The Inner History of the National Convention of South Africa*, (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912), p. 11.

> It is the only British community left: it is surely if slowly going ahead: and to sacrifice its individuality and its possibilities as a British make-weight until we see how unification is going to work and how far the policy of the unified Boer Government is consistent with Imperial interests would be, in my opinion, an act of almost incredible folly.[73]

The turn of political events in South Africa after 1910 soon made all hopes for an early Rhodesian entry into the Union rather dim. The breach between Botha and Hertzog in 1912 over the question of South Africa's relations with the Empire had a traumatic effect on Southern Rhodesians, most of whom prided themselves on their loyalty to the Crown. This created an unfavourable political climate for a possible early entry of Southern Rhodesia into the Union. There were, of course, other factors such as the question of bilingualism, which made the prospect of Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Union very bleak indeed. By March 1913 Lewis Harcourt, Secretary of State for the Colonies from November 1910 to May 1915, gloomily pointed to a growing reluctance on the part of Southern Rhodesians to join the Union. "It is obvious that they cannot have full responsible government," he observed, "and though one would imagine that Union was their proper ultimate objective they do not seem to be inclined to that for the moment."[74]

---

[72] J. P. R. Wallis, One Man's Hand: The Story of Sir Charles Coghlan and the Liberation of Southern Rhodesia, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1950), p. 106.

[73] Long, op. cit., pp. 149-50.

The second and perhaps the most important development that ultimately turned the scales against Southern Rhodesia's possible entry into the Union prior to the 1922 referendum was the dramatic growth of Afrikaner nationalism as reflected in the gains made by the Nationalist Party in the general elections of March 1920 and February 1921. In 1920 the Nationalists won 44 seats in the Assembly and the South African Party, with the help of 3 Independents, gained the same number, and Smuts was only able to form a Government with the support of the Unionist Party which had won 25 seats. Although in 1921 Smuts and the South African Party--now enlarged by the absorption of the Unionist Party--won an overall majority of 22 seats in the Assembly, the Nationalists successfully held their own ground by winning the same number of seats that they had at the time of dissolution.[75] From the results of these two general elections it became evident to the Southern Rhodesian settlers of British stock that Afrikanerdom was on the march and that Smuts' victory in 1921 had merely temporarily arrested its progress; it had not repulsed it.

In the wake of the 1920 general elections in South Africa Lord Milner, Secretary of State for the Colonies from January 1919 to February 1921, confided his bitter disappointment with the turn of political events in the Union, in so far as the future of Southern Rhodesia was concerned, to Lord Buxton:

---

[74] Cited in Hyam, op. cit., p. 49.

[75] See Eric A. Walker, A History of Southern Africa, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 3rd ed., 1957), pp. 572-3; The Round Table, vol. 10, (1919-20), pp. 684-5 and vol. II, (1920-21), p. 699.

> I was hoping to see her join the Union at an early date.... Now it seems to me that the possibility of her doing so has become more remote. Smuts, with a strong majority, would have made her tempting offers. Now he is not in a position to do so, and nobody else is likely to try. Nor will Rhodesians, unless I am greatly mistaken, ever join the Union as long as there is a danger of Separation gaining the upper hand.[76]

In fact, the Southern Rhodesian general elections of April, 1920 which followed closely upon those in South Africa saw an overwhelming defeat of the Unionist party. Out of the thirteen members returned to the Legislative Council, eleven were pledged to support the demand for responsible government under the leadership of Sir Charles Coghlan.[77]

To H. J. Stanley, the Imperial Secretary in South Africa at the time and a man who was later to play an influential role in the movement for closer union between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, the outcome of the Southern Rhodesian general election was equally significant regarding his own views concerning the territory's political destiny. As he pointed out in his memorandum of 21 July, 1920 submitted to the Colonial Office,

> Of the possible alternatives, incorporation in the Union of South Africa, although possibly the ultimate destiny of the Territory, is not an immediately practicable policy. There is no prospect at present of seeing the consent of the electorate or of its representatives to any proposal for entry into the Union, and His Majesty's Government are pledged not to force the people into the Union against their will.

Although incorporation into the Union would undoubtedly be the best solution from the point of view of Imperial interest, he felt that public opinion in Southern Rhodesia, as demonstrated by the last election, was "decisive against Union as it is against the continuation of Chartered rule." In his view the only sound alternative left was representative government or responsible government.

---

[76] 26 April, 1920. Cited in Hyam, op. cit., p. 54.

[77] F. M. G. Willson, ed., Source Book of Parliamentary Elections and Referenda 1898-1962, (Department of Government, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963), pp. 111-4; Long, op. cit., pp. 256-7; The Round Table, vol. 11, (1920-21), p. 702.

> I am one of those who for some time past have held that the best solution in the interests of the Territory would be the institution of Representative Government under the Crown as a step either to full Responsible Government or to entry into the Union, or both, and as an abstract proposition I adhere to that view....

Southern Rhodesians, he said, had a record of loyalty "second to none within the Possessions and Protectorates of the Crown," and were, therefore, worthy of the confidence of His Majesty's Government. He was certain that they would "not abuse that confidence if the control of their affairs were placed in their own hands."[78]

Viewed against these developments, the outcome of the 1922 referendum may perhaps be regarded as not entirely unexpected and it would be extremely hard to cavil at the settlers' decision to reject Smuts' offer, given the political climate prevailing in the Union at the time. Smuts did not help his own cause by his rather unwise decision to come to Southern Rhodesia from 5th to 18th August 1922. In spite of his protestation that his visit was non-political, his presence in Southern Rhodesia while the referendum campaign was in progress damaged the pro-unionist cause as it seemed to suggest outside interference.[79]

---

[78] "Memorandum. The Constitutional Question in Southern Rhodesia", 21 July, 1920. Stanley (Sir Herbert James) Correspondence, 1910-41, and memoranda etc., Rhodes House Library, Oxford. (Cited hereinafter as The Stanley Correspondence).

[79] In fact during his tour of Southern Rhodesia Smuts was unable to resist the temptation to speak out on the issue. He implored Southern

[Continued on next page.]

To compound the blunder, Smuts' speech made in Western Transvaal on his return journey raised fears among Rhodesians that his real intention was to use the territory as a dumping ground for the Afrikaner 'poor whites'.

> When I see the farms becoming smaller and smaller... and the schools growing larger every day, I wonder what is to become of us if we have to continue in a small way. That is why I say, let Rhodesians come in. Let Rhodesia come in in the days of her youth.... Our ideal is to become a great country, and to prevent our people becoming bijwoners.[80]

To Southern Rhodesians this speech seemed to conjure up visions of "a flood of poor Afrikaner whites" with their large families pouring in to grab up all the vacant land in the country.

Moreover, once Smuts had decided to cast aside the meekness with which he had charmed the Paris Peace Conference into entrusting South West Africa to his care in 1[illegible]9, and to reveal what one writer has called "a ruthless streak in him"[81] by bludgeoning the white miners in the Rand Strike of 1922 with the aid of the army, the Southern Rhodesian white workers had no hesitation in voting against entry into the Union.[82] And as luck would have it, the meeting between Smuts and

---

[Continued from p. 34]
Rhodesians to "look at this question from the broader point of view, the future of the sub-continent." The Round Table, vol. 13, (1922-23), p. 205; Davies, op. cit., pp. 24-27.

[80] See The Round Table, vol. 13, (1922-23), p. 210.

[81] Eric Rosenthal, comp., Southern African Dictionary of National Biography, (London: Frederick Warne & Co. Ltd., 1966), p. 351.

[82] J. D. C. Drew, op. cit., p. 46. For Smuts' handling of the Rand Strike see W. K. Hancock, Smuts: The Fields of Force 1919-1950, vol. 2, (Cambridge University Press, 1962), chapter 4. The total number of lives lost during the strike was 153. "I have earned an additional claim to

[Continued on next page.]

the Rhodesian delegation in Cape Town from 3rd to 18th April, 1922, to discuss Smuts' terms for Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Union, took place while the acrimonious debate on the Rand Strike was in progress inside the South African Parliament.

In spite of the result of the 1922 referendum the belief that Southern Rhodesia's destiny lay in her ultimate incorporation into the Union was slow to die, and few political observers at the time were prepared to accept the voters' verdict as final. "For the time being," commented The Round Table on the referendum result, "the question of joining the Union is dead," but at the same time it reiterated the view that the territory's destiny lay to the South.[83] Even Smuts, despite the rejection of his 1922 offer, continued to dream of a "greater South Africa." In 1925 he confided to Sir John Chancellor, the first Governor of Southern Rhodesia, 1923-1928, that although his visit to Southern Rhodesia in 1922 had strongly convinced him that there was no chance of her coming into the Union, he was still hopeful of seeing the establishment of "a great South African Dominion like Canada to include the whole of the southern half of Africa from the Cape to Kenya."[84] General Hertzog's statement following the formation of the Pact Government in

---

[Continued from p. 35]
the titles of butcher and hangman," Smuts wrote to a close friend when it was all over. Cited in Ibid., p. 84. During the referendum campaign Southern Rhodesian trade unionists generously quoted General Hertzog's words that Smuts' footsteps "dripped with blood".

[83] Vol. 16, (1925-26), p. 767.

[84] "Note of a visit to General Smuts at Irene Farm near Pretoria, 5.11.25", The Papers of Sir John Chancellor, 7/5. Rhodes House Library, Oxford.

1924 that it was better for all concerned that Southern Rhodesia should first experience the joys and pains of self-government before seeking entry into the Union, was hardly comforting to those people who were eager to see an early consummation of union between the two countries. Hertzog, after all, had always viewed Smuts' endeavours to bring Southern Rhodesia into the Union as a sly move "to break the back of Afrikanerdom."[85]

But even among those people who were prepared to accept the view that the grant of responsible government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 was not necessarily inconsistent with the ultimate objective of her incorporation into the Union and would in fact facilitate it since it would enable her to join the Union on equal footing, the Nationalist Party's electoral triumph in June 1929 which relegated its Pact ally, the South African Labour Party, to "a fifth wheel in the ministerial trek-waggon,"[86] dashed all hopes of Southern Rhodesia's eventual entry into the Union. There were other developments during the 1930's which helped to solidify Southern Rhodesia's determination to stay out of the South African "laager", such as the currency question, the customs union issue, bilingualism--"that *bête noire* of the Rhodesians," as *The Round Table* called it,[87] the imposition of quota on Southern Rhodesian tobacco and the general talk of secession from the Empire by Nationalist leaders.

---

[85] For Hertzog's views regarding Southern Rhodesia's relations with South Africa see Chancellor's despatch of 15 November, 1925 to L. S. Amery, Colonial Secretary, November, 1924 - June, 1929, in which he gives an account of his conversation with Hertzog during his visit to South Africa in 1925. *Ibid*.

[86] Walker, *op. cit.*, p. 625. In spite of this outright victory, Hertzog was generous enough to give the Labour Party two seats in the Cabinet.

[87] Vol. 12, (1921-22), p. 905.

Thus by the time Hertzog and Smuts had teamed up to form the Fusion Ministry in 1934, the finality of the Southern Rhodesian referendum had generally become an accepted fact. Smuts' presence in the Government could hardly have been expected to change Southern Rhodesia's attitude towards South Africa. To some observers Smuts' position within the Government did not seem much better than that of a bird in a gilded cage.[88]

As far as Southern Rhodesia herself was concerned, the outcome of the referendum also had significant implications concerning the future course of her political development. For one thing it meant, as The Round Table pointed out, that Rhodes' dream of seeing her enter the Union in order to tip the racial balance in South Africa in favour of the British remained nothing but a dream.[89] All hopes that Rhodesia "may ultimately be the weight which swings the balance in South Africa decisively on the side of the British Crown,"[90] were finally laid to rest in 1922. For a country that had been developed on the assumption that it would eventually become part of the area of white supremacy to the south, the referendum result implied a new political orientation and readjustment of goals. As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the best solution for the Rhodesian question would have been the territory's entry into the Union and failing that the next best solution was responsible government. Although the idea of representative government under the Crown was often mentioned, it was never seriously considered since it would have thrown more responsibility on the British Government. In view of Great Britain's additional post-war commitments entailing the administration of the mandated territories in Africa and the Middle East, the prospect of being caught up in racial and constitutional conflicts similar to those that had afflicted Natal before 1906 was chilling.

---

[88] As Professor A. Keppel-Jones points out, in spite of the alliance between Hertzog and Smuts, the Nationalists continued to pursue their old goals but "under cover of a new banner." South Africa: A Short History, (3rd ed.; London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1963), p. 179.

[89] Vol. 23, (1932-33), p. 225.

[90] Churchill's words in 1906 cited in Hyam, op. cit., p. 21.

The result of the Rhodesian referendum was that it forced British authorities to hurry up the arrangements for setting up responsible government for Southern Rhodesia without sufficient time to consider the deeper implications of this step. This was particularly serious in view of the fact that unlike the older colonies which had passed through the familiar stages of Crown Colony government or representative government to self-government, under the direct supervision of the Crown, Southern Rhodesia only took one giant leap from Company rule to responsible government without ever having had any direct link with the British government. As Tawse Jollie was later to point out, "While other South African colonies have recently enjoyed--or suffered--a great deal of scrutiny and publicity as to their conduct of native affairs, Southern Rhodesia has been permitted to plod along since 1896, in an obscurity which I am far from deprecating."[91] It is thus no exaggeration to say that throughout her history British authorities never actually got to know the real Rhodesia. They tended to see Rhodesia in terms of the political developments in South Africa, hence the tendency to exaggerate Southern Rhodesia's "loyalty" to the Crown as well as her "liberalism" towards

---

[91] "Native Administration in Southern Rhodesia", Journal of the Royal Society of Arts, vol. lxxiii, (30 August, 1935), pp. 973-4.

Africans.[92]

The final settlement between the British Government representatives and the British South Africa Company concerning the termination of the latter's rule over the Rhodesias was hammered out in an atmosphere more typical of backroom stockmarket haggling than one in which the destiny of nearly two million people was involved. Much of this haggling was concerned with the financial details of the settlement. Although the settlement fell far short of the golden handshake which the Company had once dreamed of it was, nevertheless, a satisfactory one in spite of verbal protests from some of the shareholders who felt that they had been short-changed by the British Government.[93]

The Southern Rhodesian referendum also had important implications for Northern Rhodesia. The white settlers there were naturally concerned with the question of Southern Rhodesia's possible entry into the Union. In fact, two Northern Rhodesian delegates, L. F. Moore and Sir Randolph Baker, were present at the Cape Town Conference between the Southern Rhodesian representatives and members of Smuts' Government to discuss the terms upon which Southern Rhodesia would be admitted into the Union.[94]

---

[92] See, for instance, the statement made by W. Ormsby-Gore, then Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, in the House of Commons in announcing the Department's decision to grant self-government to Southern Rhodesia. The new Colony, he said, had "a fine tradition in connection with native administration and native relations." Parliamentary Debates, vol. 167, 25 July, 1923, col. 500. In the years after 1923 this became the stock theme of the Dominions Office response to any criticism of Southern Rhodesia's native policy in Parliament.

[93] For the reaction of the shareholders to the settlement see The Times, 25 July, 1923.

[94] Denny, op. cit., p. 345.

Since, from a geographical point of view, there was very little possibility of Northern Rhodesia joining South Africa without Southern Rhodesia, the 1922 referendum can thus be regarded as equally decisive for her as it was for Southern Rhodesia. Although the South Africa Act had made provision for the later admission of "the territories administered by the British South Africa Company" into the Union, it is quite evident from the Colonial Office's response to the Company's amalgamation proposals in 1915, as well as from their views regarding Southern Rhodesia's political future up to the time of the referendum, that only Southern Rhodesia was actually expected to join South Africa: "Northern Rhodesia was only remotely expected to enter the Union, and only contingently upon the entry of Southern Rhodesia."[95] In any case, the Northern Rhodesian settlers were not particularly keen to join the Union.[96]

It was largely for these reasons that after the Southern Rhodesian referendum the Company Directors found it in their best interests to negotiate a package deal with the British Government by which the Company would be relieved from the onerous responsibility of administering Northern Rhodesia which had thus far proved to be a constant drain on its finances. In fact, during these negotiations the Company representatives made it abundantly clear that unless the settlement concerning Southern Rhodesia was coupled with an agreement on Northern Rhodesia, they would not be disposed to accept it.[97] One significant result of

---

[95] Hyam, The Failure of South African Expansion, p. 199, fn. 5.

[96] Denny, op. cit., p. 344.

[97] Cmd. 1914. Rhodesia. Correspondence regarding a proposed settlement of various outstanding questions relating to the British South Africa Company's position in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, July, 1923, p. 2.

Southern Rhodesia's decision not to become part of Smuts' grandiose dream of a "Greater South Africa" was that she in turn began to nurture ambitions of her own based on an equally grandiose dream of a "Greater Rhodesia" which was expected to include Northern Rhodesia, the northern part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate and, ultimately, Nyasaland. As Hyam points out, "Southern Rhodesia's subsequent history of Central African Federation and U.D.I. is a direct legacy of its 1922 decision not to enter the Union."[98]

* *

The year 1923 was, according to one historian, a crucial one in African history; "it marked the close of Smuts' regime in South Africa, the granting of self-government in Rhodesia and the refusal of self-government in Kenya."[99] While the significance of these three events in relation to the general history of Africa may be questioned, their influence on the political developments in Northern Rhodesia can hardly be exaggerated. It is true that the publication of the White Paper of 1923 by the Duke of Devonshire, Secretary of State for the Colonies in the Conservative Government of 1922-1924, which contained the denial of self-government to the white settlers of Kenya[100] does not appear to have immediately caught the attention of the Northern Rhodesian settlers.[101]

---

[98] _Op_. _cit_., p. 3.

[99] C. E. Carrington, _The Liquidation of the British Empire_, (London: George Harrap, 1961), p. 47. The key to this denial lies in the smallness of Kenya's white settler population. There were 9,651 settlers in Kenya in 1921 compared with 33,620 in Southern Rhodesia in the same year.

[100] "His Majesty's Government," it declared, "cannot but regard the grant of responsible self-government [to Kenya] as out of question within any time which need now be taken into consideration." Cmd. 1922. _Indians in Kenya. Memorandum_. 23rd July, 1923, p. 11.

[101] Gann, _A History of Northern Rhodesia_, p. 241.

No notice appears to have been taken of the principles enunciated in that Paper regarding British colonial policy in Kenya, until these were restated in a more emphatic, some would say peremptory, manner, and the scope of their application extended by Lord Passfield, in his White Paper of 1930 to include all the British dependencies in East and Central Africa.[102] These principles referred to the doctrine of African paramountcy and the policy of colonial trusteeship which generally came to be accepted as representing a definition of Great Britain's post-war colonial policy in tropical Africa, particularly in the multi-racial communities of East and Central Africa. The White Paper of 1923 explicitly acknowledged the "importance of safeguarding the interests of the African natives" in Kenya. "Primarily," it said, "Kenya is an African territory, and His Majesty's Government think it necessary to record their considered opinion that if, and when, those interests and the interests of the migrant races should conflict, the former should prevail." It was further pointed out that in the administration of Kenya the British Government regarded themselves "as exercising a trust on behalf of the African population" and were "unable to delegate or share this trust...."[103]

---

[102] Cmd. 3575. Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa, June 1930. Lord Passfield, formerly Sidney Webb, became Secretary of State for the Colonies and Dominions Affairs in Ramsay MacDonald's second Labour Government in June, 1929. For further information on Lord Passfield see chapter 2 below.

[103] Indians in Kenya, pp. 9-10. Recent scholars who have examined the circumstances of the origins of the 1923 White Paper as well as its actual application have come to the conclusion that its significance has been grossly exaggerated. See E. S. Atieno-Odhiambo, "The Colonial Government, the Settlers and the 'Trust' Principle in Kenya to 1939", Transafrican Journal of History, vol. 2, (1972), pp. 94-113; Dan Horowitz, "Attitudes of British Conservatives Towards Decolonization in Africa", African Affairs, vol. 69, (January, 1970), pp. 9-26.

There were two main reasons why the 1923 White Paper with its far-reaching pronouncements went virtually unnoticed in Northern Rhodesia. Firstly, it was exclusively concerned with Kenya, the colonial storm-centre where racial conflicts involving the white settlers, the Asian immigrants and the African inhabitants were already causing great discomfort to the Colonial Office and were also attracting the attention of a number of colonial critics and publicists, both inside and outside Parliament. Secondly, in 1923 the Northern Rhodesian settlers hardly had time to reflect deeply on the wider implications of the Devonshire White Paper, if they ever took notice of it at all. At the time of its publication they were more immediately concerned with the negotiations then in progress between the Colonial Office and the British South Africa Company pertaining to the winding up of Company rule over the two Rhodesias following the Southern Rhodesian referendum. The outcome of these negotiations was that on 12 September Southern Rhodesia was formally annexed to the Crown and became a semi-self-governing Colony with a responsible government constitution with effect from 1 October, 1923. Although she was not yet a fully-fledged Dominion--foreign relations and certain aspects of her internal affairs were still subject to Imperial control--she was placed under the Dominions Office. This uniqueness or rather ambiguity of Southern Rhodesia's constitutional status within the Empire[104] was to continue until November 1965 when the Rhodesian Prime Minister, Ian Smith, issued a unilateral declaration of independence for the Colony. Northern Rhodesia, on the other hand, was taken over by the Colonial Office with effect from 1 April, 1924, and administered as a Protectorate under a Crown Colony constitution until she was granted her independence in October, 1964.[105]

---

[104] "We are what may be termed a constitutional hybrid," declared one Rhodesian Minister in 1949, "we are neither a Colony nor a Dominion." Cited in Palley, _op_. _cit_., p. 215, fn. 6.

The end of Company rule over the two Rhodesias brought the issue of amalgamation to the foreground once more now that the question which had hitherto tended to cloud the consideration of its merits and demerits, namely, whether Southern Rhodesia was to be incorporated into the Union of South Africa or was to be granted responsible government, had finally been resolved. One of the most persuasive arguments which had been advanced against the Company proposals in the Southern Rhodesian debates of 1916-17 that amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia was going to delay the territory's attainment of self-government, no longer applied after 1923. Indeed, many of the leading political figures in Southern Rhodesia including Sir Charles Coghlan, the Premier, and Tawse Jollie, who had been prominent in the campaign against the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias, were now ready to support it. In its programme written in 1924, the Rhodesia Party, successor to the Responsible Government Association, placed the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and the "Eventual establishment of a Central African Dominion" high on its priority list. Similarly, the Southern Rhodesian Progressive Party, formed in 1926, also called for the formation of a "Greater

---

[105] For the details of the settlement between the British Government and the Company see Cmd. 1914. Rhodesia Correspondence regarding a proposed settlement of various outstanding questions relating to the British South Africa Company's position in Southern and Northern Rhodesia, July, 1923; Cmd. 1984. Rhodesia. Agreement between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British South Africa Company for the settlement of outstanding questions relating to Southern and Northern Rhodesia, 29th September, 1923.

Rhodesia."[106] By 1925 The Round Table noted that the idea of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia was already gaining ground in Southern Rhodesia and that some of the Government Ministers who had voted against the Company proposals in 1917 were now having second thoughts on the matter.[107]

The imponderable factor in the situation was the attitude of the Northern Rhodesian settlers towards amalgamation now that the much hated Company rule had been terminated and the constitutional status of the territory had been upgraded by the creation of a Legislative Council which was a marked improvement on the Advisory Council set up by the Company in 1918, a body that had neither legislative nor executive powers. In order to understand the attitude of the Northern Rhodesian settlers towards the question of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia between 1924 and 1930 it is important to know something about their political aspirations and their own conception of the role which they expected to play under the new constitution.

The change of government which took place in 1924 was received with general satisfaction by the settlers in the territory even though there was no immediate significant change in the general spirit of the administration as most of the Company's civil servants were retained by the new regime. In his inaugural address to the Legislative Council Sir H. J. Stanley, the new Governor, rightly referred to the introduction of Colonial Office rule as "the beginning of a new chapter in the history of Northern Rhodesia."[108] As far as the white settlers were concerned, the most attractive feature of the new administration was the creation of a Legislative Council which, according to the recollections of one Official Member, John Smith, who sat on the first Council which opened on 23 May, 1924, "was of historical importance as the first milestone upon the road to self-government."[109] The Legislative Council was made up of the Governor who, as President of the Council, possessed a deliberative as well as a casting vote; 5 ex-officio Members who, under the chairmanship of the Governor, formed the Executive Council; 4 Nominated Official Members and 5 Elected Unofficial Members. Between 1924 and 1945 the composition of the Legislative Council changed four times. In 1929 the number of the Elected Members was increased to 7. In 1938 equality between the Official and the Unofficial Members was achieved by reducing the Nominated Official Members from 4 to 3 while adding a Nominated Member to the Unofficials to represent African interests. In 1941 the balance between the two sides was maintained by adding 1 Nominated Member to the Officials and 1 Elected Member to the Unofficials. Finally in 1945, in accordance with the House of Commons announcement of October 1944, an Unofficial majority in the Legislative Council was achieved by increasing the Nominated Unofficial Members from 1 to 5, three of whom were to represent African interests. Further changes took place in 1948 under which 2 of the 3 Members representing African interests were Africans. All these changes, except the last one, were the outcome of settler demands.

---

[106] Alan R. Taylor and Eugene P. Dvorin, "Political Development in British Central Africa, 1890-1956. A Select Survey of the Literature and Background Materials," Race, vol. 1, (November, 1959), p. 61.

[107] Vol. 16, (1925-26), p. 768. See also Palley, op. cit., p. 326.

[108] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 23rd May, 1924, col. 6. He was Governor from 1924 to 1927.

---

[109] "The first Session of the First Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, 23rd May, 1924," The Northern Rhodesian Journal, vol. iv, no. 2, 1959, p. 180. It is interesting to observe here that while the white settlers saw the change of 1 April, 1924, as the first giant step towards the devolution of power into their own hands, Zambian historians of the post-independence era see this date "as the day which led inexorably to the amicable granting of Zambia's independence forty years later to an African government." See Richard Hall, Zambia, (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965), p. 103; Henry S. Meebelo, Reaction to Colonialism. A Prelude to the Politics of Independence in Northern Zambia 1893-1939, (Manchester University Press, 1971), p. 235.

When Northern Rhodesia was taken over by the Colonial Office in 1924 the territory, which was then "little more than a stagnant backwater,"[110] had barely emerged from the pioneer stage of development. Under the rule of the Company the government of Northern Rhodesia was "chiefly an affair of outposts--of native commissioners and a small police force living many day's march from the nearest white man."[111] In the last census taken in 1921 the European population numbered 3,634, including women and children. That of the Africans was estimated at 979,704. In many respects the Protectorate still bore many characteristics of a frontier settlement--poor means of transport, long distances between rural homesteads and a general state of backwardness. The most important activity was maize growing along the line of rail (with some tobacco farming in the north-eastern region adjoining Nyasaland) and cattle ranching. Next to farming came mining which was confined to the northern end of the railway line along the Congo border. There was also a small but vocal community of traders around such towns as Livingstone in the south, Broken Hill (Kabwe) and Ndola in the north and Fort Jameson (Chipata) in the east.

The farmers were a struggling community. They were severely handicapped by lack of experience and capital, hence their covert envy of Southern Rhodesia where their counterparts enjoyed the services of the Land Bank which had been established in 1924. It was for this reason that the farming members in the Legislative Council like Captain Thomas,[112] and Douglas E. C. R. Stirke,[113] were generally sympathetic towards amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia on economic grounds, although politically they shared their fellow settlers' aspirations for self-government.

---

[110] Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 193.

[111] Jollie, "Greater Rhodesia", United Empire, vol. xxii, (September, 1931), p. 493.

Until 1935 most of the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council were farmers representing rural constituencies.[114] Even the non-farming Members like Moore (drugstore and newspaper owner), Frank H. Lowe (accountant), Charles S. Knight (contractor), Kennedy E. Harris (businessman) and Gerald C. Norris (Broken Hill mine employee), had large numbers of farmers in their constituencies.[115] However, because of the scattered nature of the farming community, the problem of poor communication[116] and the lack of spare time, the farmers never became an effective pressure group in the Legislative Council which remained under

---

[112] Member for the Southern Electoral Area, 1926-1929 and 1932-1935.

[113] Member for the Midland Electoral Area, 1926-1929.

[114] It is interesting to note that in 1935 the mining constituency of Nkana elected a farmer's wife, Catherine Olds, to the Legislative Council with the specific object of speaking on behalf of the miners. Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 261.

[115] The first three represented the Livingstone and Western Electoral Area; Moore from 1924 to 1941, Lowe from 1929 to 1932 and Knight from 1932 to 1938. Harris represented the Ndola Electoral Area, 1929 to 1935 and Norris, the Northern Electoral Area, 1929 to 1935.

[116] There was once a time when the Member for the Eastern Electoral Area had to travel through Mozambique and Southern Rhodesia to reach Livingstone.

Moore's domination until 1939. Moore, who seldom travelled in the territory, being content to collect gossip from his customers, tended to look down on the farmers. It was not until 1938 when Roy Welensky, an ex-boxer and train driver who had become an active trade unionist among the railway workers, was elected to represent the Northern Electoral Area that a gradual shift in the territory's political discussions from rural to industrial politics began to appear in the Legislative Council. Welensky's position in the Legislative Council was strengthened when his newly formed Labour Party won all the five seats it contested in the 1941 general elections. This made labour the most represented section of the European population in the Legislative Council.

Until 1945 the Northern Rhodesian Unofficial Members, in contrast with those in Kenya, were handicapped by a lack of an effective organisation. Most political discussions outside the Legislative Council took place at such informal gatherings as "sundowners".[117] Politics revolved round personalities. It was by virtue of his seniority among the Unofficials that Moore was able to assume the informal position of "Leader of the Unofficial Members". When Governor Sir Hubert Young (1934-1938) decided on a policy of consulting the Unofficial Members in matters of policy between Council sessions, Moore became the medium of communication between the Government and the Unofficial Members. Moore also acted as Chairman of the Unofficial Members' Committee, an informal body which usually met just prior to the opening of each Council session in order to discuss the Government legislative programme. It was not until 1945 that a more formal body, the Unofficial Members' Organisation, was set up under the Chairmanship of Lt. Col. Stewart Gore-Browne, the

---

[117] Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 239.

Nominated Unofficial Member representing African interests.

Gore-Browne, one of the most fascinating figures in the Northern Rhodesian settler politics, attended Harrow and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. He first came to Central Africa in 1911 as a member of the Anglo-Belgian Commission of that year and immediately fell in love with Northern Rhodesia. It was not until 1920, after leaving the army, that he was able to return to Northern Rhodesia to settle permanently. He built himself an imposing country estate at Shiwa Ngandu in the manner of an English squire, equipped with a hospital and a school for his African servants and neighbours, which he ruled with paternalistic "benevolence and a hand of iron." "My original idea, born in those days of boundless humanitarian optimism...," he wrote years later, "was to found a soldiers' settlement at Shiwa Ngandu which was to work in happy co-operation with the surrounding Natives who, one supposed, would only be delighted to take part in the Utopia-on-European lines."[118]

Between the Officials and the Unofficials there was generally a wide area of common agreement, particularly in matters appertaining to native policy. A large number of the Northern Rhodesian settlers shared a common pioneering spirit and dedication to Rhodes' imperial ideals. Although most of them were British-born, their entry into the territory had been via Southern Rhodesia and South Africa.[119] Although they habitually referred to England as "back home",[120] only a few of them kept any close contact with "the old country." Most typical in this respect was Moore who had left London in 1892 at the age of 24 ("because chilblain drove me out," he once said), having left school at the early age of 13. After a year's stay in Cape Town he moved to Mafeking where he remained until 1898 before settling in Bulawayo. He came to Livingstone in 1904 which became his permanent home till his death in 1945.

---

[118] For an account of Shiwa Ngandu see his two articles "The Relations of Black and White in Tropical Africa", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxxv, (October 1935), pp. 378-386, and "Shiwa Ngandu", The Northern Rhodesian Journal, vol. vi, (1965), pp. 235-238. Throughout his life Gore-Browne remained implacably opposed to the principle of "Native Trusteeship".

[119] Except for a large influx of miners from the south who entered the territory in the mid-1930's, most of the settlers who came after the end of the First World War did so directly from Great Britain.

These then were some of the men who formed the backbone of Northern Rhodesian politics during the twenties and the thirties. "I saw a number of them during my visits to Northern Rhodesia," wrote Sir James Currie, Chairman of the Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies in 1936, "and their calibre [the words "both mental and moral" were crossed out in the letter by the author] appeared to me very low though I did not see them all."[121] The man they had to deal with at the Colonial Office in 1924 was J. H. Thomas, a former railway engine cleaner who had risen to high office via the British trade union movement. He was, however, a very dedicated imperialist and an admirer of the British Empire. "I've been sent here to see that there's no mucking about with the British Empire,"--these are said to have been his first words of address to his staff when he took over at the Colonial Office in 1924.[122]

---

[120] Even Welensky, who had no stain of English blood in his veins, was fond of using this phrase. He once described himself as 50% Polish, 50% Jewish and 100% British.

[121] Currie to the Colonial Office, 3 February, 1937. P.R.O./C.O./795/89/45047/5/1937.

[122] Cited in Gregory Blaxland, J. H. Thomas: A Life for Unity, (London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1964), p. 170.

The first indication of the direction in which settler political opinion in the territory was moving became immediately evident in the first session of the new Council during a discussion concerning the redistribution of seats for the five elected settler representatives in the Legislative Council and the delimitation of their constituencies.[123] In the course of this debate the Governor found it necessary to remind the Unofficial Members that the Council was not to be mistaken for a Parliament

> where a Member or a group of Members can determine a decision and where therefore it is of importance to a particular constituency to have as large a representation as possible. The object of having Unofficial Members in this Council is that they should ventilate the opinions and represent the views which are held in various parts of the country, and bring before the Government considerations which otherwise might escape the notice of the Government.[124]

The Unofficial Members, however, took strong exception to this reminder since they saw themselves as "the representatives of the people." Their point of view was awkwardly but forthrightly expressed by their leader, L. F. Moore, who after having led a long crusade against Company rule was now about to launch another one, this time against Colonial Office administration.

> You compare a Parliament with this Council. The differences between a Parliament and this Council are small and where they are small in a matter where the agreement is more complete they should not be emphasised. It is more like a Parliament than it is unlike a

---

[123] When the Legislative Council was constituted in May 1924 all the five Unofficial members of the old Advisory Council were nominated en bloc to the new Council pending elections which were subsequently held on 24 April, 1926.

[124] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 28th May, 1924, col. 110.

> Parliament. We are to all intents and purposes a Parliament and likely to become a Parliament....[125]

In this difference of views between the Governor and the Unofficial Members concerning the place of the Legislative Council in the territory's political development may be seen the genesis of a conflict that was later to embitter the relations between the Colonial Office and the Northern Rhodesian settlers, and one in which the question of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia was to become a convenient battle ground for the white settlers.

The Colonial Office was, of course, fully aware of the dangers already demonstrated in Kenya of allowing the Elected Members to regard themselves as the "representatives of the people." When the question of the delimitation of electoral districts in Northern Rhodesia was under consideration, C. Strachey, a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department in the Colonial Office under which Northern Rhodesia had been placed in 1924, had warned against the pitfalls of seeming to invest the Legislative Council with the false notion that it was a miniature Parliament. He pointed out what he termed "the absurdities of the situation" where in a territory as large as England, Scotland and France put together, a handful of white settlers--the Africans, he said, "do not come into the question"--were to elect "representatives" to a body on which there was a permanent Government majority and which would probably meet only once a year. "The whole thing," he said, "seems worthy of the realm of comic opera."[126]

Referring to the situation in Kenya, Strachey felt that a great deal of trouble there had arisen mainly from the folly of "allowing the Legislative Council to be regarded as a sort of Parliament, with all the paraphernalia of an English election, constituencies, female suffrage, & etc." whereas under the present "rudimentary condition of affairs" a Legislative Council was nothing more than "an advisory body useful in keeping the Governor informed on a very limited range of interests--those of the farmers & miners." In any case, Strachey was doubtful whether in fact elections based on territorial lines were really necessary in Northern Rhodesia "as the interests of one lot of farmers must be pretty much the same as those of another lot in another part of the country."[127] He deprecated even the official use of the term "general election" and felt that it should be avoided as much as possible since it might "encourage the erroneous view that the position of the elected members was equivalent to that of members of Parliament." As an alternative measure he suggested representation of interests rather than of constituencies, but the Governor as well as Sir E. A. Grindle, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, argued strongly against this proposal. The latter pointed out the practical problems of trying to deny the Elected Members the status of "representatives" of the people by whom they had been elected. How was one to distinguish between by-elections and what were, after all, general elections, he asked? He felt very strongly that "it would be a bad start if we were to minimize their representative capacity."[128]

---

[125] *Ibid*., 20th May, 1925, col. 102.

[126] Minute of 19 April, 1924. P.R.O./C.O./795/1/18231/1924.

Years later, when faced with the demand of the Northern Rhodesian

---

[127] Ibid.

[128] Minute of 26 April, 1924. Ibid.

Elected Members for major constitutional concessions which they backed up with a threat to resign en masse, J. A. Calder, a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department at the Colonial Office, began to feel that the decision to establish an elective Legislative Council in the territory had been a grave blunder:

> Looking back over the constitutional history of Northern Rhodesia for the last twelve years, with its recurrent crises due to the demands of the Elected Members, the conclusion to be drawn is that it was a most unfortunate mistake that an elected Legislative Council was instituted. Experience in Tanganyika, Uganda and Nyasaland shows that with mixed communities in Tropical Africa you get a much more representative and helpful Council by nomination than by election.

In his opinion a nominated Council "would have given general satisfaction for many years to come and been of much more value in the Government of the territory." He was, however, doubtful whether after twelve years of the elective system of representation it would be possible to revert to a nominative method.[129]

This little skirmish over the role of the Elected Members was the first indication of the higher horizon towards which the Northern Rhodesian settlers were already beginning to cast their political sights. Indeed, as early as June 1922, Moore had stated before the Advisory Council that "The people of this country desire to build up a self-governing state ... within the Empire, which ... seems to be possible only if Crown Colonial government is established first."[130] Precedents in the older colonies had long demonstrated that the creation of an elected settler representation in a colonial legislature was only the beginning of a process of gradual devolution of power from Downing Street to white settler communities, and it was a development of which the Northern Rhodesian settlers were fully conscious. The history of the Cape Colony, Natal, the two former Boer republics in South Africa and, more recently, Southern Rhodesia where white settler minorities had been granted self-government in spite of the presence of large unrepresented African majorities were still vivid in their minds. And it was precisely for this reason that the Northern Rhodesian settlers had initially welcomed the introduction of a Crown Colony form of government in 1924. "The new constitution," wrote the Governor to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "seems to have given general satisfaction, and at the moment the voice of controversy is unusually quiescent...."[131] To them it represented not only a release from the abominable rule of the Company, but also set them on the well-trodden path towards eventual self-government which they regarded as their legitimate goal.

---

[129] Minute of 29 October, 1936. P.R.O./C.O./795/85/45170/1936. He was, in fact, advised that such a drastic action could not be taken "except for very grave reasons." See minute by Sir W. C. Bottomley, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 29 October, 1936. Ibid.

[130] Cited in Robert I Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa. The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1965), p. 96.

In fact, before the end of 1927 Moore was already contemplating the next step in the territory's constitutional development, namely, equal representation in the Legislative Council between the Official and Unofficial Members, the ultimate goal being responsible government. "But we do aspire as our revenue rises and our expenditure too," he declared, "and we are able to balance the two, to, at least, equal representation, and I think we all look forward in the not too dim and distant future to a form of responsible government."[132] Motions for the increase of Unofficial membership of the Legislative Council were brought forward on four occasions between July 1927 and March 1931. It was readily acknowledged, of course, that the attainment of self-government would not be immediate and would largely depend on the rate of increase of the white population and on the improvement in the territory's financial position. Southern Rhodesians had, after all, been promised self-government as soon as they could prove themselves financially self-sufficient, a promise which was faithfully fulfilled by the Imperial Government--a trifle too soon, according to Moore.

---

[131] Stanley to J. H. Thomas, 5 April, 1924. P.R.O./C.O./795/1/20114/1924.

The example of Southern Rhodesia, in fact, was to remain indelibly inscribed in Moore's mind. "As soon as we are financially and in other respects suited for responsible government," he said, "the will of the people will not be denied. We shall get it."[133] These expectations were later strengthened by Sir J. C. Maxwell, the territory's second Governor, when he declared himself in full agreement with the remarks made by his Chief Secretary "that the constitutional development in this country is and must be towards self-government."[134] While the goal of the Northern Rhodesian settlers was firmly fixed on self-government, amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia did not appear to offer any attraction. It was not until their expectations for self-government had been dashed to the ground by Lord Passfield's White Paper of 1930 coupled with the depression which hit the territory between 1931 and 1933, that a swing in favour of amalgamation became noticeable.

---

[132] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 28th November, 1927, col. 19.

[133] Ibid., 23rd April, 1928, col. 129.

[134] Ibid., 21st November, 1929, col. 162.

* *

The first concrete evidence of Southern Rhodesia's interest in amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia appeared in 1925 in connection with the question of the future administration of the Rhodesia Railways. Under the 1923 settlement the British South Africa Company had been granted and guaranteed an exclusive monopoly of control over the railway system operating in the two Rhodesias and part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate. This control, however, was generally resented by the Rhodesian farmers due to the high shipping rates charged by the Company. The Rhodesian Government responded to the farmers' plight by demanding government control of the entire railway system.[135] It was not until 1927 that the issue was finally resolved by the creation of a Railway Commission on which Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Bechuanaland were represented.[136] It is interesting to observe that among the advocates of amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia at this time were Sir Charles Coghlan, the Premier, and H. U. Moffat, Minister of Mines, Works and Industries, both of whom had been strongly against it before 1923. In the course of a speech made on 30 November, 1925, Moffat proposed an amalgamation of the two Rhodesias as a means of bringing about a much simpler but more efficient method of administering the railways, adding that the unification of the Rhodesias had long been his cherished aim. "I personally from the beginning, before the beginning, looked forward to the day when Northern and Southern Rhodesia should be one country."[137]

---

[135] Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 248; Bulawayo Chronicle, 5 December, 1925.

[136] The Times, 16 February, 1927.

The Southern Rhodesian amalgamation proposal was discussed by the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office during Sir Charles Coghlan's visit to London in 1926. Up to this time the general assumption in London was that Southern Rhodesia's interest in Northern Rhodesia was only limited to the central portion of the territory containing the railway line and the mining area. In his interview with the Secretary of State on 30 July, 1926, Coghlan, however, startled British authorities by declaring that although at one time he had not contemplated an arrangement which would extend beyond the central portion of Northern Rhodesia, he had now come to the conclusion that the amalgamation of the whole northern territory with Southern Rhodesia was desirable.[138] What had apparently brought about this change on the part of the Premier was his Ministers' concern about what they saw as the British Government's determined policy of drawing Northern Rhodesia into the orbit of the East African dependencies. The basis of this concern was the appointment of the East Africa Commission which visited Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, Uganda, Kenya and the Tanganyika Territory in 1924. Its terms of reference included an investigation into the question of closer co-ordination of policy on matters of general economic development, particularly with regard to labour problems and matters of transport and communication.[139] Similarly, Amery's White Paper of 1927 which proposed another East African Commission to look into the question of closer union in this region also included Northern Rhodesia in its terms of reference.[140]

---

[137] Part of this speech is cited in a Colonial Office memorandum of May, 1926 in P.R.O./C.O./795/11/X4586/1926.

[138] "Note of conversation between S. of S. & Sir C. Coghlan 30/7/26". P.R.O./C.O./795/13/XF6029/1926.

[139] Cmd. 2387. East Africa. Report of the East Africa Commission, April, 1925, p. 3.

By the end of 1927 Sir John Chancellor had come to feel that the argument which he had previously used to dissuade the Southern Rhodesian Ministers from asking for the whole of Northern Rhodesia, namely, that this would double Southern Rhodesia's African population and would thus impose a heavy strain on the Colony's resources, had been greatly weakened by Amery's White Paper whose terms of reference appeared to foreshadow the ultimate incorporation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland into an East African Federation.[141] Coghlan was, however, assured by the Secretary of State that no change was contemplated by the British Government in the existing regime in Northern Rhodesia and that in the event of any change being considered the Government of Southern Rhodesia would be given ample opportunity to express their views. As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, it was still too early to make a final decision regarding Northern Rhodesia's political destiny. This was essentially the same view which had been expressed by the East Africa Commission in 1925 when it advised against the partition of Northern Rhodesia or the amalgamation of North-Eastern Rhodesia with Nyasaland which had been proposed by the Company in 1921.[142]

---

[140] Cmd. 2904. Future Policy in regard to East Africa, July, 1927.

[141] Chancellor to Sir Edward Grigg, Governor of Kenya, [1928?]. The Papers of Sir John Chancellor, 7/6. The first page of this letter is missing from the Papers.

[142] Report of the East Africa Commission, p. 101.

When the Southern Rhodesian Ministers brought up again the question of Northern Rhodesia's amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia in 1927 during Amery's visit to Southern Rhodesia as part of his Empire tour, Amery reiterated his view that the British Government was not yet in a position to commit itself with regard to the future of Northern Rhodesia. At the same time he intimated that there was much to be said in favour of a future division of Northern Rhodesia, with the eastern portion being joined to Nyasaland and the East African dependencies, and the western portion going to Southern Rhodesia. In a private letter to his Parliamentary Under-Secretary, W. Ormsby-Gore, Amery stated that it was his own feeling that Southern Rhodesia would ultimately join South Africa and for this reason the British Government would not wish to carry the extension of Southern Rhodesia beyond what should ultimately constitute a permanent boundary between the Union and the new Central Africa. Where that boundary would be was, of course, not yet clear, but in Amery's view it should be somewhere along the "waist" between the Western and the Eastern parts of Northern Rhodesia.[143]

With regard to the Southern Rhodesian Government's request for full control of the Rhodesia Railways, Amery informed Coghlan that there were several issues involved in this proposal which he would prefer to see left alone. In the first place, he felt that the Rhodesian Government's proposal to acquire and operate the line running through the Bechuanaland Protectorate would precipitate a demand by the Government of South Africa for the transfer of the Protectorate to the Union which had "reversionary" interest in the administration of the territory. This, Amery said, "is a contingency which I wish to avoid."[144] Secondly, Amery was not keen on the idea of joining the railway strip of Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia merely to facilitate the take over of the Rhodesia Railways by the Southern Rhodesian Government. If and when the question of partitioning Northern Rhodesia came up for consideration, he said, "it would have to be dealt with on its own merits and not merely as a means of enabling the Government of Southern Rhodesia to acquire the railways."[145]

---

[143] See "Notes" by E. G. S. Machtig, Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Dominions Office, 1 January, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/40/35663/1930. Palley, however, citing a personal communication from an unidentified private source, states that Amery was personally in favour of the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. Op. cit., p. 327, fn. 1.

Part of the reason for the reticence of the Colonial Office regarding Northern Rhodesia's political destiny was the emergence of a new factor which was beginning to cause some re-thinking concerning the territory's political future. This was the brightening outlook in the territory's copper resources. It was largely this factor that had prompted the Southern Rhodesian Government, on the one hand, to show a new interest in an amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia,[146] and Stanley, on the other, to advise the Secretary of State against the cession of the railway strip to Southern Rhodesia. New mining developments at the northern end of the railway line, he said, were likely to invest this area with an importance which it did not have in 1917 when the Southern Rhodesian Elected Members had rejected the Company's amalgamation proposals.[147]

---

[144] Amery, to Chancellor, 14 October, 1925. The Papers of Sir John Chancellor, 7/6. Amery, however, was personally favourable to the annexation of the northern part of the Protectorate to Southern Rhodesia as an ultimate solution.

[145] _Ibid_.

[146] Palley, _op_. _cit_., p. 327.

This new impetus to Northern Rhodesia's mining development which was accompanied by the discovery of new copper mines, was largely attributable to the British South Africa Company's mining policy introduced in 1923 of granting exclusive prospecting rights for limited periods of time to financially strong subsidiary or concession companies in place of individual prospectors and small syndicates whose lack of capital had made it impossible to employ more scientific and systematic methods of mining.[148] The new discoveries, proclaimed Sir Henry Birchenough, President of the British South Africa Company, at the annual meeting of the Company held in London on 23 February, 1926, "were of a nature so promising that shareholders could look with confidence to their providing at no distant time appreciable addition to the Company's royalty revenue."[149]

Another glowing picture of Northern Rhodesia's mineral industry was painted by Edmund Davis, Chairman of the Bwana Mkubwa Mining Company, who expressed great astonishment that few people in Great Britain seemed to be aware of the great mineral developments that were taking place in the territory:

> Within a very few years Northern Rhodesia should play an important part in the production of base metals. The white population of the territory should increase rapidly, townships should grow up, the public revenue should augment, and a large new trade be created within the Empire.[150]

---

[147] For Stanley's views see a Colonial Office memorandum of May, 1926 in P.R.O./C.O./795/11/X4586/1926.

[148] Gann, "The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper: 1923-1952", The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, no. xviii, (1955), p. 4.

[149] The Times, 24 February, 1926.

[150] Ibid., 9 December, 1925.

In fact, by 1927, after a visit to Northern Rhodesia, Davis was already proclaiming the existence of a "copper belt" whose extent was possibly larger than the one in the Katanga province of the Belgian Congo. Behind these major changes and developments in the territory's copper mining industry was the sudden rise in the world's demand for copper triggered by a general expansion in the production of electrical goods and appliances and the increase in the automobile industry after the end of the war.[151]

It was this glittering picture of the territory's mineral resources, coupled with the expected influx of large numbers of white settlers, which made the Colonial Office hesitant in coming to a definite decision about Northern Rhodesia's political destiny. And as Stanley pointed out in 1927, "We are not quite sure at the moment whether we are a South African Territory or an East African Territory."[152] Northern Rhodesians, he said, were determined to hold their own and to wait for the turn of events before deciding whether to seek closer association with their neighbours in East Africa or their kinsmen to the south.

This indecisiveness of the Colonial policy towards Northern Rhodesia was to continue up to the break-up of the Central African Federation in 1963. Until then British policy towards Northern Rhodesia can best be described as a hotch-potch of conflicting aims, awkward inconsistencies and glaring contradictions. Only in 1963 did it finally become

---

[151] Gann, "The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper", op. cit., pp. 4-5; Gann, "History of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 188901953", Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, ed. W. V. Breisford, (London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1960), p. 84.

[152] "Progress in Northern Rhodesia", Journal of the African Society, vol. 26, April, 1927, p. 210.

"clear that Northern Rhodesia was a black man's country, definitely contrasted with the white supremacy South." Until this time "Governors and officials on the spot equivocated on the political destiny of this variegated territory."[153] Although the influence wielded by the men on the spot was certainly decisive on several aspects of policy,[154] much of the uncertainty concerning the territory's political destiny stemmed from the ambiguity of policy emanating from London.

The changes made in the Colonial Office with regard to the administration of Northern Rhodesia following the termination of Company rule in 1924 did not necessarily involve a corresponding change in the spirit of the administration itself. Much of the territory's "South African outlook" which it had acquired during Company days continued almost unabated after 1924 as men of South African background continued to enter the country lured by "white wages" in the copper mines. The influence of South African ideas became particularly noticeable in the labour relations between black and white on the Copper Belt and a few Afrikaners even managed to secure election to the Legislative Council. In 1925 Major A. G. Church, a British Labour Party Member of Parliament who had visited Northern Rhodesia in 1924 as a member of the East Africa Commission, noted how the territory's development had become more closely associated with South Africa than with the East or West African Territories.

---

[153] Henderson, op. cit., p. 56.

[154] According to Andrew Cohen, a former member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department of the Colonial Office in the 1930's and a former Governor of Uganda, in the inter-war period "The Colonial Office always to a large degree left things to the government concerned in matters of native administration." British Policy in Changing Africa, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959), p. 25.

> The influence of South African ideas is evident in the attitude of many towards native development.... In North-Western Rhodesia tradition and convention tend to regard the native as an unskilled wage-earner, whose chief value is to provide labour in the mines and on the European plantation farms.[155]

It was mainly under Sir H. Stanley, the territory's first Governor, that South African ideas began to permeate the new administration.

Stanley's appointment was shrewdly calculated to make the transition from Company rule to Colonial Office rule as little disruptive to the white settlers as possible since he was thoroughly "South African" in his political outlook.[156] His early colonial service career had been spent in South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. From 1910 to 1913 he served as Private Secretary to the Governor-General in South Africa and later became his Secretary, 1913 to 1915. From 1915 to 1918 he was Resident Commissioner in Southern Rhodesia and later became Imperial Secretary to the British High Commissioner in South Africa in 1918 until his appointment as Governor of Northern Rhodesia in 1924. His wife, Reniera, was the daughter of Henry Cloete, a well-known South African author. The result of Stanley's appointment was that "a fundamentally South African attitude grew up at all levels of the administration" as evidenced by his decision to adopt a freehold land tenure system for the Northern Rhodesian settlers in direct opposition to the Colonial Office's preference for the Tanganyika system which had been recommended by the East Africa Commission in 1925.[157] In fact, J. F. N. Green, a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department in the Colonial Office, was later to describe Stanley's term of office "as representing the unchecked infiltration of South African ideas!"[158] Thus by the time Lord Passfield issued his White Paper in 1930, the South African ideas of native policy had already become firmly entrenched in the territory's administration.

---

[155] The Times, 17 April, 1925.

[156] Hall, op. cit., p. 104.

[157] Henderson, op. cit., pp. 64-66; Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 215.

The ambiguity of the British Government's policy towards Northern Rhodesia is, perhaps, nowhere better illustrated than in regard to the question of whether or not the territory was to be politically associated with the East African Dependencies (Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika), or with Southern Rhodesia. The question of Northern Rhodesia's future political alignment following Southern Rhodesia's achievement of self-government first appeared, as we have seen, in 1925 in connection with the issue of the administration of the Rhodesia Railways. Although the railway question was subsequently resolved in February 1927, that of Northern Rhodesia's future political alignment was not. The publication of Amery's White Paper in July 1927 announcing the British Government's decision to send a special commission to Africa "To make recommendation as to whether, either by federation or some other form of closer union, more effective co-operation between the different Governments of Central and Eastern Africa" might be secured,[159] led the white settlers in the two Rhodesias to believe that a final decision regarding the future political destiny of Northern Rhodesia was at last going to be made.

The dilemma of the Colonial Office concerning Northern Rhodesia's ultimate political alignment at this time can best be judged from the fact that although the territory was now classified as an East African dependency, there was still no clear-cut view as to whether Northern Rhodesia should be encouraged to seek closer political ties with East Africa or with Southern Rhodesia. There were many people in both the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office who privately shared Strachey's view that

---

[158] See Bottomley's minute of 24 October, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

[159] Future Policy in regard to East Africa, p. 7.

> the geographical position of Northern Rhodesia with its central railway binding it to Southern Rhodesia and all its history sentiment and tradition being essentially South African rather than East African, the arguments for its adhering to any federation based on Nairobi must be far weaker than for adhering to its southern neighbour, with whom it already has much in common, including a customs union.[160]

Before the publication of Lord Passfield's White Paper on native policy in 1930 and the coming of economic depression, the white settlers of Northern Rhodesia, however, showed no significant desire to be politically associated with either East Africa or Southern Rhodesia. This was clearly revealed in the Legislative Council debate on the East African Commission on closer union, headed by Sir E. H. Young, which was due to arrive in the territory on 7 April, 1928.[161] This was perhaps the only time that the question of whether or not Northern Rhodesia should be politically associated with the East African dependencies or with Southern Rhodesia came close to being examined by the Northern Rhodesian settlers in a relatively calm and peaceful atmosphere without being influenced by outbursts of anger against the Colonial Office which were so characteristic of the period after 1930.

---

[160] Minute of 27 July, 1926. P.R.O./C.O./795/13/XF6029/1926.

[161] The announcement of the Commission's visit was made to the Legislative Council by Sir James Crawford Maxwell on 25 November, 1927.

In Northern Rhodesia the discussion concerning the Commission's visit revolved round three main alternative courses, whether the territory was to be linked with the north by means of a federation with East Africa, or with the south through an amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, or whether it was to keep its separate identity and work its way towards self-government. Government Ministers in Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, were alarmed by the fact that the Commission's terms of reference appeared to contemplate a possible incorporation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, both reservoirs of cheap African labour for Southern Rhodesia, into an East African federation. It was for this reason that although Southern Rhodesia as a self-governing Colony was not included in the Commission's terms of reference, at the request of the Southern Rhodesian Government the Commission made a stop at Salisbury before proceeding to Northern Rhodesia.

Although there was general unanimity among the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members against federation with East Africa, opinion regarding ultimate amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia was divided, with three members, Lewis Gordon (Northern Electoral Area), Captain Thomas H. Murray (Southern Electoral Area) and Douglas E. C. R. Stirke (Midland Electoral Area) supporting some form of association with Southern Rhodesia. Murray and Stirke later visited Salisbury for an informal and unofficial meeting with the Government Ministers to ascertain the terms which they were willing to offer to Northern Rhodesia for joining Southern Rhodesia.[162]

---

[162] For the details of the two Elected Members' visit to Salisbury and their discussion with the Southern Rhodesian Ministers on 12 March, 1928, see Enclosure VII to a confidential despatch from the Governor of Southern Rhodesia to the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, 17 March, 1928. P.R.O./C.O./795/22/35018/1928.

In the Legislative Council the main attack against amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia was led by Moore. "So far, at all events, as I am concerned," he said, "we shall never have anything to do with amalgamation."[163] Northern Rhodesia, he argued, should remain a separate political entity and await the time when she would be ready for self-government. He saw no reason why Northern Rhodesians should willingly subordinate their "interests and prospects to the preponderating population of Southern Rhodesia." He was also concerned that under amalgamation the territory might find itself irrevocably drawn, willy nilly, into South Africa in the event of Southern Rhodesia deciding later to join the Union.

Of more immediate concern to Moore, however, was the fear that amalgamation was likely to ruin the town of Livingstone where he had some business interests,[164] since it would lose its status and importance as the capital of Northern Rhodesia. An interesting sidelight to Moore's determination to keep Northern Rhodesia out of Southern Rhodesia was his proposal to rename the territory "Transzambesia", "Windsoria" or "Cecilia", in view of what he said was Southern Rhodesia's tendency to appropriate the name "Rhodesia" to herself, a misrepresentation which to his mind implied a form of superiority. It was time, he said, that Southern Rhodesians were taught that Northern Rhodesia was not "a subsidiary province of Southern Rhodesia, but is a country on its own and developing separately."[165]

---

[163] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 28th November, 1927, col. 18.

[164] See above, p. 49.

[165] *Ibid.*, 5 March, 1926, cols. 21-23.

Speaking editorially through his paper, Moore called for tranquility and maintenance of the status quo for at least five years during which time the territory was to be left to develop on its own. Until Northern Rhodesia's white population had increased and her finances had considerably improved, he felt it was impossible to tell which of the three possible courses would be best for her--federation with the East African dependencies, amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia or self-government. For the present, he said, Northern Rhodesians must keep an open mind and not commit themselves to any policy which might hinder the general progress of the territory. "We hope our friends in Southern Rhodesia will realise the reasonableness of this attitude and that agitation will cease so that all can devote their attention to their respective affairs undisturbed by alarums and excursions."[166]

As far as the general public was concerned, opinion on amalgamation was by no means easy to gauge, as Stanley had previously pointed out on the occasion of Moffat's amalgamation proposal contained in his speech of 30 November, 1925. There were certainly some among the Northern Rhodesian settlers to whom the ideal of a "Greater Rhodesia" had a certain appeal and others, mostly among the farming community, who were eager to secure the services of the Land Bank in Southern Rhodesia through amalgamation. But on the whole, as Stanley observed "a majority in favour of amalgamation would not be obtainable at present."[167] Opposition to amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia was most vocal in the Livingstone area where Moore's influence, both as leader of the Unofficial

---

[166] Livingstone Mail, 15 December, 1927.

[167] See a Colonial Office "Memorandum" of May, 1926. P.R.O./C.O./795/11/X4586/1926.

Members of the Legislative Council and as editor of his own newspaper, was strongest. Some of the Northern Rhodesian settlers recalled the occasion in 1917 when their southern counterparts had rejected with an unmistakable show of contempt the Company's amalgamation proposals of 1917. At a public meeting held in Livingstone on 13 December, 1927, to discuss the question of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia--more accurately, the meeting was called in order to endorse Moore's stand against amalgamation in the Legislature--one speaker stated that "in those days we were the 'Black North' and Southern Rhodesia would have nothing to do with us." He also referred to the displeasure voiced by Southern Rhodesians at the appointment of Sir Drummond Chaplin in March 1921 as joint Administrator of the two Rhodesias because "they did not like the look of our revenue and expenditure account." In the speaker's view, "Southern Rhodesia has had its own way twice; now it is our turn."[168]

It was largely the expectation that the Commission was going to settle once and for all the general uncertainty concerning the future political alignment of the East and Central African dependencies that its report was awaited with keen eagerness by a large number of people in Rhodesia as well as in East Africa. "I am sure," wrote Sir Edward Grigg, Governor of Kenya, to Sir John Chancellor, "That much good will come to both the Northern & Southern group of territories from Hilton Young's Commission if the members are as wise & as able as the Chairman."[169] After the Commission had returned to London to prepare its report, Frank Melland, a former administrator in Northern Rhodesia during the Company period, pointed out that although the Commissioners must have had a very difficult task before them, they had also had a great opportunity. "It has been a chance, indeed, to leave behind them a wonderful heritage, and it is to be hoped that no one,... through narrow-mindedness, marred this chance."[170]

---

[168] Livingstone Mail, 15 December, 1927.

[169] n.d. The Papers of Sir John Chancellor, 7/6.

One person who was not so optimistic about the Commission's report was J. H. Oldham, one of the four members of the Commission. He had privately written to Chancellor while the report was still under preparation,

> If our report is published in its present form it will I hope do some good, but it will certainly lack the qualities which gave Lord Durham's Report its place in history. I never expected our achievement to equal his, but I believe that it is in our power to make a more telling contribution to thought about East African matters than the report makes in its present draft.... What I desire is that the essential positions should be stated more boldly and that we should make as clear as possible to everyone precisely what we mean.[171]

As a balanced criticism of the Commission's report, it would be difficult to improve on these words. After all the high expectations aroused by the Commission's visit to East and Central Africa, its report, published in January, 1929, came as a dismal anti-climax. It was roundly denounced by the Rhodesian settlers, on the one hand, for its pronouncements on native policy as well as for its failure to come up with a clear-cut statement regarding the territory's political destiny, and by the Colonial Office advisers, on the other, for its lack of foresight regarding Northern Rhodesia's future economic development.

---

[170] "Closer Union in East Africa", Fortnightly Review, n.s., vol. 123, (June, 1928), p. 758. What Melland was personally hoping for was a single step unification of the East and Central African group of territories which he viewed as an "ultimate (and inevitable) object."

[171] Oldham to Chancellor, 26 September, 1928. The Papers of Sir John Chancellor 10/3.

In his dissenting view, the Chairman was driven by the lack of an adequate system of communications between the northern and the southern group of territories to the conclusion that "the main interests of Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, economic and political, lie not in association with the East African territories but rather with one another and with the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia."[172] To this end he recommended the establishment of a Central Executive Authority for the two southern territories by delegating to the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, who would then become High Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, some of the powers presently exercised by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.[173]

The majority report, on the other hand, disagreed entirely with the Chairman on this point. They felt that such an arrangement as he had recommended would cause some embarrassment in a case where the Governor of Southern Rhodesia might have to recommend a policy for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which was not in conformity with the one recommended by the Southern Rhodesian Ministers. But their most important objection to the Chairman's recommendation, however, was that it might seriously prejudice the future political orientation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, especially if it were adopted merely as a temporary expedient, as such an arrangement might be difficult to undo should a different policy be later decided upon for these two territories. For these reasons they found themselves unable to recommend "the forging of any fetters which might bind them to the South" through either federation or amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.[174] In their view, the best course for the present was to maintain the individual status of the two Protectorates, pointing out that "It was as yet impossible to foresee what would be the best ultimate grouping of these territories."[175]

---

[172] Cmd. 3234. Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa, January, 1929, p. 252.

[173] Ibid., p. 260.

The Commission's Report came under a barrage of savage attack and even wanton mutilation in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council where the Elected Members often confused its pronouncements on Native policy with those of the 1923 White Paper, with Moore quoting profusely from the two documents as if they were one and the same thing.[176] At one stage in the course of the debate the Governor wondered whether he and Moore had in fact read the same document.[177] Moore led the attack against the Report by reading the following sentence from the 1923 White Paper, "The paramount duty of Trusteeship will continue as in the past to be carried out under the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the agencies of the Imperial Government, and by them alone." This sentence, he said, was largely responsible for the Commission's terms of reference and for the spirit in which the investigation had been undertaken. It was a pronouncement which he thought might have been made by the Ghengis Khan or the war Lord of Germany, but "Here it is said by His Grace, the Duke of Devonshire."[178] He then proceeded to lash out against what he termed the British Government's "Benevolent concern for the natives." In his view, progress in the territory could continue "only on the terms of white paramountcy." He protested very strongly against what he considered to be implied in the doctrine of trusteeship, namely, that the settlers were in Africa in order to turn the black continent into "a school for natives." Africans, he had written in his memorandum submitted to the Commission in 1928, were "wholly unfitted for participation in any form of government."[179] According to Moore, African development was only incidental to that of the country. "We came here and we are here to stay and dominate," he said, "and the land of this Territory belongs more to those who make use of it, than to any other."[180]

---

[174] Ibid., p. 284.

[175] Ibid., pp. 284-5.

[176] With regard to its views on native policy, the Commission's Report, as well as Amery's White Paper of 1927 in which the Commission's terms of reference were defined, amounted to a modification of the principles enunciated in the 1923 White Paper. See, for instance, the Colonial Office memorandum of October, 1934 entitled "Historical Summary of Native Policy in East Africa," written by A. B. Cohen, in P.R.O./C.O./795/72/25659/1934; Robert R. Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour's Experiment with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1962, p. 111.

[177] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 21st March, 1929, col. 357.

To Moore and his settler colleagues, the main issue between the settlers and the Africans was basically one of survival, that is, "which race, the white or the black, in the interest of humanity and civilisation should survive." It was for this reason that the principle of "native paramountcy" was generally considered abhorent. "If I were rude" Moore said, "I should say to that 'bosh'." He went on,

---

[178] Ibid., col. 329.

[179] "The East African Special Commission", n.d. P.R.O./C.O./795/22/35108/1928.

[180] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 21st March, 1929, col. 332.

> Self-preservation is the first law of nature. I intend to strive for my own survival and for the supremacy of my race, and I shall not be dictated to by the Duke of Devonshire to the extent that I must abnegate myself to the native race.[181]

The view that the Report was more concerned with African than with European interests, "super-coddling the natives", as Moore called it, was also shared by Captain Murray who felt that "the interests of the native point of view had been allowed to predominate to an utterly irrational extent, especially as regards Northern Rhodesia."[182] After listening to this effusion of fury directed mainly against the principles of British colonial policy, the Governor felt that the Report had been greatly misunderstood and that the Elected Members had taken "a rather narrow view of the intentions of the members of the Commission when they read, as they did, about the paramountcy of native interests."[183]

As far as the question of closer union was concerned, Moore, however, was not too displeased with the majority report. Their recommendation in favour of maintaining the status quo fell in line with what he had been preaching since 1925. Murray, on the other hand, while rejecting, like everyone else, any suggestion of a partition of the territory, was quite favourable to the Chairman's proposal of linking Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia. Although he felt that the Report would have the effect of delaying closer union with Southern Rhodesia, he was, nevertheless, confident that it would eventually come to that in the end.[184] Towards the end of the year Murray followed up this declaration by introducing a motion in the Legislative Council calling upon the British Government to convene a conference consisting of representatives from the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office, the members of the Southern Rhodesian Legislature and the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council, "to investigate the possibilities of, and the difficulties which may stand in the way of the formation of a Greater Rhodesia."[185] The motion, however, failed to gain the unanimous support of the Elected Members, and even the two who voted for it qualified their support by expressing the view that amalgamation could not be effected until further development had taken place in both countries.

---

[181] Ibid.

[182] Ibid., col. 344.

[183] Ibid., col. 360.

On the whole, as Sir J. Maxwell pointed out to the Secretary of State, there was as yet no real interest shown in the subject of amalgamation in the territory outside the Railway Zone, stretching from Livingstone to Ndola, which in 1928 comprised 6,475 white settlers out of a total of 7,356 for the whole territory. And even within this region settler opinion was divided. The Governor, in fact, detected less enthusiasm for amalgamation now than there had been in 1927 when the appointment of the Commission was first announced, a fact which he attributed to a general misunderstanding of Amery's instructions when explaining the Government's decision to send out a Commission to East and Central Africa.[186] In Maxwell's view most of the pressure for amalgamation came from Southern Rhodesia. "The Premier and the Members of his Cabinet," he wrote to the Secretary of State "never lose an opportunity of drawing attention in Southern Rhodesia to the advisability, though as far as I can tell from their published utterances, they too recognise that it cannot be immediate."[187] For the present at least, the Governor felt that the issue of amalgamation could safely be "regarded as an academic and not an immediately practical issue in the minds of the majority of the European settlers, even when they are not, as many are, definitely opposed to it."[188]

---

[184] Ibid., col. 348.

[185] Ibid., 21st November, 1929, col. 166.

[186] Maxwell to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 2 December, 1929. P.R.O./C.O./795/33/3546/1929.

Personally, Maxwell did not consider amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia as being in the interest of the people of Northern Rhodesia, both black and white. Neither did he favour the idea of an early conference on the subject, suggesting that it be put off for at least three years.[189] In his evidence before the Commission he had, however, expressed doubts about the likelihood of Northern Rhodesia being able to remain a single administrative unit for any length of time, although he thought the immediate partition of the territory would be premature.[190] Much of the future political course of the territory, Maxwell felt, was largely dependent on the development of better communications. If, for instance, a bridge over the Zambezi were built, the future of North-East

---

[187] __Ibid__.

[188] __Ibid__.

[189] __Ibid__.

[190] See a memorandum by H. F. Downie, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, entitled "Future Administration of Northern Rhodesia", 17 August, 1929. P.R.O./C.O./795/32/35408/1929.

Rhodesia might then lie with Nyasaland.

Although Maxwell had no decided views regarding the future of the Railway Zone, he did express the opinion that large-scale mining developments were likely to increase the importance of this area in the not too distant future to a point where it would eventually be in a position to join Southern Rhodesia on its own terms. This, however, would mean that the richest part of the Protectorate would be taken away leaving the rest and by far the most populous part of the territory under a severe financial handicap. And even if the projected Sinoia-Kafue branch of the Rhodesia Railways were ever built, Maxwell was doubtful as to whether there was sufficient identity of interest between Southern and Northern Rhodesia to constitute real unity. Northern Rhodesia, he said, was a tropical territory and he felt "it would not be wise if South African political views ('colour bar') were to spread throughout Northern Rhodesia." He brushed aside suggestions that amalgamation was necessary in order to rescue Southern Rhodesia from being absorbed by South Africa, pointing out that if there should be any movement in Southern Rhodesia in favour of joining the Union, amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia would not help to prevent it. But if, on the other hand, Northern Rhodesia could be linked with the northern territories, she might become strong enough to resist the pull from the south.[191]

The Commission's Report also failed to impress the Colonial Office,

---

[191] Ibid. Maxwell's antipathy towards linking Northern Rhodesia with the south can perhaps be explained by the fact that, unlike Stanley before him, he was a "West African" man, having spent some thirty years of his Colonial service in West Africa before coming to Northern Rhodesia as Governor in 1927.

In spite of his rather patronising remark made a few months after the Report came out that it would long prove "a veritable mine of counsel and guidance for those responsible for the administration of African affairs,"[192] Amery was, in fact, greatly disappointed with it. He pointed out years later that the Report's recommendations were not "altogether practical". Particularly with regard to East Africa, he felt that the Commissioners had overreached themselves,

> instead of confining themselves to the economic issues where a single development policy was most needed, they aimed at the much more difficult and doubtful object of unifying native policy, where local conditions differed so widely, not only between the three territories, but within those territories themselves.[193]

At the time when he wrote these words, however, he was able to find solace in the fact that as far as the Central African group of territories were concerned, the "eminently desirable project" had at last been fulfilled with the creation of a federation comprising Nyasaland and the two Rhodesias in August 1953.

The other person in the Colonial Office who was profoundly disappointed with the Report was W. Ormsby-Gore, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies. He termed the Commission's recommendations regarding the northern group of territories "Nebulous, impracticable and tendencious"; and as far as the majority's proposed solution to the problems of the Central African group were concerned, he found the Report "even more inadequate."[194] The main defect of the Report in his view lay in the Commissioners' failure to appreciate the significance of what he described as "the tremendous coming development of the cupriferous belt in Northern Rhodesia," a development which he felt even Northern Rhodesians themselves had not yet begun to appreciate. In ten years' time, he said, half of the world's supply of copper would be coming from Northern Rhodesia.

---

[192] "Problems and Development in Africa", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. 28, (July, 1929), p. 331.

[193] My Political Life, War and Peace 1914-1929, vol. 2, (London: Hutchinson, 1953), pp. 361-2.

[194] Minute of 20 March, 1929. P.R.O./C.O./795/30/35260/1929.

> We shall be dealing with big figures--assuming copper is £100 a ton by then, and the output of Northern Rhodesia is equivalent to 200,000 tons a year from all the various operating companies--a not excessive figure--you will have £20,000,000 worth of entirely new wealth coming out of Northern Rhodesia each year.[195]

Even if amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia came through, Ormsby-Gore was convinced that Northern Rhodesia was ultimately going to be the richer and, therefore, the more important of the two countries. At the same time he was certain that the mining interests, for reasons related to labour legislation, were not likely to favour amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia as they would prefer "to employ as high a percentage of non-European labour as possible." What was urgently required in his view were long-range plans, and he felt that no right decisions could be taken in this regard unless it was realised "that the Hilton Young Commission 'missed the bus' completely in Northern Rhodesia as elsewhere."[196]

From Ormsby-Gore's remarks it is evident that in the consideration of the question of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias a new factor which was later to exercise a powerful influence on British policy makers, alongside considerations of trusteeship obligations towards the Northern Rhodesian Africans, was now beginning to emerge as clouds of war began to darken the European horizon. This was the development of the copper mining industry in Northern Rhodesia.

---

[195] Ibid.

[196] Ibid.

No immediate action was taken by the British Government on the Commission's recommendations concerning the southern group of territories in view of the more pressing problems affecting the East African dependencies which demanded more immediate attention. Besides, it was generally felt that the subject of amalgamation could not be rushed and that more time was needed before the question of Northern Rhodesia's political destiny could finally be determined. The Northern Rhodesian Elected Members' request for a round table conference to discuss amalgamation was accordingly turned down as premature in view of the developments that were taking place inside the territory as well as those that were expected to take place in the near future.[197]

The Commission's Report was also received with great disappointment by the Southern Rhodesian Ministers. In their observations, which were forwarded to the Colonial Office they expressed complete disagreement with the majority report and urged that no action be taken on it which might be prejudicial to future political union between the two Rhodesias.[198] Here the matter remained until the publication of Lord Passfield's White Paper on native policy in East Africa which brought the issue of amalgamation once more to the forefront of political discussion. As far as the Northern Rhodesian settlers were concerned, however, the main significance of the Hilton Young Report lay in the fact that its observations regarding questions of policy towards white settlers in British East and Central Africa contained the first broad hint that the immediate attainment of self-government could no longer be presumed. The Commission's view that there could be no question of responsible government in the "mixed states" of tropical Africa until the Africans could be brought up to share in the responsibility of government in accordance with the Imperial Government's trusteeship obligations[199] was described by Moore as "startling".

---

[197] Lord Passfield to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, 25 January, 1930. P.R.O./C.O./795/33/3546/1929.

[198] See Machtig's minute of 4 October, 1930. P.R.O./C.O./795/40/356631/1930.

> If that were to be taken truly and literally then we shall never attain responsible government until we had educated the natives to sit in this Council. If that be the case, then responsible government as an actual goal, must be abandoned. It will not take place for generations. I do not think it will ever take place.[200]

Although the Report dampened the earlier expectations of the inevitability of self-government, there was as yet no indication that the Northern Rhodesian settlers were ready to embrace the idea of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia in spite of Moore's vague hint that if responsible government was unattainable in the future, they might have "to choose another path" to obtain it. It was not until 1933 that the idea of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia began to gain popular support among the Northern Rhodesian settlers and we must now look at the developments that brought about this volte-face.

---

[199] Op. cit., pp. 83-4. Amery flatly disagreed with this view and regarded this statement as an uncalled-for obiter dictum.

[200] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 21st March, 1929, col. 339.

Chapter 2

THE WHITE PAPER CONTROVERSY AND THE ISSUE OF AMALGAMATION IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

The clamour and controversy aroused by the Hilton Young Report in Northern Rhodesia had barely died down when, to use Amery's words, "the mischance of a general election"[1] on 30 May, 1929 ushered in a second minority Labour Government in Great Britain under Ramsay MacDonald with the result that the whole question of closer union in East and Central Africa now passed into the hands of Sidney Webb who, as Lord Passfield, became Secretary of State for the Colonies and Dominions Affairs on 7 June.[2] Both Webb and his wife, Beatrice, detested the new title. Beatrice never used it at all, and Webb only while he held office. "My instinct," she wrote in her Diary, "was against the use of a title and Sidney, tho' feeling less strongly acquiesced."[3] Although she remained resolute in her silent campaign against the aristocracy, she was rather disappointed that the general public tended to view her actions as a "feminist gesture" rather than "a depreciation of titles."[4]

---

[1] "The Crown and Africa", African Affairs, vol. 52, no. 208, (July, 1953), p. 184.

[2] On 5 June, 1930 the Dominions Office was given its own head, J. H. Thomas, and Webb was left to administer the Colonial Office for the remainder of the Labour Government's term of office.

[3] Diary of Beatrice Webb, June 20th, 1929. All references to the Diary are to the typewritten manuscript at the London School of Economics and Political Science Library.

[4] *Ibid.*, June 29th, 1929.

The change of Government, although not entirely unexpected, came as a bitter blow to Amery whose project for closer union in East and Central Africa was left in complete disarray. In his opinion, it was Webb who wrecked his scheme by issuing "a dogmatic White Paper" which, by antagonising the white settlers, "postponed all possibility of federation indefinitely."[5] The key figure in the events which brought about strained relations between the Northern Rhodesian settlers and the Colonial Office was Sidney Webb. So much has been written about Webb's failure at the Colonial Office by people who knew him very closely that there is a tendency to overlook the difficulties with which he was faced during this period.[6] He was seventy years old when he took office in 1929. Although he was still physically sound, he had already reached a point in his life where he could look back on his past achievements with a certain degree of complacency. As Beatrice put it,

> His mind has lost its restless energy but then he lost that twenty years ago. His very happiness has dulled his desire to alter the existing order--a social order which has shown itself so beneficient to us! And the rise to high office so late in life has naturally not diminished his subconscious complacency with the world as it is.[7]

Among the highlights of Webb's achievements was the growth of the London School of Economics and Political Science, particularly its final acceptance by the three British political parties. "Certainly the Webbs ought to be grateful to the political world in which they have grown old," wrote Beatrice in her Diary.[8]

---

[5] My Political Life, vol. 2, p. 362.

[6] See the introduction in Margaret Cole, ed., Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1924-1932, (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956); Drummond Shiels, "Sidney Webb as a Minister", The Webbs and Their Work, ed. Margaret Cole, (London: Frederick Muller Ltd., 1949); Kingsley Martin, "The Webbs in Retirement", Ibid.; Leonard Woolf, Downhill All the Way An Autobiography of the Years 1919-1939, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1967).

[7] Diary, March 12th, 1930.

Just before the general election Sidney Webb had decided to give up politics altogether and withdraw from the Labour Party in order to devote the remaining years of his life to writing in partnership with his wife, something which Beatrice had been looking forward to since 1924. After the election, however, Webb, according to Amery, was "dragged out of retirement, and made to take a peerage as Lord Passfield...."[9] It had originally been intended to send Webb to the House of Lords, mainly because he was childless and Ramsay MacDonald was opposed in principle to the creation hereditary peers--but without office. The man slated for the Colonial Office was A. V. Alexander who had been Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade in the first Labour Government. Both Arthur Henderson and J. H. Thomas wanted the Foreign Office but MacDonald offered the latter the post of the Lord Privy Seal and the Director of Employment. At first Thomas declined this offer and decided to take the Colonial Office which he had held in 1924. On the morning of 6 June he went to the Colonial Office to meet Amery, the outgoing Minister, and the latter was "glad to pass the cares of his much-loved Empire into the hands of such 'a sound Imperialist at heart'." But in the afternoon he decided to take the Employment position in spite of Amery's warning that he was starting his job with a noose round his neck with Snowden, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, holding the other end of the rope.[10]

---

[8] Ibid.

[9] My Political Life, vol. 2, p. 502. For an account of the circumstances surrounding Webb's appointment to the Colonial Office see Philip Snowden, An Autobiography, vol. 2, 1919-1934, (London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson Limited, 1934), pp. 757-766; Blaxland, op. cit., pp. 220-221.

Urged on by his wife, Webb refused to go to the House of Lords without a protfolio. It was only after MacDonald had discovered his own error in not having appointed at least two Secretaries of State in the House of Lords as was required under the constitution that Webb was given the Colonial Office. One person who was not too displeased with Webb's appointment was Sir Francis Newton, the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London. He was happy that the Dominions and the Colonies had not been given to Lord Olivier, the author of White Capital and Coloured Labour (1906), and The Anatomy of African Misery (1927), who was well-known for his anti-white settler views.[11] According to Beatrice, Webb was delighted with this "very handsome offer" which brought him back to the department in which he had served as a civil servant.[12] It was, she said, the only office "about which he knows a good deal more than about others." Yet in spite of this advantage he was unable to deal effectively with the demanding colonial problems which confronted him during his term of office, particularly those pertaining to the white settlers in Kenya and the Jewish immigrants in Palestine. Although Webb can by no means be classified as a complete success at the Board of Trade, the post he occupied in the first Labour Government, he was at least happier there. In the Colonial Office, on the other hand, he became extremely unhappy and on more than one occasion he tried to desert his post. When the end of the second Labour Government came Webb, as Beatrice says, was "delighted to be out of it all."[13]

---

[10] Blaxland, *ibid*., p. 221.

[11] Gann, A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934, (London: Chatte & Windus, 1965), p. 278.

[12] Diary, June 6th, 1929.

According to Dr. Drummond Shiels, his Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State in the Colonial Office, Webb's failure stemmed from his inability to handle situations where human emotions and psychological factors were involved, especially where, as in the case of Kenya and Palestine, he was confronted with strong pressures from opposite directions. His relative success at the Board of Trade, he says, was largely due to the fact that there he was dealing mostly with facts, figures and statistics and the nature of the work involved was within his own range of competence.[14] Secondly, among his Cabinet colleagues Webb was a political lightweight and was never able to impress his views upon them, an essential quality in the Cabinet system where there is always a competition of views and success largely depends on one's ability to impress one's colleagues. Webb also laboured under another disadvantage. As a politician he was unable to inspire awe in Parliament. As Kingsley Martin points out, his pointed beard was always the target of jest in Parliament and his voice was too weak to impress many people.[15] Webb also had a rather indifferent attitude towards his Cabinet duties. From his wife's Diary, for instance, we learn that he was "significantly indifferent whether or not his way prevails," and that if the Cabinet decided to listen to other voices, Webb was always willing to "carry out their wishes to the best of his ability."[16] He was not a debater, and he often found it difficult to make up his own mind on controversial issues.

---

[13] Ibid., August 25th, 1931.

[14] "Sidney Webb as a Minister", op. cit., p. 203.

[15] "The Webbs in Retirement", ibid., p. 287.

Webb was also handicapped by what Shiels calls "the civil service way of looking at things."[17] From 1881 to 1891 he had served in the Colonial Office where his duties involved interviewing applicants to the Colonial Service in West Africa. He later rose to the rank of second class clerk in the Department dealing with the Cape Colony, Natal and Zululand.[18] Beatrice described him as a "super civil servant" whose instinct was to obey the orders of his superior and make the best of the business.[19] This quality, however, proved to be a serious handicap once he became a Cabinet Minister. The difference between initiating orders and merely implementing ready-made decisions was quite substantial. From his years of association with the Fabian Society, the London County Council and the various committees of the Labour Party he had mastered the art of drawing up memoranda, weighing both pros and cons of the issues involved, but he never really acquired the sense of ultimate responsibility and never got used to advocating a policy for which he would be criticised and which he would have to stand up and defend.

On East Africa, for instance, he had prepared an elaborate memorandum for the Cabinet in which he had set out in detail what he believed to be a wise compromise between the two Reports by Sir Hilton Young and Sir Samuel Wilson on closer union.[20] The Left wing of the Labour Party, however, led by Josiah Wedgewood, a former Liberal who had joined the ranks of the Labour Party in April 1919, whom Beatrice described as "a fanatical believer in crude political democracy on strictly numerical basis", was, in her view, "determined to have the blood of the settlers--to make them feel that they are beaten."[21] In the end the Cabinet decided that the document should not be submitted to the Joint Select Committee as a scheme of reform, but as an ordinary memorandum discussing different proposals so that it would be up to the Committee to decide which proposals it would accept. Rather than fight to defend his own point of view, Webb chose to submit meekly to this proposal without offering any resistance. "I told Macdonald not to bother about me and my views," he told his wife, "I have done my best to give a workable scheme of reform--but it is so uncertain how things will work that I'm quite ready to leave the final decision to the Jt. Committee."[22] Privately Webb was hoping that the whole issue would drag on until it would be left to another Secretary of State to make the final decision.[23]

---

[16] November 28th, 1929.

[17] "Sidney Webb as a Minister", op. cit., p. 206.

[18] Gregory, op. cit., p. 80.

[19] Diary, November 29th, 1929.

Lastly, Webb also suffered from what Margaret Cole calls an

---

[20] Cmd. 3378 Report of Sir Samuel Wilson on his Visit to East Africa, 1929.

[21] Diary of Beatrice Webb, November 29th, 1929.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

"innate trust in the expert"[24] a view which is corroborated by Shiels who points out that Webb had great respect for any individual whom he believed to be an expert. "He regarded as experts," he says, "most, if not all, of the senior men in the Colonial Office and was, perhaps inclined to accept their judgement without always applying the same critical examination which he gave to other matters."[25] It was a common view among the Labour M.P.s that Webb was "too much in the hands of his officials". Beatrice, for instance, was shocked to discover the impotence of Cabinet Ministers in determining policy as well as the power wielded by permanent officials. When Virginia Woolf casually remarked to her about "How thrilling it must be to watch actual decisions being made--decisions which alter the life of 'nations'," her retort was that it was "outsiders representing interest or enthusiasm" and "permanent civil servants" who made decisions. Cabinet Ministers, she said, were "relatively unimportant."[26]

> In ninety-nine cases of a hundred decisions are taken by the minister, on the advice of his permanent officials; in the hundredth case, after consultation with the P.M.; and, perhaps in one or two 'high policy' issues, after consultation and agreement with the leaders of the other parties.[27]

As far as she could discern, Cabinet meetings were merely held in order to tell the Ministers as a body decisions already arrived at by other means so that they might all tell the same story to the Lords and

---

[24] Beatrice Webb's Diaries, op. cit., p. xiii.

[25] "Sidney Webb as a Minister", op. cit., p. 206.

[26] Diary, October 27th, 1929.

[27] Ibid., March 30th, 1930.

Commons and at party meetings.[28] It is, of ccurse, not altogether improbable that Beatrice's rather cynical view of the working of the British Cabinet system was largely influenced by Webb's own weakness in an administration that was totally lacking in strength, solidarity and forceful leadership. That the Labour Party as then constituted should have been in power was, in Beatrice's view, an absurdity. "In Home Affairs," she said, "it (the Labour Party) has no policy--it has completely lost its bearings," and she now began to doubt the "'inevitability of gradualness' or even the practicability of gradualness in the transition from Capitalist to an equalitarian civilisation."[29] Besides, both she and her husband deeply loathed MacDonald whom she regarded as "the greatest political *artist* (as distinguished from orator or statesman) in British political history."[30]

As problems over Palestine and Kenya mounted, Webb became more conscious of his weak position inside the Cabinet. "People will say that your husband has not been a success as a Minister," he told his wife one day after returning from London in a very depressed mood, "The P.M. is cross about Palestine."[31] An undated draft letter in Webb's Papers addressed to MacDonald in which Webb reminds him of his previous request to be relieved from ("burden of")[32] office, tells the whole story of his frustrations. "The past two years," he writes, "have taken a good deal out of me; and at my age of 72 I really cannot continue without risk of breakdown." He then goes on to mention "the succession of difficulties" he has had to face and expresses regret that he had been unable to be of greater assistance in the counsels of the Cabinet.[33]

---

[28] *Ibid*. This, however, should be taken with a grain of salt. Beatrice knew very little about what went on inside the Cabinet. Webb, she complained, did not tell her much. The lack of direction from the Prime Minister left the initiative on policy matters on the individual Ministers and it was here that Webb's weakness became obvious.

[29] *Ibid*., February 4th, 1931.

[30] *Ibid*., December 21st, 1929.

[31] *Ibid*., December 14th, 1930.

Already Webb had had to suffer the humiliation of having the Dominions Office taken away from him and given to J. H. Thomas. Considered alone, perhaps, this incident can be viewed more as a logical culmination of the step first taken by Amery in 1925 when the Dominions Office was separated from the Colonial Office than a reflection on Webb's competence as a Minister, although this is not what MacDonald had in mind when he made the change. His main concern was to rescue his close friend, Thomas, from the Employment Office where, with unemployment figures reaching close to the two million mark, he had become an object of criticism and derision. Sixty Labour Party M.P.s had signed a petition for Thomas's removal from the post. It was in order to "relieve Thomas without insult" that the Dominions Office was taken away from Webb to create a new post for the beleagured Minister.[34] But the removal of Palestine from jurisdiction and its placement under a Committee of the Cabinet was unmistakably a censure for his handling of the problem there. "A man less loyal to the committee system of government would probably have resigned under the latter rebuff," writes Margaret Cole, and points out that some of those closest to him regretted that he did not do so at the time.[35]

---

[32] Although these words are crossed out in the draft, their significance is unmistakable.

[33] Sidney Webb Papers, London School of Economics and Political Science Library.

[34] Blaxland, op. cit., p. 238.

In all fairness to Webb it should, however, be pointed out that his tenure at the Colonial Office coincided with a very difficult time for Great Britain and the Empire. The financial and economic crisis facing the country which ultimately brought about the "inglorious" and "queer end of the Labour Cabinet",as Beatrice called it,[36] was approaching its climax. Unemployment was high and the newspapers were already proclaiming "Great Britain's impending doom". For one fleeting moment Beatrice thought that the demise of capitalism was at hand. "It may be that the 'decay of capitalist civilisation' which we prophecied [sic] and described ten years ago," she wrote in her Diary, "is actually taking place and that some new and better forms of social life are struggling through in ways we fail to recognize."[37] The heavy load of work in the Colonial Office and the mounting demands of the colonial Empire were burdensome enough without the additional stress caused by divisions within the Labour Cabinet.[38] Webb's policies in East Africa and Palestine exposed him to bitter attacks both inside and outside the Labour Party. The Prime Minister showed very little interest in questions related to the conflict between the Africans and the settlers in Africa. For instance, when a deputation consisting of C. R. Button, Josiah Wedgewood and John Scurr met the Prime Minister to present their views on Kenya, MacDonald, according to Beatrice's account, "listened to their plea and asked Sidney to answer--while continuing to read his correspondence...."[39]

---

[35] Beatrice Webb's Diaries, p. xiv, Shiels, "Sidney Webb as a Minister", op. cit., pp. 214-215.

[36] Diary, August 25th, 1931.

[37] February 25th, 1930.

[38] The internal problems of the second Labour Government culminating in MacDonald's "gross betrayal" of August 1931, are discussed in Webb's 33 page handwritten memorandum in his Papers entitled "Papers relating to the crisis of August 1931, and the resignation [Continued on next page.]

It is, however, clear that Webb was neither the terror nor the scourge that the white settlers in both Kenya and Northern Rhodesia made him out to be. Few of them seemed to realize the pressures under which he had to act in matters relating to the contentious issues affecting black and white relations in Africa. As he told Sir Edward Grigg, rather apologetically,

> I am afraid that you may think that I have been interfering a great deal, especially in regard to native affairs. But your own political experience will enable you to appreciate my position this end. Native administration attracts an increasing amount of attention in this country--and, to be quite frank, in the case of Kenya, suspicion--particularly in regard to the relations between natives and the immigrant communities;

[Continued from p. 96]
of the Labour Government," written in September 1931, with an Epilogue dated 16 November, 1931. Most of it is a vituperative personal attack on Ramsay MacDonald as a leader. For a less pungent but still bitter account of the events of August 1931 see Webb's article, "What happened in 1931: A Record by Sidney Webb (Lord Passfield)", The Political Quarterly, vol. 3, (1932), pp. 1-17. Other accounts of the afflictions of the Labour Government at this time can be found in several autobiographies and biographies of its main figures such as J. R. Clynes [he was Secretary of State for Home Affairs], Memoirs, 1924-1937, vol. 2, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1937), Blaxland, op. cit., and Snowden, op. cit.

[39] Diary, November 9th, 1929.

> and the principle of trusteeship for the natives makes a tremendous appeal to the people here.[40]

As it was, Webb was severely criticised by people like Josiah Wedgewood whom Beatrice described as "the prime mover in the revolt of the Left", for "his lack of unqualified hostility to the English settlers in Kenya."[41] Caught in the middle of the verbal war between the pro-settlers and the pro-African groups, both of whom were largely represented among the Conservatives and Labourites, respectively, Webb elected to argue in favour of some middle course which he felt would "secure the consent of those concerned who are outside the Party and thus enabling the policy to be carried out."[42]

Webb's attitude towards the British Empire was in fact tolerant, even conservative, when compared with that of the Left wing members of the Labour Party like Josiah Wedgewood, H. G. Wells, Leonard Woolf and even Beatrice, all of whom were already predicting its demise as a result of the changes brought about by World War I. "For me," wrote Wells in 1929, "I live in the Empire as a man who occupies a house with an expiring lease. I can contemplate the disappearance of the last imperial links with equanimity."[43] To Wells the persistent belief in the Empire among his contemporaries was a clear case of

---

[40] Lord Passfield to Grigg, 1 May, 1930, Sidney Webb Papers. On matters of colonial interest, Webb's Papers are rather disappointing. In the file headed "Correspondence with Colonial Governors" only his acrimonious private correspondence with Sir Edward Grigg is to be found. On several points, however, his wife's Diary is very illuminative.

[41] Diary, November 28th, 1929. Beatrice adds, however, that Wedgewood was "just as angry at Sidney's lack of unqualified enthusiasm for the case of the Jewish Settlers" in Palestine.

[42] Ibid., November 9th, 1929.

[43] Imperialism and the Open Conspiracy, (London: Faber & Faber, 1929), p. 12.

> a lag in our political apprehensions, and a still greater lag in our educational adaptations. We are facing the second quarter of the twentieth century with the already lagging political ideology of the third quarter of the nineteenth, and therein reside most of the distinctive stresses and dangers of our time.[44]

In his view the conditions under which the British Empire had developed and which had helped to sustain it in the past no longer existed. The British Empire, he said, was primarily a product of steamships whose prosperity and security had largely been dependent on the sustained control of the sea lanes. The invention of the aeroplane, coupled with the competitive shipbuilding of the other nations of the world had, however, "so changed the cohesion of this sea-knit confederation that it is now no more than a heterogenous system of regions linked by long and vulnerable lines of communication."[45]

Beatrice Webb was also unable to find any justification "for the present congeries of Dominions and Colonies" which made up the British Empire. As far as she was concerned the British Empire which reached its territorial apogee at the conclusion of World War I was already suffering from what she called "a sort of senile hypertrophy" which had been hastened by Great Britain's exhaustion from the war and the added responsibilities of administering the African and the Middle East mandates. As a result of the decline of British wealth and power relative to the United States of America,the whole fabric of the British Empire seemed destined to gradually "dissolve into vague ties of sentiments" without any governmental meaning. The call for free trade within the Empire and other such stunts were to her nothing more than "pre-doomed attempts to galvanise the evaporating tie of sentiment into something substantial."[46] Like Wells, she wondered how long the fiction of the British Empire could last. "How long will the ghost of the B. E. survive," she asked, "Fifty years?"[47] As she watched her husband toiling and straining under the heavy weight of administering the Empire she was unable to hide her deep-felt pity for him. "It is depressing to administer a concern which is in process of dissolution," she wrote in her Diary towards the end of 1929, adding, however, that neither Webb nor Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary, shared her pessimism--"they believe in God's Englishman."[48] Webb, according to Leonard Woolf, must have been born "half a little conservative and half a little liberal." He points out that although in economic and social spheres he could be considered progressive and even revolutionary, where the British Empire was concerned "he was a common or garden imperialist conservative."[49] Such then was the man who was soon to find himself at the centre of a furious uproar in Kenya and Northern Rhodesia.

---

[44] Ibid., p. 14.

[45] Ibid., p. 22.

* *

When Webb took over the Colonial Office in June 1929 one of the problems demanding urgent attention was the question of black and white relations in British East and Central Africa which had already been a subject of investigation by the East Africa Commission headed by Sir Hilton Young whose findings were published six months before the Labour Party came to power. No immediate action regarding the Commission's recommendations had been taken by the British Government and it was thus left to Sidney Webb to work out a policy that would hopefully resolve the outstanding sources of conflict in the spheres of political administration and economic development. With this aim in mind Webb issued two White Papers in June 1930. The first dealt with the long-standing question of closer union in East Africa[50] whose proposals were to form the subject of a Joint Committee which the two Houses of Parliament were to be invited to appoint. The absence of this particular specification in the second White Paper[51] indicates quite clearly that it had not been Webb's original intention to submit it to the Joint Select Committee.[52] This meant of course that as far as the Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa was concerned, there had never been any intention on Webb's part to subject this policy to the scrutiny of, and possible modification by, outside parties or bodies. That he eventually did is a reflection of his inability to stand his own ground in the face of intensive pressure and criticism.

---

[46] Diary, October 20th, 1929.

[47] _Ibid_.

[48] December 2nd, 1929.

[49] _Op_. _cit_., p. 236.

The Memorandum on Native Policy, "the Magna Charta of native policy" as Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister later called it,[53] brought upon

---

[50] Cmd. 3574. Statement of the Conclusion of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards Closer Union in East Africa.

[51] Cmd. 3573. Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa.

[52] See also Shiel's reply to Ormsby-Gore's question in the House of Commons on this point, vol. 241, 9 July, 1930, col. 414.

[53] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 292, 12 July, 1934, col. 652.

Webb the wrath and the abuse of the European communities not only in East and Central Africa, but as far afield as South Africa where General Hertzog, the South African Prime Minister, and his Minister of Lands, Piet Grobler, spoke out strongly against the policy enunciated in it.[54] Dr. Shiels thought it rather unfortunate that Hertzog's speech was never "adequately dealt with, at the time," by any of the leading Government Ministers.[55] The effects of the White Paper on native policy were, according to Lord Winterton, a Conservative Member of Parliament for nearly forty seven years (1904-1951) who was an absentee land owner in Northern Rhodesia and one of the severe critics of Sidney Webb, "far-reaching and wholly unfortunate":

> Where serious difficulties already existed in regard to the relationship of different races, as in Kenya, it has increased the differences of opinion; where, as in Northern Rhodesia, Europeans and Africans have hitherto lived peaceably side by side, and the disturbing element of Asiatic immigrants has been absent, it has aroused among the European population apprehension and indignation, and has given General Hertzog the opportunity to raise in an acute and embarrassing form the question of the correlation of Native Policy in Eastern and Southern Africa.[56]

In view of the bitter controversy aroused by the Memorandum it may perhaps be wondered why Webb had found it necessary to issue it in the first place.

---

[54] The Times, 1 November, 1930. Hertzog's attack was delivered at a formal dinner of the Dominion Prime Ministers who were in London for the Imperial Conference. For Grobler's statement see The Times, 20 September 1930 and The Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Friend, vol. 20, (October, 1930), pp. 108-9.

[55] "The East Africa Report", The Political Quarterly, vol. 3, (1932), p. 75.

[56] "Northern Rhodesia and the Future" The Empire Review, vol. Lii, (December, 1930), p. 410.

Apart from the wider scope of the application of the Memorandum, the principles enunciated in it were not new as Webb himself readily admitted. They were basically the same as those previously stated in 1923 by the former Conservative Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Duke of Devonshire. According to one historian, the "real father of the paramountcy declaration" was Dr. J. H. Oldham, a prominent figure in the World Missionary Conference. It was he who first suggested to the Colonial Office the idea of such a declaration which was readily accepted as a "welcome way of escape" from the conflict between the settlers and the Indians in the Colony.[57] Webb's Memorandum noted that the British Government accepted "whole-heartedly the Duke of Devonshire's declaration in the White Paper of 1923 that the interests of African natives must be paramount, and that if and when, those interests and the interests of the immigrant races should conflict, the former should prevail." The Memorandum then went on to state that the relation of the British Government to the native population of East Africa was that of trusteeship "which cannot be devolved, and from which they cannot be relieved." The ultimate responsibility for the exercise of trusteeship was thus deemed to rest with the British Government alone. This was by far the most controversial part of the Memorandum since it appeared to imply a denial of any delegation of power to the white settlers. But even here Webb was merely repeating the words used in the Duke of Devonshire's declaration of 1923 which had stated that "This paramount duty of trusteeship will continue as in the past to be carried out under the Secretary of State for the Colonies by the agents of the Imperial Government, and by them alone."[58] It is therefore little wonder that Drummond Shiels came to feel that the attack on the Labour Government's White Paper was politically motivated. Why, he asked, was this Paper being attacked whereas the White Paper that had been issued by the Conservative Government in 1923 and upon which this one was based was never attacked? To him it appeared to be a case where it could be said "that while one man may steal a horse, another may not look over a hedge."[59] The furore aroused by the Memorandum must have come as a great surprise to Webb. As he told Sir Edward Grigg, there was nothing revolutionary in his White Paper; all that he had done was nothing more than "a dotting of i's and a crossing of t's,"[60]

---

[57] George Bennet, "Paramountcy to Partnership: J. H. Oldham and Africa", Africa, vol. 30, (January, 1960), p. 357.

Where Sidney Webb erred, however, was in his failure to point out that during Amery's term of office the policy of trusteeship had been watered down by the doctrine of "Dual Policy" enunciated in the White Paper of 1927 which, instead of leaving the exercise of trusteeship exclusively in the hands of the British Government and its agents, now sought to associate the white settlers in the execution of this responsibility. In practical terms, and in spite of the contention by the Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa that the association of the settlers in the responsibility of trusteeship was "not necessarily synonymous with increased political control in native affairs,"[61] such association could only mean a transfer of political power to the white settler minority and the ultimate surrender of the fate of the Africans into their hands. And given the conflict of interest which the East African Commission in its Report of 1929 considered to be "almost inevitable" in practice, it is hard to understand the same Report's view that "if the immigrant communities are to be associated ... in the trusteeship for the natives, this must not give them power to vary the terms of the trust,"[62] since the settlers were themselves a party to the conflict.

---

[58] Cmd. 1922. Indians in Kenya, July, 1923, p. 10.

[59] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 246, 9 December, 1930, col. 361.

[60] Webb to Grigg, 9 July, 1930. Sidney Webb Papers.

[61] Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, vol. 1, Report, H.C. 156, 6 October, 1931, p. 28.

In Amery's view, however, the growth of European settlement in the East and Central African dependencies raised an important question concerning the part which the white settlers should play in the economic and political development of the territories in which they were resident. Their claim to share progressively in the responsibility of government was one which he felt could not be ignored.[63] It was this aspect of Amery's policy which led some Labour Party members of Parliament to suspect that the White Paper policy of 1923 was being subverted.[64] Some stated quite explicitly that Amery's policy of associating the white settlers in the responsibility of trusteeship was in fact a reversal of the Devonshire policy.[65] The view that Amery's White Paper of 1927 "modified" the policy laid down in 1923 was, in fact, acknowledged by some of the officials in the Colonial Office.[66] It is thus clear that in spite of Amery's assertion that his White Paper was a reaffirmation of the essential principles of the 1923 declaration, a view which was later endorsed by the Joint Committee in 1931, a significant change had in fact been introduced in 1927 and Webb would have won credit for himself had he had the courage to point this out as the reason for issuing his Memorandum. His assertion, however, that his White Paper on native policy was "in no way inconsistent with what has been described as the 'Dual Policy'" begs the obvious question--if the two policies were not inconsistent, why had he found it necessary to issue his Memorandum? His argument that he was merely stating "in clear and comprehensive form" those same principles was hardly convincing, especially at a time when there was a growing feeling that there had already been too many White Papers and Commissions on East Africa.

---

[62] Ibid., p. 7.

[63] Future Policy in regard to Eastern Africa, p. 5.

[64] See H. J. Thomas' speech in the House of Commons on 19 July, 1927, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 209, cols. 260-1.

[65] Ibid., col. 276, Harry Snell.

The overall effect of Webb's Memorandum was that it brought to the centre of the political forum the question of the role which the white settlers were expected to play in the development of tropical Africa. Just prior to the publication of his Memorandum, Webb had written to Grigg in Kenya informing him of his intention to issue a general statement concerning native policy which would serve as a guide in matters of colonial administration not only for the East African dependencies, but for all colonial administrations concerned with the governance of native peoples.[67] Grigg responded by lecturing Webb on the need for circumspection in dealing with the delicate subject of native policy and impertinently warned him against the dangers of "general statements and long-range definitions of policy on questions which take varying shapes as conditions change, and gradually become capable of new solutions as experience grows." He went on,

---

[66] See A. B. Cohen's memorandum of October, 1934 entitled "Historical Summary of Native Policy in East Africa". P.R.O./C.O./795/72/25659/1934.

[67] Passfield to Grigg, 1 May, 1930, Sidney Webb Papers.

> I do, therefore, most earnestly submit that the faith of the Empire and of successive Imperial governments should not be pledged to any documents until all parties have had an opportunity of examining them, until all local governments have also had their say, until all phrases open to various interpretations have been eliminated, and until, therefore, misunderstandings in the future have been provided against as fully as human shortsightedness allows.... We are already suffering in East Africa from hasty declarations, which are both mutually inconsistent and variously understood. We should guard against exposing native policy to any dangers of this kind by every means in our power.

More particularly, Grigg made an earnest appeal for due consideration of the European settlers in the definition of policy which Webb was about to make.

> I hope also that any documents published will show a due regard for the welfare of the European people as well as the native and other peoples in East Africa. The European community was established here by the Imperial Government. Our honour and our future are in its hands in this sense, that if the British settler were to fail and degenerate he would bring European civilization gradually down with him in his fall.... The partizans who refuse to face this cardinal fact are the African's worst friends; and I have frankly regretted to see so little recognition of it in the communications which you have sent me during recent months.[68]

After the publication of Webb's White Papers relations between the two men broke down almost completely with Grigg openly attacking not only Webb's policies, but the Labour Government itself. "Your party is by its very nature a party of zealous and militant reformers," Grigg wrote to Webb at one point, "and many of them have had to learn from responsibility that there is a very wide and difficult debateable [sic] land between the enunciations of political principles and the practical application of these principles to the circumstances of the time."[69]

---

[68] Grigg to Passfield, 30 May, 1930. *Ibid*.

Although some of the people who were close to Webb urged him to recall Grigg, he refused to do so. Shiels' suggestion that this refusal was probably due to Webb's "respect for the expert, his wide tolerance for a view different from his own, and his personal modesty"[70] is not only unconvincing, but seems totally irrelevant given the intense hostility between the two men. A more plausible explanation seems to be Webb's own weakness and ineptitude and the fact that at this particular time he was already "tired of his job" and was eagerly looking forward to retirement. "I should not like to say this to anyone else," he confided to his wife "but I wish we had been defeated last night."[71] Grigg, too, was nearing his own retirement and had, ironically enough, only stayed for an extra year in Kenya after the end of his regular term in 1929 at Webb's own request.[72] Other reasons for Webb's reluctance to recall Grigg were political--his fear of precipitating a settler rebellion in Kenya and provoking parliamentary criticism against the already beleaguered Labour Government at home.

---

[69] 23 June, 1930. Ibid.

[70] "Sidney Webb as a Minister", op. cit., p. 218.

[71] Diary, February 4th, 1931.

[72] Gregory, Sidney Webb and East Africa, p. 126.

The real significance of Webb's Memorandum on native policy can best be appreciated when viewed against the special value attached to the colonial Empire by imperialists of the Chamberlain type of whom there was still a forceful remnant among the Conservatives: men like T. Johnston (Dundee) who still thought in terms of "the Empire of our own flesh and blood overseas", and many others who, to Wedgwood's chagrin still spoke of the Empire as "a tradesman balancing his accounts."[73] To these men the white settlers in tropical Africa occupied a position of special importance in the Empire in view of Great Britain's weakened post-war economic position relative to other Big Powers. British settlers in East and Central Africa now became the spoilt children of the Empire. It is true, of course, that since the First World War the old idealized and romanticized image of the white settler in Africa was gradually being replaced by a new one which was largely influenced by the ideal of colonial trusteeship enshrined in Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. This stated that the well-being and development of the inhabitants of the former German colonies in Africa who were "not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world constituted a sacred trust of civilization." In spite of the growing criticism of the land and labour policies of the white settlers in Kenya, there was still a soft spot in the hearts of many British politicians for the European settlers in Africa based largely on the 'kith and kin' idea or the 'power of the blood' which persisted well into the era of decolonization during the

---

[73] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 227, 30 April, 1929, col. 1474.

1960's.[74]

Although the First World War is generally regarded as one of the major events that shook the foundations of European colonialism in Africa, it took several decades before the reality of this development became manifest. Old imperial habits and ideas persisted seemingly unshaken and unshakable. In the face of the growing economic importance of Africa, the principles of native paramountcy and trusteeship were no sooner defined than they were immediately relegated to the background. American criticisms of imperialism were contemptuously dismissed as irrelevant and ignorant, coming as they did from a nation with no sense of history, "Americans," declared the Economist, "are on the whole not very interested in history"--including recent history.[75] As one observer pointed out,

> Many visions were shattered by the Great War and it seemed, in the nineteen-twenties, that our vision of a great imperial future had been lost amid the dreary wastes through which the Empire had journeyed.... The shadows, it appeared, were beginning to lengthen where a previous generation had boasted the sun never set. These signs of impending dissolution, however, proved to be superficial.[76]

By stripping Germany of her former colonies the European Imperial powers, it seemed, had succeeded in exorcising the demon from their midst. Imperialism had been purified.

---

[74] See Dan Horowitz, "The British Conservatives and the Racial Issue in the Debate on Decolonization", Race, vol. xii, (October, 1970), pp. 169-187.

[75] 28 November, 1942, p. 658.

[76] A Modern Conservative, A National Faith, London, n.d. [1938] p. 41. Cited in Wolfe W. Schmokel, "The Hard Death of Imperialism: British and German Colonial Attitudes, 1919-1939", Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, ed. Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Louis, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 334.

In the years immediately following the war "The Empire bulked large in British discussion and policy," observes one recent writer. He points to the "under-employed British economy" during this period, the difficulty the British were experiencing in competing for markets against other industrialised nations of the world, and the raising of tariff barriers by these nations aganst British goods.[77] All these developments pointed to a new appreciation of Empire trade, particularly the dependent Empire, in respect of primary products and markets for British manufactured goods, particularly to those people who viewed with disgust the rapid devolution of power to the self-governing Dominions after World War I culminating in what one British Member of Parliament referred to as "that shameful document the Statute of Westminster."[78] The economic value of the dependent Empire where there was as yet little or no industrial activity, loomed even larger. British colonies, it was pointed out, were not "hampered as the Dominions are by their own secondary industries, and it is in that field that many of us who are very much interested in this question of Empire development are looking for future progress and future prosperity."[79]

One of the most vocal exponent of the indispensability of the tropical Empire to the British economy was Amery whose speeches on this theme are reminiscent of those of Joseph Chamberlain during his campaign for tariff reform at the beginning of the century.[80] Typical of his views is the following speech made in the House of Commons in 1925:

---

[77] Ian Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire 1919-1939, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972), p. 17.

[78] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 267, 1 July, 1932, col. 2179, Captain MacDonald.

[79] Ibid.

> From the point of view of our own interests it is worthwhile keeping in mind that the economic possibilities for us in the development of the tropical Empire are perhaps greater than those available to us anywhere else in the world. We have there immense territories with immense natural resources. Our trade with that Empire is purely complementary. It is a trade that brings the articles practically none of which we produce in this country and many which are not produced by the Dominions; a trade, moreover, which in the nature of things is bound to be complementary for many years to come.[81]

Colonial trade was, in Amery's view, also complementary to that of Great Britain in the sense that the colonies were essentially producers of primary commodities and because of the special importance of this type of trade to British economy, he did not deem it "probable or indeed very desirable in the interests of the populations themselves, that industrial development should be unduly accelerated in their case."[82]

Another factor which lent great significance to Empire trade was the huge war debt which Great Britain owed to the United States plus the fact that her capacity to lend money for investment abroad had "almost disappeared". For these reasons it was felt essential that the country's dependence on foreign sources of supply should be reduced in preference for those sources of supply within the Empire, especially from those countries which had a sterling exchange as this would involve no strain on British supplies of gold.[83] There were also other people who saw the colonies as a "chain of shops over the Empire, ready to buy our goods."[84] It was statements like these that prompted Col. Wedgewood to protest that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was not "a tradesman balancing accounts" but a man responsible for the government of nearly 100,000,000 people, pointing out that when colonial affairs were being debated "we should consider those people not their value to us...."[85] His duty and that of the Colonial Office, he said on another occasion, was not the promotion of British trade or any trade with the colonies, but the welfare of the colonial peoples.[86] It is perhaps fair to point out that this economic appreciation of the colonial Empire was not just confined to the Conservatives. When the Labour Party introduced the first Colonial Development Act in 1929 one of its main objectives was to deal with Great Britain's economic position. Although Professor Kenneth Robinson disputes this fact,[87] we have the actual words of the man who was responsible for the Act. "I introduced that Act," stated J. H. Thomas in Parliament in 1930, "as an unemployment Measure, but I did not disguise from the House of Commons that Colonial development was also a factor to keep in mind."[88] Some of the Left wing members of the Labour

---

[80] See his pamphlet, Empire and Prosperity, (London: Faber and Faber, 1930).

[81] Parliamentary Debates, vol. 187, 27 July, 1925, col. 84.

[82] Ibid., vol. 227, 30 April, 1929, col. 1411.

---

[83] Amery, Ibid., col. 85.

[84] Ibid., vol. 219, 13 July, 1928, col. 2655, Lieut. Col. McDonnell.

[85] Ibid., vol. 227, 30 April, 1929, col. 1474.

[86] Ibid., vol. 292, 12 July, 1934, col. 626.

[87] The Dilemma of Trusteeship" Aspects of British Colonial Policy Between the Wars, (Oxford University Press), 1965, p. 56.

[88] Ibid., vol. 240, 26 June, 1930, col. 1400. See also a similar statement by Malcolm MacDonald in the House when he introduced the [Continued on next page.]

Party like J. F. Horrabin, however, were apprehensive about the use of the colonies in order to solve the British unemployment problem as this might encourage "a sort of working-class Imperialism" whereby British workers would tend to regard the natives of Africa and their resources as a means for their own benefit.[89]

Coupled with the new appreciation of the economic value of the colonial Empire was the discovery of a new sense of importance of the white settlers whose presence in Africa was regarded as indispensable to the development of the territories in which they were settled. The result was a tendency to idolize the British settlers--"that wonderful, virile community," as Amery described them. "They are people of hot temper," stated Arthur Steel-Maitland, "strong in themselves, a robustous kind of folk with many good qualities, much like a large number of their critics at home would be."[90] Amery pleaded for a "thoroughly sympathetic" attitude towards the white settlers in East Africa urging that they be regarded as partners with the British Government in the development and administration of the colonies rather than as intruders. In his view the best means of bringing about this partnership was by associating them closely in the responsibility of trusteeship. And it was mainly on this ground that Amery found the 1923 White Paper "negative" with regard to the political aspirations of the white settlers. There was also the "civilizing" role of the white settlers which made them a

---

[Continued from p. 113.]
Second Colonial Development Act. The earlier Act, he said, was designed "not to help colonial development . . . but . . . to solve our own unemployment problems." Vol. 361, 21 May, 1940, col. 45.

[89] *Ibid.*, col. 1484.

[90] *Ibid.*, vol. 172, 8 April, 1924, col. 376.

special class deserving a special treatment. "However great may be the difficulties and dangers involved in the contact between black and white in such conditions," declared Amery, "I cannot help believing that in the long run, from the point of view of the native himself, the benefit of white civilization will be more enduring than when it is merely implanted from without by a purely transitory contact."[91] This view was later endorsed by the Joint Committee on closer union.

An even more important reason why in Amery's view, the white settlers should be "carried along" in the responsibility of trusteeship for the Africans as well as in the government of the colonies was the difficulty of trying to govern from Whitehall "a white community which has self-government in its blood." It was not possible in the twentieth century, he said, to govern people six thousand miles away by use of an official majority, and any attempt to do so without regard to the sentiment of the men on the spot would be one of the worst failures of British colonial policy. "I do not want Lord Delamere [the leader of the white settlers in Kenya] or his successors in the future to appear in the role of George Washington."[92] In advancing this argument in favour of carrying the white settlers along in the task of governing the colonies, Amery never tired of referring to the case of South Africa as a good example of the dangers involved in refusing to trust white settlers with full responsibility for the government and welfare of the Africans. The error there, he said, was the Imperial Government's failure to realise that ultimately it was with the white settlers that the political destiny of South Africa would lie. His statement on this point is worth quoting at length.

---

[91] Ibid., vol. 187, 27 July, 1925, col. 87.

[92] Ibid., vol. 213, 20 February, 1928, col. 1310.

> One of the great mistakes made in the early history of South Africa was that the Imperial Government regarded itself as the one and only champion of the native races and alienated and thrust on one side the white community, which was often mistaken perhaps, but was sometimes right. The result was to breed in the white settlers not only hostility towards the Government which denied them a share in the control of their own affairs but hostility towards the ideals with which that Government was associated. This fosters in the white community the idea that their only responsibility is a white responsibility, that the black man is not their affair because the British Government will look after him. That is a very shortsighted conception of responsibility. The day will come, unless indeed the growth of white settlement comes to a stop within the next generation, when with the growth of a large settled community, no Government in this House can ultimately resist the demand for self-government. When it does come you want the man to whom you transfer your trusteeship to have the spirit of trusteeship. You do not want to hand over people who have trusted you for generations to men who have never showed any sense of responsibility. If, on the other hand, you bring that community, a community of very fine types of men inspired by British traditions, earlier into a share of responsibility; if you make them see something of the work of government and the responsibility of government from the inside, you will breed a race of men whom in the fullness of time this House may be able to hand over its trusteeship without any fear that it will be distorted.[93]

As one historian points out, Amery's choice of South Africa as an illustration of his point regarding the merits of associating the white settlers with the responsibility of trusteeship is "somewhat surprising".[94] This was, indeed, a complete distortion of the doctrine of trusteeship as defined in the Duke of Devonshire's White Paper of 1923. According to Amery's view, the white settler minorities in East and Central Africa were evidently to be closely associated with the responsibility of government until, or as soon as, the trusteeship of the African races could be handed over into their hands. This view, however ignored the conflict of interest in a number of areas between the settlers and the Africans which was the raison d'etre for the doctrine of colonial trusteeship in the first place. The settlers were thus being called upon to act as advocates and judges in their own case.

---

[93] *Ibid*., vol. 209, 19 July, 1927, col. 291.

[94] George Bennet, "Settlers and Politics in Kenya", *History of East Africa*, ed. Vincent Harlow, E. M. Chilver, assisted by Alison Smith, (Oxford University Press), 1965, vol. II, p. 304.

One of the most critical post-war colonial problems facing British statesmen in the multiracial communities of East and Central Africa concerned the determined demand by the white settler minorities for constitutional reforms leading to self-government. One view, held by Amery, was that the settlers should be granted their request before they become rebellious. There was also the assumption that the more power the settlers were given, the more liberal they would become in their attitude towards the Africans. The other view, which was common among the members of the Labour Party, was that in view of the clash of interests between the two races such a request ought to be rejected. "If we admit white settlers into the Government and give them important influence in that Government," declared one M.P., "it is dubious whether, should such a clash of interests occur, the natives will find their interest considered in preference to the white settlers' interests." After all, he said, the settlers were not "angels with sprouting wings."[95] Before granting self-government to territories where there were "mixed communities", stated Colonel Wedgewood, the British Government

> ought to enquire whether the different racial elements in the country are sufficiently able to take their share

---

[95] Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 209, 19 July, 1927, col. 296, E. Thurtle.

> in self-government, and to see that there is no liability of exploitation of the element by another, or of racial divisions leading to opposition. Till that time comes, we have to go on shouldering the responsibility and acting in this country as though we were the real representatives of the people in the particular Crown Colony concerned.[96]

Sidney Webb's Memorandum on native policy brought the conflict between these two views to the forefront of public debate.

* *

The problem of how the principle of colonial trusteeship and the doctrine of African paramountcy were to be reconciled with the seemingly indispensable role of the white settlers in the general economic development of East and Central Africa,[97] nevertheless, remained unresolved. In both areas the European settlers strongly opposed the doctrine of African paramountcy which had first been proclaimed in 1923 until the Joint Committee nullified it in 1931 by redefining it in a totally negative way.[98] "The doctrine of paramountcy," it said, "means no more than that the interests of the overwhelming majority of the indigenous population should not be subordinated to those of a minority belonging to another race, however important to itself," a definition borrowed from a letter which appeared in The Times of 12 November, 1930 under the signature of Lord Sanderson and fifteen others including Lord Olivier, Leonard Woolf, H. G. Wells and J. A. Hobson. What this new definition meant was that henceforth "everybody's interest would be paramount."[99] Even though the Joint Committee's definition was declared to be the operative policy,[100] reference to the subject of paramountcy was carefully avoided after 1931. The Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Hubert Young, was severely reprimanded by the Colonial Office in 1935 when he interpreted the Joint Committee's definition of paramountcy to mean that "the interests of the non-native should not be subordinated to those of the native majority."[101] As one writer has observed, the doctrine of African paramountcy "which had first been used, in regard to Kenya, partly as a defence of the privileges of Europeans against a challenge from Indians," had finally been watered down to a point where it had now "become a device for protecting those privileges from challenge in the interests of the natives themselves.[102]

---

[96] Ibid., vol. 219, 13 July, 1928, col. 2672.

[97] It is almost impossible to assess with any degree of accuracy the contribution made by white settlers in the economic development of Kenya and Northern Rhodesia, particularly in the area of agriculture. As Lord Hailey points out, "any estimate made is liable to be influenced by racial or political prepossessions." An African Survey A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, (Oxford University Press), (revised 1956) 1957, p. 772. Had adequate education and assistance been given to the Africans in these areas there is no reason to think that they could not have done as well as Africans in West Africa, for instance, where there was no white settlement.

[98] Robert Gregory, "Crisis for the British Empire: The East African Challenge to the Durham Tradition", The South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 59, (1960), p. 149.

---

[99] Colin Leys, A New Deal in Central Africa, ed. Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 42. Lord Hailey also points out that the Joint Committee's definition of paramountcy was "a supersession rather than an interpretation" of the 1923 declaration. Op. cit., p. 192.

[100] Cmd. 4141. Correspondence (1931-1932) Arising from the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, August 1932, p. 52.

[101] See Malcolm MacDonald to Young, 21 September, 1935. P.R.O./C.O./795/77/45104/1935.

[102] Davidson, op. cit., p. 72. For a discussion of the anti-Indian origins of the doctrine of African paramountcy as first defined in 1923 in respect of Kenya see B. G. McIntosh, "Kenya 1923: the Political Crisis and the Missionary Dilemma", Transafrican Journal of History, vol. 1, (January, 1971), pp. 103-129.

In place of the paramountcy of native races there was now a general preference for the concept of racial partnership between the white settlers and the Africans, the view being that the interests of the two groups were interdependent and that the prosperity of one was closely dependent on that of the other. In the political verbiage of the time, racial partnership sounded fine, but in practical terms and in view of the dominant economic and political position enjoyed by the white settlers, all it meant was a retention of the status quo, with the settlers as senior partners and the Africans as subordinate partners. The white settlers, pointed out one Member of Parliament, were quite capable of looking after their own interests and had had the benefit of a sound education before going to Africa and were thus fully equipped to deal with the rigours of modern conditions of life and could state their case very effectively. "It is not, therefore, surprising," he said, "that the interests of the white population prevail."[103] Partnership in this sense, therefore, meant no more than what Lord Malvern (Dr. Godfrey Huggins) the first Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, later referred to as the relationship between a rider and his horse.

In Northern Rhodesia Webb's Memorandum was given a very rough reception by the white population and it was not long before the issue of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia as a means of an escape from Colonial Office rule and its White Paper policy began to surface. When Lord Winterton, one of the absentee land-owners in Northern Rhodesia and a self-appointed spokesman for the Northern Rhodesian settlers in the British Parliament, visited the territory in September

---

[103] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 267, 1 July, 1932, cols. 2165-6, J. A. Parkinson.

1930 he found the whole country up in arms against Webb's Memorandum which he described as "injudicious and offensive".[104] The Empire Parliamentary Delegation consisting of three Members of Parliament from each of the three British political parties which visited Northern Rhodesia at the end of August 1930 described in their Report the bitter and universal resentment felt by the settlers against the Memorandum and the "wide-spread feeling of indignation against the Colonial Office" which it had aroused in the territory.[105] The initial response of the Northern Rhodesian settlers was to send a note of protest to the Secretary of State for the Colonies expressing their total dissent from the principles embodied in the Memorandum. They were particularly angered by the fact that the Memorandum had been issued with the specific instructions to the Officers Administering the territories concerned to take immediate steps to bring their native policies into strict conformity with the policy laid down in the document. They pointed out that the policy outlined in the Memorandum could "be effective only through the co-operation of the European settlers." At the same time they submitted a request for an early consultation with the Secretary of State through a delegation of the Elected Members of the Legislative Council to be sent to London at public expense.[106]

At a public meeting held in Livingstone on 24 July, a strongly worded resolution was passed expressing "utmost indignation" at the fact that instructions had been issued to District Administrators to carry out the policies enshrined in the Memorandum "which direct that Europeans are to be treated with injustice whenever their interests conflicted with those of the natives." The resolution demanded that "such instructions be withdrawn forthwith." The Memorandum was also denounced as "insulting and humiliating" to the European settlers of Northern Rhodesia who, it was said, had already demonstrated their willingness and capacity to undertake the development of the country and the advancement of the African "in conformity with the principles of civilization and humanity." The meeting further endorsed the Elected members' request for a delegation to interview the Secretary of State. It was generally hoped that once in London the delegation would be able to make representations to the proposed Joint Select Committee of the two Houses of Parliament which was to discuss matters arising out of the White Paper on closer union in East Africa.[107] It was, nevertheless, odd, as the Governor's Deputy noted, that while the declared objective of the delegation was to obtain an authoritative interpretation of certain portions of the Memorandum, the Elected Members found it fit to interpret those portions to their own constituents most of whom had not read the document.

---

[104] Orders of the Day, (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd., 1953), pp. 164-5.

[105] For a summary of the Report see "The Parliamentary visit to Northern Rhodesia, 1930", Journal of African Society, vol. 30, (January, 1931), pp. 4-26, and The Times 31 December, 1930.

[106] Governor's Deputy to Passfield, 22 July, 1930. P.R.O./C.O./795/40/35683/1930.

The Colonial Office, however, showed no desire to meet the proposed delegation. "I hope they won't come," minuted Sir C. Bottomley, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies.[108] The

---

[107] Governor's Deputy to Passfield, 28 July, 1930. Ibid.

[108] 26 July, 1930. Ibid.

Elected Members were asked to submit a written representation of the points which they wished to discuss with the Secretary of State so as to enable him to decide whether in fact a delegation would be necessary. At the same time the Acting-Governor (the Governor, Sir James Maxwell, was in London at the time attending a Colonial Governors' Conference) was asked to intimate to the Elected Members that the views expressed in the White Paper were "a declaration of the policy of His Majesty's Government" and that the Secretary of State "would not contemplate any departure from the policy enunciated in the Paper."[109] The result was a crude and offensive Memorandum, dated 11 August apparently drafted by Moore and then circulated among the Elected Members for their approval.[110]

The Memorandum which reached the Colonial Office on 1 September, was aptly described by Green as "a miserable production" which would only serve to discredit its authors if it were published in England in its present form. In it the Elected Members stated that in their view the British Government was "primarily concerned with the furtherance of the interests of British subjects of British race and only thereafter with other British subjects, protected races, and the nationals of other countries, in that order." They questioned the entire policy of trusteeship pointing out that they were "unaware of any formal or legal duty undertaken by or imposed upon the British Government to act as Trustees of the native races." In their view the assumption of trusteeship by the Imperial Government was both "uncalled for and inadvisable" and they rejected the doctrine of African paramountcy as

---

[109] Passfield to the Deputy Governor, 31 July, 1930. Ibid.

[110] See Acting Governor to Passfield, 12 August, 1930. Ibid. Enclosure II.

"incompatible with justice." They further expressed strong resentment against interference "directed by uninformed or misinformed authority resident many thousand of miles away" in the relations between the settlers and the Africans which could only lead to hostility and antagonism between the two races and eventually bring about the defeat of "the no doubt well-intentioned efforts of the would-be Trustees." They strongly protested against the policy of subordinating the interests of "civilized Britons to the development of alien races, whose capability of substantial further advancement had not yet been demonstrated," which they described as "contrary to natural law." No community of British subjects, they said, would submit to such "deliberate prejudice." In the face of what they described as the British Government's determination "to prefer the interests of alien and barbarous races to those of their own," they hinted at the possibility of soliciting "the sympathy and aid" of "neighbouring colonies enjoying freer institutions and more equitable opportunities"--an unmistakable reference to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa. The entire policy of the White paper was roundly denounced as calculated to bring about the "disruption and ruin of the British Empire."

The Colonial Office, however, refused to bow down to what one official called "the sneers and threats" of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members. Their Memorandum, in fact, merely served to harden the Secretary of State's determination to refuse them an interview. After considering their representations, Passfield flatly rejected the request for an interview, "since the views expressed were wholly irreconcilable with the considered policy of His Majesty's Government." He continued,

> As the difference of principle is so profound and I have no intention of departing from the general line of policy laid down in the White Paper of 1923 and the

> Memorandum, a conference can have no useful result and therefore I do not feel justified in placing the expense of a deputation on the funds of the Protectorate.[111]

Not only was the request for an interview with the Secretary of State rejected, but Northern Rhodesia was excluded from the terms of reference of the Joint Select Committee on closer union in East Africa to which Passfield's Memorandum on native policy was also submitted. The curt and cavalier manner in which the Northern Rhodesian settlers were treated by the Colonial Office stands out in very marked contrast with the way in which the Kenyan settlers were treated whose delegation succeeded in getting a hearing from the Colonial Office. The white settlers of Kenya had a powerful lobby in London and a few of the Conservative Members of Parliament had at one time or another visited East Africa. Northern Rhodesian settlers, on the other hand, were few in numbers and relatively poor--hence their request for Government funds to enable them to send a delegation to London. In Winterton they had, of course, a diligent spokesman, but alone he was unable to accomplish much. The outcome of Webb's brusque reply was that the question of the White Paper soon merged with the wider issue of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias.

The first step in this development was an unofficial conference held at Victoria Falls on September 27-28, between five Northern Rhodesian Elected Members (two were absent--one was ill and the other was in London) and eight members of the Southern Rhodesian Assembly, led by Captain Bertin, to discuss Webb's White Paper. A proposal in favour of early amalgamation between the two territories was introduced but was later withdrawn once it became apparent that two of the Northern Rhodesian delegates, John Brown and Chad Norris, were not willing to support it. It was felt by the Southern Rhodesian delegates that only a unanimous resolution would carry weight and since this was not forthcoming it was decided to substitute a milder one expressing the Conference's unanimous view that the application to Northern Rhodesia of the policy outlined in the White Paper would "militate against the best interests of all races in both Northern and Southern Rhodesia."[112] At the same time, the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members, on the advice of Lord Winterton, decided to send a cable "couched in courteous terms" to the Secretary of State for the Colonies acknowledging his reply and enquiring about the views of the British Government regarding the question of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.[113] "As conditions approximating to those which obtained in Southern Rhodesia at the time of the grant of responsible Government to that colony will in near future prevail in Northern Rhodesia," read the cable, "would H.M. Government accept representations for amalgamation emanating from elected members of both territories for amalgamation of two Rhodesias under a similar constitution to that of Southern Rhodesia."[114]

---

[111] Passfield to the Officer Administering the Government, 20 September, 1930. Ibid.

The importance of this telegram need not be exaggerated. As The Times correspondent in Bulawayo pointed out, this was the first time that a statement in favour of amalgamation had ever received the unanimous support of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members.[115] However, it soon became clear after the conference that this unanimity was of short duration. The view that "With the publication of the Passfield Memorandum, differences of opinion on the question of Amalgamation vanished"[116] is not altogether correct. Although Moore's initial response to Passfield's reply had driven him to support amalgamation, he soon regained his composure and went back to his old position in favour of the status quo. The demand for amalgamation by the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members as a result of the rejection of their request for an interview with the Secretary of State came as no surprise to the Colonial Office. Bottomley, for instance, had earlier pointed out that the Secretary of State's refusal to defray the cost of the Elected Members' delegation to London was certain to provide an impetus towards amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, but he felt that as the Elected Members' "somewhat excessive ideals" had to be disappointed, it was immaterial "whether they receive the disappointment there or here."[117]

---

[112] The Times, 29 September, 1930.

[113] Winterton, Orders of the Day, pp. 164-5.

[114] Governor of Northern Rhodesia to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 30 September, 1930. P.R.O./C.O./ 795/35663/1930.

On the whole, the Colonial Office welcomed the challenge of the Northern Rhodesian settlers and felt confident that they would be able to deal with it successfully. "It is fortunate," minuted Green, "that the clash has come on so favourable a ground for the historic Colonial Office policy as the absurd representations on native policy which he

---

[115] 29 September, 1930.

[116] Edward Glegg, Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 68.

[117] Minute of 16 September, 1930. Ibid.

[Moore] has persuaded his colleagues to support."[118] Green's proposed reply to Northern Rhodesia's enquiry regarding the question of amalgamation reveals the nonchalant manner in which the Colonial Office was ready to deal with the Northern Rhodesian settlers. The Elected Members he suggested, should be informed that the British Government could only receive representations from the members of the Southern Rhodesian Legislature through the Government of Southern Rhodesia, but it was pointed out to him that such a reply would only serve as an invitation to the Government of Southern Rhodesia to make representations of their own.[119] As it was, on the same day that this minute was written a telegram from the Southern Rhodesian Government was received at the Dominions Office endorsing the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members' request for a joint conference on amalgamation.[120]

It was this intervention by the Government of Southern Rhodesia which forced the Colonial Office officials to adopt a more serious attitude towards the issue of amalgamation than they had at first been inclined to. "I have never regarded this question as a very urgent one," wrote Sir Samuel Wilson, the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, towards the end of October, "and in consequence I have never in the midst of all other problems given it much thought." But now he began to appreciate its importance so much that he began to wonder whether it would not be wise to consult the leaders of the other political parties in Parliament before reaching a decision.[121] With the arrival of the Southern Rhodesian telegram, the question of amalgamation suddenly became an issue of major importance. "The matter is obviously an important one from the point of view of the relations between His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and the Government of Southern Rhodesia (to say nothing of the Union)," said E. A. Machtig, an Assistant Under-Secretary of State in the Dominions Office, "and may well have to come before the Cabinet."[122]

---

[118] 1 October, 1930. It was generally assumed in the Colonial Office that Moore was the man behind the demand for amalgamation. "The whole thing is Moore-ish," Bottomley had written on 26 August, 1930. Ibid.

[119] Minute by Machtig, 2 October, 1930. Ibid.

[120] Governor of Southern Rhodesia to the Dominions Office, 2 October, 1930. P.R.O./D.O./35/423/11969/1/1930.

It is thus evident that if the Colonial Office only had the Northern Rhodesian settlers to deal with they would have preferred to shelve the question of amalgamation indefinitely. As Grindle, the Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, observed, "If we had only N. Rhodesian elected members to deal with an answer on the lines 'nothing to add' would seem to be indicated. But as the S. Rhodesian Government has taken a hand, I suppose we must take the matter more seriously."[123] Henceforth the determination of British policy towards the question of amalgamation became a subject of consultation, not only between the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office, but also between the two departments and the Cabinet as well as with the Leaders of the Opposition Parties represented in the House of Commons. Up to the end of World War II British policy towards closer union movement in British Central Africa was consciously based on an all-party concept so as to keep the issue above party lines as well as to secure continuity of policy.

---

[121] 29 November, 1930. P.R.O./C.O./795/40/35663/1930.

[122] Minute of 4 October, 1930. Ibid.

[123] Minute of 9 October, 1930. Ibid.

* *

In trying to reach a decision on the issues raised by the two Rhodesian telegrams it is evident that the Government was caught without any policy of its own concerning the question of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias. From the day of the arrival of the Southern Rhodesian telegram of 2 October, 1930 it was to take exactly nine months before a statement of policy on amalgamation was issued by the two Secretaries of State and in that time the Government had to parry several embarrassing questions from the Opposition benches as well as irksome enquiries from the Rhodesian settlers. In endeavouring to find an appropriate answer to the two Rhodesian telegrams several approaches were considered by the two departments involved in this matter. One easy way out of the problem which was first suggested by the Colonial Office advisers was simply to refer the Southern Rhodesian Government to the Secretary of States' statement of 25 January, 1930 regarding the Elected Members' request for a conference following the publication of the East Africa Commission Report in 1929. In that reply it was pointed out that in view of the developments that were taking place in the territory as well as those that were likely to take place in the future, it was as yet impossible to come to a definite decision regarding Northern Rhodesia's political orientation. It could then be pointed out that no change had taken place since that time to justify a conference at present. This was the line of approach preferred by H. F. Downie,[124] in the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department, but it was never pursued.

---

[124] See his minute of 7 October, 1930. Ibid.

At the same time the idea of partitioning Northern Rhodesia was given serious consideration although it was generally felt that this would have to be along slightly different lines than those embodied in the "Malcolm Plan" drawn up in 1921 which had hitherto been viewed favourably by the Colonial Office. Since that time the position had been "fundamentally altered by the gigantic mining development in the north of the Railway Strip," as Green pointed out. In his view there were now "overwhelming reasons for maintaining the fullest Imperial control" over the railway area including the mining area near the northern border with the Congo whose potential copper export was expected to reach a figure of 400,000 tons in ten years time.[125] In the interest of Imperial trade and defence it was considered essential for the British Government to retain full control over this area in the event of a decision being made to partition the protectorate. There was also the prospect of an influx of a large number of African workers into the mining area in the course of the next fifteen or twenty years. "His Majesty's Government in London," Green pointed out, "must accept responsibility for their welfare," particularly in view of the White Paper on native policy which had just been issued.[126]

It was, however, immediately acknowledged that a flat refusal to Southern Rhodesia's request for a conference to discuss amalgamation would not do since that request was likely to be repeated in the future, probably at a more inconvenient time than the present. Such an awkward situation could be avoided, however, if a reasonable concession could be made to Southern Rhodesia so as to "repel unreasonable demands" in the future. Such a concession, Green suggested, might take the form of ceding to Southern Rhodesia the area south of the Kafue River extending southwards to the Victoria Falls and bounded on the west by Barotseland. This was the area of highest concentration of the white settlers in the whole territory most of whom were engaged in farming. Green was confident that this arrangement would be acceptable to the Northern Rhodesian settlers since their main object in demanding amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia "was to enable their views, which were South African to the extreme, to prevail over the policy of His Majesty's Government."[127] Thus united with Southern Rhodesia, they would be able to find there a native policy which was more congenial to their own tastes. The rest of the territory would then remain under the direct control of the British Government. If this arrangement was acceptable to Southern Rhodesia, a conference might then be convened at some future date to discuss the details.

---

[125] Green's minute, 8 October 1930. Ibid.

[126] Ibid.

Of these two possible replies, Wilson was inclined to favour Downie's which only referred to the impending developments in Northern Rhodesia as the reason for rejecting the request for a conference to discuss the proposed amalgamation of the two territories. Green's specific reference to the White Paper, he felt, was likely to be viewed as "provocative" by the Rhodesian settlers.[128] In the end it was decided to send only an interim reply to Southern Rhodesia promising to look more closely into the matter as soon as the Imperial Conference was over.[129] In the meanwhile "annoying" questions, as Bottomley called them, regarding the Government's response to the Rhodesian telegrams were coming up with embarrassing regularity inside the House of Commons. Two weeks had already gone by since the reception of the telegram from the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members and not even a note of acknowledgement had been sent. Had this been done, said Bottomley, "we should, I suppose, have escaped the wigging." Since then, he added, Southern Rhodesia had got into the way.[130] Although Bottomley was in full agreement with Green that nothing should be done to increase the self-importance of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members, he, nevertheless, felt that "the time for anything in the nature of a snub" was now over. Wilson also admitted the blunder of never having acknowledged the communication of 30 September from the Elected Members since the Government was now being impaled in Parliament for that omission.

---

[127] Ibid.

[128] Minute of 16 October, 1930. Ibid.

Once the Imperial Conference was over the time seemed ripe for taking a much closer look into the whole issue of amalgamation. In view of the political, economic and administrative issues involved in this question, not only in relation to Northern and Southern Rhodesia, but to South Africa as well, it was considered essential to refer the matter to the Cabinet before sending a reply to Southern Rhodesia so that whatever decision was eventually arrived at would be a Cabinet rather than departmental or inter-departmental one. Evidently the magnitude of this question which the Colonial Office was at first inclined to treat as an unimportant matter was now beginning to be appreciated.

---

[129] The Conference met from 1st October to 14th November, 1930.

[130] Minute of 12 November, 1930. Ibid.

In reviewing the historical background to the question of amalgamation the two departments decided to look no further than 1929. "It seems unnecessary at this stage," wrote Machtig, "to go back further into the past than the Hilton Young Commission's Report of 1929."[131] As a result of this decision hardly any reference was made to the views already expressed by the Colonial Office on this matter prior to this date. No reason was given for this decision, but a most likely explanation would seem to be the development of the mining region in Northern Rhodesia coupled with the expected increase in the size of the settler population, possibilities which were totally unforeseen in 1917 when the British South Africa Company amalgamation proposals were discussed. In view of these new developments, the views expressed by the Colonial Office at the time that Northern Rhodesia was destined to be "a native territory" were no longer considered valid under the present conditions.

The first major step in the search for policy on the subject of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias was the decision by the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office advisers to draw up a joint memorandum for the Cabinet outlining the various issues requiring special consideration before any decision could be made on the Rhodesian request for a conference on amalgamation. As the party primarily concerned with this issue, it was decided that the Colonial Office should set out the views of the Secretary of State and the reply which he would wish to see sent to Southern Rhodesia. The Dominions Office, on the other hand, would deal with the matter from the point of view of British Governments' relations with Southern Rhodesia and future developments to Southern Africa.[132]

---

[131] Minute of 4 October, 1930. Ibid.

[132] Minute by Machtig, 21 November, 1930. Ibid.

Equally important was the proposal, first mentioned by Wilson, to bring in the leaders of the Opposition parties in the discussions concerning the issue of closer union between the two Rhodesias, a procedure which the Government had already adopted in regard to the issue of closer union and native policy in East Africa. The main advantage of this procedure was that any policy that the Government might decide upon on this issue would represent not only the views of the party in power, but of all the parties in Parliament, thus ensuring continuity of policy. This procedure may also have been dictated by the fact that the Labour Government had no majority in the House of Commons and the consultation of Opposition members was therefore intended to secure a degree of general approval for its colonial policy, particularly in view of the furore over Webb's White Paper on native policy. The proposal to consult with the Leaders of the Opposition parties was placed before the Cabinet on 5 December, 1930 and approval was accordingly given on 10 December.[133]

From the point of view of the Colonial Office the amalgamation issue posed a number of problems regarding British policy in Northern Rhodesia. First, there was the question of the transfer of the administrative capital from Livingstone to a point further north and closer to the mining area. If there was to be complete amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, it would thus be a waste of funds to proceed with this project. Until the question of amalgamation was settled the future location of the territory's capital could not yet be determined. Secondly there was the question of the future of Northern Rhodesia's African inhabitants, numbering about 1,300,000--roughly a third more than those of Southern Rhodesia. Amalgamation would mean transferring them to an administration over which the British Government had only a shadowy control in matters of native policy. "Can this be squared with what has been said about H.M.G. not divesting itself of the trusteeship?", asked Bottomley. Southern Rhodesia's policy towards Africans, he observed, though not "illiberal", was largely governed by colour bar in respect of skilled African labour. In the event of amalgamation, differences in policy governing African employment would thus create a serious difficulty since "any definition of paramountcy of native interests seems to require that this field of advance should be left to the African."[134]

---

[133] C.P. 409 (30). P.R.O./CAB/24/217/1930 and C.P. 72 (30). Ibid.

One possible way of dealing with this problem might be to couple the offer of amalgamation to Southern Rhodesia with the retention of British Government control over native affairs. This, however, did not seem likely to meet the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members' specific request for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias "under similar constitution to that of Southern Rhodesia." Besides, it was evident that the Northern Rhodesian settlers' demand for amalgamation was prompted by their determination to escape from the White Paper policy. If the concern for African interests ruled out the transfer of the whole territory to Southern Rhodesia, the alternative solution which was given serious consideration by the Colonial Office was that of transferring only a portion of the Protectorate to Southern Rhodesia. Three areas seemed to immediately suggest themselves for retention under direct

---

[134] "Notes" prepared by Sir W. C. Bottomley for the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 29 November, 1930. P.R.O./C.O./795/40/35663/1930.

Imperial control because of the nature of their populations. One was the Barotseland district which, as an African state subject to final treaty relations with the British Government, could obviously not be transferred to Southern Rhodesia. The second area was North-eastern Rhodesia, also a predominantly African region with close ethnic and economic affinities with Nyasaland. Only about 400 Europeans engaged in tobacco farming were settled in this portion of the territory. The third area was the northern part of the territory bordering Tanganyika. As in the other two areas, there was only a sprinkling of European settlement in this region.

The next region which it was felt should be retained under British control was the central area comprising the mining area and the farming region immediately south of it. Bottomley saw the mining area as the "most important Imperial asset" and for this reason he was reluctant to see it transferred to Southern Rhodesia. "In case of emergency," he said, "it would not be desirable that this country should be dependent on the good-will of any other Administration for securing the supplies of essential material."[135] If the mining region was to be retained under British Control, it seemed also essential to retain the farming area immediately to the south of it for the purpose of supplying agricultural products to the mines. The only area which the British Government might be willing to transfer to Southern Rhodesia was the southernmost part of the territory, roughly 10,000 square miles in extent, in which the town of Livingstone and the Victoria Falls were located, but it seemed very unlikely that Southern Rhodesia would be ready to accept this offer. Bottomley was in fact quick to point out that the acquisition of of this area "would not be sufficient to strengthen Southern Rhodesia as a south-central African State of British complexion serving as a set-off to Afrikanderism in the Union."[136] Up to the formation of the Central African Federation in 1953 the idea of bolstering up Southern Rhodesia as the last bastion of British influence and ideals in Southern Africa remained one of the stock arguments used in support of closer political union between Southern and Northern Rhodesia.

---

[135] *Ibid.*

Meanwhile, the preparation of the joint memorandum by the officials of the two departments dragged on until the middle of April, 1931 when the document was finally presented to the Cabinet. When Green saw the Dominions draft in January he was very critical of certain portions of it dealing with Southern Rhodesia's native policy which he felt conveyed "an inaccurate implication" that Southern Rhodesia's policy was in conformity with that of the British Government. The first part of the draft, he said, was nothing more than a "eulogistic account" of the Colony's native policy which while not exactly repressive had, nevertheless, "allowed the native to stagnate, has disintegrated his tribal system, and quietly shut him out of every form of skilled employment." After forty years of European rule, he pointed out, there was not a single African clerk or artisan under Government employment outside the reserves. In practice, though not in law, there was, he said, "a rigid colour-bar" in both private and public service as well as a "servile" pass law in the Colony.[137]

In their joint Memorandum which was placed before the Cabinet on 15 April,[138] the two Secretaries of State drew attention to the two Rhodesian telegrams calling for a joint conference with British Government representatives to discuss amalgamation. At the same time they pointed out that unless the Government was in sympathy with the idea of amalgamation it would be pointless to agree to convene such a conference. What the Cabinet had to decide, therefore, was "whether the Government should or should not contemplate the amalgamation of Northern with Southern Rhodesia in the near future, and if not, whether there is any alternative to a mere rejection of the Southern Rhodesia Government's proposal." In the Cabinet's consideration of this question the two Ministers drew attention to some of the issues which had to be borne in mind and which were likely to affect the British Government's relations with Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa.

---

[136] Ibid.

[137] Minute of 30 March, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/43/36048/A/1931.

Firstly, they referred to the trend of public opinion in Southern Rhodesia which in the past two years appeared to have turned away from amalgamation with South Africa, once regarded as the Colony's inevitable destiny, and was now moving towards the ideal of a separate British political unit in the north which would be large enough to counterbalance Dutch influence from the south. Recent developments inside the Union, they said, appeared to have strengthened this tendency, while the Southern Rhodesian Ministers had lost no opportunity of calling attention to the Colony's hopes to the "reversion" of Northern Rhodesia. Reference was also made to Amery's intimation to Moffat in 1927 that there was much to be said in favour of an ultimate partition of Northern Rhodesia, with North-eastern Rhodesia joining Nyasaland as part of the

---

[138] C.P. 84(31). P.R.O./CAB/24/220.

East African group of territories and the western part being amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia. In view of all this it seemed that any reply which fell short of this possibility would be received with great disappointment by the Government of Southern Rhodesia and "might be regarded as setting a bar on what has begun to be regarded as a legitimate aspiration." This, in fact, was an understatement since the Southern Rhodesian leaders had, as we have seen, now firmly set their eyes on acquiring the whole Protectorate. Further reference was made to the Southern Rhodesian Government's disagreement with the majority report of the Hilton Young Commission and their representations that no action be taken by the British Government which would be prejudicial to future closer union between the two countries. But apart from these considerations, the two Ministers saw "no reason affecting Southern Rhodesia why a change should be made at the present time in the arrangements for the future administration of Southern and Northern Rhodesia respectively which were concluded only seven years ago when the two Rhodesias passed from the administration of the British South Africa Company."

With regard to British relations with South Africa, the two Ministers felt that "the aggrandisement of Southern Rhodesia at the expense of Northern Rhodesia" was likely to arouse concern among the Union Ministers. Although South Africa had no claim to any part of Northern Rhodesia and could not, therefore, rightfully object to the incorporation of any part of it with Southern Rhodesia, such an action might provoke a request by the Union Government for the transfer of the three High Commission Territories whose ultimate incorporation into the Union was already provided for in the South Africa Act. If the South African Government were to make such a request their first target was certain to be the Bechuanaland Protectorate which shared a common frontier with both Southern Rhodesia and the Union. The South African Government might thus want to take immediate steps to safeguard the "reversion" of the Protectorate to themselves. In the opinion of the authors of the Memorandum, such a request "would be embarrassing, as it has for some time, for reasons connected with native administration and for other reasons, been the policy of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to avoid such incorporation, at any rate for the present." It was also "highly improbable that Parliament, under existing conditions, would be willing to approve such incorporation in view of the fact that the native inhabitants of the territories would be strongly opposed to it." There was also the possibility which had often been voiced in the past of the Bechuanaland Protectorate eventually being associated with Barotseland since both of them were predominantly African, with the northern part going to Southern Rhodesia.

Coming to Northern Rhodesia itself, it was pointed out in the Memorandum that as Barotseland and North-eastern Rhodesia were almost purely native areas akin to the other native areas in tropical Africa, it would be advisable to leave them under the direct control of the Imperial Government. Their transfer to a self-governing white community should not be contemplated even if such a transfer were to be subject to the same supervisory powers presently held by the British High Commissioner for South Africa in respect of African affairs in Southern Rhodesia. It seemed also likely that the increase in the ratio between blacks and whites that would result from the addition of Northern Rhodesia to Southern Rhodesia would cause friction between the Southern Rhodesia Government and the Imperial Government over the exercise of the reserved powers.

With regard to the mining region, it was suggested that in the interest of Empire policy this area ought to be left under the control of the Imperial Government for economic and strategic reasons. "These mines," declared the two Ministers, "may before long be the governing factor in the copper markets of the world, and their output will become essential to national defence in the event of war and of primary importance to the Empire's trade and manufacture in peace-time." Moreover, negotiations regarding the boundary between Northern Rhodesia and the Congo were still in progress and the transfer of the mining area to Southern Rhodesia at this time would create unnecessary difficulties for the British Government and might impede the progress of these negotiations. For administrative convenience as well as for purposes of food supply to the mines, it was considered essential to retain control over the agricultural area adjoining the mining region to the south. Besides, the two Ministers were doubtful whether the Government of Southern Rhodesia, which they described as essentially a "'farmers' Government", was adequately equipped to administer so large and so important an area as this promised to be. They feared that friction might develop between the Southern Rhodesian Government and the mining interests with similar results as had occurred in the Transvaal before the Anglo-Boer War.

The only area, therefore, which could be considered for transfer to Southern Rhodesia was the southern portion of the territory below the Kafue River bend. "Not only is this area closely allied to Southern Rhodesia geographically," it was pointed out, "but it is predominantly an area in which there is a settlement by European 'farmers', like Southern Rhodesia itself." Roughly a quarter of the European population of Northern Rhodesia was settled in the area. The administration of the remainder of the territory would thus be made easier "by the transfer of a considerable section of the settled white population to a self-governing Colony with which they are economically, geographically and, somewhat to the Government's embarrassment, politically allied." More fundamental to the whole problem of future relations between the two territories was the question of "where, in the future, the boundary is to lie between a Southern Africa, with one type of civilisation, and a central, or central and eastern, Africa with another type of civilisation." Although a definitive answer to this question could not, in the view of the two Ministers, be given "for a good many years to come," since part of the answer depended on factors and developments which could not yet be clearly foreseen, all that could be done at this stage, they said, was to ensure as far as was possible that whatever decision was taken on the Southern Rhodesian Government's request, it "shall be such as will not prejudice in a sense contrary to natural development whatever line of division may eventually prove to be the most suitable."

Thus as far as the two Ministers were concerned the most that could be offered to Southern Rhodesia was the Livingstone area, and if the Southern Rhodesian request for a conference were accepted it would have to be limited to the consideration of this offer. In order to avoid any possible misapprehension they advised that in offering to participate in such a conference, the Government should make it very clear to the Southern Rhodesian Government that in their view the time was not yet ripe to decide the future political orientation of the part of Africa lying between the Zambezi River and the Tanganyika Territory and should, at the same time, indicate that as far as they were concerned it was impossible to consider any diminution of the

British Government's direct responsibility in respect of the mining area of Northern Rhodesia. As the two Ministers pointed out,

> By the offer of a Conference, accompanied by an intimation to this effect, His Majesty's Government would have made it clear that they were not opposed to a readjustment of boundaries if there were a practical advantage in this and a definite desire for it. On the other hand, this attitude would also serve as a plain indication that the transfer of the Livingstone area to Southern Rhodesia would not take effect unless the Southern Rhodesian Government were really anxious to take over that area and, moreover, were willing to do so as an alternative to the idea that they should take over the whole of Northern Rhodesia or of a larger part than the Livingstone area. There would thus be no question of a transfer of the Livingstone area to Southern Rhodesia under conditions which would encourage Southern Rhodesia to hope for early amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia or, indeed for the addition of further parts of Northern Rhodesia within a period which can now be envisaged.

It would, therefore, be left to the Southern Rhodesian Government to decide whether or not they would accept a conference under these conditions. If they did, the next step would be to consider the position of the Africans in the area to be transferred and to look into the question of boundaries. Neither of the two Ministers, however, thought it likely that these conditions would be acceptable to the Southern Rhodesian Government, but they considered their proposals preferable to a flat refusal of the Rhodesian request for a conference.

The Cabinet approved these recommendations. The next step was for the two Secretaries of State to arrange a meeting with the representatives of the Opposition parties to discuss the Government's position on amalgamation so that any decision reached on this subject would have the concurrence of all the parties represented in Parliament. Within the Colonial Office, however, there was some minor disagreement regarding the advisability of making an early disclosure of this arrangement in Parliament. Both Wilson and Bottomley foresaw political difficulties in such a move as it might lead to intensive lobbying of the Conservative representatives by the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members and possibly by the members of the Southern Rhodesian Government as well. As Bottomley pointed out, "What should be an impartial survey of the position from a general Imperial point of view will be in danger of becoming a dispute leading to no settled policy for the future."[139] It was, however, generally felt that such a disclosure was inevitable as it would be necessary to reveal to Parliament the present position in the consideration of the issue of amalgamation. The announcement was accordingly made in Parliament on 22 May.

Meanwhile, questions continued to be asked in the House of Commons regarding the Government's position on amalgamation. It was already an embarrassing six months since the Rhodesian telegrams had been received and the Government appeared nowhere nearer a decision. Green in the Colonial Office was also becoming concerned about the adverse effects which a further delay in reaching a decision on the question of amalgamation might have on development plans for Northern Rhodesia. "We cannot," he said, "expect members of the Legislative Council to vote money, or our officials to work enthusiastically, for native technical education, the new capital, or mining village if they do not know whether or not the policy is to be maintained." He was therefore, anxious that the main lines of policy should be settled and made known as soon as possible.[140]

---

[139] Minute of 16 May, 1931. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/23/1931.

[140] Minute of 9 February, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/43/36048/"A"/1931.

The Northern Rhodesian Elected Members were also beginning to exert new pressure on the Colonial Office for a reply to their communication of 30 September, 1930. In a note submitted to the Governor which was signed by all of them they now expressed a desire to explore new possibilities of further participation in the Government of the territory and thus wished to ascertain first the Secretary of State's agreement or otherwise with the principle of amalgamation.[141] "I infer from this telegram," minuted Green, "that the Elected Members think that they have managed to put the Secretary of State into a serious difficulty and that the time is favourable for bargaining for increased power."[142] This in fact marked the beginning of a new strategy by the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members of coupling the demand for amalgamation with a request for constitutional reforms which would give them more effective control of the Government, and, as will presently be seen, this strategy was used with reasonable success during the inter-war years. Thus although by the end of the Second World War all requests by the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia had been turned down, the British Government was successfully pressured by the settlers into granting a number of significant constitutional concessions in order to pacify them.

Anxiety about amalgamation was also becoming evident among the politically conscious Africans in Northern Rhodesia as indicated by a message sent to the Colonial Office by an African who identified himself as the "Educated Native" which read, "The natives of Northern and Southern

---

[141] Maxwell to Passfield, 20 March, 1931. Ibid.

[142] 23 March, 1931. Ibid.

Rhodesia hope and pray that the British Government will not be too ready to grant amalgamation to the two countries as that is the first step towards Dominion Status and repression of the blacks."[143] There was at this time already a number of quasi-political organizations in the territory, the Welfare Societies, dating back to the Mwenzo Association first formed in 1923 among the early crop of mission educated Africans. According to one recent writer, the Mwenzo Association of 1923 was in fact a revival of an earlier one by the same name formed about 1912.[144] These were originally formed with the modest purpose of establishing contact among the educated Africans (their meetings were conducted in English) in order to seek advancement for themselves under the white man's rule as well as to establish lines of communication with the Government. By the 1930s these Societies began to extend their scope into politics. It was from the Federation of Welfare Societies formed in 1946 to unite all the various Societies that had mushroomed over the territory that the first Zambian nationalist organization, the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, was formed two years later.

It was not, however, until June that the actual terms of the British Government's statement of policy on the subject of amalgamation were worked out in the course of two meetings between the representatives of the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office led by their respective heads, and the representatives of the two Opposition parties, L. S. Amery and Lord Winterton, for the Conservatives, and Robert Hamilton and

---

[143] The note was undated. Ibid.

[144] David J. Cook, "The Influence of Livingstonia Mission upon the Formation of Welfare Associations in Zambia, 1912-31", Themes in the Christian History of Central Africa, eds. T. O. Ranger & John Weller, (London: Heinemann, 1975), pp. 98-134. See also Meebelo, op. cit., pp. 235-254.

P. J. Pybus, for the Liberals. In the first meeting held on 2 June, the case for making amalgamation the ultimate goal of British policy was forcefully stated by Amery giving as his main reason the need to prevent the South African native policy and influence from spreading beyond the Limpopo River through the absorption of Southern Rhodesia by the Union. In his view whatever the general opinion was regarding the merits and demerits of Southern Rhodesia's native policy--and as far as Amery was concerned the Colony's native policy was beyond reproach--it was still preferable to that of South Africa. Although Southern Rhodesia had lately been moving away from the Union, Amery was fearful that a blank refusal to entertain her aspirations for a "Greater Rhodesia" coupled with her concern about the wider implications of the recently published Memorandum on native policy might very well cause her to turn to the South. If this happened the process of absorption was not likely to end with Southern Rhodesia. If, as seemed probable, the development of the mining industry in Northern Rhodesia resulted in an influx of a considerable white population, there would soon develop a strong demand for self-government which the British Government would find it very difficult to resist. In such a situation the attitude of Southern Rhodesia might become crucial for if she showed signs of drifting towards the south, her example might well be followed by the white mining population of Northern Rhodesia.

According to Amery the best barrier to a "Greater South Africa" based on a native policy that was inconsistent with British ideas would be a "Greater Rhodesia" made up of the union of the two Rhodesias which would act as a buffer state between the South African native policy, on the one side, and the East African White Paper policy, on the other. For these reasons it seemed extremely desirable that even if the British

Government were not prepared to accept amalgamation at this particular time, care should be taken that any statement of policy issued should not close the door completely against it as an ultimate goal.[145] In the discussions that followed, attention was drawn to the likelihood that any statement which seemed to favour amalgamation might precipitate a demand on the part of the South African Government for the transfer of the High Commission Territories. J. H. Thomas read out a recent statement made by General Hertzog in reply to a question in the South African Parliament relating to Swaziland in which he had indicated that the only obstacle to the territory's incorporation to the Union was the Labour Government in Great Britain. Another point that was touched upon concerned the attitude of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members on the question of amalgamation which was described as unstable and extremely variable.

Towards the end of the discussion Lord Winterton produced a draft formula for use as a basis for a statement of policy regarding the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. The main points of this draft referred, firstly, to the British Government's reluctance to agree to the amalgamation of the two territories at the present time giving as reasons for this view the uncertainty regarding the development of the Northern Rhodesian mining industry, the paucity of the European population in the territory and the short lapse of time since the British Government had taken over direct responsibility for the Protectorate in 1924. Secondly, it was pointed out that while the British Government had no objection to the future amalgamation of the two territories in principle, whenever circumstances should justify it, that decision would be governed by a number of considerations such as the welfare and development of the African population and their ability to represent their case in the new government that would be established, the economic position of the country and the size of the European population. Thirdly, it would be necessary to emphasize in the agreed statement that the Northern Rhodesian territory to be amalgamated would not necessarily have boundaries co-terminus with the territory as at present constituted, and that Barotseland would necessarily have to be excluded from any scheme of amalgamation. Lastly, Lord Winterton felt that in order to alleviate uneasiness among the Northern Rhodesian settlers as well as to allay their fears, it could be mentioned in the statement that so far as possible Northern Rhodesia would be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia as an entity if and when amalgamation took place. This last point, however, seemed somewhat inconsistent with the earlier one mentioned in the draft regarding possible changes in the boundaries of the Northern Rhodesian territory to be amalgamated and the stipulation concerning the exclusion of Barotseland.

---

[145] "Note of meeting held in Lord Passfield's room on June 2nd, to discuss the future of Southern and Northern Rhodesia". P.R.O./D.O./35/11969/24/1931. See also C.O./795/43/3648/"A"/1931.

It is a remarkable fact that in these joint discussions with the representatives of the Opposition parties the initiative in laying down the guide lines for Government policy on amalgamation was left almost entirely to the two Conservative party members. In the minutes of the two meetings that were held on this subject there is no evidence of Webb's contribution to, or active participation in, the discussions. J. H. Thomas in fact played a relatively more important part in these meetings and it is perhaps not surprising that in her Diary Beatrice Webb complains that even "In a minor matter of N. Rhodesia, Thomas again intervenes...."[146] By this time MacDonald seems to have completely lost faith in Webb, and it is by no means insignificant that at about the time that the first meeting with the Opposition representatives was held, Webb wrote MacDonald "a quite definite but very courteously worded plea for retirement ... and an ultimatum that he, S. W., must be released by October," suggesting Lord Ponsonby as his possible successor if Lord Snowden was still invalided.[147] The Government's statement on the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias, as finally adopted, was largely the handiwork of Lord Winterton and Amery.

For the second meeting with the Opposition representatives held on 25 June, a "Draft Statement" based on Lord Winterton's draft formula was prepared by Sir H. Batterbee, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Dominions, and Bottomley. Their only modification to Lord Winterton's draft formula was the inclusion in the "Draft Statement" of a reference to the consultation of the Opposition parties which they considered necessary in order to prevent public lobbying of the Opposition parties in future by the Rhodesian settlers. They also decided to omit Lord Winterton's pledge to the Northern Rhodesian settlers that as far as was possible Northern Rhodesia would be amalgamated with Southern Rhodesia as a single entity pointing out that such a promise was both inconsistent with the earlier part of Lord Winterton's draft, and also inconvenient.[148]

J. H. Thomas, on the other hand, wanted it made patently clear in the final policy statement that the ultimate decision regarding the question of amalgamation would rest exclusively with the British Government. At the same time he felt it necessary to consider what could be done "to facilitate co-ordination of policy between Southern and Northern Rhodesia." If it was decided to turn down the Rhodesian request for a conference on amalgamation, he thought it wise to include some intimation to the Southern Rhodesian Ministers which would "encourage them to get into closer touch with Northern Rhodesia on matters of policy which are of common interest."[149] The contradiction that was to plague British policy towards the two Rhodesias is blatantly obvious from this minute. While amalgamation was to be rejected for the present time, closer relations between the two countries were to be encouraged in matters of common policy. No mention was made in the "Draft Statement" of the offer of the Livingstone area to Southern Rhodesia which had been suggested in the joint Cabinet Memorandum as an alternative to complete amalgamation of the two countries since this point had not been raised in the 2 June meeting. Besides minor wording amendments introduced by Amery, no substantial changes were made in the "Draft Statement" during the second joint meeting. It was generally agreed that no steps should be taken to split any part of Northern Rhodesia before the question of amalgamation had been settled since this would, in Lord Winterton's view, create unnecessary apprehension in the territory.[150] The "Draft Statement" received Cabinet approval on 1 July[151] and was announced simultaneously in the two Houses of Parliament on the following day as well as in Northern and Southern Rhodesia.[152] It had thus taken nine months to the day since the arrival of the Southern Rhodesian telegram before the Government was able to give a definitive reply. For the Rhodesian settlers the ordeal by waiting was at last over.

---

[146] December 14th, 1930.

[147] Diary, May 31st, 1931.

[148] "Draft Statement (Based on Lord Winterton's outline)". P.R.O./C.O./795/43/36048/"A"/1931.

---

[149] Minutes of 10 June, 1931 on the "Draft Statement". Ibid.

[150] "Memorandum. Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia". Ibid. This gives the minutes of the second joint meeting of 25 June, 1931.

[151] C.P. 36(31). P.R.O./CAB/24/219/1931.

The text of the Government's policy statement on amalgamation closely followed Lord Winterton's draft formula. As already indicated, Webb's own contribution to this policy statement is virtually non-existent. MacDonald's indignation over Webb's handling of the Palestine issue had relegated him to the side-lines as far as actual participation in the Government's policy-making process was concerned, and even in the area of Webb's own jurisdiction the Prime Minister preferred to rely on J. H. Thomas. Webb had also become indifferent towards matters of colonial policy and, indeed, towards the fate of the Labour Government itself whose end he secretly prayed for and which was in fact less than two months away. This would seem to suggest a modification of Gregory's assertion, at least as far as policy towards the question of amalgamation is concerned, that Webb was "his own master" and "must be held responsible for the colonial policy of the second Labour government."[153]

The main points of the three-party policy statement of 2 July which laid down the main foundation of British policy towards the question of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias until the outbreak of the Second World War may briefly be summarised as follows: first, it was stated that the British Government were not prepared to agree to the amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia at the present time. A substantially greater advance in the development of Northern Rhodesia was deemed necessary before a final decision could be reached regarding the future of Northern Rhodesia. Reference was also made to the small and scattered white population of Northern Rhodesia and to the problems of native development which were still at a stage which made it "inevitable that His Majesty's Government should hesitate to let them pass even partially out of their responsibility." At the same time while amalgamation was considered impracticable "now or in the near future," it was pointed out that the British Government did not wish "to reject the idea of amalgamation in principle should circumstances in their opinion justify it at a later date" as they were concerned about the prejudicial effect on the progress of both countries if such a rejection were regarded as a permanent bar to their future evolution. In the meanwhile it was stated that "for some time to come Northern Rhodesia should continue to work out its destiny as a separate entity, observing the closest possible co-ordination with its neighbours, and especially with Southern Rhodesia."

---

[152] Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 254, 2 July, 1931, cols. 1471-2; House of Lords, vol. 81, cols. 563-4.

[153] Sidney Webb and East Africa, p. 104.

Secondly, it was made very clear that the conditions of any amalgamation scheme, "if and when it arises for actual discussion," must involve a definite provision for the welfare and development of the African population. Furthermore, it was intimated that the area to be amalgamated would not necessarily have the same boundaries as Northern Rhodesia in its present form, that Barotseland would necessarily require separate treatment, and that special arrangements might have to be made regarding other parts of the Protectorate. Lastly, it was pointed out that in order to ensure continuity of policy for the future it had been found necessary to confer with the members of the Opposition parties in determining the British Government's policy towards the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. Thus although the conclusions embodied in the statement represented the views of the British Government, they were considered likely to recommend themselves to all the members of the House. After a gestation period of nine months the Government's policy statement was received with even greater interest in the two Rhodesias than the East Africa Commission Report of 1929.

Chapter 3

DEPRESSION POLITICS AND THE AMALGAMATION QUESTION IN NORTHERN RHODESIA

The immediate response of the Northern Rhodesian settlers to the British Government's statement of 2 July on amalgamation was one of extreme anger and disappointment. On 9 July the Greater Rhodesia Society, formed in the previous year in response to Webb's Memorandum on native policy with the aim of bringing about a complete amalgamation of the two Rhodesias,[1] held a public meeting in Livingstone "to protest against the action of the Imperial Government in deciding against a conference between the two Rhodesias on the subject of amalgamation without consulting the people concerned."[2] A strongly worded resolution expressing disagreement with the entire statement on amalgamation, particularly the suggestion that in the event of amalgamation ever becoming practicable Northern Rhodesia's boundaries might have to be altered so that the British Government could retain control of certain portions of the territory, was passed unanimously.

The fact that the statement had been formulated in consultation with the representatives of the Opposition parties was, in the view of one speaker at the meeting, a clear indication that "a change of Government at home would make no difference whatsoever" regarding the control exercised by the British Government over the territory. The same speaker went on to lash out against what he referred to as "this unctous rectitude of officialdom at home" and "this arrogant superiority which is a libel on the Europeans of this land." To the Colonial Office, however, the Governor described the proceedings of the meeting as having been "conducted in the spirit of buffoonery," pointing out that according to the information he had received of those present at the meeting "about 7 men, 2 women and one small boy held up their hands in favour of the resolutions."[3]

---

[1] See a Reuters' telegram of 19 December, 1930 in P.R.O./C.O./795/40/35663/1930; The Times, 24 January, 1931.

[2] Livingstone Mail, 15 July, 1931.

Among the few educated and politically conscious Africans in the territory who had been following the issue of amalgamation with obvious concern, the British Government's statement came as a great relief. Their general attitude can be gauged from an undated note sent to the Secretary of State for the Colonies by "Two Educated Natives" which read

> The natives of Rhodesia thank you and the British Government from their hearts for postponing amalgamation. The natives know more about this question than the whites and we do not want to be taken out of the direct control of the British Government.[4]

The view that the Northern Rhodesian Africans were generally silent onlookers in the controversy concerning the question of amalgamation or did not comprehend the issues involved in it[5] is obviously an exaggeration. Even as late as 1939, after the Northern Rhodesian Africans had unmistakably indicated their firm opposition to amalgamation before the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission, headed by Lord Bledisloe, which visited the Rhodesias and Nyasaland in 1938 to enquire into the question of closer union, it was still maintained that the Africans were incapable of giving a considered opinion on this matter.

---

[3] Maxwell to Passfield, 20 July, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/43/36048/"A"/1931.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 269; Maxwell to Passfield, 2 December, 1927. P.R.O./C.O./795/33/35467/1929.

The response of the Southern Rhodesian Government to the British Government's statement was also one of disappointment, but the fact that amalgamation had not been permanently ruled out was well appreciated. Indeed, the general tone of the despatch was regarded as sympathetic. Moffat, the Southern Rhodesian Premier, termed the statement a favourable document in so far as it welcomed the idea of co-operation and consultation between the two Rhodesias.[6] Captain Bertin, the leading figure in the amalgamation movement in Southern Rhodesia, was inclined to blame some of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members for their wavering statements following the Victoria Falls conference of September 1930 which, in his view, must have led the British Government to doubt whether there was any united support for amalgamation in the territory. Under these circumstances he saw the British Government's reply as one that could have been expected. He called upon the Southern Rhodesian Government to act upon the hint given in the statement regarding the need for closest co-operation between the two territories by holding annual conferences at which matters of common concern could be discussed.[7]

The British Government's statement on amalgamation also received a warm welcome from Sir H. J. Stanley, the former Governor of Northern Rhodesia, now British High Commissioner in South Africa, who was the first to champion the cause of federation between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland at a time when the main focus of attention was still limited to the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. He was particularly pleased with the British Government's decision to defer for the future its final decision on amalgamation without any "banging and bolting of doors against the evolution of some form of closer union at a future, not necessarily very distant, date."[8] What he had in mind here was, as he explained to Harding,

---

[6] The Times, 30 July, 1931.

[7] Ibid., 4 July, 1931.

> the eventual creation of a federal rather than unitary Central African system North of the Limpopo, to embrace the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, with the addition, should circumstances permit--(a hope rather than an anticipation)--of the whole, or at any rate the Northern portion, of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, and the possibility, remote though it may be, of an ultimate nexus of some kind with the Eastern group of Territories.[9]

This was the scheme which Stanley was to pursue relentlessly until 1936 when he became converted to the ideal of amalgamation. To both the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office, on the one hand, and the Northern and Southern Rhodesian settlers, on the other, the federal solution was never given any serious consideration until after the end of the Second World War. "Sir H. Stanley has previously advocated this conception," Machtig scribbled across the margin of Stanley's despatch, "but it is difficult to envisage its operation in practice."[10]

In spite of the rejection of immediate amalgamation by the British Government, there was general satisfaction among the members of the Southern Rhodesian Government with the encouragement given to the policy of co-operation and consultation between the two Rhodesias indicated in the 2nd July announcement. There was a strong feeling, however, that the question of amalgamation ought not to be made dependent on the progress of development in either territory and it was feared that any delay in bringing it about might, on the contrary, tend to retard such progress and development. As the grant of Responsible Government to Southern Rhodesia in 1923 had greatly contributed towards promoting British interests in the Colony, so would the union of the two Rhodesias also be a source of strength to British interests in the southern portion of the African continent, as well as to the Empire as a whole.[11] The main concern in Southern Rhodesia was that the longer the settlement of the question of amalgamation was delayed, the more widely would the policies in the two territories diverge until the differences between them would become so rigid as to be incapable of reconciliation. There were already fears in the Colony that under Sir James Maxwell, Stanley's successor, Northern Rhodesia's native policy was beginning to assume a "West African" complexion.

---

[8] Stanley to Sir Edward J. Harding, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, 28 July, 1931. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/29/1931.

[9] _Ibid._

[10] _Ibid._

The need for closer co-operation between the two Rhodesias was particularly stressed by Stanley, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, who was seriously disturbed over what he saw as an unfortunate tendency of the two territories to drift apart in recent years. Moffat had already written to Harding complaining about Maxwell's actions which he said had rendered co-operation between the two administrations "a very difficult task." He pointed out that at one point he had even considered making a formal protest about Maxwell's attitude but in view of the Governor's impending retirement he had decided to wait for the arrival of his successor in the hope that the situation would improve.[12] Like Moffat, Stanley blamed Maxwell's attitude towards the Southern Rhodesian Government for this apparent breakdown in co-operation between the two territories. In his view, if this tendency were allowed to continue it might eventually create "a serious obstacle to the drawing together of the several British States in Central Africa into a cohesive group." He referred to what was later to become his pet theme, namely, the danger of pushing Southern Rhodesia into the arms of South Africa. If Southern Rhodesia were left isolated, he argued, the only course open to her would be absorption by the Union under conditions which would involve "the submersion of her distinctly British attributes," and once that happened the other British Territories in Central Africa, including the Bechuanaland Protectorate, would inevitably suffer the same fate.[13]

---

[11] Murray Bisset, Acting Governor of Southern Rhodesia, to J. H. Thomas, 18 August, 1931. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/19/1931.

Although Stanley found no support for his federal project from either the Dominions Office or the Colonial Office, this did little to deflate his enthusiasm for it. Maxwell's actions, on the other hand, received full backing from the Colonial Office. According to Green the truth of the matter was that Maxwell had had to deal "with a mentality that is unable to understand why Northern Rhodesian interests should not be subordinated at all points to those of Southern Rhodesia." In his view the root of the problem was Southern Rhodesia's tendency to treat Northern Rhodesia "as an inferior territory which must always give way to the convenience of her neighbour." He commended Maxwell for having "upheld the policy of His Majesty's Government with a tact and ability that has attracted attention and respect in the press of the Union and of Southern Rhodesia."[14]

---

[12] "Note of discussion between Sir Edward H. Harding and Mr. Moffat, P.M. of Southern Rhodesia on 22 June, 1932". P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/33/1932.

[13] Stanley to Harding, 16 August, 1932. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/36/1932.

Although the British Government's statement was strongly denounced by the Northern Rhodesian settlers, there was as yet no unanimity of opinion in favour of amalgamation. Even though Moore joined in with his fellow settlers in their protest against the British Government's failure to consult them before issuing their statement of 2 July, he carefully dissociated himself from their protest against the rejection of immediate or early amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. On the contrary, he found himself in complete agreement with the Secretary of State's despatch on this point. He was opposed to amalgamation being effected now or even within few years. The question of amalgamation, he said, could only be determined after the territory had made further progress in its development. For the present he preferred to remain on peaceful terms with the Mother Country to which he professed deep attachment. Even with regard to the constitutional role of the Elected Members in the Legislative Council, Moore displayed a very conservative attitude pointing out that their position was not as hopeless as it had often been made out to be. They were accorded a fair hearing, he said, and their views were generally given due consideration by the Governor.[15]

Evidently once the panic caused by the White Paper was over and after receiving reassurance from Sir James Maxwell that there was "nothing whatsoever in that White Paper which means any change of policy on the part of this Government," or anything that was "detrimental to the interests of white settlers," and that as far as he was concerned the White Paper was not going to make any material difference in the administration of the territory,[16] Moore's confident belief in the inevitability of self-government for Northern Rhodesia was fully restored. Their goal, he said, was to make Northern Rhodesia "a white man's country."[17] For a man who was described in 1936 as the only one of the four Governors Northern Rhodesia had had who was "in sympathy with the policy of native trusteeship," Maxwell's statements were sometimes irreverently blunt and quite embarrassing to his superiors. In the East Africa issue of December 25, 1930, for instance, he was quoted as having said that

---

[14] Minute of 1 July, 1932 on Moffat's discussion with Sir Harding. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/33/1932.

[15] Livingstone Mail, 15 July, 1931.

> In so far as this Dependency is concerned, I should like, without qualification, to endorse the conclusion of an editorial in the Bulawayo Chronicle of November 3. 'There is no equality between white and black today and those who advocate it misread the problem. There is no equality because there is no ground for equality.'[18]

Obviously the Governor's West African outlook had been unable to withstand the Northern Rhodesian political climate. After the publication of Webb's White Paper Maxwell expressed his adherence to the 'kith and kin' policy. "In dealing with the settlers," he told the members of the

---

[16] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 27 October, 1930, Appendix, pp. 217-34. In the Colonial Office Green described the Governor's address as "an able piece of work in language suited to the mentality of the Northern Rhodesian whites."

[17] Livingstone Mail, 15 July, 1931.

[18] Cited in Normal Leys, A Last Chance in Kenya, (London: The Hogarth Press, 1931), p. 139.

Royal African Society on 1 July, 1930, "always remember that they are of your race."[19]

As long as there seemed to be reasonable prospects of Northern Rhodesia attaining self-government in the near future, amalgamation did not appear to be the immediate objective as far as the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members were concerned. Even their communication of 30 September, 1930 to the Secretary of State for the Colonies conveyed no sense of urgency about the matter. It was framed, as we have seen, in the form of an enquiry concerning the attitude of the British Government towards amalgamation once conditions in Northern Rhodesia approximated those in Southern Rhodesia at the time of the grant of Responsible Government in 1923. It is true, of course, that the White Paper did arouse serious doubts about the prospects of early achievement of self-government in spite of the Governor's assurances that nothing had happened to make him change his previous view that the territory's progress could only be towards some form of self-government. "How can that be possible," asked Captain Murray, skeptically, "in view of the statement that His Majesty's Government regard themselves as exercising a Trust on behalf of the African population and [that] they are unable to delegate this Trust?"[20] But even Murray, himself a long time advocate of amalgamation, did not think that amalgamation should be effected immediately. "I am convinced," he said, "that amalgamation must come in the near future."[21]

---

[19] "Some Aspects of Native Policy in Northern Rhodesia", _Journal of the Royal African Society_, vol. xxix, (October, 1930), p. 476.

[20] Northern Rhodesia, _Legislative Council Debates_, 18th November, 1930, col. 29.

[21] _Ibid._, col. 31.

Obviously he was in no hurry for it.

There was certainly a large number of the Northern Rhodesian settlers who firmly believed that the ultimate destiny of the two Rhodesias was fusion into a "Greater Rhodesia" but who were, at the same time, opposed to what G. Chad Norris, Member for the Northern Electoral Area, called "panic politics" and who, like him, felt that Northern Rhodesia was "capable of a much more dignified entry into amalgamation than that of breathless refugees seeking succour."[22] What the White Paper really did was to strengthen the settlers' demand for a greater share in the government of the territory. "I hold that this White Paper justifies the white people in seeking a far more effective voice in the government and administration of the country," Moore said, "or they will find that arbitrary decisions favouring the native majority but ruinous to the whites and, possibly to the higher interests of the State, will be implemented."[23] The view that Webb's Memorandum on native policy made amalgamation between the two Rhodesias "an agreed issue" among the Northern Rhodesian white settlers is therefore not quite accurate.[24]

That self-government was still regarded as the first priority by the Elected Members, or at least an issue upon which they were able to present a united front, is evident from the motions brought up in the Legislative Council while awaiting the Secretary of State's reply to their request for a conference to discuss amalgamation. On 16 March 1931, for instance, the Government was asked to consider "the desirability of preparing and publishing suggestions for a scheme of self-government for the Territory."[25] This was followed by a telegram to the Colonial Office enquiring about a reply to their request for a conference which in the same breath expressed their "desire to explore every alternative under which they would further participate in the Government of the Territory."[26] Quite clearly amalgamation was only being used as a lever for extorting more political power from the Colonial Office. When the reply to this communication arrived with no reference to their request for further participation in the government, Moore was understandably furious and was convinced that the Secretary of State had deliberately misread their telegram. He felt that they were being treated "with a rather lofty indifference" and issued a vague warning that the only alternative to submission was "some form of disloyalty."[27] Lastly, Noris' motion of 1 April, 1931 also dealt with the subject of constitutional change, the first stage proposed being an increase in the number of the Elected Members in the Legislative Council as well as representation in the Executive Council. He backed up this request by pointing to the rapid increase in the white population as well as to the continuing improvement in the territory's financial position.[28]

---

[22] The Bulawayo Chronicle, 11 October, 1930.

[23] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 18 November, 1930, col. 35.

[24] Colin Leys, "How the Federation was Made", Colin Leys and Cranford Pratt, ed. A New Deal in Central Africa, (London: Heinemann, 1960), p. 9.

---

[25] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, col. 18.

[26] Maxwell to Passfield, 20 March, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/43/36048/"A"/1931.

[27] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 30 March 1931, cols. 154-5.

[28] Ibid., cols. 193-4.

The Colonial Office viewed this growing pressure for settler participation in the government with both contempt and alarm. "We must profit by our mistakes in Kenya and watch this," warned Bottomley.[29] Drummond Shiels was firmly opposed to any constitutional concessions being made to the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members. "We must not encourage this handful," he said, "to speak in the name of the people of Northern Rhodesia."[30] In his reply Webb stated that he did not consider that any constitutional changes in Northern Rhodesia were necessary or even desirable until a substantially greater advance had been made in the development of the territory.[31] This reply might have been expected to sour Moore's optimism regarding the territory's prospects of an early achievement of self-government, but the fall of the Labour Government in August, followed by the formation of the National Government and the replacement of Sidney Webb by Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister (later Lord Swinton) at the Colonial Office,[32] seemed to augur well to the Northern Rhodesian settlers. "I do not believe that the new Colonial Secretary will support the policy of his predecessor," declared Moore in the Legislative Council.[33] Even more important to Moore than the change of personnel at the Colonial Office was the fact that the new administration was overwhelmingly dominated by the Conservatives--according to Amery, Ramsay MacDonald was nothing more than a "label" which gave the name "National" to a coalition in which he had only about a dozen supporters and had no real authority. Viscount Templewood described him as "a captive in a gilded prison,"[34] while Winston Churchill called him "the boneless wonder."[35] Thus with obvious glee but less accuracy Moore declared that it was from a Conservative Government that Northern Rhodesia had secured an Advisory Council in 1918 (actually it was a coalition Government consisting of Liberals and Conservatives that was in power at the time although the man heading the Colonial Office, Walter Long, was a Conservative), and a Legislative Council following the termination of Company rule on 31 March, 1924. On the latter point Moore was probably nearer the truth. Although the Northern Rhodesian constitution was inaugurated under the first Labour Government which had come to power on 22 January, 1924, it is most likely that the constitutional arrangements were made by the Conservatives. The documents governing the Northern Rhodesian constitution were dated 20 February.

---

[29] Minute of 29 May, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/46/36123/1931.

[30] Minute of 14 July, 1931, Ibid.

[31] Passfield to Maxwell, 30 July, 1931. Ibid.

[32] During the short interval between the fall of the Labour Government on 25 August and the appointment of Cunliffe-Lister on 5 November, J. H. Thomas took over the Colonial Office while holding his former position in the Dominions Office.

[33] 24th November, 1931, cols. 137-8.

Moore was thus confident that the Conservatives would prove more sympathetic to their cause than Labour and might grant them an increased say in the government of the territory. He then proceeded to lecture the Legislative Council on the virtues of the Conservative Party,

> The Conservative Party ... is true to its name, which is important to us. The Conservative Party is known to be a repository of the lessons of the past. They will remember, as we all remember

---

[34] Nine Troubled Years, (London: Collins, 1954), p. 30.

[35] Cited in Clynes, op. cit., p. 200.

> what happened to our eldest brother: he left home 170 years ago.[36]

Fortified by his faith in the Conservative Party, Moore refused to abandon his hopes for the territory's early attainment of self-government. His most savage attacks were largely directed at the Northern Rhodesian Government, "this shadowy entity," as he called it, pointing out that responsible government would be far better than the "reactionary" Government that they had at present. It was time, he said, that "a certain amount of power should gradually devolve on the elected representatives of the taxpayers, that is to say the white settlers."[37]

It was not long, however, before Moore abandoned his cherished ideal of self-government in favour of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. The explanation for Moore's sudden conversion to amalgamation is to be found in two developments which raised a dark cloud of uncertainty over the territory's political future, namely, the economic depression which hit Northern Rhodesia early in 1931, reaching its peak in 1933, and the so-called policy of Africanisation which was the direct result of the depression. The key to the understanding of Northern Rhodesia's settler politics in the years between the two World Wars is is to be found in the territory's unstable financial and economic position during most of this period.

When the British Government took over the administration of Northern Rhodesia in 1924 the territory's financial outlook was far from encouraging. The first Budget revealed an expenditure that was in considerable excess of the expected revenue, and the British Treasury had to provide a grant-in-aid to the amount of £138,000. It was Stanley's hope that the territory's "demands upon the heavily-burdened British taxpayers" would soon be reduced in the not too distant future. His hope was pinned on the future development of the copper mining industry, but at the time when he uttered these words Northern Rhodesia's financial prospects looked very grim.

---

[36] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 24th November, 1931, col. 138. The "eldest brother" was probably a reference to the United States of America.

[37] *Ibid.*, col. 133.

Overall development was practically at a standstill mainly due to the policy adopted by the British South Africa Company in the years 1921 to 1924 when the future administration of its territories was under consideration. Anxious to be relieved of the heavy burden of administration and sensing the impending end of its rule over the two Rhodesias, the Company showed no eagerness to spend on the territory's development during this transitional period.[38] Instead it resorted to a policy of rigid economy with the result that some of the essential services were starved of the required funds. As Stanley pointed out,

> Every possible opportunity was taken in the years 1922-23 and 1923-24 to cut down actual expenditure below the amount which had been estimated as necessary, and the result is that arrears have accumulated in many directions, and that some increase has now become inevitable.

He pointed out that the Company's Estimated Expenditure for the 1922-23 fiscal year, for instance, was £373,495, but the Actual Expenditure was £338,983 and for the 1923-24 period the respective figures were £344,037 and £323,508.[39] Throughout the years that the Company was in charge of Northern Rhodesia its basic aim had been to keep its administrative costs to a bare minimum in order to protect its commercial revenues. This, in fact, was the cause of Moore's early frays with the Company whose objective, he declared in 1907, was "first and foremost to wring profit and advantage from their position without effort or the expenditure of money...."[40]

---

[38] Denny, op. cit., p. 342.

[39] Stanley to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 17 November 1924. P.R.O./C.O./795/4/57484/1924.

The fact that under the terms of the 1923 Agreement all the minerals were left exclusively in the hands of the Company placed Northern Rhodesia in an awkward financial position since the revenue derived by the Government from this source was limited to the income tax payable by the Company on its royalties. Although at the time of the conclusion of the Agreement the feeling was strong among the Directors and the shareholders that the Company had been ruthlessly treated by the Government, this bargain, as the Pim-Milligan Report pointed out, proved a remarkably good one for the Company.[41] In 1923 the Company's mining revenues were relatively small amounting to a petty sum of £12,781, but by September 1935 they had shot up to £111,231 and to £310,955 by September, 1937. In 1923, however, no one foresaw the dramatic development in the copper mining industry. The relative ease with which the Company was able to secure exclusive mineral rights over the territory is also attributable to the eagerness of the Colonial Office officials to clinch a quick settlement with the Company without being involved in a long and embarrassing law suit, which the Company had already given notice to proceed with, contesting the financial terms offered by the Government. As one of the Treasury Solicitors, R. M. Greenwood, remarked,

---

[40] Cited in Denny, op. cit., p. 220.

[41] A. W. Pim and S. Milligan, Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia, Col. No. 145, 1938, p. 83.

> It is a little unfortunate that this agreement has to be settled in such haste. Had time permitted we should have considered it desirable for an agreement of this importance to have been approved by the Attorney-General.[42]

The fact that the mines were operated by companies registered in London meant that the income tax payable to the Northern Rhodesian Government was considerably less than that payable to the British Government in London. "The combined effect of these two factors," the Pim-Milligan Report pointed out, "is that just under 60 per cent of the total levy on the really important industry of the country is paid to the United Kingdom Government and to the British South Africa Company."[43]

By the end of the 1920's, however, Northern Rhodesia's financial position had improved to the extent that for the first time the territory was able to balance its budget in 1929. In transmitting the 1930-31 Estimates to the Treasury, Green described the Protectorate's finances as "extremely satisfactory" pointing out that the revenue had all but doubled in six years.[44] The Governor was also optimistic. By the end of 1930 he predicted that Northern Rhodesia would have a balance of assets over liabilities amounting to £130,000, and that revenue for the year 1930-31 would exceed expenditure by over £100,000.[45] Throughout

---

[42] Greenwood to Sir C. Davis, Colonial Office, 25 September, 1923. Cited in Slinn, _op_. _cit_., p. 373.

[43] _Op_. _cit_., p. 338.

[44] Green to the Treasury, 13 February, 1930. P.R.O./C.O./795/35/35484/1930.

[45] Maxwell to Passfield, 16 December 1929. _Ibid_.

1930, the year of Webb's White Paper, Northern Rhodesia's financial outlook continued to improve. Green wrote of the "exceptionally favourable financial position of Northern Rhodesia" which indicated "clearly the remarkable growth of revenue" which had taken place in the last few years. Most encouraging of all was the fact that the territory had received no grant-in-aid from the Treasury since the 1925-26 financial year and Green felt that the time had now come to ask for Northern Rhodesia's release from Treasury control. Accordingly in April Maxwell was informed by the Secretary of State that

> in view of the present satisfactory financial position and future prospects of the Protectorate, and on the understanding that the debt to the Exchequer in respect of previous loans-in-aid will be repaid out of the proceeds of the first public loan, the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury have agreed that the control hitherto exercised by them over the financies of the Protectorate shall be discontinued as from the end of the financial year 1929/30.[46]

Thus on the very eve of the economic slump, Northern Rhodesia, seemed well "poised on the edge of economic expansion."[47] The only discordant note in this otherwise rosy picture was, as Green pointed out, that in the area of African employment Northern Rhodesia was far behind any other Tropical African dependency and it did not appear from the Estimates that anything was being done to rectify this state of affairs. He was, however, quick to point out that this was not the Governor's fault. "I suspect quiet obstruction among those members of the service who date from Company rule," he said.[48]

---

[46] Passfield to Maxwell, 2 April, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/47/36167/1931.

[47] Edward Clegg, Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, (Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 59.

[48] Minute 6 February, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/41/36006/1931.

The release from Treasury control was not only a public expression of the British Government's confidence in the territory's financial future but, as far as Northern Rhodesian settlers were concerned, a giant step towards eventual independence from Colonial Office rule. It gave them the assurance that self-government was only around the corner. By the end of 1931, however, this sense of confidence and optimism had been replaced by a feeling of despair and pessimism. This was due to the sudden drop in the price of copper which was the result of a world-wide slump experienced by all the major copper-producing countries.[49] From £72 per ton, the price of copper fell almost overnight to a new low of £27. This dramatic fall occurred just after the mining Companies in Northern Rhodesia, encouraged by the recent boom in the international market, had decided to embark on an extensive programme of exploration and exploitation of new mines involving heavy investment in new methods of copper production.

In an attempt to cope with the crisis and in order to stabilise copper prices, an agreement was reached among the world's major copper producers limiting production, first to 25 1/2 per cent of their maximum productive output and later to 20 per cent. The quota system became effective in Northern Rhodesia from 1 January, 1932.[50] For a country whose economic livelihood was dependent upon the mining industry, the results were calamitous and far-reaching.

The introduction of the quota system led to the closure of several mines on the Copperbelt which threw a large number of workers, both

---

[49] Gann, "The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper", op. cit., pp. 6-7.

[50] Maxwell to Cunliffe-Lister, 22 August, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/53/36385/1932; Pim-Milligan Report, p. 87.

Europeans and Africans, out of regular employment. In February 1931 the Bwana Mkubwa Mine near Ndola closed down and operations of Chambeshi and Kansanshi Mines were suspended in June. By the end of the year the Mufulira Mine which had just reached production stage, and the Nchanga Mine had followed suit, and only the Roan Antelope and the Nkana Mines remained in production.[51] Even the zinc mine at Broken Hill (Kabwe) was forced to close down "on account of the continuous monthly losses" which meant a loss of employment by 100 European workers out of a total of 175, and by 1,000 African workers out of a total of a regular working force of 1,600. The General Manager's request for a Government subsidy of £2,500 for a period of six months in order to keep some of these men on their jobs was firmly rejected by the Secretary of State for the Colonies.[52]

The impact of these developments on Northern Rhodesia's economy was, as Gann points out, catastrophic since the territory had no other alternative source of wealth to fall back upon.[53] In the graphic words of Sir Richard Storrs, Maxwell's successor, Northern Rhodesia was "caught bending" by the depression and that it was only due to his predecessor's efficient handling of the finances prior to the crisis that she had been "caught bending at a very much less acute angle than many other governments of the world."[54] The depression in fact was slow in reaching

---

[51] Maxwell to Cunliffe-Lister, 14 June, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/54/36416/1932.

[52] Maxwell to Passfield, 9 June, 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/47/36164X/1931; Passfield to Maxwell, 16 June, 1931. Ibid.

[53] A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 252.

[54] Cited in R. H. Hobson, "Fourteen Months: Sir Richard Storrs in Northern Rhodesia December 1st, 1932-February 17th, 1934", Part I, The Northern Rhodesian Journal, vol. VI, (1965), p. 142.

Northern Rhodesia although when it did, it hit the territory very hard. Unlike the other copper-producing countries of the world, Northern Rhodesia was, as Gann suggests, fortunate in that her labour costs were very low due to the abundance of cheap African labour and the mining companies were never faced with huge unemployment benefit demands from organized labour since there was as yet no trade union movement in the territory among either the European or the African mine workers.[55] The full impact of the depression only became widely felt in the territory in the course of 1932. The 1930-31 financial year had closed with an excess of revenue of £125,000 thus enabling the territory to repay its loan to the British Treasury. "It is a further matter of gratification," Sir James Maxwell had proudly informed the Legislative Council on 10 February, 1932 "that this, if not the only British Territory in Africa, is one of the very few that was able to balance its revenue and expenditure for 1930-31, without drawing on its reserves."

This optimism was not, however, shared by everyone in the Colonial Office. While paying tribute to Maxwell for having efficiently guided Northern Rhodesia's finances to a point where the territory had succeeded in earning its emancipation from the Treasury, T. L. Rowan, a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department, was deeply disturbed by the dramatic fall in the territory's rate of revenue increase. In spite of the Governor's optimism, he warned that unless there was an immediate increase in revenue, the recurrent expenditure would soon exceed the total revenue.[56] Green, on the other hand, detected another flaw in the Governor's Estimates which was soon to blow up into a stormy controversy. This was the reluctance to employ Africans in the Government service so as to reduce expenditure. To him the present Estimates appeared "to mark the collapse of our policy of training natives to skilled work under the government." He went on,

---

[55] "The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper", *op. cit.*, p. 7. Not until October 1936 was the Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers' Union formed by the European miners. See R. L. Prain, "The Problem of African Advancement on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia", *African Affairs*, vol. 53, (April, 1954), p. 43.

> The Europeans who, in Northern Rhodesia, do the work of minor clerks, telegraphists, typists, mechanics, etc., performed by natives in other tropical dependencies at one-eighth the cost, are mostly recruited locally and are thoroughly South African in outlook. The training and appreciation of native employees is in their hands and, from what I can gather, I infer that they are determined not to admit any poaching on their reserves and are confident that they can defeat anyone in Northern Rhodesia or in the United Kingdom who may attempt to secure for the natives any share in the employment offered by Government service that is not of the poorest character.

Indeed, from the current Estimates it appeared to Green that the opportunity had been taken "not only of barring further employment for natives, but of starting to reduce such meagre opportunites as exist."[57]

Green pointed out, for instance, that in the Secretariat while the European clerks' salaries were being raised from £2,202 to £2,623 per year, those of the Africans were being held down to £176 and the number of African clerks was also being reduced from 3 to 2. This was also true of the Customs department. European clerks were being given a raise from £3,386 to £5,348 per year, while African clerks were getting a cut from £218 to £186. He noted similar developments in the Department of Agriculture where European employees were being given a raise and the Africans a cut. The money to maintain this "expensive white establishment in these hard times," he said, was thus being secured partly by reducing the African staff and "largely by postponing expenditure on native education and on sanitation; and by various other negligible economies." In his view, the source of the problem was not the Governor, of whom he had a very high opinion, but the Northern Rhodesian settlers. "The Governor and the well-disposed Heads of Departments," he said, "are obviously powerless against the staff, backed as they are by the opinion of the settlers."

---

[56] Minute of 3 March, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/51/36321/1932.

[57] Minute of 30 March, 1932. Ibid.

With Maxwell's retirement due before the end of the year, Green was very doubtful whether the Colonial Office would be able to find anyone capable of modifying the system which had been inherited from the Company administration.[58] More than anyone else in the Colonial Office he fully appreciated the powerful influence of settler opinion in Northern Rhodesia and the settlers' ability to thwart the objectives of the British Government's colonial policy. As Maxwell prepared to leave the territory, Green's pessimism about the possibility of the Africans being given a better deal by the white settlers became more marked. "I believe that Sir J. Maxwell has done his best to get natives fair treatment," he wrote, "but has been overcome by the quiet resistance of his civil service."[59] Before leaving the Colonial Office in 1933 Green fired his last volley in a semi-official farewell letter to Mackenzie-Kennedy, the Chief Secretary, in which he told him quite bluntly that they would have to get a man trained under Cameron (Sir Donald Cameron, former Governor of Tanganyika, 1925 to 1931, and a staunch exponent of Lugard's policy of Indirect Rule) to help them "as your civil service is--excuse my saying it--hopeless when it comes to developing native responsibility."[60]

---

[58] Ibid.

[59] Minute of 23 September, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/53/36385/1932.

Once the depression set in, its effects on the Northern Rhodesian economy were quite severe and almost all the industries in the country were severely affected by the slump in the price of copper since almost all aspects of the country's economy were directly or indirectly linked up with the mining industry. By 1932 virtually all the territory's economic activity had ground to a halt. But hard and severe as the material aspects of the depression were on the Protectorate as a whole, the psychological aspects were even more shattering, raising as they did the much dreaded spectre of "poor whiteism". For a moment the cult of white supremacy upon which the economic exploitation of the African and the privileged position of the whites in the territory was built appeared to be floundering as a result of the depression.[61]

Even before the depression Northern Rhodesian settlers had always been haunted by the fear of the presence of poor whites in their midst who were often seen as traitors to the cause of white supremacy. To them South Africa was a constant reminder of the potential dangers of "poor whiteism" where the number of poor whites in 1930, that is, before the depression had actually made any visible impact in the country's economy, was estimated by the Carnegie Poor White Commission to be in the 300,000 to 400,000 range, out of a total white population of 1,800,000.[62] In supporting a motion for the introduction of compulsory education for European children in the Legislative Council in 1930, Kennedy E. W. Harris, Member for the Ndola Electoral Area, drew attention to the predicament of a poor white in South Africa whose only place, he said, was "a limbo between the white aristocracy and black ranks, to both of whom he is equally an object of contempt and pity." He went on,

---

[60] See Mackenzie-Kennedy to Bottomley, 8 November, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5566/1933. Green's letter was dated 16 May.

[61] Cf. E. S. Malherbe, "The Poor White Problem", The African Observer, vol. IV, (April, 1936), p. 16.

> The social system will not permit him to do Kaffir's work and so he preserves a fancied superiority over the producing native, at the cost of losing every quality which may be of value to the state. From unemployed he becomes unemployable. In time he will lose even the smallest remnant of self-respect which prevents him now from admitting the native to social equality with himself. He will invariably mix with them if this degeneration continues in the future, and our problems will be further complicated by the creation of a new racial equality.[63]

In 1932 the spectacle of whites doing "Kaffir's work" seemed closer to reality when reports of unemployed Europeans doing "pick and shovel work" round Lusaka began to circulate. To the Northern Rhodesian settlers nothing could be more appalling as well as humiliating!

For the time being education seemed to offer a reasonably safe barrier between the whites and the blacks but by the end of the Second World War this no longer seemed to suffice. Roy Welensky, the future Prime Minister of the Central African Federation, whose formal education ended at Standard Six, was no longer willing to accept the argument that the only way by which the whites could "keep ahead of the African" or could be prevented from becoming 'hewers of wood and drawers of water' was through a "superior education". He now began to view this as nothing more than "a short-term policy". "If the only distinction between the African and ourselves is this question of education," he said, "and far more capable people than myself suggest it is, then it is a difference that will disappear, and if it disappears then the African gradually takes over."[64]

---

[62] *Ibid.*, p. 18.

[63] Northern Rhodesia, *Legislative Council Debates*, 1st April, 1930, cols. 260-61.

One significant result of the depression in Northern Rhodesia was the sudden drop in the number of Europeans employed on the Copperbelt from 3,326 in January 1931 to 964 in December, a decrease of about 70 per cent.[65] Years later Sir Stewart Gore-Browne recalled the daily convoys of lorries passing by his Shiwa Ngandu estate headed for the Lupa goldfields in Tanganyika "packed with people who had been earning £70 or £80 a month on the Copperbelt, but who were now glad to get mealie meal to eat, and who were pitiably grateful for any tins or fruit we could spare."[66] A number of European destitutes were to be found in the small rural towns of Northern Rhodesia living under conditions which one white settler, Major H. K. McKee described as "similar to Shanty Town in Johannesburg."[67] Between 1931 and 1934 the Government spent no less than $33,500 on the relief of white destitutes. Charitable organisations, like the Ndola Distressed British Subjects Committee which was formed in July 1932, sprang up all over the territory to provide relief to unemployed whites.[68]

---

[64] *Ibid.*, 28 August, 1945, col. 62.

[65] Hobson, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

[66] Cited by Hobson, *Ibid*.

[67] "Northern Rhodesia and Federation", *United Empire*, vol. xliii, (July-August, 1952), p. 190.

In dealing with the problem of unemployment the Northern Rhodesian Government's care and concern was limited to unemployed and destitute whites. Although the Secretary for Native Affairs, Moffat Thompson, acknowledged the existence of large numbers of Africans who were "wandering about in quest of employment," he did not think that this "need cause the Government any great anxiety." African requirements, he said, were not very great and their standard of living was not very high and for the Government to try to do anything about their condition would be encroaching "upon the responsibilities of the tribe and the family clan."[69] The stereotyped view of African mine workers among the Northern Rhodesian settlers and Government officials was that of migratory labourers who only worked for a 'target' and then returned to their tribal villages. Africans, it was often stated, only went out to work in order to obtain tax money hence African Unemployment was summarily dismissed by one Elected Member, Herbert L. Goodhart, Member for the Eastern Electoral Area, as "not so pressingly important." To them the African was above, or rather below, ordinary human economic needs and wants. "If ever there existed a human type that gives the lie to the text-book notion of 'economic man'," wrote one Southern Rhodesian settler, "it is the native of South Central Africa."[70]

---

[68] See a Colonial Office file entitled "Relief of Destitute Europeans", P.R.O./C.O./795/71/25635/1934.

[69] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 15 February, 1932, col. 146.

[70] L. M. Hastings, "The Infant of the Empire", The Listener, vol. xxiv, (5 September, 1940), p. 340.

Thompson conjured up an idyllic picture of tribal village life to which the jobless Africans could always retire in times of economic distress and become self-supporting. As he explained,

> Natives are fortunate in that they have more land than they can use for agricultural purposes; the forests contain animals and insects of many varieties which the population are accustomed to make use for food; there are fish which can easily be obtained in most of the large rivers and swamps and the reserves contain edible fruits, roots and wild vegetables of many kinds.[71]

This view, however, completely ignored the fact that by 1930 "some 102,000 able-bodied African males were in paid employment outside their traditional homes and occupations, some 37 per cent of the estimated number in the whole of the territory."[72] In the older mining townships there was already a permanent African urban population, but the view that the loss of a job meant something different to Africans than it did to Europeans persisted. Whenever the question of African unemployment was brought up it was generally treated "as a social rather than an economic problem," and African unemployed were dismissively described as "loafers".[73]

It would be wrong, however, to ascribe Northern Rhodesia's financial problems during this period entirely to the slump. The crisis, in fact, had long been coming. As Green rightly pointed out, the root cause of the territory's financial difficulties was attributable to two main factors, neither of which had anything to do with the slump. The first was the 1923 Agreement between the British Government and the British South Africa Company which "left an enormous proportion of the resources usually at the disposal of a young Protectorate in the hands of the Company or its off-spring."[74] Under this Agreement, as already pointed out, all the territory's mineral resources were left exclusively in the hands of the Company and for a period of forty years the Company was also entitled to half of all the proceeds from the sale of Crown land in the Protectorate. In addition, the Company retained vast freehold tracts of land in Northern Rhodesia. In return for these concessions the Crown, in Green's words, "received some half-derelict public buildings, an extravagant administration and an annual deficit."[75]

---

[71] Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates, 15 February, 1932, cols. 146-7.

[72] Edward Clegg, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

[73] J. R. Hooker, "Shortages among the Surplus: European Views of African Unemployment in British Central Africa between the Wars", The Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 3, (1969), pp. 421-23.

Gann suggests that the favourable settlement secured by the Company under the 1923 Agreement was mainly due to the appointment of Ormsby-Gore as Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in 1922 since he was "a personal friend as well as a connexion by marriage of Malcolm's,"[76] one of the Company Directors who was involved in the settlement negotiations with the British authorities. This, however, is only partly true. Certainly during the time when he was Secretary of State for the Colonies Ormsby-Gore clearly demonstrated his sympathetic attitude towards the Company by rejecting Sir Hubert Young's persistent entreaties to have the question of the Company's ownership of mineral rights in Northern Rhodesia ("Sir H. Young's King Charles' head," as Ormsby-Gore called it) reopened. He pointed out that their right of ownership had always been recognised "not only by the general public and all the persons and companies engaged in mining, but also by past Governors of Northern Rhodesia and by the Colonial Office under all successive Secretaries of State." He also reminded him of the view taken by the Colonial Office in 1923 that "it would be difficult to question the Company's claim to own the minerals throughout the Territory."[77]

---

[74] Minute by Green, 20 March, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5563/1933.

[75] See his memorandum entitled "Northern Rhodesia and Amalgamation" published by the Labour Party Advisory Committee on Imperial Affairs in April, 1937. Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, 22/1/102.

[76] A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 190.

A more plausible explanation for the favourable terms obtained by the Company, however, seems to be the British Government's inability to appreciate the potential value of Northern Rhodesia's mineral wealth as well as the Colonial Office's failure to do a thorough research on the Company's claims due to its eagerness to reach a quick settlement with the Company before the matter was brought to court. In the view of a Southern Rhodesian journal, the Crown could have had the territory "lock, stock and barrel" in 1923 including the mining royalties and the railways for some additional million pounds, but

> Lacking faith and vision the Imperial Government preferred to take it over as cheaply as possible, left the railways alone, perpetuated the Company's rights to the royalties, and let the Company retain 50 per cent of the land revenue for forty years. So the Company to-day gets much of the revenue which the territory might have had and with which it would be in clover.

The only solution to Northern Rhodesia's financial difficulties, the writer suggested, would be to buy out "the vested interests" on a loan floated by the Imperial Government.[78]

---

[77] Ormsby-Gore to Sir H. Young, 7 May, 1937. P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45105/1937.

The second factor which was also responsible for Northern Rhodesia's financial difficulties was the manner in which the territory had been administered from its early days. According to Green, "the South African system of running a country, 99 per cent of whose inhabitants are poor natives with (at present) little productive or taxable capacity, by an administration of expensive Europeans," was bound, sooner or later, to produce a financial crisis of this magnitude.[79] Since the early days of Company rule, he said, Northern Rhodesia had always been in financial hot water except during periods of mining boom. The reason for this was that "a tropical native territory" had been run by the Company on purely South African lines involving the employment of expensive whites on petty work while nothing was being done to train Africans for these positions. Since the take-over of the territory by the British Government in 1924 the position had, if anything, "grown worse".[80] It had always been the hope of the Colonial Office that the extension of indirect rule to Northern Rhodesia would effect some savings in the cost of administration, but this had not proved to be the case. Green pointed out once again that "the traditional prejudice against trusting the natives" was still "very strong" in the territory.[81]

---

[78] 'Janus', "Matters of the month", The African Observer, vol. VII, (June, 1937), pp. 7-8.

[79] Minute of 20 March, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5563/1933.

[80] Green's minute of 23 September, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/53/3685/1932.

[81] Minute of 20 March, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/55631/1933. Indirect Rule was introduced in Northern Rhodesia in 1929 but the Native Authorities were not given financial responsibility. See Lord [Continued on next page.]

It thus became evident to the Colonial Office advisers that in order to grapple with the territory's financial crisis a wider view of the issues involved would have to be taken. It also became manifestly clear that there was more to the problem than just the question of trying to balance the Budget. The problem, in fact, was both financial and political. Indeed, the political effects of the depression were both far-reaching and long-lasting. While the indications of a return to financial stability were already evident by 1935 when the territory succeeded in balancing its Budget for the first time since the slump, the political reverberations of the depression continued to be felt up to the outbreak of the Second World War and soon merged with other problems created by the war itself. Politically, the depression precipitated another confrontation between the Northern Rhodesian settlers and the Colonial Office similar to the one brought about by the publication of Webb's White Paper in 1930. And, as in 1930, amalgamation became the battle ground.

* *

The immediate concern of the Colonial Office was to try to trim down the territory's administrative expenditure through a programme of strict economy involving retrenchment in the Government Service and the employment of Africans in place of Europeans in the lower ranks of the Service. It was the latter programme that brought about a head-on collision between the Colonial Office and the settlers and soon revealed the ineffectiveness of Downing Street control in the face of settler oppositon.

[Continued from p. 186]
Hailey, Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part II. Central Africa: Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia, (London: H.M.S.O., 1950), p. 83.

Already the closure of the mines had thrown large numbers of workers, Europeans and Africans, out of employment. As a result of the retrenchment policy no less than 3,500 Europeans left the territory in 1931 alone, most of them on their own accord and at their own expense. Of those who applied for repatriation in 1931, 157 were repatriated to their countries of origin, mostly to Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, at Government expense. In 1932 the figure rose to 409 after which it tapered off to 175 in 1933 and 26 during the first nine months of 1934.[82] There were others as well who were deported as prohibited immigrants or as undesirables. By the end of March 1931, a sum of £1,137 had been spent by the Government on the relief and repatriation of destitutes. At the end of the year this figure had risen to £3,090.[83] One significant result of this exodus was the sudden drop in the European population of Northern Rhodesia from 13,300 in 1931 to 10,500 in 1932.[84] The political significance of these figures will be seen shortly.

Sir James Maxwell's retirement at this critical juncture did not seem to augur well for the territory's future. "I doubt if we shall find a successor to Sir J. Maxwell" Green reflected gloomily, "strong enough to remodel the system inherited from the British South Africa Company,"[85] a prediction that turned out to be correct particularly with regard to Maxwell's immediate successor, Sir Ronald Storrs, who simply wilted under the pressure of the white settlers. Storrs arrived in Livingstone on 1 December, 1932 to face "a country ... sunk in the depths of a depression"[86] and almost on the verge of bankruptcy. "It would be more unkind than untrue," writes Hobson, "to summarize the moment as 'the wrong man in the wrong place at the wrong time'."[87] Storrs' urbane outlook together with his Middle East background (he was Governor of Cyprus where he had become a noted Arabist before coming to Northern Rhodesia), hardly prepared him for the problems that he was to face in Northern Rhodesia. His dislike of administrative drudgery--he is said to have once described himself as "unindustrious, but not unenergetic"--may have contributed to the complete loss of confidence in him by the Colonial Office after his dismal failure to grapple with the territory's financial problems by refusing to implement unpopular though necessary measures. One suspects that, besides his poor health, this may have been one of the reasons for his recall after only fourteen months in the country.

---

[82] P.R.O./C.O./795/71/25635/1934.

[83] Maxwell to Cunliffe-Lister, 19 March, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/52/36365/1932.

[84] Pim-Milligan Report, op. cit., p. 85.

[85] Minute of 30 March, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/51/36321/1932.

In the face of the depression Maxwell had been persuaded to the view that a "stocktaking" of the territory's financial resources was necessary and in April 1932 a five man local Finance Committee was accordingly appointed to look into the question of how Government expenditure in such areas as staffing, salaries and leave conditions could be reduced "without loss of efficiency in administration," and to advise on the best methods of increasing the territory's revenues through taxation, should this be necessary.[88] After submitting two Interim

---

[86] Hobson, op. cit., p. 137.

[87] *Ibid.*, p. 135.

[88] Maxwell to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 12 April, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/53/36385/1932.

Reports, dated 19 May and 3 June 1932, the Commission's final Report was presented to the Governor in August. In its findings the Commission anticipated a deficit of at least £120,000 for the 1932-33 financial year, a figure which stunned the Governor who had apparently not been expecting so large a fall in the territory's revenue. Although Maxwell described the Commission's Report as "a very valuable document," its recommendations for reducing the country's expenditure failed to impress Green since these contained "no hint of the possibility of economising by the use of the natives" in the Government service.[89] On the contrary the Commission expressed the view that the training of African surveyors, for instance, "must be uneconomic until the general standard of native education, throughout the Territory was very greatly improved," but no attempt was made in the Report to rectify this situation. In Kenya, by way of contrast, the employment of Africans in the lower ranks of the civil service appears to have taken place with little or no resistance from the Colony's white settlers. This is not to say that the Kenyan settlers were any more liberal than those in Northern Rhodesia. Their tolerance, as Bottomley correctly pointed out, was largely due to their recognition of the fact that the first victims of the Africanisation of the service in Kenya would be the Indians and not the whites.[90]

In the area of African education Northern Rhodesia in the 1930's was well behind other African dependencies.[91] Compared with Nyasaland

---

[89] Minute of 23 September, 1932. Ibid.

[90] Minute of 24 October, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

[91] For a full scale discussion of the state of African education in Northern Rhodesia during this period see an article by Trevor Coombe, "The Origin of Secondary Education in Zambia", (3 parts), African [Continued on next page.]

and the Congo, for instance, her record, as Green said, was "discreditable", and now the Commission was proposing to depress it even further by starving it of the necessary funds. Green drew attention to the discrepancy in the Commission's Report between the proposed reductions in the European and African education departments.

> They are careful of European education (35,621, i.e. £3.10.0 per head of white population), in which they merely suggest dispensing with such teachers as may be rendered superfluous by the loss of a quarter of the population. In native education (£24,740, i.e., 4d. per head of native population) the Committee advise dispensing with the Assistant Director and two Superintendents, warning all missions that it may be necessary seriously to reduce, or even to cancel their grants in 1933-4, stopping special teaching at the Jeanes School.[92]

The Report's proposals concerning African education, however, came as no surprise to Green in view of the fact that the Commission "consisted of three settlers, all thoroughly South African in outlook; of Mr. Dobree, the Treasurer, who I have reason to believe has been the most efficient opponent of Colonial Office policy; and of Mr. Dutton, Chairman, who has been in the Protectorate less than two years."[93]

As the Colonial Office began to scrutinize Northern Rhodesia's system of administration it soon became evident to S. M. Campbell, a member of the West Indian department, that the territory was "overstaffed on the administrative side" and, like Green, he came to the

---

[Continued from p. 190]
Social Research, (June, 1967), no. 3, pp. 173-205, (December, 1967), no. 4, pp. 283-315, and (June, 1968), no. 5, pp. 365-405. Also J. M. Winterbottom, "Looking Back", The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, no. 13, (1953), pp. 30-34.

[92] Minute of 23 September, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/53/36385/1932.

[93] Ibid.

conclusion that the source of the problem was the attempt "to run a tropical country with a mainly European staff," a policy which he considered totally unsound "for financial and political reasons". Taking a wider view, he pointed out that unless a sounder policy was adopted, the alternative was failure, if not total disaster.[94] The general consensus in the Colonial Office was that a more effective way of tackling the problem was to authorise Sir Ronald Storrs, the Governor-designate, "not only to cut down European staff but also to build up native staff, and that no account of prejudice, based either on colour or on the inconvenience of training natives should be allowed to get in the way."[95] This, as Bottomley pointed out, meant in effect that henceforth Northern Rhodesia must be "developed as a preponderantly native country," and he felt that the present need for economy was the best opportunity "for getting on with the good work."[96]

The austerity measures proposed by the Finance Commission were deemed inadequate by the Colonial Office advisers. The Credit Tax which they had proposed, for instance, was considered "trivial". In Green's view something more substantial than the Commission's recommendations would have to be aimed at, but at the same time he realised, as he pointed out to Bottomley, that it was perhaps "better to secure even a little which the Unofficial Members will accept" rather than run the risk of incurring their hostility and thus prejudice the success of the Colonial Office efforts to secure greater native advancement in the territory. Bottomley was in full agreement with this view and he also realised that nothing could be done at the moment until Sir Ronald Storrs was "in the saddle". He made it quite clear, however, that Northern Rhodesia was "about the last place where policy ought to be permanently decided according to what the Unofficial Members want."[97]

---

[94] Minute of 28 September, 1932. Ibid.

[95] Minute by Bottomley, 29 September, 1932. Ibid.

[96] Minute of 8 October, 1932. Ibid.

From the discussions prior to Storrs' assumption of his new post it is evident that both Green and Bottomley were not particularly optimistic about Storrs' ability to handle the situation in Northern Rhodesia and they both felt that he would need strong backing from the Colonial Office if he was to make any significant change. Before his departure for Northern Rhodesia Sir Ronald Storrs was given a general briefing regarding the measures which he was to introduce on his arrival. He was to arrange for an increased income tax and a moderate salary levy. Both measures were to be introduced simultaneously on 1 April, 1933. He was also informed of the prevalence of "South African" ideas in the territory concerning the subject of the employment of Africans and was given to understand that it was the British Government's "duty and policy not only to combat any extension of these ideas but to assist natives in every way to become competent to fill minor posts."[98]

The substitution of African for European Government employees, Storrs was told, would "result in considerable savings on the cost of administration," and it was pointed out to him that the Report of the recent Finance Commission had come as a great disappointment to the

---

[97] Minute of 20 October, 1932. Ibid.

[98] "Note of a discussion held at the Colonial Office on Friday 28th October at which were present Sir J. C. Maxwell, Sir R. Storrs, Sir C. Bottomley, Mr. Green, Mr. Rowan". Ibid.

Colonial Office because of its apparent refusal to consider effecting economies in this way. Indeed, to the Colonial Office it appeared that the Commission's economy proposals "had been chosen with a definitely anti-native bias and would if adopted as they stood render the realisation of our policy in this matter considerably more difficult in the future."[99] On this subject of the employment of Africans in the Government Service Maxwell advised extreme caution. The Colonial Office, he said, must move "circumspectly and as unobtrusively as possible" and pointed out that drastic measures would lead to serious local opposition, particularly in view of the present high unemployment in the territory. Bottomley, however, cockily assured him that they expected this and would be prepared to face it. As events soon proved, these were only empty words.

Due to the absence of the Secretary of State from London at this time the official authorization for Storrs to proceed with the policy of Africanisation was not despatched until January 1933. The difficulty in phrasing this despatch in order to make it palatable to the Northern Rhodesian officials is evident from the number of excissions and alterations in the original draft. For instance, the passage

> I have reached the conclusion that a policy, having as its aim the definite and progressive replacement of Europeans by natives, where possible should be followed, and that no amount of prejudice, based either on colour or the inconvenience of making provision for the training of natives, should be allowed to stand in its way.

was crossed out in the draft.[100]

Upon his arrival in Northern Rhodesia, however, Storrs immediately came under the influence of the white settlers. After a visit to Nyasaland in 1933, he referred to the Northern Rhodesian Africans as "inferior" to those of Nyasaland whom he described as "intelligent",[101] a view which Green saw as "part of the propaganda with which Sir R. Storrs has been stuffed by Mr. Moore and others of the entourage." In his view the trouble was not that the Northern Rhodesian Africans were inferior, but that the settlers were ill-disposed. "There is just as good material as in the Congo or Nyasaland, but at present it is being wasted."[102] Storrs' Budget for the year 1933-34 soon revealed his lack of courage and unwillingness to adopt the measures which he had been instructed to introduce for fear of antagonising the Northern Rhodesian settlers. "It is clear," remarked Campbell after scrutinizing the Governor's Estimates, "that this budget does not attempt to tackle the formidable problem with which Northern Rhodesia is now faced. We here must I think insist on that problem being faced and solved."[103] The situation soon developed into a classic case of a colonial Governor who, when faced with the direct opposition of the local settler community to a policy emanating from London, chose to disobey the orders from his superiors as the lesser of the two evils.

---

[99] Ibid

[100] See Cunliffe-Lister to Storrs, 10 January, 1932. Ibid.

Rather than introduce the Non-Native Personal Tax which he had been ordered to, Storrs advised recourse to the British Treasury instead, a proposal which Green felt the Colonial Office should refuse to contemplate, and that the Governor "should be told so firmly." With this view Campbell fully concurred.

---

[101] Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 31 May, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

[102] Minute of 16 June, 1933. Ibid.

[103] Minute of 4 March, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5563/1933.

> I do not think we could, or should, approach the Treasury at present. We certainly could not approach them on the basis of this budget. It entirely fails to deal with the basic realities of the position.[104]

Northern Rhodesia, he said, must be made to face the facts, but Green realised that the Governor was not likely to make an attempt. "We shall get no help from Sir Ronald Storrs who has simply refused to tackle a difficult job and passed it over to us," he said.[105]

Further instructions were sent to the Governor regarding the measures which he was asked to introduce in order to reduce the expenditure and balance the Budget. The tone of the instructions this time was rather stern:

> I consider that you should aim at balancing the budget in 1935. For this purpose I think it imperative that you should immediately begin retrenchment to an extent calculated to save £50,000 on 1934 budget.[106]

Once more the areas where savings could be effected were indicated. His attention was directed to the employment of Africans in place of European clerks and the reduction of staff in the European Education Department where the ratio of teachers to pupils was said to be 150 per cent higher than in England itself. The Governor was also ordered to reduce expenditure in the Police Force by substituting African constables and sergeants for Europeans. It was also pointed out to him that the proportion of administrators to population was still high. "I am unable to understand why European clerks should be necessary to deal with European population as they are not required in other parts of tropical Africa." It was also obvious from this communication that the Secretary of State was becoming impatient with the Governor:

---

[104] _Ibid_.

[105] Minute of 6 March, 1933. _Ibid_.

[106] Cunliffe-Lister to Storrs, 29 March, 1933. _Ibid_.

> You will understand that I am only suggesting these particular economies for your consideration and do not wish to interfere with your primary responsibility but it is my conviction that it is not possible to manage a country which is 99 per cent native by means of a predominantly white administration. I therefore attach first importance to training and use of native clerks and artisans, even at the cost of temporary loss of efficiency.[107]

Storrs thus found himself in the difficult position of having to face the Elected Members with measures which he was certain they would oppose.

In presenting these proposals to the Legislative Council the Governor did his best to take the sting out of the policy of Africanisation by assuring the Members that the training of Africans, in order to be effective, would involve a long period of education.[108] The following day he made it abundantly clear that he was not in favour of the Colonial Office measures. When one member of the Legislative Council suggested a reduction of the medical and sanitary staff and the removal of doctors from the outlying districts as an economy measure, Storrs retorted:

> The sanitary services in general, are, with the European educational services, the services which more than any

---

[107] Ibid.

[108] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 3 April, 1933, col. 301.

> others, by eliminating the diseases of the body and preserving the vigour of the mind, will tend to preserve that ideal of this territory as a white man's country (Mr. Moore and Mr. Knight: Hear, hear), of which ideal there is no more jealous guardian and exponent than the Governor. (Elected Members. Hear, hear.)[109]

Moore relished these remarks to the full and when he took the floor it was merely to state that in view of what the Governor had said the Elected Members had "nothing more to add." Quite clearly not only had Storrs decided to oppose the Colonial policy of Africanisation, he was also resolved to espouse the political cause of the Northern Rhodesian settlers.

The reaction of the Elected Members to the Secretary of State's proposals was predictably hostile. To Norris it was another example of the Colonial Office intervention without a proper appreciation of local conditions, local ideas, and local associations, and a clear indication of the "lack of vision among those directing colonial affairs in London to-day."[110]

> You must be aware, Sir, that the settler population cannot be expected to view the policy adumbrated this morning with anything other than alarm. It ignores completely what we consider to be our legitimate aspirations.... The fatuity of expecting to train the local native in the time required to give us the urgently needed relief in the years which lie ahead seems to have been completely ignored.

He also made it clear that the policy of Africanisation would encounter the "bitterest opposition" of the white settlers and that the Elected Members "as representatives of the European settlers" would not only be unable to co-operate in such a policy, but would also be compelled to consider "all possible alternatives."[111]

---

[109] Ibid., 4 April, 1933, col. 364. It was statements like these that deeply endeared Storrs to the Northern Rhodesian settlers. As Moore pointed out in his paper, "Our present Governor as I have said is a good governor--a very welcome change." Livingstone Mail, 3 May, 1933.

[110] Ibid., 3 April, 1933, cols. 325-26.

In Moore's view the policy of Africanisation was certain to lead to the lowering of the general standard of administration. "The amenities of civilisation," he said, "would tend to disappear" and the African incursion into the Government Service would "alter the character of the Colony" and draw it nearer to the East African dependencies.[112] Moore also linked the Africanisation programme with the White Paper policy and spat out his venom against the Colonial Office and its advisers who, in his view, consisted of highly educated but unqualified academicians with no local knowledge or experience of the countries which they were governing. The Elected Memebers' anger with the Colonial Office over the issue of the employment of Africans was reinforced by other grievances such as the British Government's request to the Northern Rhodesian Government to repay a Treasury loan of £103,000 at a time when the territory was still suffering from the effects of depression and while the Imperial Government was receiving "enormous revenue" in the form of income tax from companies operating in the country but registered in London.

There was also general resentment among the Northern Rhodesian settlers against the decision to proceed with the plans for the transfer of the capital to Lusaka, a decision which in some inexplicable way, Moore saw as part of the White Paper policy. Although Moore's opposition to the removal of the capital from Livingstone was not entirely above personal interest, this opposition was generally shared by other Elected Members who, though not particularly against the principle of the transfer as such, were, nevertheless, angered by the decision to proceed with the project in the face of the financial difficulties facing the territory. Particularly galling to the Elected Members was the fact that a sum of £15,000 had been advanced from the Colonial Development Fund towards this project whereas Storrs' request for Treasury assistance in order to balance the Budget had been rejected. Moore not unjustifiably saw this as "sheer extravagance" and roundly condemned the "absorption and expenditure of money, which we can ill afford, on unproductive purposes when it is required for development purposes."[113]

---

[111] Ibid., col. 327.

[112] Ibid., 6 April, 1933, col. 432.

Opposition to the Colonial Office policy of Africanisation in Northern Rhodesia was also expressed by Die Vaderland in South Africa which strongly denounced the British Government's declared intentions of gradual replacement of whites by "natives" in the Government Service (the word "African" was considered "unmannerly" by the paper) in order to save £50,000. The Union, it said, should rather advance the £50,000 than allow Northern Rhodesia to pursue such a policy.[114] Strong as the resentment against the Africanisation policy among the Northern Rhodesian settlers was, it was, nevertheless, clear to some of them that, like the White Paper policy, it was not likely to amount to anything more than what Moore called a "pious hope". Indeed, Norris was confident that with the improvement in the territory's economic position the policy of Africanisation would soon find "its pigeon hole in which, let us hope, the rats will nest."[115] Storrs in fact bluntly told the Legislative Council that there was "no intention on the part of the Government prematurely or artificially to extend the field for African employment in the Government Service," He went on

---

[113] Ibid., 27 May, 1933, col. 30. Cunliffe-Lister also felt it was a mistake to transfer the capital to Lusaka. "When I went to the Colonial Office," he wrote in his memoirs, "this project had gone too far to be arrested." I Remember, (London: Hutchinson & Co., 1946), p. 93. Lord Bledisloe also described the selection of Lusaka as the new capital of Northern Rhodesia as "a wicked waste of public money." Bledisloe to Colonel Oliver Stanley, 27 October, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./795/128/45104/1944.

[114] 15 April, 1933. Extract in Stanley's despatch to Thomas, 19 April, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

> There has not been cited one scrap of evidence of a single instance hitherto of any such Africanisation whatever, of any indication that such a policy is contemplated. And I will take this opportunity of pronouncing a categorical, authoritative, and, I trust, final refutation of statements to the effect that this Government or the Home Government intend to adopt any policy prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the white inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia.[116]

Even the Johannesburg Star found it "really remarkable", considering the circumstances, that the Governor was able to express himself so bluntly on this issue.[117]

To the Secretary of State Storrs defended his action by pointing to the poor educational qualifications of African clerks. The best policy, he said, was "to proceed with caution." At the same time he considered it important to bear in mind that the European settler "not unreasonably demands opportunities for his children to enter the lower grades of the Civil Service." He therefore thought it "economically unsound and politically unwise" to try to fill up posts occupied by "almost first class European clerks" with insufficiently trained Africans. The apparent disparity in the provision for European and African education, he said, was explainable by the fact that the Native Education Department had only recently been established (1925) and that for the present time it was impossible to provide further funds. At the same time he expressed his reluctance to proceed with further reductions in the area of European education.

---

[115] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 29 May, 1933, cols. 72-3.

[116] Ibid., cols. 88-9.

[117] 20 June, 1933. Extract in P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5566/1933.

> I cannot but view with apprehension the possibility of a generation of European children growing up in a milieu which makes for degeneration of racial characteristics, deprived of adequate education and lacking any sense of discipline. I can conceive of nothing more dangerous to the population, European and native, than the presence in the country of a 'poor white' uneducated class and I would rather spend such sums as are available in keeping at bay the dangers which the presence of such a class must create in a tropical African dependency than in hastening on the process of native education, desirable though this may be.[118]

With this explicit enunciation of his views Storrs thus placed himself squarely on the side of the settlers and it is not very difficult to see why to Moore and his settler colleagues he became "a good governor" whose premature departure from the territory was deeply regretted.

To Rowan, however, Storrs' despatch was a clear indication that the Governor was taking "an extremely short view of the situation," and that unless the programme of African education was accelerated the territory would be faced with bankruptcy. More than this, the despatch revealed the extent to which the Governor had become imbued with "South African" ideas. "On general principles," remarked Green, "Sir R. Storrs merely repeats what he is told by the Afrikander entourage of Govt. House."[119] These, however, were the qualities that won Storrs great admiration among the Northern Rhodesian settlers. They extolled him for his "ability, the good temper, the fairness and the really great efforts" that he had displayed in dealing with them. "You have only been with us three and a half months, Sir," declared Moore in the Legislative Council with rather unusual humility, "but we have learnt already to respect you and I must say, even though you resent it, to like you."[120]

---

[118] Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 15 February 1933. Ibid.

The controversy concerning the policy of Africanisation in Northern Rhodesia went on virtually unnoticed by the members of the British Parliament. None of them appeared to be aware of the difference of views on this subject between Sir Cunliffe-Lister and Sir Ronald Storrs. The few stray questions on the issue of Africanisation in Northern Rhodesia which came up in the House of Commons were superficial and entirely based on inadequate information gathered from the press. Thus the Secretary of State for the Colonies had no difficulty in satisfying the House on the points that were raised. In reply to a question which came up in the House of Commons on 3 May, 1933, regarding the Colonial Office policy on the subject of the employment of Africans in the service, Cunliffe-Lister merely gave a brief statement on the instructions which he had recently sent to the Governor regarding the policy of encouraging the training and use of native clerks and artisans in the Government service without any elaboration.[121] When asked on 1 July whether his attention had been drawn to a resolution passed by the Elected Members of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council expressing opposition to the policy of Africanisation, the Secretary of State simply answered in the negative and there was no further discussion on this point.[122] Obviously Members of Parliament were handicapped by lack of information regarding the situation in Northern Rhodesia as well as lack of interest in colonial matters as a whole. During the Colonial Office Estimates debate, for instance, one Member of Parliament was critical about the fact that not more than a dozen members on the Government side had "thought it necessary or desirable to attend this Debate on our Colonial Empire to which they so frequently and so glibly refer on other occasions."[123]

---

[119] Minute of 6 May, 1933. Ibid.

[120] 6 April, 1933, col. 432.

[121] Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates, vol. 277, cols. 849-50.

It is, however, difficult to view the policy of Africanisation without being cynical about the Colonial Office intentions. From the start Africanisation was a false issue or, as The Times called it, a "bogey" which became a convenient weapon among its opponents "to sway opinion in the North and arouse fear in the South."[124] It must have been obvious right from the start that the Northern Rhodesian Civil Service could never be Africanised, even partially, until a sufficient number of Africans had been trained to take up responsible positions in the Service. But given the state of African education in the territory during the 1930's this was unlikely to happen until long after the present financial crisis was over and forgotten. Indeed, once Northern

---

[122] Ibid., vol. 280, cols. 920-921.

[123] Ibid., vol. 292, 12 July, 1934, col. 63. Major Milner.

[124] 12 June, 1933.

Rhodesia's financial and economic outlook began to brighten up nothing was ever heard again of the Africanisation question. After reading a despatch from Mackenzie-Kennedy discussing the problems of African education in the territory, Bottomley ruefully admitted that it was still a long way before anything substantial would ever be done "in the way of making reasonable use of Africans in subordinate places, because of the low general level of [African] education."[125] By July, 1933 Storrs was able to inform the Secretary of State that the issue of Africanisation had "largely spent itself."

Furthermore, in all the discussion regarding the subject of employment of Africans in the Government Service, Colonial Office spokesment never disguised the fact that the education of the Africans was only insisted upon "so that they [the Africans] may be extensively employed by Government and then the resulting savings can be used for the general benefit of the country."[126] It is significant that until the coming of the depression there is no evidence of any Colonial Office pressure on the Northern Rhodesian Government to prepare Africans for employment in the Civil Service. In spite of the establishment of the Native Education Department in 1925, African education was left almost entirely in the hands of few scattered and poorly subsidized village mission schools offering some elementary education to Standard IV and whose main emphasis was on religious teaching.[127] As Maxwell pointed out, one of the things that struck him most about Northern Rhodesia after his arrival from West Africa was the lack of employable Africans, a defect which he attributed to the fact that there were, with very few exceptions, no Africans with the education that could qualify them "to fill even the subordinate appointments".

---

[125] Minute of 24 October, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5566/1933.

[126] Rowan's minute, 1 May, 1933. Ibid.

[127] Maxwell to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 February 1931. P.R.O./C.O./795/44/36072/"B"/1931, and 16 May, 1931, 795/47/36167/1931. In the latter despatch Maxwell mentions his visit to one of these missions where he found the members engaged in compiling a Chibemba-Latin Dictionary!

It is true, as Maxwell further pointed out, that during its period of administration, the British South Africa Company "did nothing for native education" in Northern Rhodesia in spite of its undertaking under the 1900 Barotse Agreement, nor can the obstacle posed by settler opinion against African advancement in education be underestimated. Outside the Government Service, declared Mackenzie-Kennedy, the territory was faced with what he described as "the infernal influences of the south" which the Government could do very little to alter.[128] But even taking all these factors into account, it is difficult to exonerate the British Government for its failure to insist on a more equitable provision for African education from the beginning of its administration over Northern Rhodesia. And as Rowan pointed out,

> it must not be forgotten that we shall soon have had direct administration of the Protectorate in our hands for 10 years and despite the fact that the Native Education Department was only established some two years after we took over this administration it is surely not unreasonable to expect that some definite proposals should have been evolved with the object of fitting natives to take a proper part in the service of Government.[129]

To Bottomley it was a matter of deep regret that "even before N.R. was taken off Treasury control we did not insist on better provision for

---

[128] Mackenzie-Kennedy to Bottomley, 9 September, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5566/1933.

[129] Minute of 29 September, 1933. Ibid.

[African] education."[130]

That the general standard of African education in Northern Rhodesia remained practically unchanged in spite of the return of prosperity is evident from the views expressed by the men who led two Commissions that visited the territory just before the outbreak of the Second World War. In spite of what they called the "strenuous and self-sacrificing efforts" on the part of the religious missions in providing education for the Africans, Sir Allan Pim and his fellow Commissioner, S. Milligan, found the general level of African education in the territory following their visit in 1937 "regrettably low". At the same time they flatly refuted the popularly held view among the settlers that the Northern Rhodesian Africans were "inferior to their neighbours in mental capacity."[131] Similarly, Lord Bledisloe whose Royal Commission visited Central Africa in 1938 found the general conditions in Northern Rhodesia "more than depressing." "It was," he said, "almost sickening to think that within a territory over which at least for the time the Union Jack was flying there was such an immense amount to be done both in the matter of education and elementary agriculture."[132]

* *

The direct result of the depression and the Colonial Office attempt to foist upon the Protectorate its policy of Africanisation was the revival of the amalgamation movement which, as Sir Ronald Storrs told Cunliffe-Lister, had been "more or less dormant" when he first arrived in the territory with no indication that it would soon be revived. The policy of Africanisation was generally viewed by the settlers as an attempt by the Colonial Office to shackle Northern Rhodesia to the East African dependencies. In fact since the publication of Webb's White Paper in 1930 the association of Northern Rhodesia with the East African territories had become very unpopular among the Northern Rhodesian settlers. As Chad Norris, Member for the Northern Electoral Area, pointed out in the Legislative Council during a debate on the Estimates,

---

[130] Minute of 6 October, 1933. Ibid.

[131] Pim-Milligan Report, op. cit., pp. 286-7.

[132] Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 376, 20 November, 1941, cols. 517-8.

> There has always been something rather sinister in the manner in which we have been grouped with the East African Colonies. (Mr. Knight: Hear, hear.) We do not envisage, Sir, a future as a black protectorate. This country has been pioneered from the south and there, Sir, lie our affinities.[133]

Northern Rhodesians, he went on, were inspired by the same high hopes that had inspired "those who have established the Dominion and self-Governing Colony that lie to the south of us...."[134] The fact that while Northern Rhodesia was going through a difficult financial period, Southern Rhodesia succeeded in balancing her Budget and was able to purchase the British South Africa Company's mineral rights in 1933 for a sum of £2,000,000[135] made her an object of envy among the Northern Rhodesian settlers. They began to dream of what Norris described as

---

[133] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 3 April, 1933, cols. 325-26.

[134] Ibid., col. 326.

[135] Gann and M. Gelfand, Huggins of Rhodesia the Man and his Country, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964), p. 90.

"a South Central African Federation-Dominion," thoroughly British in character which would "ensure safe access to the sea" for the territory's copper. If this sounds like a flight into fantasy, it should be pointed out that Norris was by no means the only inspired dreamer in the midst of the financial crisis facing the country. Towards the end of 1932, just after the Finance Commission had tabled its gloomy report on the territory's finances, the Chief Secretary, (Mackenzie-Kennedy), was somehow able to gather enough inspiration to assure the Members of the Legislative Council that they were "moving to great changes" in Southern Central Africa.

> I think we all look forward, Sir,--those of us who are interested enough in Africa to look beyond the immediate needs of the day--as a preliminary, to the formation of a big South Central African State or federation of States.[136]

Earlier in the same debate Norris had dazzled his colleagues with his grandiose and glittering dream of "a new dominion which shall turn its back to the Indian Ocean and face the West to the Atlantic, the white man's sea." To be included in this South Central African dominion were the two Rhodesias, the northern portion of Bechuanaland, South West Africa and, possibly, Nyasaland. Thus as the territory appeared to be sinking deeper and deeper under the weight of economic depression, the settlers' visions of the future began to soar higher and higher into the realm of political fantasy.

Most dramatic and much closer to reality was Moore's conversion to amalgamation. At the time of the publication of Webb's White Paper Moore, as we have seen, had been stampeded into supporting his colleagues' request for amalgamation, but once he had received Maxwell's assurance that the Paper did not in fact mean any material change in the Protectorate's administration and that it was "to a large extent academic", he soon returned to his old anti-amalgamationist position. If Moore's ready acceptance of Maxwell's personal assurances seems rather naive, the years following did nothing to disillusion him. Indeed, the absence of any visible change in the manner in which Northern Rhodesia was administered after the White Paper led Moore to the conclusion that the Paper had in fact been withdrawn.[137] Webb's Memorandum has been described as nothing more than a "provocative shirt-trailing by the Colonial Office."[138] Moore had therefore no reason to think that even after the proclamation of the policy of Africanisation things would be any different. His conversion to amalgamation must, therefore, be seen as a direct result of the economic depression whose effects were more immediate than either Webb's White Paper policy of African paramountcy or the Colonial Office policy of Africanisation.

---

[136] 21 December, 1932, col. 305.

In the first place, the depression radically changed Moore from an extravagant optimist regarding Northern Rhodesia's prosperous future which he had so confidently predicted in the past into an extreme pessimist. "A consideration that has affected us--or me I should say--in this matter," he told the Legislative Council after the presentation of the Budget in 1933, "is that as far as it is possible to foresee from these figures before us our budget cannot be balanced for at least two years of cutting down and retrenchment and reduced services, two years that we do not care to contemplate."[139] As far as he could see, the only possible way to effect economy was through the amalgamation of the Services of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under a single Government which would also mean "entire freedom from Colonial Office suggestions." Although this would necessarily involve being placed under the Dominions Office, to Moore that, in itself, would be a change for the better. In his view amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia would mean "increased liberty for the subject" and a larger say in the Government, the two things which he said were denied them under the bureaucracy of the Colonial Office. Thus after many years of hesitation during which time some of his colleagues had charged him with delaying amalgamation, Moore now felt that the "psychological moment" had come to make the change.

---

[137] Ibid., 6 April, 1933, col. 448. In 1935 Moore dismissed trusteeship as "altruism by proxy." Ibid., 9 December, 1935, col. 483.

[138] Henderson, "Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia", p. 85.

Moore's project of amalgamation included not only the two Rhodesias, but, ultimately, Nyasaland and the Bechuanaland Protectorate. At the same time he forcefully rejected the suggestion of any partition or dismemberment of the territory. In throwing his weight behind amalgamation Moore felt that all the disadvantages of political union between the two Rhodesias which had existed in the past had now disappeared. He pointed out that although for the past five or six years he had been opposed to amalgamation, the reasons for his opposition had been gradually disappearing in the last two years. Firstly, all along he had expected an increase in the size of the territory's European population which would bring with it rapid constitutional developments and thus enable Northern Rhodesia to meet Southern Rhodesia at the conference table on equal terms and negotiate with her on equal footing with neither of them claiming superiority over the other. Under the present circumstances he felt that this was just a pipe dream. "Our population," he said, "has declined and is declining: we have made provision for repatriation in this very session."[140] At the same time he noted that the territory's constitutional progress had been arrested--he was referring here to the rejection by the Colonial Office of the Elected Member's representations for a greater share in the Government, the latest being that of March, 1932.[141]

---

[139] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 6 April 1933, cols. 431-2. For Moore's further statement concerning his conversion to amalgamation see the Livingstone Mail, 3 May 1933.

Secondly, Moore's earlier opposition to amalgamation had also been based on his belief that the territory could always rely on the Imperial Exchequer for support in times of financial difficulties. But the recent refusal of Storrs' request for a Treasury loan to balance the Budget had bitterly disappointed him. He saw little hope of the Government being able to carry on beyond 1934 with the resources it had at its disposal. Thirdly, Moore had always feared that Southern Rhodesia's economic interests might clash with those of the mining and agricultural interests in Northern Rhodesia. Now, however, he felt that there was no longer any justification for this fear since both countries were badly off agriculturally. With regard to Southern Rhodesia's numerical preponderance about which he had previously been quite concerned, he now saw this as a matter of little consequence since it was now simply a choice between "two evils"--domination by the south or domination by the Colonial Office. And of these "two evils" he regarded domination by the Colonial Office, with its White Paper policy and Africanisation programme, as the worst. In his view the greatest obstacle to Northern Rhodesia's progress was continued Imperial control and he felt that the territory's development could only be facilitated by amalgamation with what he described as the prosperous and progressive people of the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia "who are our blood brothers."

---

[140] Ibid., col. 436.

[141] See Cunliffe-Lister to Maxwell, 4 March, 1932. P.R.O./C.O./795/46/36123/1931. For an earlier rejection see Passfield to Maxwell, 30 July, 1931. Ibid.

The view that Moore's conversion to amalgamation was prompted entirely by the Imperial Government's decision to proceed with the transfer of the capital from Livingstone to Lusaka[142] is only partially correct. Admittedly Moore was not above such impetuousness--as a personal protest against the transfer of the capital, he declined the Governor's invitation to attend together with the other Elected Members the opening ceremony for the new capital in 1935. His contention that the decision to support amalgamation had been forced upon him by "circumstances" can hardly be questioned. His pessimism regarding the territory's economic future was quite genuine. As he told the Legislative Council,

> I thought two or three years ago that the revenue from the copper mines was going to alter the position in this territory so materially and bring in so much revenue that I advised and pressed for heavy expenditure: I admit it. The revenues may rise, they may collapse utterly and I am not going to gamble with destiny.[143]

From now on Moore began to plump for amalgamation and he now considered the tentative terms which the Southern Rhodesian Ministers had been willing to offer to Northern Rhodesia in 1928 and which he had ridiculed at the time, as "reasonable".

---

[142] See Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 26 July, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

[143] 6 April, 1933, col. 437.

In spite of Moore's dramatic change of front, however, there was as yet no complete unanimity among the Elected Members regarding the urgency of amalgamation. Three of them felt that the time was inopportune to press for it. H. L. Goodhard, Member for the Eastern Electoral Area, thought it best to ascertain Southern Rhodesia's views on the matter first, a consideration of major importance in view of Northern Rhodesia's parlous economic position which might have a discouraging effect on Southern Rhodesia. More than that he felt that to press for amalgamation at a time when the territory was still faced with a huge deficit would make their motives appear suspect. "I would prefer," he said, "to wait until we are in a better position to go to them on more of an equality which I think we shall be able to do."[144] Captain Brown, Member for the Midland Electoral Area, also felt that to press for amalgamation at the present time "would look as if we were simply doing so to obtain outside assistance when we could not solve our own difficulties." Their demand for constitutional progress, Norris said, ought to be based on something more dignified "than a mere political expediency." He recalled how on a previous occasion some of the Elected Members "seriously contemplated more or less hurling themselves at the feet of Southern Rhodesia to secure protection from the policy of native Paramountcy", and this time they were imploring Southern Rhodesia to save them from bankruptcy. Norris envisaged the eventual union between the two countries as "a dignified proceeding" from which both parties stood to gain much.[145]

---

[144] Ibid., cols. 441-2.

Moore celebrated his conversion to amalgamation by introducing a motion in the Legislative Council calling upon the Government "to take into consideration procedure for effecting amalgamation with the minimum of delay."[146] Explaining his decision to press for amalgamation at this time, Moore pointed out that he had now come to realize that the policy of the White Paper was, after all, still in force as indicated by the recent attempt to Africanise the Government Service. He denounced that policy on grounds of self-preservation:

> We white people have not come to this country solely or even mainly to raise the native in the scale of civilisation. That is not our object. Our main object is to survive ourselves, to improve our conditions if we can and occasionally some of us--I am not so fortunate--to raise a family and perpetuate our race.[147]

This, he said, was a biological necessity of every being. Raising the African "in the scale of civilisation" would only be done for "a very selfish reason," namely, "to make them better customers for our products and for those we import." But he made it quite clear that the settlers were not in Northern Rhodesia "in the interests of the natives."[148] Moore's motion, however, only received support from two of the Elected Members, Harris and C. S. Knight, the second member for the Livingstone and western Electoral Area. The three other Elected Members voted with the Official members to defeat the motion--the seventh Elected Member, Captain Murray, a staunch amalgamationist, was in London at the time and would certainly have voted for amalgamation. Thus although there was general agreement among the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members on the principle of amalgamation, there were still differences concerning the urgency of the issue.

---

[145] *Ibid.*, col. 448.

[146] 29 May, 1933, col. 57.

[147] *Ibid.*, col. 61.

[148] *Ibid.*

The amalgamationist cause in Northern Rhodesia was thus weakened not only by divisions among the Elected Members who, as Sir C. Rodwell, the Southern Rhodesian Governor, pointed out after a visit to the territory, were "pulling different ways,"[149] but also by the lukewarm attitude of the Southern Rhodesian Government towards the issue at this time. The amalgamation debate in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council took place at a time when the Southern Rhodesian Assembly was in its last sitting and the party leaders were pre-occupied with the forthcoming general elections. It was, therefore, an inopportune time to push the question of amalgation, as Moore himself readily acknowledged. "I think it is a very unfortunate time," he said, "when the people of Southern Rhodesia are distracted by their own affairs, to throw upon them a proposal which we might have discussed with them in more peaceable times and may have to discuss a few months hence, the difficulty is we do not know with whom."[150] He, nevertheless, felt that the matter was of such importance that it would not be affected by questions of parties and personalities.

---

[149] Rodwell to Harding, 25 July, 1933. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/56/1933.

[150] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 6 April, 1933, cols. 439-40.

The impending general elections were not the only factor affecting Southern Rhodesia's attitude towards amalgamation. Although the Colony was spared the severe initial impact of the depression, largely due to the cushion provided by large profits derived from the construction boom in the Northern Rhodesian mining districts prior to the copper slump,[151] Southern Rhodesia did not escape entirely unscathed; she had her fair share of unemployment, falling prices and declining revenue. Moffat's Rhodesian Party which had been in power since 1923 began to lose popularity and cleavages within the Party began to appear resulting in the formation of splinter groups under a variety of names--the Progressives, Country party and Independents. In 1932 most of these groups were brought together under the Reform Party and in July Dr. Godfrey Martin Huggins was chosen as party leader.[152] In the September general elections which The Round Table described as "a confused struggle" in which 78 candidates battled for the 30 seats in the Assembly, the Reform Party was returned with a handful of 16 seats against 9 for the Rhodesian Party and 5 for the Labour Party.[153] In November 1934 another general election took place following the formation of the United Party which was the result of a merger between a section of the Rhodesia Party and a large portion of the Reform Party. This time Huggins won a landslide victory and was thus able to consolidate his position in Southern Rhodesian politics, a position which he was to maintain, sometimes precariously, until his retirement from politics in 1956 as Lord Malvern, thus becoming the longest reigning Prime Minister in the British Empire.[154]

---

[151] Gann and Gelfand, op. cit., p. 80.

[152] Huggins was born in England in 1883. He came to Southern Rhodesia in 1911, five years after qualifying as a medical doctor. Expecting to stay in the country for only six months, he decided to settle permanently. He entered the Legislative Assembly in 1924 as a member of the ruling Rhodesian Party, then led by Sir Charles Coghlan. Disagreement with the Party now led by H. U. Moffat, over a number of issues one of which was "the idea of Africans enjoying the same political rights as white men" [Gann, History of Southern Rhodesia, p. 296], forced him to resign and join the Reform Party. In 1932 he was chosen as Party leader in his absence.

[153] Vol. 24, 1933-1934, p. 446.

In the political climate prevailing in Southern Rhodesia at the time amalgamation was relegated to the background. Moffat, though personally favourable to amalgamation was still quite content with the British Government policy statement of 2 July 1931 and still considered that there was a long way to go before the formation of a British Dominion of Central Africa could be accomplished.[155] In a private conversation with Sir Ronald Storrs in Salisbury in April 1933, Moffat had expressed the view that the time was not yet ripe to press for the amalgamation of the two territories. He was opposed to any attempts being made to force the issue before Northern Rhodesia had reached the requisite stage of development. Storrs responded to this view by declaring at a public banquet given in his honour by the Southern Rhodesian Government that "though the lady bore the same name and was not in principle averse, she was still young, relatively undeveloped and uncultivated and had not yet, in the opinion of her legal guardian, reached the age of consent."[156]

---

[154] For an analysis of the political events in Southern Rhodesia between 1932 and 1934 see Gann and Gelfand, op. cit., pp. 88-109; D. J. Murray, The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 242-270.

[155] Stanley to Thomas, 6 December, 1932. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/42/1932.

[156] Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 31 May, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

Like Storrs, Moffat felt that amalgamation was something which could neither be forced nor hastened. Although during their visit to Salisbury from June 25 to 29 to discuss amalgamation with the Southern Rhodesian Ministers, Moore and Knight were accorded a very warm reception, they returned without any concrete proposals. Moffat's resignation as Premier soon after their visit and his succession by George Mitchell whom they did not get a chance to meet as he was in South Africa at the time, further devalued the importance of their visit.

With the election of Huggins as Southern Rhodesia's Premier in September 1933, the amalgamation cause suffered another setback. Although Huggins had participated in the Victoria Falls conference of 1930, his immediate concern at this time was the economic plight of the Southern Rhodesian farmers and the more pressing problem of jobless white workers who were demanding tighter protection against African competition in the labour market. In Huggins' view, the immediate solution to the first problem lay in territorial segregation by means of which he hoped to keep the two races as far apart as possible. His belief in the panacea of segregation is evident from the fact that he had chaired the first meeting of the Segregation Society held in Salisbury in 1929.[157] His solution to the second problem was the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 fashioned on a similar legislation in South Africa which became the "skilled Workingman's Charter."[158] By excluding Africans from the definition of employees and by prescribing statutory wage rates for European workers in certain specified industries, it thus established a _de facto_ labour colour bar.[159] During a visit to Livingstone in 1933, Huggins confided to Storrs that his Government was not giving any serious consideration to the subject of amalgamation at present and pointed out that when the matter was last discussed between the Southern Rhodesian delegates and the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members at Victoria Falls in 1930, it was largely because of Moore's actions that no agreement was reached. This time, he said, Southern Rhodesia would prefer to wait until convinced by sound argument and clear proof of Northern Rhodesia's seriousness before making amalgamation a matter of practical politics.[160]

---

[157] Murray, op. cit., p. 290.

[158] Gann and Gelfand, op. cit., p. 98.

Besides the political turmoil in Southern Rhodesia, another reason for Southern Rhodesia's apparent indifference towards amalgamation was Northern Rhodesia's financial difficulties and her sudden fall from apparent prosperity to near bankruptcy. "One need not be a cynic," remarked Bottomley, "to assume that this has some bearing on the present lukewarm attitude of Southern Rhodesia."[161] Northern Rhodesia, saddled as she was with a huge deficit and high rate of unemployment, was obviously not as tempting as she had been a few years earlier when, as Stanley observed, her "expenditure could hardly keep pace with a super-abundance of revenue."[162]

Southern Rhodesia's indifference towards the issue of amalgamation came as a great disappointment to a large number of the Northern Rhodesian settlers. And as Moore wryly pointed out,

---

[159] Murray, _op_. _cit_., p. 290.

[160] Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 December, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

[161] Minute of 15 January, 1934. _Ibid_.

[162] Stanley to Harding, 24 April, 1933. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/44/1933.

> It is idle to deny that the recent elections in Southern Rhodesia resulted in a set-back to the amalgamation project. Southern Rhodesians--or an unascertainable proportion of them--evidently consider that they are more favourably situated with regard to the native problem than are we in the Black North. They are determined to defer indefinitely any association with Northern Rhodesians in their attempts to extend our Imperial civilisation.[163]

So despondent was Moore that he now began to feel that the only alternative course left was for the two countries "to continue to develop separately" and that the project of co-operation between them should be abandoned for the time being. Northern Rhodesians, he said, "must achieve their freedom from meticulous bureaucratic control by themselves."[164] At the same time Moore drew attention to the bleak future facing the territory. The tiny flow of immigrants had trickled to a halt, while emigration had in the last few months reduced the white settler population to approximately where it stood six years ago. Even if the mines were to increase their productive capacity, there appeared little chance of attracting new settlers. "The Imperial Government," he said, "clearly visualises a Central Africa almost exclusively populated by natives." Under these circumstances it seemed that the only possible solution to Northern Rhodesia's problems was for her "to work out her destiny independently."[165]

* *

The Colonial Office view regarding the question of amalgamation at this time was that nothing had occurred in Northern Rhodesia to warrant a modification of the 1931 inter-party conclusion that the Protectorate must be allowed an opportunity to develop along its own lines while maintaining close co-operation with Southern Rhodesia on matters of common interest. Moreover, the Secretary of State for the Colonies was assured by the Governor that in view of the lack of interest shown by Southern Rhodesia in amalgamation it was very unlikely that the issue would come up again in any acute form "for some time to come," and that the Northern Rhodesian settlers were now resigned to wait for a new initiative from the south.[166] "Amalgamation," minuted Bottomley, "must be regarded as entirely off the map until Northern Rhodesia is on a better financial footing if for no other reason" and he did not foresee any likelihood of Southern Rhodesia wanting to take her over in her present financial condition.[167]

---

[163] Livingstone Mail, 4 October, 1933.

[164] Ibid.

[165] Ibid.

Among the Northern Rhodesian Africans the resurgence of the amalgamation movement among the settlers was viewed with growing concern. A resolution passed by the Ndola Native Welfare Association described amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia as being "greatly to the detriment of the interests and legitimate aspirations of the Native population" of Northern Rhodesia and could only "be of benefit to the Europeans and not to the natives." In transmitting this resolution to the Colonial Office, Storrs pointed out that there was no doubt that "it expresses a point of view that is generally held by the more intelligent and that it will develop as they do" even though he felt, like Stanley before him, that the majority of the Northern Rhodesian Africans were not yet in a position to weigh the advantages or disadvantages of amalgamation to themselves.[168] "I note with interest," wrote Bottomley after reading the Governor's despatch, "that the natives have learnt the trick of passing resolutions."[169]

---

[166] Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 13 December, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

[167] 24 October, 1933. Ibid.

Besides amalgamation, another scheme of closer union that was canvassed, though it never won any support, between 1931 and 1936 was that of a federal union between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland advocated by Sir H. J. Stanley although he was not the first person to suggest this idea. As early as July 1918 Frank Melland, a British South Africa Company civil servant in Northern Rhodesia writing under the pseudonym of "Africanus," had proposed the creation of what he called a "British East Central African Confederation" stretching from the Sudan to the Zambezi River as part of the post-war reconstruction of the British East and Central African Empire. Southern Rhodesia was, however, excluded from this arrangement. In his view, "whether within or without the Union" Southern Rhodesia was and would always be part of the Union of South Africa while Northern Rhodesia was an integral part of Central Africa.[170] By 1920, however, he had come round to the view that Southern Rhodesia should be given a chance of joining the proposed confederation if she so desired even though he still felt that the Zambezi formed a "natural southern border".[171]

---

[168] Storrs to Cunliffe-Lister, 26 July, 1933. Ibid.

[169] Minute of 29th August, 1933. Ibid.

[170] "A Central African Confederation", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. 17, July, 1918), p. 285.

[171] "Further Thoughts on a Central African Confederation", Ibid., vol. 19, (January, 1920), p. 107.

Stanley's early thoughts concerning the political future of the Rhodesias may be traced back to the period of his service in Southern Rhodesia and South Africa as Resident Commissioner for Southern Rhodesia, 1915-1918, and Imperial Secretary in South Africa, 1918-1924. During these years he held strongly to the view that the ultimate destiny of Southern Rhodesia lay in her incorporation with the Union and that the "force of circumstances" would eventually impel the European population in the settled area of Northern Rhodesia along the railway line "to seek fusion with Southern Rhodesia." The rest of the territory, he felt, "will probably always be more suitable for administration on the lines of a predominantly native territory than under any European form of self-government." He then suggested that the Governor of Southern Rhodesia should be made Deputy High Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia.[172]

By 1927, however, having observed the course of events in South Africa, he now favoured, as a long-term policy, "the expediency of encouraging and strengthening British solidarity Northward of the Limpopo." As he explained his scheme to the Colonial Office,

> I should like to see a solid 'bloc' of British dependencies comprising in the South the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia (and possibly a portion, if not the whole, of the Bechuanaland Protectorate) and in the North the politically advanced Colony of Kenya, bound together by some political nexus as well as by the more intangible link of distinctly British sentiment.[173]

Although Stanley thought Southern Rhodesia might be disinclined to be grouped together with the "Black North", he, nevertheless, felt that she was "sufficiently British to feel the reaction of the present and prospective disagreements in the Union as a deterrent from an early progress towards amalgamation with the South," and that her attitude towards the North might consequently undergo some change. At this time Stanley was firmly opposed to the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia as this would have the effect of taking Northern Rhodesia out of the British Central and East African Territories comprising Kenya, Uganda, Zanzibar, Tanganyika, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia (the first four were to constitute a Northern subdivision, and the last two a Southern one) and thus remove "the only bridge over which Southern Rhodesia might conceivably at some future date think of entering this group." For the present, however, he did not consider Southern Rhodesia's entry into this group to be "within the probabilities of practical politics" although he felt that its political structure should be built in such a way "as to facilitate and attract the eventual adhesion of Southern Rhodesia." As to whether the final destiny of the British Central and East African Territories "should be within or without the Union, whether it should enter the counterpoise," was to be left open for future determination.[174]

---

[172] Stanley to Lambert, 10 August, 1920. The Stanley Correspondence.

[173] Confidential "Memorandum", 1 June, 1927. P.R.O./C.O./795/40/35663/1930.

In another Memorandum submitted to the Dominions Office in 1931 just before taking up his new appointment as British High Commissioner in South Africa, Stanley reiterated his objection to the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. But in view of the existence of a strong desire for amalgamation on the part of the white settlers in the two territories , which was not so evident when he wrote his earlier Memorandum, he now proposed "a federal nexus" comprising the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. This was to be constituted under a Governor-General or High Commissioner who would be advised by a federal Council and directly responsible to the Crown. As far as native affairs in Southern Rhodesia were concerned, the Governor-General would exercise the supervisory powers presently vested in the High Commissioner for South Africa and was to have similar or even wider powers in respect of the other two territories. Future readjustment of boundaries among the federated units or future internal constitutional changes within any of them were not precluded under this scheme.[175]

---

[174] Ibid.

After the British Government's rejection of amalgamation in 1931, Stanley began to press harder for his ideal of a "central African Federation" which would be strong enough to import and to maintain British traditions outside the Union. In a semi-official letter to Harding[176] Stanley freely expatiated on his idea of bringing together "the several British States in Central Africa into a cohesive group" which was largely based on his exaggerated fear of Southern Rhodesian absorption by the Union. Although he did not wish to imply that "a linking-up" of the Central African territories with South Africa should necessarily be "deprecated for all times as undesirable in any circumstances," he felt that British policy ought to be framed in such a way that if such "a linking-up" did eventually take place

> the Central African Territories should be able to come into the Union, not as disparate weaklings, but as a

---

[175] "Memorandum", 12 March, 1931. Ibid.

[176] 16 August, 1932. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/36/1932.

> coalescent group possessed of sufficient strength and solidarity to withstand the risk of engorgement by anti-British (or at any rate un-British) tendencies in the South.

If, on the other hand, such "linking-up" failed to materialize, it would still be desirable that the Central African territories should be organised in such a way as would enable them "to cohere and hold their own as a Province of the Empire." Since amalgamation had already been "ruled out of the province of practical politics for many years to come," the choice in his view lay between a "federation of sorts and an ever widening divergence of centrifugal particles." Personally, he felt that there was "a possibility (I will not put it higher than that)--of the idea of federation striking root and making growth."

In the light of the controversy surrounding the policy of Africanisation in Northern Rhodesia which had created strong resentment among the white settlers towards Africans, Stanley began to doubt whether the Northern Rhodesian settlers would now be prepared to acquiesce in the inclusion of the whole territory in the federal scheme or to waive for the time being their aspirations for self-government. He now began to feel that a division of Northern Rhodesia, if accompanied by a creation of a central federal authority under a Governor-General or High Commissioner, might overcome settler objections to partition. He then proposed the incorporation of the Railway Strip and the mining region of Northern Rhodesia into Southern Rhodesia "for the sake of peace and progress". In his view neither the Southern Rhodesian Government nor the Northern Rhodesian settlers were likely to accept a compromise which stopped short at the Kafue--a suggestion that had been made by Colonial Office in 1930 but had apparently been discarded--as this would exclude from participation in the enjoyment of self-government "the large and most progressive majority of the European inhabitants of Northern Rhodesia and would withhold from Southern Rhodesia the prospective benefit of the revenue likely to accrue from the copper industry."[177]

Although the excision of the Railway Strip and the Copperbelt from the rest of Northern Rhodesia would mean that the revenue from the mining region would not be available for the development of the African areas to the east and west of the Railway Strip, Stanley felt that if the partition were accompanied by a federal arrangement, it would still be possible "to co-ordinate native policy, fiscal relations, and the exigencies of demand and supply in respect of native labour."[178] A report in the Rand Daily Mail of 17 May, 1933 that the Nyasaland settlers, stirred up by recent developments in Northern Rhodesia, were now demanding the association of the Protectorate with Southern Rhodesia rather than with the East African dependencies as had always been envisaged by British authorities, was received with great jubilation by Stanley. "The conclusion which I draw is that things are beginning to move in Central Africa," he wrote to Harding, "and that my idée fixe in regard to the creation of a federal nexus between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland (and, if possible, the whole, or at least the Northern portion, of the Bechuanaland Protectorate) may prove to be not altogether a mere visionary 'wild-cat' scheme."[179] While not underestimating the difficulties in the way, Stanley felt that these were not altogether insurmountable.

---

[177] Stanley to Harding, 24 April, 1933. P.R.O./D.O./35/11969/44/1933.

[178] Ibid.

[179] Stanley to Harding, 17 May, 1933. Ibid.

Both the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office, however, remained very skeptical about the feasibility of federation. Machtig found Stanley's conception of federation "difficult to follow." But even more than that, he found it "meaningless". In the first place, a federation between a self-governing Colony and two territories possessing no responsible government was, in his view, inconsistent with the British Government's control over the finances of the two Protectorates, particularly over their native policies which he considered to be an essential element in their constitutions. He dismissed Stanley's idea of federation as a "will-o-the-wisp".

> It seem perfectly clear that 'federation' as advocated by Sir H. Stanley is a 'will-o-the-wisp' which it would be futile to pursue, though I do not suggest that we should tell Sir H. Stanley so.... It is inconceivable that His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom should be willing to give up the trusteeship of the native in the essentially native areas of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, to abandon its control over the important copper mines of Northern Rhodesia, and to give up all its other interests in the two Protectorates, merely to please the settlers of Southern Rhodesia.[180]

In the second place, even if the British Government were willing to go along with Stanley's scheme, it was highly unlikely that the mixture of such "discordant elements" as a self-governing white community and two predominantly African territories would ever be a source of strength. Rather the opposite in fact. In his opinion it was likely to create "explosion rather than fusion." Machtig's views here are of significant interest, not only in view of the British Government's volte face after the Second World War concerning the question of federation between the three territories, but also with regard to the racial and political discussions that led to the dissolution of the Central African Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland in 1963.

---

[180] Minute of 28 March, 1933. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/36/1932.

In his reply to Stanley, Harding expressed serious doubts about the feasibility of federation "in the sense of the surrender by a number of separate states of certain of their powers and functions to a central government," so long as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were administered by officials who were directly under the control of the Secretary of State for the Colonies since this would involve divesting Southern Rhodesia, as far as federal matters were concerned, of her self-governing attributes. Neither was he impressed by Stanley's proposal of having the Governor of Southern Rhodesia appointed as High Commissioner for the two Protectorates and vesting him with the powers presently exercised by the British High Commissioner in South Africa in respect of native affairs in Southern Rhodesia. He referred Stanley to the Southern Rhodesian Government's request in 1931 to have the powers of the British High Commissioner merged with those of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia which had been rejected by the British Government on the ground that this would be "constitutionally anomalous, and likely give rise to practical difficulties."

Harding also regarded closer political union between the two Rhodesias as inconsistent with the British Government's decision on the question of amalgamation contained in the statement of 2 July, 1931.

> That decision, so long as it stands, must, I think, be regarded as governing the whole question of the constitutional relations between Southern and Northern Rhodesia, including any project for linking them together politically, whether described under the name of federation, closer union or amalgamation.[181]

---

[181] Harding to Stanley, 15 June, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

At the same time Harding considered it undesirable to lend any encouragement to the views expressed in a manifesto of the Southern Rhodesia Reform Party which implied that Rhodesians were necessarily entitled to the reversion of the neighbouring territories involving the trusteeship of nearly three million African inhabitants and the control of mineral resources of major importance. Although a final answer to the question of "where in future the boundary should be between a Southern Africa with one type of civilisation, and a Central, or Central and Eastern Africa, with another" could not possibly be given at the moment, Harding was almost certain that such a boundary would cut right across such a federation.[182]

After reading Harding's letter, Stanley modified his views somewhat. He pointed out that in using the word "federation" it had only been for the sake of convenience "to designate a form of association definitely not unitary in character." What he had in mind, he said, was co-ordination as opposed to amalgamation. Secondly, he stated that he had never contemplated the surrender by Southern Rhodesia of her attributes of self-government nor had it been his intention that the co-ordinating functions should be vested in the Governor of Southern Rhodesia. What he was proposing was a scheme which would provide for the continuance of the Governor and Government of Southern Rhodesia as presently constituted and the retention of the present reservations in respect of native affairs, the only difference being that the supervisory powers presently held by the British Government under the Southern Rhodesian Constitution would now be exercised by a High

---

[182] _Ibid_.

Commissioner resident north of the Limpopo instead of one resident in the Union.[183]

This convoluted explanation, however, failed to convince British authorities about the practicability of the scheme. As R. R. Sedgwick, Assistant Secretary in the Dominions Office, sarcastically observed,

> It appears from this that 'federation of S. & N. Rhodesia, Nyasaland, & the S.A.H.C.' = the transfer of the H.Cr. for S.A. from Cape Town to Bulawayo & calling him H.Cr. for Central and Southern Africa! I wonder [why] Sir H. Stanley does not suggest calling him Holy Roman Emperor--whose position such a H.Cr. would rather resemble.[184]

Similarly, Bottomley in the Colonial Office considered Stanley's federation scheme incapable of realization, at least for the present. "It seems to me no solution of the Northern problem to take away its independent status by placing it under a High Commissioner," he observed, "and I should not myself advocate that course either for Northern Rhodesia or Nyasaland."[185] Furthermore, Bottomley was doubtful as to whether Stanley could be regarded as "an altogether unbiassed observer on this point."[186] In spite of the obvious lack of enthusiasm for his proposal in Whitehall, Stanley continued to press for a federation of the three territories which Bottomley derisively referred to as "a hobby of Sir Stanley's." So persistent was Stanley that when he began to criticise the Colonial Office policy of Africanisation in Northern

---

[183] Stanley to Harding, 27 July, 1933. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/58/1933.

[184] Minute of 18 October, 1933. Ibid.

[185] Minute of 8 November, 1933. Ibid.

[186] Minute of 24 October, 1933. Ibid.

Rhodesia, M. A. Greenhill thought that he was "exceeding his brief" and Calder felt that it was time that Stanley was "given a hint to moderate his zeal" for "amalgamating the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland" since he appeared to be going "much further and much faster than the Secretary of State for the Colonies."[187]

There were two other proposals that were brought up as alternatives to amalgamation during this period and both were rejected by the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office. One was based on the principle of racial segregation between blacks and whites in Southern Rhodesia. It was first proposed by Lieut.-Colonel C. L. Carbutt, Chief Native Commissioner of Southern Rhodesia, in his evidence before the Agricultural Economic Committee in 1933 which had been appointed to look into the state of the agricultural industry in the Colony, and later elaborated in a memorandum which he and Huggins presented to the Dominions Office during their visit to London in 1934.[188] Carbutt's scheme was basically a manifestation of the European fear of the African which had recently been revived by the depression. Politically, Carbutt stated in his memorandum that the Southern Rhodesian whites were afraid of the numerical strength of the black race and in presenting his views before the Dominions Office, the Chief Native Commissioner did not mince his words:

---

[187] Minute of 4 September, 1935. P.R.O./D.O./35/4241/11969/80/1935.

[188] For Carbutt's evidence before the Agricultural Committee see Governor of Southern Rhodesia to the Dominions Office, 22 January, 1934. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/61/1934. See also his article "The Racial Problem in Southern Rhodesia", NADA, no. 12, 1934, pp. 6-11. For a copy of his memorandum, "Native Problem", see P.R.O./C.O./795/72/25659/1934.

> to say that the white man will never submit to political domination by the black man, is in Southern Rhodesia an undeniable truism. It follows that no matter to what heights of civilisation the native attains the white man will not admit him in large number to political equality.

Similarly he felt that if the African was given full economic scope to develop his capabilities he would not for long remain a mere unskilled worker. He pointed to the situation in South Africa where, according to mining reports, the African had already made "almost phenomenal advance in efficiency during recent years," a development which had led to fears about the ultimate elimination of the European worker from the entire range of mining operations. It was in order to forestall a similar development in Southern Rhodesia that Carbutt unfolded his 'grand design' of territorial segregation which went far beyond the present policy embodied in the Land Apportionment Act of 1930. His proposal envisaged an amalgamation of Southern and Northern Rhodesia, but only "on condition that native interests be declared and remain permanently paramount in Northern Rhodesia, exclusive of a strip along the railway line and of the Copper Belt," in which unfortunately Europeans have acquired such large interests that they could not be expropriated reasonably, while in Southern Rhodesia European interests would be paramount and the first consideration.[189]

Under this arrangement, Carbutt argued, white development in Southern Rhodesia would be freed from the "embarrassing necessity" of having to consider native interests. Those Africans who did not like the conditions in Southern Rhodesia would be free to migrate into Northern Rhodesia where their development would likewise be unhampered by any need to consider its repurcussions on European interests. The movement of Africans from Southern to Northern Rhodesia, Carbutt felt, would take place in a "natural way" without any compulsion, since it would enable the African "to excape [sic] from conditions which will be distasteful to them," and for this reason he was confident that Southern Rhodesian Africans would "welcome" this arrangement. Furthermore, Huggins felt that the scheme would also resolve the question of African franchise in Southern Rhodesia since Africans would in future only be allowed to vote in their own areas.[190] Carbutt, as Bottomley observed, while apparently not willing to give up the Railway Zone and the Copper Belt, wanted to use Northern Rhodesia as a "dump for the native population of Southern Rhodesia" so that Southern Rhodesia "would become a European's paradise and the Union Government, profiting by so good an example, would proceed to decant its own native population, with a similar opportunity of servility, into Nyasaland, Tanganyika and Uganda."[191]

---

[189] "Native Problem". P.R.O./C.O./795/72/25659/1934.

Carbutt's scheme, however, received no support from the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office. Sir John L. Maffey who became permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies in November 1933, felt that the proposal would involve an entirely new orientation of Imperial policy and would be a contravention of the British Government's policy statement of 2 July, 1931. The scheme also ran counter to British policy in Northern Rhodesia that Africans should not be denied the opportunity of political and economic advancement. Harding concurred with this view and pointed to the possible difficulty of presenting such a scheme to Parliament in view of the British Government's special responsibility for Africans in Southern Rhodesia. Bottomley also saw no "ultimate advantage in shutting the two races up in separate cages when their interests very largely overlap and the day-to-day Government of the Territory which holds them both is a matter which affects the two races in equal shares."[192] Moreover, even if room could be found in Northern Rhodesia for the "dispossessed Naboths"--which was doubtful--Bottomley saw no "justification in moving natives whose agriculture competes with European agriculture" to remote areas "where their access to markets of any kind might be insecure."[193]

---

[190] See the Colonial Office minutes of a meeting held in the Colonial Office Conference Room on 16 July, 1934 to discuss Carbutt's Memorandum. Ibid.

[191] Minute of 27 February, 1934 on Carbutt's evidence before the Agricultural Economic Committee. P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister was not enthusiastic either about the prospect of Southern Rhodesian Africans who, as British subjects, would be entitled to vote, entering Northern Rhodesia where the Africans as British Protected persons were not. "I wish to help S.Rh," he said, "But we must be careful that our guests fit in to our structure and our policy."[194] He pointed out that it would be awkward to have Southern Rhodesian Africans voting in Northern Rhodesia when Northern Rhodesian Africans possessing the requisite property qualifications could not do so. As far as he was concerned the best solution would be "no native votes all round." Although both the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office appear to have taken the Huggins-Carbutt proposal seriously, it is quite evident that Huggins never really expected a favourable response to it. Even though he had demanded a categorical reply from the British Government by May 1935, when he came to London for the Silver Jubilee Celebrations and held discussions with the Colonial Office, he never referred to this matter.[195]

---

[192] Minute of 18 September, 1934. P.R.O./C.O./72/25659/1934.

[193] Minute of 27 February, 1934. P.R.O./C.O./61/5555/1933.

[194] Minute of 18 May, 1935. P.R.O./C.O./795/72/25659/1934.

The second proposal which was also given serious consideration by the Colonial Office as an alternative to amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia was that of Sir Harold Baxter Kittermaster, Governor of Nyasaland, which involved Nyasaland's merger with Northern Rhodesia. Nyasaland, he said, should never have been allowed to develop as a separate entity, in the first place.[196] The Governor's proposal of "extinguishing his own appointment," however, received no support from the Colonial Office where it was subjected to close scrutiny by Cohen who saw a number of "serious objections" to it.[197]

From an economic point of view Cohen felt that the advantages of a merger between Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia were negligible due to the absence of any significant trade and poor transportation links between the two territories. Financially there seemed to be very little to be gained from such a merger. Finally, from a political point of view Cohen felt that the Governor's proposal was highly unlikely to be acceptable to the European settlers in the two Protectorates since their main objective was to attain self-government through amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and to gain freedom from Colonial Office rule. Under the scheme thus proposed neither of these two objectives was going to be achieved. The only condition under which a merger between Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia could be acceptable to the settlers was if it were recognized by the British Government as a first step towards complete union with Southern Rhodesia. Such a step, however, would be a violation of the policy laid down in 1931 which ruled out any surrender of British colonial trusteeship over Northern Rhodesian Africans through amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and could, therefore, be regarded as applying with equal force to Nyasaland. Cohen advised against any action being taken which might commit the British Government to a future amalgamation of the enlarged Protectorate with Southern Rhodesia. In his view it was best not to interfere with the status quo until the return of prosperity.

---

[195] See minute by A. B. Cohen, 3 September, 1935. Ibid.

[196] Kittermaster to MacDonald, 27 June, 1935. P.R.O./C.O./795/77/45104/1935. See also his semi-official letter to Sir Maffey, February 1935, in C.O. 795/73/45007/1935.

[197] "Memorandum on the suggestion that Nyasaland should be merged with Northern Rhodesia", n.d. Ibid.

There was also a general fear within the Colonial Office that an amalgamation of the two Protectorates would trigger off a fresh demand for the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia before the British Government was ready to deal with it. In Cohen's view, it was "undesirable to take any steps which will bring this controversy to the fore." Moreover, until the whole question of the political future of British Central Africa was finally resolved, it was considered inadvisable to merge the two Protectorates as it might become necessary at some future date to undo such an arrangement. In his conclusion, Cohen felt that it would be "impolitic to liquidate the Government of Nyasaland until it is absolutely certain that it will not be decided ultimately to leave the Protectorate as a native state increased in area by the addition of North-Eastern Rhodesia," a possibility which had been mentioned in the Hilton Young Report of 1929.

Kittermaster's proposal also failed to win the support of Sir Hubert Young, the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and former Governor of Nyasaland. Indeed, Young was only prepared to support the proposal on condition that the merger of the two territories "should be regarded as a step towards the eventual union, in one form or another, of the three territories of British Central Africa." Unless this condition was accepted, he warned that "the critics of the present regime in Northern Rhodesia would take little comfort from the amalgamation of these two territories under the same regime, even if substantial economies were thereby effected."[198] Young's observations on Kittermaster's proposal reveal a more realistic appreciation of the influence wielded by the settlers in Northern Rhodesia which he had proclaimed in his first address to the Legislative Council shortly after his arrival.

> I regard Hon. Elected Members as the permanent element in such a Council as this. Individually they may change, but as a corporate body they represent those who intend to spend the whole of their lives in this Territory. They represent permanent local interests in a way that no official can claim to do, least of all a Governor who has only just a few short years to look forward to in which to learn what those interests are.[199]

To Young it was "essential that each step in the future development of the Central African bloc should, if possible, be taken with the ready co-operation of the respective legislators."[200]

In the end Kittermaster was advised by the Secretary of State for the Colonies that it would be premature to examine the question in any great detail unless the Governor could convince him that "the serious obstacles" to the amalgamation of the two Protectorates could be overcome and that there were "substantial advantages" that could be derived from it.[201] Furthermore, Kittermaster's request for permission to canvass public opinion in the territory on the matter was refused. By this time, however, there were already indications of a strong resurgence in the demand for amalgamation in the two Rhodesias.

---

[198] Sir Hubert Young, "Memorandum on Policy in British Central Africa", 5 August, 1935. P.R.O./C.O./795/77/45104/1935.

[199] 1 December, 1934, col. 3.

[200] "Memorandum on Policy in British Central Africa". Ibid.

---

[201] MacDonald to Kittermaster, 21 September, 1935. Ibid.

Chapter 4

THE PROBLEM OF CLOSER CO-OPERATION IN BRITISH CENTRAL AFRICA, 1935-1939

Sir Ronald Storrs' assurance to the Colonial Office in December 1933 that the subject of amalgamation was not likely to come up again "for some time to come" was soon proved wrong as the amalgamation movement in the two Rhodesias began to show signs of revival. One of the developments that led to this resurgence in Northern Rhodesia was the resentment felt by the settlers against the policy of associating the territory with the East African Trade and Information Service in London,[1] a step which they saw as one more attempt by the Colonial Office to shackle Northern Rhodesia to the East African dependencies and thus prevent them from forging closer ties with Southern Rhodesia where they felt their destiny lay. Once again Moore led the attack.

> Why we should be forced by some other power [i.e., Great Britain] to associate ourselves with East Africa, I do not know. It is continually being forced upon us: we do not want to be associated with East Africa in any way.[2]

With this sentiment Sir Hubert Young expressed complete sympathy. He pointed out to the Secretary of State that there was "some substance" in the Elected Members' contention on this point as it was in keeping with the declared policy of the British Government announced in 1931.[3]

---

[1] This was one of a number of organisations or agencies (quite distinct from the Crown Agencies which were under the supervision of the Secretary of State for the Colonies) set up by the individual colonies in London to promote the sale of their respective products and to advertise their respective countries to prospective settlers and investors.

[2] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 19 December, 1934, col. 332.

The question of Northern Rhodesia's participation in the East Africa Trade and Information Office, while not very important in terms of the monetary contribution involved--£722 per year--was, nonetheless, significant in that it revealed more clearly the long standing ambivalence of British policy towards the question of Northern Rhodesia's political orientation. On the one hand, the policy of keeping the territory within the orbit of the East African dependencies was, as we have seen, first indicated in 1924 when Northern Rhodesia was placed under the East African Department of the Colonial Office. It was later underlined by the territory's participation in the East African Governors' Conference which was maintained well beyond the Second World War, and by the inclusion of Northern Rhodesia within the ambit of Sidney Webb's White Paper policy. On the other hand, the British Government's statement of 1931 had stressed the importance of the maintenance of closer co-operation between Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia on matters of common interest. Indeed, in that statement it was specifically pointed out that while the British Government rejected immediate amalgamation between the two territories, they were not, however, opposed to it in principle. The policy of closer co-operation with the southern colony was later re-affirmed in a Colonial Office despatch of July 1933 to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia following a departmental meeting with the representatives of the British Empire Producers' Organisation from the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland in London on 16 May, 1933.[4]

---

[3] Young to Cunliffe-Lister, 4 January, 1935. P.R.O./C.O./795/73/45007/1935.

[4] Cunliffe-Lister to Storrs, 3 July, 1933. P.R.O./C.O./795/63/5626/1933. This was one of several organisations which came into existence after the end of the war due to Great Britain's abandonment of

[Continued on next page.]

On several matters of general policy, Northern Rhodesia never quite conformed with the other African dependencies. She was often out of step with them in certain aspects of native policy. In theory the territory was supposed to be following the policy of Indirect Rule, but during his stay in Northern Rhodesia as Acting Governor and Chief Secretary, from 1934 to 1937, Sir Charles Dundas noted that this policy "was never quite understood nor wholeheartedly subscribed to" and that the "South African conception of European rule as a White jurisdiction supplanting all indigenous authority was too firmly ingrained." In spite of his efforts to develop it, he left the territory feeling that it had not "really taken root." Even the inclusion of Northern Rhodesia in the East African Governors' Conference was, in his view, "to little purpose."[5] Nor was the Governor, Sir Hubert Young, very enthusiastic about implementing this policy. During a visit to London in 1937, he was reported to have told the members of the East African group of Overseas League that he "was rather a heretic on indirect rule" and that he regarded it "more as training for the natives to run their own affairs than an acceptance that they would eventually govern the country."[6] Young in fact constantly found himself at variance with the Colonial Office on several matters of major policy mainly because of his "southward initiatives ... which smacked of excessive indulgence to settler interests...."[7] In spite of a sharp reprimand from the

---

[Continued from p. 242.]
free trade. Its purpose was to promote the production and marketing of Empire goods as part of the 'buy British' campaign.

[5] African Crossroads, (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1955), pp. 75-6.

[6] The Times, 19 February, 1937.

[7] Coombe, "The Origin of Secondary Education in Zambia", Part II, op. cit., (December, 1967), no. 4, p. 285.

Colonial Office,[8] Young continued with his wayward antics to the very end of his term.

Another factor which contributed to the revival of the amalgamation movement in the Rhodesias was the institution of a conference system for the three Governors of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia in 1935. This was preceded by an informal meeting between the three Governors which was held at the suggestion of Sir Hubert Young to discuss the question of Northern Rhodesia's representation at the forthcoming Customs Conference between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa as well as general questions of co-ordination of certain services between the three territories.[9] There was some concern in the Colonial Office at Young's suggestion which, although it was in keeping with the British Government's policy of encouraging close co-operation with Southern Rhodesia, could easily be used as a stepping-stone to further the cause of amalgamation or federation. This concern was heightened by the fact that Stanley, a long time advocate of federation, was now Governor of Southern Rhodesia.

From the point of view of the Colonial Office, the main problem was how far conversations with Stanley, as Governor of a self-governing Colony, could be kept secret from his Ministers even if the discussions were treated as informal. Calder's suggestion was to sanction Young's proposal but make it clear to him that the discussions were to be "purely informal and preliminary," and that no commitments were to be entered into. Furthermore, subjects like "federation" and "central authority" for the three territories were to be excluded from the discussions.[10] Bottomley, however, thought it futile to try to head the Governors off federation since this was, as he put it, "a hobby of Sir H. Stanley's."[11] Cunliffe-Lister also considered it both impracticable and unwise to try to limit what the Governors might wish to talk about in private. In the end it was decided to sanction the conference subject to the understanding that no publicity as regards "either subjects discussed or views expressed" was to be made, no commitments were to be entered into, and a full report of the discussions was to be forwarded to the Secretary of State.[12]

---

[8] J. E. Shucksburg to Young, 7 February, 1936, Private & Personal. P.R.O./C.O./795/84/45144/1936. It was largely as a result of Young's actions that J. A. Calder, a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department, warned that care should be taken to appoint Governors to Northern Rhodesia who were in sympathy with the Colonial Office native policy. Minute of 25 November, 1936 on Stanley's "Memorandum on Amalgamation". P.R.O./C.O./795/82/45104/1936.

[9] Young to Cunliffe-Lister, 4 January, 1935. P.R.O./C.O./795/73/45007/1935.

The meeting between the three Governors took place on 23 January during a train journey from Bulawayo to Salisbury. It was from this informal gathering that Young came up with the proposal for "occasional conferences" between the three Governors together with the request that the first such conference should be held in Salisbury at an early date. Besides the three Governors and the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, the presence of the Resident Commissioner for the Bechuanaland Protectorate was also suggested, but this was not sanctioned.[13] The Colonial Office became uneasy about one item on the agenda proposed for the conference. Under the sub-heading "Combined Services" it was stated that in view of Southern Rhodesia's distinct political status "it might be difficult to institute combined services unless and until some local central authority, whether a High Commission or an inter-territorial Council, were set up for the Central African territories...." Bottomley was startled by this suggestion. "I don't like 'central authority'," he said, "it sounds too executive."[14]

---

[10] Minute of 15 January, 1935. Ibid.

[11] Minute of 15 January, 1935. Ibid.

[12] Cunliffe-Lister to Young, 22 January, 1935. Ibid.

The Colonial Office was also concerned about the publicity which the holding of such a conference might arouse locally. In spite of the attempt by the Colonial Office to keep the conference secret, it was, in fact, highly unlikely that the three Governors could meet in Salisbury "without occasioning a good deal of talk." Besides, the inclusion of the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia as a member of the conference made it impossible to keep the conference a secret since he was bound to inform his Cabinet colleagues about its transactions. Once again permission to hold the conference was grudgingly given by the Colonial Office but Sir Hubert Young was strongly warned about the topics which he and Sir Harold Kittermaster were to avoid:

> I should deprecate, however, any discussion of any form of federation or central authority for the

---

[13] Young to Cunliffe-Lister, 29 January, 1935 Enclosure I, "Note of informal discussion held on the 23rd January, 1935, between Sir Herbert Stanley, (Governor of S. Rh.) Sir Hubert Young, (Governor of N. Rh.) and Sir Harold Kittermaster, (Governor of Nyasaland)." Ibid.

[14] This was scribbled across the margin of Calder's minute of 11 February, 1935 on the informal meeting of the three Governors on 23 January, 1935. Ibid.

> Three Territories and I should ask that you should be particularly careful in considering any proposals which would involve common services with a self-governing Colony like Southern Rhodesia, or any proposals relating to native policy which could be represented as contemplating a policy for Northern Rhodesia different in any marked way from the policy approved by H.M.G. for the East African Territories generally.[15]

As is patently evident from these instructions, British policy regarding the nature and the extent of co-operation between the two Protectorates and Southern Rhodesia still lacked clear definition. This ambiguity is further illustrated by Sir John Maffey's semi-official despatch of 12 March to Kittermaster in which he specifically requested him to co-operate with Northern Rhodesia and Southern Rhodesia even though Nyasaland had "many ties with the north" which the Colonial Office did not wish to see broken. "In most aspects of native policy," Maffey stated, "Nyasaland has far more affinities with Tanganyika and Uganda than with Southern Rhodesia."[16]

The first formal conference of the three Governors was held in Salisbury from 15 to 17 April under the Chairmanship of Sir H. Stanley, and it was the general view of all the participants that similar conferences should be held in the future at such times as might be mutually convenient. The immediate result of the Governors' Conference was that Young became a vigorous advocate of a more formal, closer link between the three territories even though he was careful to avoid the use of such words as "amalgamation" and "federation". The more closely the three Central African territories were bound together, he said, the more difficult it would be for Southern Rhodesia to break away and join South Africa. He was also critical of the policy of associating Northern Rhodesia with the East African dependencies:

---

[15] Cunliffe-Lister to Young, 2 March, 1935. Ibid.

[16] Maffey to Kittermaster, 12 March, 1935. Ibid.

> The purely artificial links which bind us to the East African territories have been forged into quite a substantial chain in only eleven years. If this chain is still further strengthened, the inevitable result will be to isolate Southern Rhodesia and throw her into the arms of the Union.[17]

Young then suggested for consideration by the Secretary of State "the desirability of the three territories being definitely regarded in future as British Central Africa." He also requested authorisation to announce on the occasion of the opening of the new capital at Lusaka that while the British Government still adhered to the 1931 policy statement on amalgamation "they recognise that the interests of Northern Rhodesia are more closely bound up with her immediate neighbours than with the East African territories, and that the term British Central Africa will be brought into use in official correspondence in future."[18]

What Young was in fact advocating was hardly distinguishable from Stanley's federal scheme except for the fact that under his proposal central control would be vested in a High Commissioner rather than a common legislature. In fact, looking closely at his despatches on this subject one is driven to the conclusion that although the writing may have been Young's, the voice was unmistakably that of Stanley.

Colonial Office advisers were not very happy with the Governor's proposed announcement and were particularly concerned about the effect it might have on the amalgamation movement inside the territory. In his reply to Young, Malcolm MacDonald, who had succeeded Cunliffe-Lister as Secretary of State for the Colonies on 7 June, 1935 and was in turn succeeded by J. H. Thomas on 22 November the same year, pointed out that an announcement along these lines "would certainly be interpreted by the local devotees of amalgamation as meaning that a first step towards amalgamation had been taken" and thus create a situation which "might be exceedingly embarrassing in the future." As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the most suitable way of effecting co-operation between the three territories was through personal contact among the Governors as well as periodical conferences provided no "detailed publicity" was given to such conferences.[19] The view that Young "endorsed the settler campaign for the amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland,"[20] is perhaps a little bit unfair. While pressing for his ideal of a British Central Africa, Young continued to denounce amalgamation as a "bogey" and the Colonial Office at first considered him to be "clearly free from any amalgamation taints," but, it is interesting to note that when Lord Bledisloe was being briefed by the Colonial Secretary prior to the Royal Commission's visit to Central Africa, Sir Hubert Young was said to have "somewhat changed his attitude in this respect since" and had now become an advocate of amalgamation.

---

[17] Young to Cunliffe-Lister, 20 April, 1935. Ibid.

[18] Ibid.

In spite of the semi-secrecy surrounding the meeting of the three Governors at Salisbury and the absence of any detailed information regarding its proceedings, the holding of the Conference was in itself a matter of great interest to the white settlers in the three territories.

---

[19] MacDonald to Young, 30 July, 1935. Ibid.

[20] Coombe, op. cit., Part II, p. 284.

The Conference was seen by the Livingstone Mail as a volte face on the part of the Colonial Office which had until then "frowned upon any communication between self-government Southern Rhodesia and their Protectorates of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland." In the paper's view the main reason for this change of attitude was "a strong hint from the Imperial Treasury," adding that "Even the British taxpayers' purse was not long enough to support indefinitely non-productive, over-administered, native utopias."[21] The Nyasaland Times also took a favourable view of the Governors' Conference pointing out that "Though the Conference per se was not of startling character, the actual happening of the Conference" was in itself significant:

> It was an indication of the way the political wind is blowing. It was an earnest official recognition that Nyasaland's destiny lies South, not North. Further, it is no little thing when the Colonial Office permits us to enter into gubernatorial conversations with a self-governing Colony. The Conference was a step in the right direction, and the Governors were working faster than even they perhaps realised.[22]

To the Rhodesia Herald the highlight of the Salisbury Conference was the desire expressed by the three Governors to hold similar conferences in the future.[23]

* *

To the settlers in the three territories the inauguration of the Governors' Conference was generally viewed as a softening of the Colonial Office attitude towards a closer political association of the British

---

[21] 24 April, 1935.

[22] 30 May, 1935.

[23] 28 May, 1935.

Central African territories. The Johannesburg correspondent of the Daily Telegraph also saw the meeting of the three Governors as a bid for a new Dominion in British Central Africa and noted, "clear indication of a strong movement to amalgamate the three territories into a new Dominion which would eventually include the northern portion of the British Bechuanaland Protectorate." He referred to recent utterances by the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister and some of his Cabinet Ministers which suggested that there was now a favourable view in high places towards the fusion of the three territories.[24] There was, in fact, already a strong pressure for amalgamation in Northern Rhodesia and, as Stanley informed Harding, it was becoming clear that the Governor was not going to have an easy time with the settlers. Part of Young's difficulties with the Northern Rhodesian settlers arose out of the latter's dissatisfaction with the Government's handling of the African taxation issue on the Copper Belt which had largely contributed to an African miners' strike in May 1935.

The controversy aroused by the Governor's selection of the personnel of the Commission which was subsequently appointed to investigate the circumstances surrounding the strike, drove the settlers and the Government further apart. This became another powerful factor in the revival of the amalgamation movement. The use of Southern Rhodesian troops in dealing with the African strikers was later used by Huggins as an illustration of the urgent need for closer co-operation between the two territories in matters of defence.[25] The general elections in Northern Rhodesia later in the year saw a definite swing in favour of amalgamation. All but one of the seven members elected to the new Council were pledged to support amalgamation. The exception was the new member for the Northern Electoral District, Lieut.-Colonel S. Gore-Browne, who favoured a federal scheme instead,[26] but even he, however, joined with the other Elected Members in voting for Moore's amalgamation motion of 9 December, 1935[27] introduced in the new session of the Legislative Council following the endorsement of amalgamation by the electorate. This marked the first time that all the Elected Members had voted unanimously in favour of amalgamation inside the Legislative Council.

---

[24] 1 July, 1935.

[25] "Record of a discussion in the Dominions Office Conference Room on June 4th, 1935." Ibid.

The most bizarre episode in this renewed campaign for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias was the correspondence between Moore and Huggins which was deliberately calculated to whip up public support for amalgamation in Southern Rhodesia and thus force the British Government to re-open the question. In a letter dated 14 October, 1935 addressed to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister, Moore pointed out that the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members were under the impression that Southern Rhodesia was no longer interested in amalgamation and that they were now discussing a proposal to the Government of South Africa concerning the drafting of the terms under which Northern Rhodesia could join the Union. "The motion," Moore stated, "would be of some interest to the Government of Southern Rhodesia...." Huggins was then invited to submit his observations on the matter before the Elected Members' meeting on 11 November.[28] After consulting his Party Caucus,

---

[26] For a full exposition of his scheme see the Legislative Council Debates, 29 October, 1936, cols. 245-253.

[27] Ibid., col. 499.

[28] Moore's letter was later published in the Livingstone Mail, 13 November, 1935.

Huggins replied to Moore in two letters, both dated 6 November. In the first letter, which was described as the "official reply" and in which Moore was told he could make any use of it as he pleased, Huggins denied that his Government was no longer interested in amalgamation and as proof of this he indicated their willingness to hold another conference at Victoria Falls between the Elected Members of the two countries. For obvious reasons, he said, none of his Ministers could attend.

In the second letter which was "not for publication, but for the information of the elected members of Northern Rhodesia," Huggins pointed out that the proposed conference would provide a plausible reason for re-opening the question of amalgamation. He stated that although he and his Ministers were in favour of amalgamation, they were hampered by the recent ruling of the "Super Government of Northern Rhodesia" against amalgamation. This meant that the Southern Rhodesian Government could not, therefore, officially take any initiative. In what became the most controversial part of this correspondence, Huggins told Moore that

> If by some means it could get about that you are considering joining the Union of South Africa there would be an overwhelming vote here in favour of joining you to prevent what would be regarded here as a disaster. The question here is regarded by many as merely higher politics and in no way urgent, and therefore the Government cannot take any action in view of the Secretary of State's despatch. On the other hand the possibility of your joining the union would make the matter a first class urgent political issue, and the Government here would have to move in the matter regardless of its not being quite in order, public opinion here would compel.[29]

---

[29] See enclosures in Young to MacDonald, 15 November, 1935. P.R.O./C.O./795/77/45104/1935.

Referring to the Governors' Conference which had just been held in April, Huggins pointed out that as far as he was concerned its real purpose was to see "if we could not make closer contact with a view to making amalgamation easier when the time arrives, and if possible bring the time for amalgamation nearer."[30] Huggins was obviously determined to use the Governors' Conference as a stepping stone towards the attainment of amalgamation.

The Colonial Office naturally took strong exception to the Prime Minister's action in communicating directly in this way with one of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members and for encouraging Moore to spread rumours that Northern Rhodesia was considering putting forward a motion for the territory's amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. Calder found Huggins' first letter "bad enough", and the second one totally "indefensible". Young, on the other hand, found Moore's action rather tactless.

> The case for union between these three territories is much too strong and good in itself for it to be necessary to bolster it up either with misleading reports of the intentions of His Majesty's Government, empty threats to join the Union, or unfair attacks upon the present regime, which all the elected members in their heart of hearts know to be working smoothly and well.[31]

Stanley was asked to find some way of intimating to Huggins the embarrassment caused to Young by his actions, but Stanley vigorously defended his Prime Minister and professed to be "a little puzzled" by the reaction of the Colonial Office. He was unable to see what embarrassment could have been caused to Young which he could have been spared if Huggins had left Moore's letter unanswered. In his view, there was nothing in Huggins' actions which "could fairly be regarded as reprehensible," though he admitted that his unpublished letter to Moore was, perhaps, uncautiously worded.[32] Huggins, he said, was "confronted with impatience beyond the Zambezi and apathy in this Colony, and if the line which he took was open to criticism, it is fair to remember that the position in which he was placed was far from easy."[33]

---

[30] Ibid.

[31] Young to Stanley, 25 November, 1935. Ibid.

Meanwhile the pressure for amalgamation was rapidly building up in Southern Rhodesia. At its second annual Congress held at Gwelo on 18 November, 1935, the United Party overwhelmingly endorsed the principle of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias and passed a resolution requesting the Government to take active steps to bring the matter before the electorate and thus make it a live issue. The original motion had included Nyasaland but an amendment by E. C. F. Whitehead deleting her was accepted although the door was left open for her later inclusion. In his speech Huggins dealt with the apprehension which had been voiced by the Southern Rhodesian Labour Party that amalgamation would lead to the imposition of the Colonial Office native policy on the amalgamated state. He assured the Congress delegates that such would not be the case.

> I do not think that any Government in this Colony would endanger what liberties we have got for the sake of amalgamation. So we can be certain that nothing less than what we have got would be accepted in any terms of amalgamation. Nothing less than the policy of

---

[32] Stanley to Harding, 29 November, 1935. Ibid.

[33] Stanley to Young, 29 November, 1935. Ibid.

> Southern Rhodesia would be the native policy of Northern Rhodesia under amalgamation.[34]

This, of course, meant that amalgamation could only take place on the basis of the abandonment by the Colonial Office of its declared trusteeship obligations towards the Northern Rhodesian Africans.

It is, in fact, rather surprising that so much fuss was made by the Southern Rhodesian Labour Party concerning the retention of Imperial control over native policy in the two Protectorates in the event of amalgamation being achieved. Tawse Jollie found this argument a very familiar one to those who had, like herself, campaigned for responsible government before 1923.

> We were told over and over again that the Imperial Government would 'never hand over 800,000 natives to a small handful of white settlers.' Quite a lot of water has run under the bridge since then, and a good many values have changed.[35]

To those who were familiar with the constitutional history of the self-governing colonies within the Empire, this was hardly an issue worth worrying about.

The next important development in the amalgamation campaign was a two day unofficial Convention held at the Victoria Falls on 23-24 January, 1936 attended by all the seven Northern Rhodesian Elected Members and delegates representing the three Southern Rhodesian political parties. Neither of the two Governments was represented at the Convention since this was an unofficial meeting. A resolution in favour of "the early Amalgamation of Northern and Southern Rhodesia under a Constitution conferring the right of complete self-government", which was deemed to be "in the interest of all the inhabitants of both Colonies [sic]," was passed unanimously after a demand by some of the delegates that Dominion Status should be made a condition of amalgamation failed to win the support of the majority of the delegates. Only on the insistence of the Labour Party representatives was the phrase "complete self-government" (which implied complete withdrawal of the reservation clauses in the Southern Rhodesian Constitution) included in the final resolution.[36] The Convention then went on to discuss the terms on which amalgamation could take place and the form of government that might be set up for the amalgamated units. The Government of Southern Rhodesia was to be asked to approach the Imperial Government with a view to arranging a meeting between the three parties "to discuss the principle of Amalgamation and the draft of a Constitution for the proposed Colony of Rhodesia." The draft Constitution would then be submitted to the electorates of Northern and Southern Rhodesia for their approval by means of a referendum.[37]

---

[34] Rhodesia Herald, 19 November, 1935.

[35] 6 May, 1938. Ibid.

Following the Convention the Southern Legislative Assembly passed, by a majority of 20 to 4, a motion on amalgamation along the lines of the Victoria Falls Convention Resolution. Six of the Members of the Assembly were absent from the House but four of these were known to favour amalgamation.[38] In transmitting this motion together with the minutes of the Convention to the Dominions Office, Huggins expressed the hope that the Imperial Government would not make a "precipitate decision" on the matter which might alienate the sympathy of the people of the two Rhodesias. He then made a passionate appeal to MacDonald for a Round Table Conference on amalgamation:

---

[36] S. H. Veats, "The Rhodesias and Amalgamation", The Nineteenth Century, vol. 124, (September, 1938), pp. 321-22

[37] For the Resolutions of the Convention see the enclosure in Young to Ormsby-Gore, 20 June, 1936. P.R.O./C.O./795/82/45104/1936. See also Veats, op. cit., pp. 319-322. Veats was one of the Southern Rhodesian advisers at the Convention.

[38] The Times, 25 January, 1936.

> Even if the views of the Imperial Government have in no way changed I think it would be a friendly gesture if you suggested a Round Table Conference on the whole subject about the time of the Coronation next year. I certainly think the Ministers at Home should hear the views of the settlers in Northern Rhodesia and the Ministers of Southern Rhodesia.[39]

Thus by the end of 1935 Huggins, obviously convinced this time that the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members were quite earnest in their desire for closer political union with Southern Rhodesia, had decided to take a more active role in the amalgamation campaign even though privately he still felt that it would take several years to achieve. His position was also strengthened by his Party's endorsement of amalgamation.

When informed of Huggins' proposal, the Colonial Office rejected outright the idea of a Round Table Conference pointing out that there had been no change on the part of the British Government in their policy towards amalgamation since its pronouncement of 1931 and that no useful purpose would be served by an oral discussion, either separately or in conjunction with the Southern Rhodesian Ministers. Besides, to admit the Unofficial Members of Northern Rhodesia to a Round Table Conference on the same footing with the Government of Southern Rhodesia appeared to Bottomley "a little odd in form."[40] The Dominions Office view, on the other hand, was that Southern Rhodesia was not yet ripe for complete self-government and that recent criticisms of the Colony's native policy in the House of Commons were a clear indication that Parliament would be very suspicious of such a proposal. Nor was Southern Rhodesia, in the Dominions Office opinion, ready to assume the task of being a "senior partner" in an administration which would certainly involve heavy responsibility in relation to Northern Rhodesia including the development of the Copper Belt. In Harding's view, the answer to Huggins' request was "clearly in the negative."[41]

---

[39] For Huggins' letter see the enclosure in Stanley to MacDonald, 15 May, 1936. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/132/1936.

[40] Minute of 6 July, 1936. P.R.O./C.O./795/82/45104/1936.

Huggins was accordingly informed by MacDonald that as far as the British Government were concerned the subject of amalgamation was still governed by the 1931 announcement which had been made after the most thorough examination of the whole issue involving consultation with the representatives of the Parties then in Opposition. Although that announcement had made it clear that the British Government were not opposed to the idea of amalgamation in principle, should circumstances in their view justify it at a later date, it was clearly intended by that statement to settle the question for some time to come. In the present view of the British Government, MacDonald went on, there had not been sufficient material change in the five years that had elapsed since that announcement to justify a reconsideration of their decision. MacDonald also drew Huggins' attention to the fact that the unanimity reached at the Victoria Falls Convention had been obtained on the basis of a constitution conferring the right of "complete self-government" to the amalgamated territory, a condition which he said the British Government could not regard as practical politics even in relation to Southern Rhodesia alone. For these reasons Huggins' request for a Round Table Conference was rejected and it was feared that accepting it under these circumstances could only give rise to a misleading impression.[42]

---

[41] Minute of 22 July, 1936. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/132/1936.

The reply originally suggested by H. N. Tait, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, that it should be made clear to Huggins that the British Government "could not contemplate, in any circumstances that can be foreseen at present, completely relinquishing their responsibilities in regard to the native population of Northern Rhodesia" since they were not prepared to do so even in respect of Southern Rhodesia,[43] did not go quite well with Calder. To him this seemed to imply that the British Government "might be prepared to hand over the Government of Northern Rhodesia to the white settlers, either alone or combined with those in the South, subject to reservation as regards native affairs."[44]

The Secretary of State's reply regarding the question of amalgamation which was announced in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council on 10 October, 1936 was received with bitter disappointment by the Elected Members and Moore responded by introducing a motion deploring the rejection of the amalgamation proposals which had been submitted "by the peoples of Northern and Southern Rhodesia." Although the motion received the support of all the Elected Members, it was thrown out by the nine Official Members of the Council,[45] after which the Elected Members announced their intention to resign *en masse* since they thought the reply applied to their motion of 2 December, 1935 calling for constitutional reforms as well. Soon after the Governor assured them that this was not the case and that if they submitted concrete proposals for constitutional reform he would refer them to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. To the Colonial Office Young pointed out that unless some prospect could be held out to the Elected Members that their proposals would "receive sympathetic consideration", some of them might resign. He then reverted to his original proposal of having the three territories officially named British Central Africa.[46] Thus the strategy of coupling the demand for amalgamation with that of constitutional reforms was once more being applied by the Elected Members. Indeed, in his reply promising to discuss the constitutional question with the Governor during the latter's leave, Ormsby-Gore specifically requested the Governor to use his personal name rather than the official title "Secretary of State" in his further speeches or communications with the Elected Members.[47]

---

[42] MacDonald to Huggins, 31 July, 1936. Ibid. See also Ormsby-Gore to Young, 20 August, 1936. C.O./795/82/45104/1936; Veats, op. cit., pp. 320-21.

[43] Minute of 2 June, 1936. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/132/1936.

[44] Minute of 18 June, 1936. Ibid.

In spite of the British authorities' strong reaffirmation of the 1931 policy statement on amalgamation, pressure against holding on to that statement was mounting on all sides. The view that there had been no material change in the position of the two territories to warrant a reconsideration of the 1931 policy was becoming increasingly difficult to maintain. For one thing an economic depression had since ravaged Northern Rhodesia dimming all hopes of an early attainment of self-government by the white settlers. Although signs of financial recovery were already evident by 1935, it was by no means certain that the territory's financial troubles were over yet. Recovery was slow and entirely dependent on a single product, copper. Although Africanisation was already a forgotten issue, it had left behind a feeling of distrust among the Northern Rhodesian settlers towards the Imperial Government's intentions concerning the territory's political future. At the same time the steady recovery of the mineral industry from the slump was beginning to make a strong impression in Southern Rhodesia. Both Huggins and his Ministers made it known to the Dominions Office that they did not accept the British Government's view that there had been no material change in the situation since 1931. On the contrary, they felt that the position had changed considerably during the last five years. In their view the onus was now on the Imperial authorities to convince the Rhodesian settlers as to why the 1931 policy should not be reconsidered.

---

[45] 29 October, 1936, cols. 268-286.

[46] Young to Ormsby-Gore, Private and Personal, 12 October, 1936. P.R.O./C.O./795/82/45104/1936.

[47] Ormsby-Gore to Young, 13 October, 1936. *Ibid*.

In fact, both the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office began to prepare quietly for discussion with Young and Huggins during their coming visit to London for the Coronation ceremonies in the summer of 1937. "When Huggins comes home," it was pointed out by Ormsby-Gore at a departmental meeting held in the Colonial Office on 3 December, "we must be prepared with reasoned arguments why we think that the 1931 declaration must for the present hold good." He then outlined what he thought should be the main consideration in reviewing British policy towards the question of the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias.

> We have to balance here the advantages of a British (as opposed to an Afrikaans) block and the disadvantage

> of having the predominantly native territories of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland subordinated to the settler colony of Southern Rhodesia.

Taking a long view of the matter, he saw the ultimate amalgamation of British Central Africa as inevitable and felt that it was only "a question of time and terms, and the time had yet to come." Another point which would require careful consideration was the position of Barotseland in the event of amalgamation taking place, and it was suggested that she should be placed in a position similar to that of the High Commission Territories.[48] The main significance of these views lies in that they reveal a growing realisation on the part of the Colonial Secretary that the 1931 policy statement was due for re-examination as well as a first hint about the ultimate inevitability of amalgamation among the British Central African territories.

The final push for the re-examination of the 1931 policy came from Sir H. Stanley whose nineteen page "Memorandum" on closer union in British Central Africa ultimately led to the appointment of the Bledisloe Commission in 1938 about which more will be said shortly. In fact Stanley pointed out quite bluntly in his "Memorandum" that the 1931 decision "need not be treated as a law of the Medes and Persians unchallengeable and immutable for an indefinite period of time" and that the change of circumstance since that date strongly justified the reopening of this question.[49] It was in this document that Stanley finally decided to abandon his previous ideal of federation between the two Rhodesias and

---

[48] See a minute of 4 December, 1936 by T. W. Davies, Private Secretary to the Secretary of State for the Colonies. Ibid.

[49] For Stanley's "Memorandum", dated 26 October, 1936 see enclosure in Stanley to MacDonald, 26 October, 1936. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/143/1936.

Nyasaland in favour of amalgamation between Northern and Southern Rhodesia. The subject of closer union in British Central Africa was one which had engaged his interest for a number of years. Reference has already been made to his two previous memoranda on this issue written in 1927 and 1931. By 1936, however, he had come to see the question of closer union in Central Africa as one "of real and rather urgent importance in both its Imperial and its local aspects."

In the "Memorandum", Stanley reviewed the history of the movement for closer union between the two Rhodesias from the British South Africa Company amalgamation proposal in 1916 pointing out that neither the Imperial authority at the time (Lord Buxton) nor the British Government, "so far as is known", indicated any objection to the proposal. Although the rejection of the Company's amalgamation proposal by the Southern Rhodesian Elected Members had been a great disappointment to him at the time, he felt that the grant of responsible government in 1923 had, nevertheless, vindicated their decision. In reference to his previous views regarding the desirability of closer union among the British East and Central African dependencies he pointed out that in the case of the East African territories his main reason for advocating closer political union was to prevent "the retrocession of Tanganyika to Germany in any conceivable eventualities of the course of international high politics."

With regard to the Central African group of territories, Stanley's reasons for favouring closer union among them were largely determined by the following considerations: firstly, there was what he saw as the "unmistakable trend in the Union of South Africa towards an un-British, even if not an anti-British, atmosphere and outlook" which made it essential in terms of Imperial interests to secure the preservation of a "distinctly British element beyond the Limpopo, strong enough to function as a counterpoise to nationalistic Afrikanerism from outside if it remained outside the Union, or as an internal leaven if it should eventually enter the Union." The only hope of achieving this goal lay in the "obliteration of dividing boundaries and the combination of resources and efforts in British Central Africa." He was, therefore, greatly concerned that if this goal were not achieved soon

> the inevitable tendency would be for the several Territories to drift further and further apart, and in the weakness of their individual isolation to become powerless to resist engulfment by the union, one by one, on terms entirely within the Union's own control and under conditions likely to result in the submergence of any distinctively British characteristics.

Although this remained Stanley's pet theme, except for a stray remark by Hertzog's Finance Minister, N. C. Havenga, in 1930, when announcing the renewal of the Customs Agreement with Southern Rhodesia in the House of Assembly in which he stated that he was looking forward to "some measure of eventual political union or federation of the parties to these agreements," there is no evidence of any Union threat to her northern neighbour. Stanley never adduced any evidence of South Africa's desire "to engulf" Southern Rhodesia. In fact, the question of Southern Rhodesia's entry into the Union at this time was largely academic. General Hertzog, on the one hand, was still adamant in his view that any entry by Southern Rhodesia into the Union must be on the basis of bilingualism and a unitary constitution. Southern Rhodesians, on the other hand, were no longer interested in joining South Africa and were now keen on amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia in order to form a "nucleus of a new and separate British Dominion in South Central Africa."[50] Havenga's needless "excursion into high politics", as the Rhodesia Herald put it, greatly offended a large number of Southern Rhodesians.[51]

---

[50] See an undated copy of a Dominions Office minute in P.R.O./C.O./795/61/5555/1933.

Secondly, Stanley felt that an administrative and political association of Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland through a single Governor might serve to divert Southern Rhodesia's native policy "from the risk of approximation towards the less liberal policy of the Union by securing the continuance of correlation with the more liberal British traditions and practice." All these arguments, Stanley said, were as valid now as they were in 1927 when he first expressed them, the only difference being that the obstacles to be overcome had now become more formidable over the intervening years though not necessarily insurmountable. For this reason he now felt very strongly that the longer a decision on this issue was deferred, the greater would be the difficulties to be overcome and that the only alternative to closer political union would be wider divergence among the three territories. The experience of the last two years, he said, had fully convinced him that periodical conferences and a genuine desire to co-operate were not on their own enough to ensure the implementation of a common policy. What was required was "a central co-ordinating authority." Stanley thus saw "the creation of a solid and substantial, distinctively British bloc in Central Africa" as a matter "of paramount and urgent importance." It would also serve to prevent an "anti-White Hall complex" among the Northern Rhodesian settlers which already existed in Kenya and whose result would be a tendency to look to Pretoria rather than to London for guidance and inspiration.

---

[51] The Times, 11 February, 1930; Hyam, op cit., p. 39.

Concerning his conversion to amalgamation, Stanley stated that until recently he had believed that the preliminary step towards a closer union of the three Central African territories might be along federal rather than unitary lines, but the developments of the last few years had made this no longer practicable. One of these developments was the attitude of the Northern Rhodesian settlers who had shown themselves unwilling to accept a federal scheme as this would leave their internal constitutional position unchanged.

> The conclusion which I have now formed, not without some reluctance, is that any form of closer union which did not enable the white settlers North of the Zambesi to participate in the self-governing institutions of Southern Rhodesia would be foredoomed to failure.

For this reason, Stanley now became convinced that amalgamation rather than federation should be the immediate objective of British policy in Central Africa. Besides the creation of a solid British bloc out of the three territories, Stanley felt that amalgamation

> would prevent any risk of the estrangement of the fervent loyalty of the Southern Rhodesian people to the United Kingdom through a feeling that they were regarded in London with a distrust which they did not consider themselves to merit.

He was, however, quick to point out that in saying this he did not wish to suggest that "any weighty moral obligation" towards the Africans should be sacrificed in the interest of conciliating the Southern Rhodesian settlers, but there was, in his view, "surely something to be said for the retention of the good will of good British subjects in a sub-continent where, in other parts, British sentiment and characteristics would seem to be losing their hold." Although he wanted to see Nyasaland included in such a union, he was prepared to let that wait for a later date if it appeared likely to delay the unification of the two Rhodesias.

Furthermore, Stanley felt that a number of changes had occurred since 1931 which justified the re-opening of the issue of amalgamation. Among these was the attitude of the South African Government which he now believed to be favourable to the union of the two Rhodesias, a view based on his recent conversations with two of the leading figures in Hertzog's Cabinet, Oswald Pirow and Smuts. He also referred to the apparent change of attitude on the part of some of the heads of the Copper Mining Companies operating in Northern Rhodesia who had previously opposed amalgamation but were now favourably disposed towards it. As evidence of this change, he referred to the conversations which he had had with Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, the Chairman of the Anglo-American Cooperation which controlled the Rhokana group of copper mines. It should be pointed out, however, that this was not the general view of all the mining Companies and certainly not that of the members of the Board of the British South Africa Company, as Calder found out in a telephone conversation with D. O. Malcolm.[52] After a visit to Southern Rhodesia in 1934, Sir Henry Birchenough, President of the British South Africa Company, came back apparently converted to Stanley's idea of a "block of British States" in Central Africa[53] but, as one writer points out, he "may have been flying a kite of his own."[54] With regard to the question of Imperial responsibility for the welfare of the Africans in Northern Rhodesia Stanley felt that Southern Rhodesia "could be trusted to deal fairly and properly with the natives" since more was being done for Africans in the Colony than in Northern Rhodesia. He did not think the interests of the Northern Africans would in any way be prejudiced by the transfer of the headquarters of administration from Lusaka to Salisbury. In place of diversity in native policy there would now be uniformity and the reservations in the Southern Rhodesian Constitution in respect of native affairs would be extended to the Constitution of the amalgamated territory.

---

[52] See minute of 9 December, 1936. P.R.O./C.O./795/82/45104/1936.

[53] See Birchenough to Cunliffe-Lister, 12 November, 1934 and the minutes of a meeting between the two men on 27 November. P.R.O./C.O./795/72/25679/1934.

[54] Slinn, op. cit., p. 379.

In order to meet political objections to this scheme which might be raised in the House of Commons, Stanley hinted at the possibility of sending out a Commission made up "of one or two open-minded men" who would visit the three Central African territories and enquire on the spot into the general question of amalgamation with special reference to its probable effect on African interests. Such an enquiry, he said, would "serve to remove many misconceptions and allay many apprehensions, so far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned." Stanley then went on to deal with the question of African administration under amalgamation and outlined a scheme involving a Second Chamber, native Councils and a "supreme native Council for the whole country" which would also serve to resolve the question of a common franchise roll in Southern Rhodesia to which he was strongly opposed.

* *

Stanley's Memorandum signalled the beginning of a new flurry of activity in both the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office. It was as if the members of these two Departments had all along been waiting for a lead that would provide a convenient opportunity of re-examining the 1931 policy statement on amalgamation. "Long range considerations of high policy loom over this question," exclaimed Sir John Maffey, "Sir Herbert Stanley touches on them." He went on,

> Perhaps the idea of getting a British self-contained block as a counterpoise to the Union, and eventually leavening the Union, is more important than all the other considerations touched on in these minutes. I see no reason to oppose Sir Herbert Stanley's proposal that the question of amalgamation should be examined by a Commission, though the considerations referred to above would necessarily be beyond the scope of a Commission.[55]

Ormsby-Gore also expressed himself as favourably impressed with Stanley's case for re-examining the 1931 policy and suggested a conference with the Dominions Office to look into the possibility of sending out a Commission of enquiry to report on the subject of amalgamation. "I am quite clear," he said, "that it is politically impossible to hold to the 1931 declaration much longer--and indeed I doubt whether it is desirable--even in the native interests."[56] Although Stanley's proposal for a re-examination of the 1931 policy received favourable response in London, this did not necessarily mean general agreement with his amalgamation proposal. "Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland have between them 3,000,000 Africans (Southern Rhodesia 1,250,000)," observed Bottomley, "and the idea of merging them in an essentially European state does not appeal to me."[57]

Stanley's Memorandum raised a number of thorny issues the consideration of which was in many ways long overdue. One of these was the question of Northern Rhodesia's future political destiny which the

---

[55] Minute of 1 December, 1936. P.R.O./D.O./35/424/11969/143/1936.

[56] Minute of 6 December, 1936. Ibid.

[57] Minute of 20 November, 1936. P.R.O./C.O./795/82/45104/1936.

Colonial Office had previously shown itself to be in no hurry to resolve even though doubts had frequently been expressed about the territory's capability of ever becoming a suitable area for permanent European settlement. If, as Calder pointed out in his review of Stanley's Memorandum, Northern Rhodesia was not considered suitable for permanent white settlement, much stronger arguments would be required to justify its amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia as was suggested by Stanley.[58] Stanley's concern about the danger of the native policies of the two territories drifting further apart was in itself an argument against amalgamation since it was an implicit acknowledgement that divergencies did exist in the native policies of the two countries. As Calder pointed out, "If it becomes increasingly clear, as Stanley fears, that its [Northern Rhodesia's] destiny to develop on very different lines from S. Rhodesia, that will be a justification for having avoided the mistake of amalgamating the two territories."[59]

It was thus evident that the only way by which a uniformity of native policy could be achieved in the two territories was either through Colonial Office surrendering its native policy in Northern Rhodesia or through the Southern Rhodesian Government surrendering its own, and on this point Huggins, as we have already seen, had made his position very clear. Amalgamation, he had said, was not going to be purchased at the price of surrendering Southern Rhodesia's native policy. As far as Calder was concerned, the tendency of the two Rhodesias to drift apart, referred to by Stanley in his Memorandum, was inevitable only because their lines of development were different and it was therefore doubtful if development forced on Southern Rhodesian lines in order to achieve uniformity would be desirable.[60]

---

[58] "Memorandum on Sir H. Stanley's Memorandum on Amalgamation", 25 November, 1936. Ibid.

[59] Ibid.

Stanley's argument regarding the creation of a British Central African block in order to save Southern Rhodesia from being swallowed up by South Africa was hardly consistent with his view that the South African leaders were now favourably disposed towards the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias. It is also interesting to observe that Stanley's reason for abandoning federation in favour of amalgamation was based solely on the consideration of settler attitudes in Northern Rhodesia. Throughout his Memorandum there is no allusion to African views, the assumption here being that only the interests of the settlers were worthy of consideration in the determination of this major question. The habit of ignoring the Africans as a major factor in the consideration of the political future of British Central Africa was to prove a major factor in frustrating all efforts to achieve amalgamation and was ultimately responsible for the demise of the Central African Federation in 1963.

The further argument in Stanley's Memorandum that without Southern Rhodesia's expertise and financial resources Northern Rhodesia's progress was likely to be slow was hardly convincing. In fact, the real reason behind Southern Rhodesia's interest in amalgamation was, as Calder rightly pointed out, the new realisation by the Colony's leaders of the significance of Northern Rhodesia's potential mineral wealth and their desire to use her revenues to promote white settlement. In Tait's view, the argument used by the Southern Rhodesian Elected Members in rejecting the Company's amalgamation proposals in 1917, namely, that it would impede the Colony's constitutional progress, still held good. Amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia which he described as "a predominantly native Territory" would similarly delay Southern Rhodesia's attainment of Dominion status. Southern Rhodesia, he said, did not have sufficient manpower to take over the control of Northern Rhodesia.[61]

---

[60] Ibid.

At an inter-departmental meeting held on 21 January, 1937 which was attended by the two Secretaries of State and the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, Sir Hubert Young, who was in London on leave at the time, Stanley elaborated on the views expressed in his Memorandum. He stressed the urgency of achieving amalgamation at the earliest possible date in view of the possibility of Southern Rhodesia being absorbed by the Union. He saw no need to wait for the further development of Northern Rhodesia as this would mean indefinite delay. While Young agreed with Stanley regarding the need to form a British block in Central Africa which could exert some influence on South Africa, he did not support the idea of an immediate amalgamation of the two countries as no definite decision had been made yet as to whether Northern Rhodesia was to be a white man's country or not. His own preference was a scheme of closer union based on a federal system which would ensure the preservation of the British Government's control over native policy in Northern Rhodesia. He thought it would be a serious mistake to hand over the direction of affairs in Northern Rhodesia to the handful of white settlers in

---

[61] "Mr. Tait's Memo", 16 November, 1936. Ibid.

Southern Rhodesia. As a preliminary step towards closer union he proposed the enlargement of the Governors' Conference by bringing unofficial members into it. This scheme, he said, would appease the Northern Rhodesian settlers whose main desire was that the territory should be regarded as potentially linked with Southern Rhodesia rather than with the East African dependencies.

MacDonald and Ormsby-Gore, on their part, expressed the view that it was highly unlikely that the British Parliament would agree to relinquish their control over native policy in the two Protectorates to a body in which the Southern Rhodesian Elected Members were in the majority. They agreed, however, that steps in the direction of closer union were desirable but felt that these should be proceeded with slowly and in stages. They foresaw serious difficulties in any attempt to achieve complete amalgamation in the near future. At the same time they expressed keen interest in the idea of a commission with wide terms of reference to look into the question of closer union among the three territories.[62]

In preparation for the talks with Huggins who was due in London for the Coronation ceremonies in the summer, the question of amalgamation was brought before the British Cabinet on 8 May. In their Joint Cabinet Memorandum[63] MacDonald and Ormsby-Gore outlined the main issues that were closely bound up with the question of amalgamation. They noted the growing white population of Southern Rhodesia which had risen from 49,000 in 1931 to the present figure of about 55,000, made up mostly of people who had come from Great Britain and were "very loyal to the British connection" and strongly opposed to being part of the Union. In their view Southern Rhodesia's main policy was to develop a large white settled population, but in the case of Northern Rhodesia they saw "little or no evidence that the white settlement policy could have much scope." With regard to the major issue of native policy, the two Secretaries of State further observed that in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the guiding principle was that of trusteeship. "His Majesty's Government," they stated, "regards itself as a trustee seeking to promote the intellectual, moral and economic well-being of the Africans." In Southern Rhodesia, on the other hand, they noted that although native administration was not entirely unsatisfactory and a good deal had been done to assist native development, the basic policy was "more towards the Union attitude than to that of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom," and involved the segregation of Africans to their own areas and the limitation of their opportunities to compete with the whites.

---

[62] "Record of discussion on 21/1/37". Ibid.

[63] C.P. 137 (37). P.R.O./CAB/24/269/1937.

The two Ministers also expressed doubts concerning the scheme under which white interests in Northern Rhodesia would be recognised as paramount in the railway and mining area as this division implied a severe restriction on African development in the remainder of the territory. Neither did Stanley's proposal of protecting African interests under amalgamation by extending to the Constitution of the united Rhodesia the powers reserved to the Secretary of State under the present Constitution of Southern Rhodesia seem feasible. For one thing, it would be difficult in practice for the Secretary of State to act upon such reservation against the expressed wishes of the Southern Rhodesian Government. Moreover, it was to be reasonably expected that as time went on Southern Rhodesia would press for the removal of all restrictions from her Constitution. As the two Ministers pointed out, in the event of a clash between the Secretary of State and the Southern Rhodesian Government on a question of major importance affecting the interest of the Africans, the position of the former might become embarrassing since, if the Southern Rhodesian Ministers chose to resign rather than accept the Secretary of State's ruling, it was very unlikely that the Governor would be able to secure an alternative Ministry to carry out the Secretary of State's policy.

From these observations the two Ministers drew the "inevitable" conclusion that "it would be impossible to inaugurate amalgamation without resigning for practical purposes the position of the United Kingdom Government as trustee for native welfare in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland." As it would not be possible to reduce the powers of self-government presently enjoyed by Southern Rhodesia, amalgamation under existing circumstances would thus mean that in matters affecting Africans in the two Protectorates the British Government "would lose the power to initiate or prescribe any definite policy." Another consideration of Imperial concern was related to the question of defence. As had been pointed out in 1931, it was considered necessary in the interest of Empire policy that the copper mining area should be retained under the direct control of the British Government because of its essential importance to national defence as well as to Empire trade. If the copper mines were to pass under a settlers' Government, it was feared that British interests might be adversely affected. The possibility of a conflict between the settlers and the mining interests could not be ruled out in view of the fact the latter, while providing a very large proportion of Government revenue, would have no effective representation in the Government. Defence would also be adversely affected by amalgamation in view of the Southern Rhodesian prejudice against the use of African troops. This, it was felt, would materially weaken the defence resources of East and Central Africa since the recruitment of Africans in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would no longer be possible.

There was a further consideration involving relations between Southern Rhodesia and South Africa which had to be taken into account in dealing with the question of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias. Although Southern Rhodesia had strongly rejected the alternative of joining the Union in 1922, there was, in the view of the two Ministers, a strong possibility that the Southern Rhodesian Government might decide to enter into negotiations with the South African Government for the Colony's admission into the Union if they felt there was no prospect for amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia. Viewed from this angle, therefore, the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias seemed likely to lessen the chances of Southern Rhodesia's gravitation towards the Union. On the other hand, there was the fear that the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias might trigger off a new demand by the South African Government for the transfer of the three High Commission Territories whose ultimate incorporation into the Union was already anticipated in the South Africa Act. At the same time the Southern Rhodesian Ministers had, on several occasions in the past, expressed a desire to annex the northern part of the Bechuanaland Protectorate, a factor which was likely to complicate the issue. In the opinion of the two Secretaries of State, a renewed demand for the transfer of the High Commission Territories to the Union would be "very embarrassing" in view of the strong opposition of the Africans in these Territories to being placed under the South African administration.

Lastly, there was Stanley's proposal for the creation of a British Central African bloc between the Union of South Africa, on the one hand, with its growing un-British temperament, and the East African dependencies, on the other, with their predominantly African outlook, in which British ideas and civilisation would predominate. However, the Joint Memorandum expressed doubts as to whether such a scheme, which would necessarily involve the withdrawal of the present control by the British Government from the two Protectorates, would be able to achieve such results in view of the fundamental differences in policies between Southern Rhodesia and the northern territories. On the contrary, the result might well be the creation of a Central African state which would even be weaker than the present three separate administrations.

In the light of these observations the two Ministers went on to suggest two possible lines of approach in dealing with the issue of amalgamation. One was to adhere to the 1931 decision. The other was for the British Government to appoint a commission to enquire whether or not some form of union or closer association between the three territories was desirable in the near future. In favour of adherence to the 1931 decision, they pointed out that as recently as the previous year the British Government had announced that they did not feel that sufficient time had elapsed since 1931 to justify a reconsideration of that decision as the lines of development in Northern Rhodesia had not yet taken any definite form. In both Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, they stated, the future of white settlement was still uncertain or, to put it differently, the British Government had not yet made up its mind whether the two Protectorates were to be developed along African or settler lines even though they were generally described as "native territories". Before any decision on this matter could be made it was thought best to await the reports of the two enquiries which were due to undertake an investigation into the financial position of the two protectorates.

Moreover, the anticipated improvement in Northern Rhodesia's financial position, owing to the rising demand for copper, would enable the Government to set its native administration on a more sound footing. All these considerations appeared to favour a reaffirmation of the 1931 policy. It was also feared that in view of the present public canvassing by Germany for the return of her former African colonies, it might be inopportune to raise the question of amalgamating the two Protectorates with the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia. This might be interpreted to mean that the British Government were now considering the possibility of relinquishing their trusteeship over three million Africans in the two Protectorates under their administration and thus encourage Germany in her efforts to recover Tanganyika.

On the other hand, there seemed to be a stronger case in favour of sending out a commission of enquiry to investigate the possibility of some form of union or closer association among the three territories. Firstly, such an investigation would be welcomed by a large number of the Southern Rhodesian settlers who were "very loyal to the British connection", and would also help to prevent the development of an "anti-Whitehall complex" among the Northern Rhodesian settlers. A commission would thus be an act of appeasement. Secondly, a full investigation of the matter would give the advocates of amalgamation the satisfaction of knowing that they had been fully heard. In the event of Cabinet approval being granted to the proposal for a commission, the two Ministers suggested that such an investigation should be made by a Commission which would have representatives from the main British political parties since "the matter is an important one affecting the authority of Parliament, and the one on which ... the Opposition parties should take their share of responsibility." They also advised that such a commission should have the widest terms of reference and should include in its scope the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland. If after their discussions with Huggins and the Northern Rhodesian representatives they felt satisfied that the balance of advantages seem to be in favour of an investigation, they undertook to report back to the Cabinet.

The Cabinet accepted these recommendations but considered it inadvisable to discuss the question of a commission with the South African Government representatives until the British Government had cleared its own mind on the issues involved although such consultation was one of the factors that had to be kept in view before any final decision could be made.[64] The discussions with Huggins and the Northern Rhodesian representatives duly took place during the Coronation ceremonies. Two meetings on the subject of amalgamation were held, one on 18 May with the representatives of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members, Sir Leopold Moore and Gore-Browne, and the other on the 27th with Huggins and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. These two exploratory meetings brought out more clearly the position of the various parties on the issue of amalgamation. Moore stood for complete union of the two Rhodesias, that is, "one Government for Northern and Southern Rhodesia from Salisbury." Asked what the Northern Rhodesian settlers expected to gain by amalgamation, Moore's crisp reply was "freedom", pointing out that at present they were no better than serfs and that the Governor was the Secretary of State's puppet. If they could not get amalgamation, he said, they would like to see alterations in the Constitution which would give the Elected Members parity with the Official Members in both the Legislative and the Executive Councils. Young, on his part reiterated his view that while he was in sympathy with the attitude of the Elected Members regarding amalgamation, he considered it premature. He returned to his previous proposal of having the three territories officially referred to as British Central Africa. A public announcement to this effect by the British Government, he said, would allay the settlers' apprehensions that Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were to be regarded as "native territories."[65]

---

[64] Extract from Conclusions of a Meeting held on Wednesday, 26th May, 1937. C.P. 22 (37). Ibid.

Huggins, on the other hand, was keen to know what the British Government's policy was with regard to South and Central African territories generally and pointed to the mounting difficulties in trying to maintain Southern Rhodesia's independence vis-à-vis the Union. He then made a strong plea for the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias, leaving Nyasaland out for the present. He considered closer co-operation through the Governors' Conference or through three separate systems of administration very inadequate. Huggins was anxious to know whether the idea of amalgamation was acceptable to the British Government and whether a commission could be sent out to look into the matter and make proposals regarding the form of government that could be set up for the combined territories. Speaking on behalf of the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members, Gore-Browne spoke in favour of amalgamation, but in his personal capacity he regarded complete amalgamation as undesirable. His own scheme which found no support among his colleagues was the amalgamation of the "white portions" of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia, leaving the "black areas" as separate units. Kittermaster, on the other hand, expressed preference for a policy of loose co-ordination rather than amalgamation. Under amalgamation, he said, Nyasaland would be "dragged along at the tail of the Southern Rhodesia cart without proper thought being expended on her interests." In his view the crux of the whole matter was native policy. Young on his part took up an intermediate position between Kittermaster and Huggins. While he felt that mere co-ordination of services between the three territories was inadequate, he considered amalgamation premature. He preferred an enlarged Inter-territorial Conference.

---

[65] "Record of a meeting on the 18th of May, 1937 in the Secretary of State's room", P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/1937.

Ormsby-Gore explained the problems in the way of complete amalgamation as advocated by Huggins, one of these being the presence of African franchise in Southern Rhodesia. He stated that he did not want that to happen in Northern Rhodesia and he let slip a remark that he was a believer in the political segregation of black and white, a belief which he said was in line with the policy of indirect rule. It was a remark which Huggins relished to the full. Evidently it was not the illiberal native policy of Southern Rhodesia that Ormsby-Gore was concerned about, but rather its "liberalism" in respect of African franchise which might be brought into Northern Rhodesia through amalgamation. In his view, the right way to proceed would be to send out a Royal or Parliamentary Commission with wide terms of reference to enquire into the whole question of closer co-operation between the three territories--he carefully avoided the word amalgamation which might frighten public opinion in Great Britain. MacDonald agreed with this suggestion but advised caution. "We want," he said, "to hasten slowly." He expressed a personal bias in favour of a British Central Africa but was extremely concerned about the

House of Commons' reaction to any modification of the 1931 policy. He felt that they should move forward gradually and by stages towards this goal.[66]

Ormsby-Gore's position on amalgamation was quite definite. "I am opposed to amalgamation now or at any time," he wrote after the 27th May meeting, "but I would be prepared to see some step taken towards closer co-operation and even closer union."[67] In his view the Colonial Office must maintain full control over native policy in the two northern Protectorates as well as a free hand over the appointment of European staff. He was, however, agreeable to the idea of a commission mainly as an act of appeasement to people like Huggins and Stanley.

> If any more is needed to appease Mr. Huggins and Sir H. Stanley I incline to the sending of a Parliamentary Commission out from here to examine and report on what steps if any should be taken to improve the co-operation where co-operation seems desirable between the three territories in all matters of common interest and in particular regard to defence, communications, scientific and technical services, the migration and conditions of employment of native labour, and economic policy...

Although he expressed himself as not particularly wedded to the above terms of reference and would have no objection to something more general about future political co-operation, he felt very strongly that constitutional questions should be excluded from the Commission's terms of reference. What was of major importance was to keep Southern Rhodesia out of South Africa.[68] Another advantage of a Commission along these lines was, as Bottomley pointed out, that it would help to satisfy public opinion in Great Britain that African interests were being safeguarded without giving Southern Rhodesia the impression that their affairs were being looked into.[69]

---

[66] "Note on a meeting held on 27th May, between the Colonial and Dominions Secretaries, the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia, the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and others", Ibid.

[67] Minute of 25 June, 1937. Ibid.

[68] Ibid.

* *

If, as was now eminently clear, amalgamation was not acceptable to British authorities, the next important consideration concerned whether any machinery for co-operation or closer union could be set up in its place. Throughout these discussions the terms "closer association", "closer union" and "closer co-operation" were bandied about indiscriminately as if they were synonymous. One proposal that was given close consideration was that of Sir Hubert Young of enlarging the Governors' Conference by the inclusion of some of the Southern Rhodesian Ministers and the Unofficial Members from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and, at the same time, provide it with a permanent Secretariat or some definitely constituted Joint Advisory Council. This, however, would depend on whether or not Southern Rhodesia would be willing to accept such a body. The other proposal was that of making the Governor of Southern Rhodesia High Commissioner for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, a proposal which had been brought up by Stanley in his 1927 Memorandum and which had also been favoured by Sir Hilton Young. But, as in the past, the obvious problem here was with regard to the position of the officer who in one capacity would be Governor of a self-governing Colony with a direct link with the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs and would be required to follow the advice of his Ministers, and, in another capacity, would be responsible to the Colonial Secretary. Such a position, it was generally felt, would be anomalous and almost impossible to work.

---

[69] Minute of 19 June, 1937. Ibid.

In view of these difficulties the Colonial Office was inclined towards the enlargement of the Governors' Conference, but it seemed unlikely that the Southern Rhodesian Government would accept this scheme since it was hardly an improvement on the present arrangement. Moreover, in the case of the East Africa Government Conference the Colonial Secretary was the arbiter, but in the case of the three Central African territories this could hardly be the case unless the Secretary of State for the Colonies was prepared to coerce one or both of the northern Protectorates to fall in with the line of action advocated by Southern Rhodesia. If on the other hand, the Southern Rhodesian Ministers accepted the idea of a Joint Advisory Council as the only possible advance on the 1931 policy, the need to send out a Commission would hardly arise. In that case the Governors' Conference would merely be asked to submit proposals for widening its scope and improving its machinery subject to the retention of Colonial Office control over native policy in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Only if the Governors' Conference failed to come up with a scheme which was acceptable to the two northern territories or one which Huggins could get the Southern Rhodesian electorate to accept, or if the Southern Rhodesian Ministers needed some advice regarding the maintenance or abandonment of the 1931 policy, would the Colonial Office be willing to consider the appointment of a commission.

Meanwhile the urgency for a decisive statement of policy regarding Northern Rhodesia's political future was forcefully pointed out by Sir Hubert Young. "This bogey of amalgamation which is raised from time to time," he wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, "has done more than anything else to impede the progress of Northern Rhodesia," and he felt that any further delay and uncertainty "would have a very bad effect upon all concerned." At the same time he denounced the demand for amalgamation as "dishonest and artificial". He did not think that the people with permanent interests in the territory, like the farmers and the traders, really wanted amalgamation. They simply lacked the courage to say so. The only people who were eager for amalgamation were, in his view, the very people who, if given full control over the Africans, would be most likely to pursue a policy directly opposed to that of the British Government.

What the territory required, Young said, was "the removal of all uncertainty for a sufficient long time to enable development to take place" and he hoped that when the announcement was made it would be made "perfectly clear that there is to be no further question of actual amalgamation for at least 15 to 20 years." In his view it could not be maintained that there had been any sufficient change of conditions since 1931 to warrant a reconsideration of the British Government statement of policy of that year regarding the question of amalgamation, and certainly none since the reaffirmation of that policy in July 1936. If any change could be said to have taken place to all, it was a change away from amalgamation. The increase in the prosperity of the copper mines which had brought about an improvement in the territory's financial position had weakened rather than strengthened the argument for amalgamation in so far as Northern Rhodesia was concerned.[70] What Young overlooked in his analysis, however, was the fact that it was precisely this prosperity that had made amalgamation so attractive to Southern Rhodesia. Nor could his assessment of the situation in Northern Rhodesia be considered quite accurate. In spite of the territory's financial and economic recovery and even without the sudden drop in the size of the European population caused by the depression (which was now slowly returning to normal) the prospects for immediate self-government were still very dim. Although between 1931 and 1946 27,000 Europeans entered the territory, almost the same number left. "No political advance towards self-government," observes one writer, "could take place until this transient European population, 95% of which lived along the line of rail, could be stabilized."[71] It was, nevertheless, perfectly clear by now that the Northern Rhodesian settlers were using amalgamation as a lever to secure constitutional concessions from the British Government, a point which Young appeared to ignore altogether.

---

[70] Young to Ormsby-Gore, 19 June 1937. *Ibid*.

Although Calder regretted that Young had not had the courage to speak so bluntly against amalgamation at the Colonial Office meeting of 27th May, he was very impressed by the Governor's arguments so much so that he now began to feel that to wait for Sir Alan Pim's report on the financial position of Northern Rhodesia before sending out a Parliamentary Commission might make the situation in the territory even more difficult. He though that the best solution might be an announcement by the British Government to the effect that after considering the 1931 policy statement they now felt that some greater measure of co-ordination might be possible through an enlarged Governors' Conference or a Joint Advisory Council. He still considered it essential, however, to maintain a separate Government in Northern Rhodesia for at least fifteen years.[72] Ormsby-Gore was also becoming quite concerned about the cloud of uncertainty cast by the question of amalgamation over the political future of Northern Rhodesia and wished the territory could be informed of the Government's decision by at least October. "I hope the Dominions will treat this as an urgent matter," he said, "as it is essential that N. Rhodesia should have some security as to the political future."[73] The question, however, was, as Bottomley pointed out, whether or not Huggins could be bluntly told that amalgamation was "off the map".

---

[71] Helmuth Heisler, "The Creation of Stabilized Urban Society in N. Rhodesia/Zambia", African Affairs, vol. 70, (April, 1971), p. 141.

[72] Minute of 30 June, 1937. P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/1937.

Before his return to Salisbury, Huggins was privately given a general indication of the attitude which the British Government was likely to take on the subject of amalgamation. A day before his departure, Huggins pointedly asked Malcolm MacDonald, for his own personal information, whether there was any real chance of something concrete being accomplished on this matter. A sense of despair and frustration on the part of the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister was clearly evident during the interview. Huggins wanted to know, so he told MacDonald, within the next few months whether there was any possibility of some steps being taken in the direction of amalgamation as this might influence his decision whether or not to continue in politics. Amalgamation would be a big constructive job to turn his hand to, he said. He explained to MacDonald the sense of frustration he was experiencing because of the difficulties and obstacles which he felt were being placed in the way of constructive development of the three territories both in Southern Rhodesia and in England. He also pointed out that there were family considerations which he had to keep in mind and that he was often tempted to go back to his medical practice.

---

[73] Minute of 2 July, 1937. Ibid.

MacDonald told him how sorry they would be to see him leave politics. With regard to amalgamation, he pointed out that what he personally favoured was "the idea of a British Central Africa" but only on the basis of a native policy which would be acceptable to the United Kingdom. In his view neither the British Parliament nor the British public would tolerate any step towards amalgamation which was prejudicial to the British Government's control over native policy in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland "unless and until they felt certain that policy in Southern Rhodesia was sound and permanently sound." For the present, however, he saw no immediate hope for amalgamation. At the same time MacDonald indicated that there was the alternative of encouraging closer co-operation between the two Rhodesias and, if necessary, Nyasaland, and that it might even be possible to envisage some form of closer union at a later stage involving the maintenance of the present Colonial Office control over native administration in the two northern Protectorates. He pointed out, however, that these were steps which might or might not ultimately lead to actual amalgamation.

While acknowledging that amalgamation in the near future was impossible, Huggins wondered whether there were any serious steps being taken towards its ultimate achievement and he also wished to know whether there was any chance of a Commission being sent out to enquire into the whole question of amalgamation as had been suggested at the meeting of 27th May. He then produced a rough draft of the terms of reference which he felt would be suitable for such a Commission. These were

> To enquire and report whether any and, if so, what form of closer political and administrative union in British

> Southern Central Africa is desirable and feasible with due regard to the interests of the European and the Native inhabitants of the Territories concerned.

MacDonald was taken aback by the magnitude of these terms and while assuring Huggins that he and Orsmby-Gore were ready to consider the possibility of a commission, he felt that the draft went further than what they might be willing to contemplate. He then sounded Huggins as to what his reaction would be if the Commission were to be instructed to enquire only into the methods of closer co-operation among the three territories. Would Huggins regard such terms so restrictive that he would rather have no Commission at all?

This was, of course, a loaded question. From MacDonald's point of view, if the answer was in the affirmative the onus for the rejection of a Commission would thus fall on Huggins. If, however, Huggins was agreeable to a Commission even under very restrictive terms of reference, it might be politically useful to him since the Commission might find it difficult not to hear evidence on amalgamation regardless of whether or not amalgamation was included in the terms of reference. Huggins accepted MacDonald's suggestion but expressed the hope that the terms of reference might be drawn in such a way that although the emphasis would be on co-operation, it would not be impossible for the Commission to consider and make observations on the possibility of some form of closer union should it consider this advisable. Personally, Huggins was skeptical about the practicability of closer co-operation as he could not see how it could work as long as the three governments remained separate, one under the control of a representative Assembly and the other two under the control of their Governors. For these reasons Huggins wanted to see the entire question of closer union thoroughly explored in which case he would be fully satisfied if, as a result of such an exhaustive enquiry, the Commission found the arguments against closer union unquestionably conclusive. What he and his Ministers would not be satisfied with was the stock answer that conditions had not changed since 1931.

To add extra weight to the pressure which he was obviously applying to MacDonald, Huggins expressed some concern that if no immediate steps were taken in the direction of closer union among the three territories, the body of opinion in Southern Rhodesia which favoured closer political association with the Union might gain considerable strength. Huggins was, of course, deliberately exaggerating here. Although a "Greater South Africa League" had been formed in the Colony in 1935 under the Chairmanship of Douglas Abrahamson to promote closer links with South Africa, the movement never really got off the ground.[74] The conversation between the two men ended with a promise by MacDonald to consult with Ormsby-Gore and the Cabinet regarding the question of an enquiry. In the event of a Commission being decided upon, MacDonald also undertook to give Huggins an opportunity to submit any comments that he might care to make regarding the Commission's terms of reference before these were finally agreed upon and published.[75] When MacDonald saw Huggins off at the station the following day he requested the latter not to disclose any information about the Commission to the Southern Rhodesian public as this might be embarrassing to the Dominions Office if it became known that Huggins had pressed for a Commission before they were ready with an answer to the request.[76]

---

[74] See Stanley to MacDonald, 5 May, 1937. Ibid.

[75] "Note of Mr. Malcolm MacDonald's discussion with Mr. Huggins before the latter's departure for Southern Rhodesia", 1 July, 1937. Ibid.

From the discussions between Huggins and MacDonald it was evident that a basis of common agreement was gradually beginning to emerge between them although MacDonald was very sensitive to British Parliamentary opinion, a quality that earned him the nickname "Timid Malcolm" from Huggins in 1939 during the London discussions on the Bledisloe Report. Over the years the Dominions Office had come to like and respect Huggins and even sympathise with his policies. Huggins' regular trips to London (he visited the Dominions Office every year from 1934 to 1937) greatly endeared him to British authorities. The general outcome of these visits was a further enhancement of Southern Rhodesia's political status. Already in 1933 the official title of the Colony's head of Government was changed from 'Premier' to 'Prime Minister'. In 1935 the Prime Minister was invited to send an observer to the Conference of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers and in 1937 the powers formally exercised by the British High Commissioner in South Africa in respect of native affairs were placed directly under the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs--a change which Huggins savoured to the full. As he explained to the Legislative Assembly:

> We do not want anybody messing about with our affairs who understands too much about them. We simply want someone who can satisfy a section of the House of Commons. The less he knows, I think, the better.[77]

When Huggins broached the idea of retiring from politics if no headway on amalgamation was possible, MacDonald expressed the general feeling of the Dominions Department when he told him how they had learned to have great confidence in him as well as admiration for his work.

---

[76] "Note by the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs", 2 July, 1937. Ibid.

[77] 26 October, 1937. Cited in Palley, op. cit., p. 294, fn. 7.

The Colonial Office reacted very sharply to the terms of reference suggested by Huggins. "I couldn't agree to 'political' in any terms of reference," protested Ormsby-Gore, pointing out at the same time that "the stock answer about no change in conditions since 1931 could no longer suffice."[78] The terms of reference preferred by the Colonial Office were as follows:

> To enquire and report whether any, and if so, what form of closer union or association between Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia, and Nyasaland is desirable and feasible, with due regard to the interests of the European and African inhabitants of the territories concerned and to the maintenance of the responsibility as it now stands, of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom for the interests of the African inhabitants.

In forwarding this rather cumbersome draft to the Colonial Secretary, Bottomley took the trouble to explain that the addition of the phrase "closer association" was intended to widen the scope of the Commission and might also help to reconcile Huggins to the omission of the word "political" in his own draft. The specific reference to Europeans was considered necessary "as people in Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia would strongly object if there were no reference to European interests." Although the allusion to the maintenance of the British Government's control over native affairs in Southern Rhodesia was not likely to be popular, it was felt that if reference to such control were only confined to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland "and by implication let the control in Southern Rhodesia lapse," there would be "strong protest in Parliament here."[79]

---

[78] Minute of 5 July, 1937. Ibid.

Ormsby-Gore was quite pleased with the Colonial Office draft. His only suggestion was that it should be prefaced with a preamble emphasising the need for close co-operation among the three territories in specific areas such as transport and communications, scientific and technical research, inter-territorial migration of labour, trade and economic policy, judicial arrangements and defence. This, he said, "would give a lead to the commission to have regard to the things in which co-operation is really needed and head them off 'politics'."[80] In a joint meeting between the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office held on 9 July, MacDonald reiterated his preference for a Commission with "somewhat limited terms of reference" if this would be acceptable to the Southern Rhodesian Government. The terms could be worded in such a way that "closer union" within certain fields would not be definitely excluded. Ormsby-Gore concurred with this view pointing out that public opinion in Great Britain would not view favourably any course of action which might deprive the British Government of its control over the copper mines in Northern Rhodesia and native policy in the two Protectorates. At the same time he recognised that if the British Government were not prepared to advance from the 1931 position they "would then have trouble with S. Rhodesia and from the unofficial Europeans in N. Rhodesia." In his view some form of machinery for co-operation between the three territories was necessary but that it should be left to the Commission to decide how this could be devised. He rejected the suggestion that this task should be left to the Governments of the three territories to work out for fear that a local Conference might come up with a solution which the British Government might not feel able to accept whereas a Commission appointed from the United Kingdom "would result in a more judicial and practicable presentment of the case."

---

[79] Minute of 7 July, 1937. Ibid.

[80] Minute of 7 July, 1937. Ibid.

The only changes made in the Colonial Office draft of the terms of reference were the substitution of the words "closer co-operation or association" for "closer union or association" and the word "native" for "African". The kind of a Commission which Ormsby-Gore had in mind was one made up of three Members of Parliament representing the three political parties with perhaps two outside persons in addition. He did not contemplate the appointment of representatives from Southern Rhodesia even if that were suggested. It seemed better that the Commission should be independent of the three territories. Sir Cosmo Parkinson's suggestion for the inclusion of a woman member was not followed up. It was anticipated that by the time the Commission went out, some time between Februaary and April, the reports on the financial position of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland by Sir Alan Pim and Sir Robert Bell, respectively, would be out, as well as Lord Hailey's African survey, thus providing the Commission with some fresh material for its investigation.[81]

From the above discussion between the two departments regarding the appointment of a Commission and its terms of reference, it is clear that the future of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland was now being considered in terms of closer association with Southern Rhodesia contrary to the view expressed in the majority report of the Hilton Young Commission in 1929. Calder was understandably concerned that this might lay the Colonial Office open to the criticism that the two Protectorates were now being "definitely handed over to the influence from the south rather than from the north." While appreciating this point Ormsby-Gore, however, felt that contact between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern territories was inevitable in view of their geographic and economic positions.[82]

---

[81] Confidential. "Question of Closer Association between S. Rhodesia, N. Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Note of a meeting held in Mr. Ormsby-Gore's room on the 9th of July, 1937". Ibid.

In the meanwhile Sir Hubert Young continued to press for "some finality" on the question of amalgamation. He reiterated his earlier view that in the event of a decision against amalgamation it should be made abundantly clear that the decision was to stand "for a really substantial period of time," adding that African opinion in Northern Rhodesia was certain to be against amalgamation.[83] Although Young's despatch was included in the Cabinet Paper then under preparation, Calder's suggestion that it should also be included in the Commission's terms of reference was considered rather drastic. "The amalgamationists," observed Bottomley, "would regard it as a subterfuge to dodge the issue."[84] In recommending the appointment of a Commission to their Cabinet colleagues on 15 July, Macdonald and Ormsby-Gore pointed out that the enquiry into the question of "closer co-operation or association" between the three territories

> must be on the strict understanding that there can be no question of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom modifying in any way the control which they exercise over native policy and administration in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, nor the reserve powers which they possess concerning Native policy in Southern Rhodesia.[85]

---

[82] Ibid.

[83] Young to Ormsby-Gore, 6 July, 1937. Ibid.

[84] Minute of 14 July, 1937. Ibid.

[85] C.P. 187 (37). P.R.O./CAB/24/270/1937.

The Cabinet was accordingly invited to approve the despatch of a semi-official letter to Huggins informing him of this decision and inviting him to say whether he would prefer the enquiry to be conducted by the three territorial Governments or by a Commission set out from the United Kingdom, even though Ormsby-Gore did not think much could be accomplished by a local enquiry. The Cabinet gave its approval to these proposals as well as to the Commission's terms of reference already agreed to by the two Ministers.[86]

In conveying the Cabinet's decision to Huggins regarding the appointment of a Commission, it was made abundantly clear that although the enquiry need not necessarily exclude the consideration of a possible political link among the three territories, "any form of closer political association between a self-governing Colony and Territories in regard to which the Secretary of State for the Colonies would continue to have a special responsibility to Parliament, would appear to be very difficult, if not impossible to devise."[87] It was thus left to Huggins to decide whether he would still favour a Commission under these conditions. "It may be, of course, that if actual amalgamation is excluded from the scope of such a Commission you may feel that the question is one the further examination of which could be adequately undertaken by the three Governors in consultation." If, however, Huggins still considered it necessary for a Commission to be sent out from the United Kingdom, the British Government would make the necessary arrangements in which case it would be necessary to explain in a statement attached to the terms of reference the general object of the Commission and the scope of its work "in order that it might be clear from the outset that amalgamation of the Territories was not in contemplation." A draft of the statement together with the proposed terms of reference was enclosed in the letter.[88]

---

[86] "Extract from Conclusions of Meeting held on Wednesday, 21st July, 1937", C.P. 31 (37). P.R.O./CAB/24/267/1937.

[87] Macdonald to Huggins, 28 July, 1937. P.R.O./795/90/45104/1937, Part II.

In his reply,[89] Huggins explained the difficulties that would arise if the Commission were precluded from reporting on the advisability of amalgamation.

> If this means that the Commission may not report on the advisability of amalgamation, either soon or later, and the conditions required before amalgamation can take place under our present constitution, the Commission would be a political embarrassment out here.

At the same time, he reiterated his previous view regarding the difficulties of consultation between the three Governments under the present arrangement regarding such matters as customs, defence and native policy. Huggins' difficulties were also related to the general elections in the Colony slated for September 1939. He referred to the presence of a group of people in the Colony, some of them within his own party, who were in favour of union with South Africa whose main contention was that amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia would indefinitely postpone the attainment of their goal. Although their number was small, Huggins was afraid that they might rouse the Afrikaner vote against him, hence he had had to promise to submit the issue to a referendum before any final settlement could be made. If, therefore, a Commission were sent out to report on closer union and amalgamation were precluded from its purview, Huggins stated, "I have no clean cut issue to propose or defend at the election such as union with South Africa would be in the hands of the opposition...." He would then be left open to the charge that he was trying to get the two Rhodesias so closely tied with each other without a referendum so as to render union with South Africa impossible; "in other words--that I had 'diddled' them out of the promised referendum by establishing indissoluble ties with the North without consulting the people."

---

[88] Ibid.

[89] Huggins to MacDonald, 23 August, 1937. Ibid.

In any case, Huggins went on, the British Government would be under no obligation to accept the Commission's report if it was deemed to be contrary to its policies in much the same way that if the Commission reported in favour of amalgamation he could not accepts its recommendation without a referendum. This was, of course, a very shrewd proposal on the part of Huggins for if the Commission reported in favour of amalgamation this would leave the British Government in the embarrassing position of having to reject it after having left it open to the Commission to make such a recommendation. Huggins then reverted to his pet theme of the establishment of a British block in South Central Africa in order to prevent a premature entry of Southern Rhodesia into the Union which he felt "would be a disaster for Southern Rhodesia and for British Africa as a whole." Although he would welcome a Commission, he urged that it should not be tied down to the present terms of reference. If this could not be agreed to, he said, "the Commission would be very useful but politically impossible, and we could not agree to it." Finally, Huggins asked that his letter be shown to the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, as he was certain that "the aim of creating a British bloc in South Central Africa may be a matter on which the Imperial Government as a whole might like to express an opinion and encourage us or otherwise."[90]

Huggins' request for the amendment of the Commission's terms of reference received strong backing from Stanley who pointed out to MacDonald that if Huggins' representations were not followed "by some outward and visible sign of progress beyond the status quo ante" the movement towards closer union would receive a permanent setback and public opinion in Southern Rhodesia would regard absorption into the Union as the only alternative to the maintenance "for as long as may be possible, of our present independence." Stanley was, of course, confident that under open terms of reference the Commission would report in favour of amalgamation "as the eventual, even if not an immediately attainable objective." More than ever before he was extremely concerned about the dangers of delay. The return of prosperity to Northern Rhodesia, he said, had brought about a new sense of self-confidence "with its usual concommittant of enhanced particularism" among the European settlers. Concerning Southern Rhodesia, Stanley warned against what he referred to as the South African "policy of encirclement" of Southern Rhodesia by offering baits to Northern Rhodesia which were certain to lead to "a widening divergence of mentality and interests between the two Rhodesias." Once more Stanley returned to his favourite theme:

> If Northern Rhodesia were drawn into the meshes of the Union net, the position of Southern Rhodesia as a distinct, self-contained entity would be so seriously imperilled as to become well nigh untenable, and absorption in the Union on such terms as the Union might decide to impose would then be merely a question of a relatively short time.

If this happened, he said, the Africans on whose account the formation of a British Central African State was being opposed would thus find themselves under the heel of Afrikanerdom. The absorption of Southern Rhodesia into the Union would also mean the disappearance of the last hope of preserving "an effective British counterpoise or leaven between the Cape and the Katanga." He foresaw a strong probability of Malan's Nationalists coming to office in six years time at the latest.

---

[90] Ibid.

To Stanley the best course lay in the creation of "a British bloc in Central Africa" which would be

> a focus and inspiration for the remnant of British sentiment in the Union, large enough to command respect, strong enough to stand out, or else to join up with the South by a federal link on terms which would secure to it the preservation of the English language and the Union Jack....

If one member of the Federation decided to sever its ties with the Empire or to abandon its allegiance to the Crown, the Federation would be automatically dissolved. In the light of these considerations Stanley saw Southern Rhodesia as standing at the parting of the ways where issues of vital importance were at stake.[91]

Further support for Huggins' request for the revision of the Commission's term of reference came from Sir Hubert Young who expressed full agreement with the view that unless the Commission were authorised to consider amalgamation it would only be a political embarrassment to the three territories. He saw no purpose in sending out a Commission unless it were at least able to recommend what conditions would have to be fulfilled before amalgamation could be considered and that if it were not permitted to do this the British Government should themselves define the conditions and do so in such a way that it would be clear to everyone that a long time should elapse before they could be fulfilled.[92]

---

[91] Stanley to MacDonald, 24 August, 1937. Ibid.

[92] Young to Ormsby-Gore, 4 September, 1937. Ibid.

The question of amending the Commission's terms of reference so as to enable it to consider amalgamation was a ticklish one in view of the fact that the Cabinet had, on the advice of the two Secretaries of State, already rejected amalgamation. The textual amendments proposed by Huggins were rather slight in themselves but, as Boyd pointed out, the issue at stake was whether or not a Commission should be sent out on the basis that it was definitely barred from pronouncing on amalgamation.[93]

In considering Huggins' request the two departments had to weigh the advantages of having a Commission against the disadvantages of having none at all as now seemed likely if Huggins' request was not met. From the British Government's point of view there were sound reasons for having a Commission. In the first place, a Commission would help to avert the further development of an "anti-Whitehall complex" among the Northern Rhodesian settlers and would also give pro-amalgamationists in the Rhodesias the satisfaction of knowing that their views had been heard. There was also the hope that an investigation by a Commission would put an end, for the time being at least, to further agitation in the Rhodesias concerning the issue of amalgamation. Secondly, there was Stanley's point that the Commission's enquiry would include an investigation into the past and present native policy of the three territories and thus help to remove various misconceptions and apprehensions on this subject particularly as far as Southern Rhodesia was concerned. This point is worth remembering in view of the significance that was to be attached to Southern Rhodesia's native policy in the determination of British Government's policy on amalgamation following the

---

[93] Minute of 14 September 1937. Ibid.

Commission's report.

Boyd, however, was not willing to regard the question of Southern Rhodesia's native policy as the only factor on which the Government's decision on amalgamation should be made to stand or fall. Even if the Commission took a favourable view of the Colony's native policy, he said, it would not necessarily follow that they would regard the amalgamation of the Rhodesias as desirable. Boyd, in fact, considered it very unlikely that the Commission would produce a unanimous report since it was to be made up of representatives from the three British political parties. For this reason he did not see the Commission's report as likely to be embarrassing to the British Government.[94] Lastly, even if Huggins could be persuaded to accept the exclusion of amalgamation from the Commission's terms of reference, it would be practically impossible to prevent the submission of proposals in favour of amalgamation by various bodies or organizations in the three territories. The Commission might experience some difficulty in drawing a clear line between what they should or should not consider relevant to their enquiry.

On the other hand, the disadvantages of empowering the Commission to report on a matter on which the Government had a closed mind were equally obvious. There was also a strong probability that a Commission with the terms of reference desired by Huggins would cause questions to be asked in Parliament as to whether this meant that the Government were prepared to accept amalgamation if the Commission were to recommend it. In Boyd's view it would be difficult to explain the position of the Government without prejudicing the very issue which Huggins wished to see left open for the Commission to report upon.[95]

---

[94] Minute of 14 September, 1937. Ibid.

The general consensus of opinion in the two departments, however, was that it was better to accept Huggins' request rather than risk the abandonment of the enquiry. Bottomley was of the opinion that even if the terms of reference were altered as desired by Huggins it was extremely unlikely that a Parliamentary Commission would recommend full amalgamation or if they did, that Parliament would accept it. As far as he was concerned "it would be merely putting off the evil day for a few months."[96] Ormsby-Gore also saw no reason to refuse Huggins' request:

> I personally have no objection to the alterations proposed by Mr. Huggins. I agree that 'amalgamation' is a false issue and I want a Commission to report accordingly. So I would go a long way to get a Commission.[97]

He was also anxious to see the whole business of the Commission settled as soon as possible, including the selection of the personnel, as there could be no political peace in Northern Rhodesia until the entire question had been "exhaustively and widely examined by an independent body who can take evidence throughout the area." Ormsby-Gore also felt that the Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs should take primary responsibility in this matter since it was Stanley and Huggins who had brought up the idea of a Commission in the first place. "I would never have embarked on this but for their representation,"[98] he exclaimed obviously irritated by what appeared to him to be an unnecessary fuss over trifling details.

---

[95] Ibid.

[96] Minute of 2 September, 1937. Ibid.

[97] Minute of 4 September, 1937. Ibid.

[98] Minute of 15 September, 1937. Ibid.

In the Cabinet meeting of 30 September the two Secretaries of State outlined the main considerations in favour of acquiescing to Huggins' request. One of these was their firm belief that in view of "the strong feeling in the House of Commons" in favour of the maintenance of the British Government's responsibilities towards the Africans in the two northern Protectorates and their supervisory powers in respect of legislation affecting Africans in Southern Rhodesia, it seemed inconceivable that a Commission on which the three political parties were represented would underestimate the importance of this factor. But in agreeing to Huggins' request they stressed that it should be made very clear to him that this was not to be taken to mean that "His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom see any likelihood of their being able to depart, at any rate in the near future, from their view as to the necessity of maintaining their present responsibility in relation to native policy in each of the three Territories concerned."[99]

Huggins finally accepted the appointment of a Commission on the basis that it "should be free to review the whole position including the question of amalgamation," subject to the full understanding of the British Government's position.[100] Although the Commission was now permitted to consider amalgamation, there was still no mention of the word "amalgamation" in the revised terms of reference hence the erroneous view of one recent writer that the Commission simply decided on its own to "put liberal interpretation on its terms of reference to include the issue of amalgamation."[101] This omission, however, does not appear to have seriously upset the Rhodesia Herald. In spite of what it called the "verbal ambiguity" in the Commission's terms of reference and the absence of any specific reference to amalgamation, the paper was firmly convinced that the Commission would not be able to proceed very far in its task "before its members discover that it is impossible to exclude amalgamation from their investigation."[102]

---

[99] C.P. 224 (37). P.R.O./CAB/24/271/1937.

[100] MacDonald to Stanley, 1 November, 1937 and Stanley to MacDonald, 4 November, 1937. P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/1937. Part II.

[101] David O. Aihe, "The Issue of Closer Association with Southern Rhodesia in Zambia's Constitutional History", Odu, no. 8, (October, 1972), p. 40.

The announcement concerning the appointment of the Royal Commission was given a warm reception in Northern Rhodesia, more particularly because it was made simultaneously with the one dealing with constitutional reform which gave the Unofficial Members of the Legislative Council parity with the Official Members. This was done by the addition of one Nominated Member to the Unofficials to represent African interests, and the deletion of one Official Member, thus achieving a balance of eight members on both sides of the Council.[103] Once the decision to appoint a Commission had been made, the next question which had to be considered concerned the composition of the Commission. In his first reference to a Commission made just before his appointment as Governor of Southern Rhodesia, Sir H. Stanley appears to have contemplated a one-man Commission--"someone of the type of Amery," but in his 1936 Memorandum he spoke of "one or two open-minded men" who could conduct an on-the-spot enquiry into the question of amalgamation between the three territories.

The idea of a Parliamentary Commission originated with Ormsby-Gore who pointed out in the Colonial Office meeting of 21 January, 1937 with the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland that where constitutional changes were involved Parliament liked to be fortified by an enquiry conducted by its own members.[104] It was decided to follow the 1931 procedure of inviting the participation of representatives from the three British political parties. This procedure was made much easier this time by the fact that all the Opposition parties were represented in the National Government. Only Sir Hubert Young seems not have been too happy with this procedure. In his view a Commission made up of people holding a variety of pre-conceived views on the question of native policy would only be a repetition of the Hilton Young Commission whose members failed to produce a unanimous report. But as the two Secretaries of State pointed out to the Cabinet in May 1937, the question of amalgamation was an important one in which the authority of Parliament was involved and one in which the Opposition parties should be allowed to take their share of responsibility.

---

[102] 17 May, 1938.

[103] See Sir Hubert Young's statement in the Legislative Council, 23 November, 1937, cols. 199-202.

The number of the personnel for the Commission originally contemplated by Ormsby-Gore was five, three Members of Parliament and two outside persons, but in his Memorandum circulated to the Cabinet on 11 November he decided to increase the membership of the Commission to six "so that the Non-Parliamentary representatives may include, in addition to the Chairman, one with administrative, and one with financial experience."[105] The administrative member, it was later explained to the Chairman, would be "a former official of standing and experience in

---

[104] See "Note on the question of Parliamentary Commission" by E. G. Machtig. P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/1937.

[105] C.P. 276 (37). P.R.O./CAB/24/273/1937.

Colonial administration."[106] Since some of the issues which the Commission was expected to deal with were not only political and administrative, but economic and commercial as well, and in view of the fact that the major part of the capital invested in the Northern Rhodesian industries was controlled from overseas, it was considered essential to have someone on the Commission "with experience in the conduct and finance of large business undertakings, who will command the confidence of the City of London."[107]

The selection of the personnel for the Commission did not proceed as smoothly as had been expected. The first choice for Chairmanship, Lord Somers, declined the position in spite of a personal appeal by MacDonald. In the end the position was offered to Lord Bledisloe, President of the National Council of Social Services and former Governor-General of New Zealand (1930-35), whose appointment was announced on 16 February, 1938. In accepting the appointment, he expressed the hope that none of the Parliamentary members would have committed themselves to strong personal views on the issues involved as this would hamper their freedom or utility as members of the Commission.[108] More difficulty was experienced in getting a Liberal Pary member for the Commission--no less than eight of the people approached declined to serve on the Commission. This was, indeed, hardly a promising start, as Boyd pointed out.[109] The rest of the members of the Commission were announced on 2nd March. The three Parliamentary members were Ian Leslie Orr-Ewing, Conservative Member for Weston-super-Mare, Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, (1935-36) and, since 1936, Parliamentary Private Secretary to the Minister of Agriculture, William Henry Mainwaring, Labour member for East Rhondda, and Ernest Evans, Liberal member for the University of Wales, formerly Private Secretary to Lloyd George (1918-20). The two non-Parliamentary members were Patrick Ashley Cooper, Governor of the Hudson's Bay Company and a Director of the Bank of England, and Thomas Fitzgerald, a former Postmaster-General for the Amalgamated Services of Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika and a former Official Member of the Legislative Councils of Kenya and Tanganyika. G. F. Seel, a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department in the Colonial Office, served as Secretary. The Commission sailed for South Africa on 29 April after taking evidence from interested parties in London between March 11 and April 29.

---

[106] See an undated confidential memorandum prepared for the Chairman of the Royal Commission. P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/3/1937.

[107] Ibid.

[108] Bledisloe to MacDonald, n.d., P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/6/1937.

[109] Minute of 18 December, 1937. Ibid.

Apart from the members of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, the personnel of the Commission appears to have provoked no adverse comment. It was only after the Commission had published its Report that the Rhodesian settlers, then in a mood of anger against the Commission's failure to recommend immediate amalgamation, began to attack the composition of the Commission. The main weakness of the Commission was the absence of any one with a first hand knowledge of the Rhodesias. While the selection of the members of the Commission was still under consideration Sir John Harris, Secretary of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, had written to MacDonald enquiring whether in addition to the political representatives "one or two representative persons with intimate knowledge and experience of the African race" could also be appointed to serve on the Commission. Harris also raised the question of extending the terms of reference so as to enable the Commission to consider the alternative of closer co-operation between the two Northern Protectorates and the East African dependencies.[110]

The Society's letter caused some few moments of anxiety in the Colonial Office. As Seel pointed out, as the composition of the Commission then stood the only person with "African experience" or who approximated this qualification was Fitzgerald, but he was doubtful whether his service as Postmaster-General in East Africa would meet the Society's request.[111] Boyd also admitted the force of the Society's argument.

> I rather fear that there will be criticism of the personnel of the Commission on the ground that none of the members will have intimate knowledge and experience of the African races. It will be urged that Mr. Fitzgerald, as ex P.M.G. in East Africa, scarcely 'fills the bill' in this respect.[112]

Only Bottomley appeared to be unruffled by this criticism since it would not have been possible to find someone "congenial both to Sir John Harris and Mr. Huggins." As far as the terms of reference were concerned, he felt that the Society could be informed that these had been discussed with the Southern Rhodesian Government and that the two Secretaries of State saw no sufficient reasons to alter them.[113]

---

[110] Harris to MacDonald, 3 February, 1938. P.R.O./C.O./795/99/45104/17/1938.

[111] Minute of 8 February, 1938. Ibid.

[112] Minute of 8 February, 1938. Ibid.

[113] Minute of 8 February, 1938. Ibid.

Such a reply, however, as Machtig pointed out, would obviously be unwise since it was certain to be interpreted by the Society to mean that the British Government had been pressured by the Southern Rhodesian Government regarding both the personnel and the Commission's terms of reference, pointing out that "we do not want to give an opening for such criticism."[114] An ingenious way of dealing with the Society's enquiry was finally found in Tait's proposal which was to defer a reply to Sir Harris' letter until the announcement of the Commission's personnel had been made and then refer him to the announcement.[115] In this way the Society would be faced with a _fait accompli_. The reply to Harris was accordingly delayed until March 5, three days after the members of the Commission had been announced in Parliament.

Before the final arrangements for the Commission were completed one last hitch which nearly proved politically embarrassing unexpectedly cropped up regarding the financial arrangements for the Commission. The arrangement contemplated by the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office was that the three Governments of Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would meet from their own funds all the expenses arising from the attachment of staff to the Commission, such as shorthand writers, the provision of office (but not living) accommodation, and local transport within their territories, but that the salaries of members of the Home Civil Service serving with the Commission would continue to be paid from the Departmental funds and the cost of printing and publishing the report would come under the Stationery Vote. All charges regarding the Special

---

[114] Minute of 10 February, 1938. _Ibid_.

[115] Minute of 7 February, 1938. _Ibid_.

Staff (Secretary, Clerical, Administrative and personal staff), outfit allowances, travelling expenses and subsistence allowances were to be charged on the British Government Funds.[116] The Treasury, however, felt that the whole cost of the Commission, apart from the salaries of the members of the Home Civil Service, should be borne by the three African Governments since the Commission had been appointed at their own request.

The issue regarding the financial arrangements for the Royal Commission had wider political implications of which the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office were fully aware. As Boyd pointed out, although there was some justification for the Treasury view that the overseas Governments should bear the cost since the Commission was being appointed to meet Huggins' request, he felt it would appear rather "undignified for H.M.G. to offer the appointment of a Royal Commission to Southern Rhodesia and then--at a later date--to tell them that H.M.G. do not intend to pay for it."[117] There was, however, an even more compelling reason for not charging the entire cost of the Commission on the three African Governments. What if the Commission were to recommend a policy with regard to closer union which was acceptable to the Rhodesian settlers but which did not commend itself to the British Government? "In that event," Boyd said, "the resentment felt by the Unofficials at H.M.G.'s decision would inevitably be aggravated by the knowledge that the Colonial Governments were bearing the costs of the Royal Commission."[118]

---

[116] See a Colonial Office File entitled 'Closer Union Between N. and S. Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Royal Commission-Financial Arrangements". P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/4/1937.

[117] Minute of 4 December, 1937. Ibid.

[118] Ibid.

Seel concurred with this view, pointing out that to charge the territorial Governments with the cost of the Commission would "gravely embarrass His Majesty's Government in the U.K. in considering the recommendations of the Commission "particularly if they should prove unacceptable to the British Government and for this reason he felt that the Treasury proposal was "one to be avoided on strong political grounds."[119]

The political considerations against saddling the three African Governments with the entire cost of the Commission were fully explained to the Treasury. Firstly, the offer of a Royal Commission had been accepted by Huggins without any intimation that Southern Rhodesia and the other two Governments would be expected to pay the entire cost and that it would be embarrassing at this late stage when the Commission had already been publicly announced to ask the three Governments to foot the entire bill. Secondly, the procedure of appointing a Royal Commission had been adopted primarily because the Cabinet had been unable to meet Southern Rhodesia's request for the undertaking of immediate steps towards the amalgamation or closer union of the three territories. On this basis the matter could thus be regarded as one which largely concerned the British Government. Moreover, if Southern Rhodesia had been invited to nominate a member or members to the Commission there might be some justification for asking her to pay a proportionate share of the cost. The additional fact that three of the Commissioners were members of the British Parliament seemed certain to make the situation even more awkward. Lastly, it was considered essential that the Government "should maintain absolute freedom to take its own view of the findings of the Royal Commission," and it was feared that "its position might be seriously prejudiced" if the enquiry were to be carried out at the expense of the three African Governments.[120]

---

[119] Minutes of 7 December, 1937. Ibid.

The last point is particularly important in view of the fact that although Huggins' request to allow the Commission to consider the question of amalgamation had been granted, the British Cabinet had already made up its mind not to accept the amalgamation of the three territories. Under these circumstances to charge the cost of the Commission on the three local Governments seemed certain to leave the British Government

> open to the reproach that we had for years resisted the idea of any constitutional change, and had at length grudgingly allowed an enquiry to be undertaken at other people's expenses, and that, if we had all along intended to refuse to face the facts as proved by the enquiry, we should never have saddled the local Government with the expense.[121]

In the end the Treasury reluctantly decided to "relax" their policy but not without a stern warning that "this accommodating habit" could not be continued any longer.[122]

This episode, unimportant though it may seem, helps to illustrate the farcical nature of the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission, especially to skeptics like Alan Herbert, M.P., who felt that Government Departments only asked for Royal Commissions in order "to find out things which they ought to know already themselves, and which almost everybody else knows."[123] This is even clearer when one looks closely at some of the documents with which the Commissioners were furnished before beginning their investigation. Among these was a secret memorandum marked "C" in the Colonial Office files,[124] which was initially intended for the Chairman only but was later shown to the other Commissioners on the strict understanding that it was "really treated as secret document."[125]

---

[120] Tait to E. Hale, Treasury, 15 December, 1937. Ibid.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Hale to Tait, 22 December, 1937. Ibid.

[123] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 23 February, 1939, col. 649.

In communicating this information to Lord Bledisloe, Seel pointed out that the document was "not to be quoted or referred to in the report."[126] The document was a summary of the correspondence between the Dominions Office and Huggins regarding the latter's request for the modification of the Commission's terms of reference in which the condition on which the Cabinet had agreed to this request was explained. The other document was a Note prepared by Boyd outlining the Colonial Office stand on the question of amalgamation as well as that of the two Governors and the European and African inhabitants in the two Protectorates which Ormsby-Gore had with him when he had an interview with the Chairman prior to the Commission's departure for Africa.[127] Thus the Commission began its investigation with a very clear picture, not only of the British Government's attitude towards the question of amalgamation, but also of the position which it was likely to take should the Commission recommend amalgamation.

---

[124] P.R.O./795/99/45104/2/1938.

[125] Minute by Ormsby-Gore, 22 March, 1938. Ibid.

[126] 22 March, 1938. Ibid.

[127] Boyd's Note was dated 14 March, 1938. P.R.O./C.O./795/90/45104/3/1937.

Chapter 5

BRITISH POLICY AND THE RHODESIA-NYASALAND ROYAL COMMISSION REPORT

The Royal Commission's visit to British Central Africa from April to September 1938 coincided with the return of prosperity to Northern Rhodesia which created a mood of contentment among the Northern Rhodesian settlers. This prosperity was mainly attributable to increased revenue from the copper mining industry even though the fear of another slump was never far away from the minds of many. "It is almost permissible to assume that Northern Rhodesia has survived the lean years," stated the Livingstone Mail, "and that prospects for the future are rosier than many of us have yet dared to hope."[1] The African share of this prosperity was, however, negligible. From the 1939 Estimates F. J. Pedler, a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department, observed that more capital had been earmarked for European education than all the other social and development services combined. Citing from the Pim-Milligan Report, he pointed out that African education was still very backward and needed "extra provision on a considerable scale." He also noted that whereas Pim and Milligan placed European education last, Sir John Maybin, the new Governor, put it first and was proposing to provide secondary education for Europeans which the Report had considered "quite unnecessary."[2] At about the same time these words were written Moore was complaining in the Legislative Council that "we provide more for the native education than we do for the whites."[3]

---

[1] 7 December 1938.

[2] Minute of 10 December, 1938. P.R.O./C.O./100/45117/1938.

The mood of contentment in the territory was further reinforced by the constitutional reforms which had recently been announced simultaneously with the appointment of the Royal Commission. Moore's reference to these reforms as tantamount to "almost a revolution in the relations between the Government and the people"[4] is indicative of the general satisfaction with which they were received by the settlers. Young was able to assure the Colonial Secretary that the reforms had "gone a long way to remove the objections which have been voiced in certain quarters to Crown Colony Government in Northern Rhodesia."[5] H. Rangeley, a long time settler in Northern Rhodesia, observed in a personal letter to A. B. Cohen in the Colonial Office that although the settlers wanted amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and were firmly opposed to any suggestion of splitting up the territory, they were not as keen on it now as they once were. In his view the demand for amalgamation "was originally political propaganda, a stick with which to beat the dog (the dog is [sic] being the Colonial Office)," and that the recent conferment of a Knighthood on Sir Leopold Moore and the latest constitutional changes had made amalgamation "less desirable in the eyes of the politicians and that they would be very glad to back down." Rangeley did, however, point out that the recent simultaneous transfers of the Governor (Sir Hubert Young), the Assistant Chief Secretary and three members of the Executive Council just prior to the arrival of the Royal Commission had given a new impetus to the amalgamation demand.[6] These transfers did much to disturb the concillatory mood prevailing in the territory. "I do not know how Government can be expected to function smoothly," stated Gore-Browne in the Legislative Council, "when an upheaval of this kind takes place."[7] Thus on the eve of the arrival of the Royal Commission the settlers had once more become belligerent. Moore's amalgamation motion of 1st June seems to have deliberately been intended to impress the Commissioners who were due to arrive in the territory on 7 July of the earnestness of their desire for amalgamation.

---

[3] 16 December, 1938, col. 454.

[4] The Times, 29 November, 1937. See also Gore-Browne's private letter to Ormsby-Gore, 29 November, 1937. P.R.O./C.O./795/92/45170/1937.

[5] Young to Ormsby-Gore, 15 February, 1938. P.R.O./C.O./101/45170/1938.

The arrival of the Royal Commission was greeted with a warm reception in Southern Rhodesia. "In ten days they have given us a picture of the supple intelligence and moral integrity of England that has made one revise one's ideas both of the Mother Country and the Colony," declared the Rhodesia Herald.[8] There was also a lively discussion on the subject of amalgamation in the local newspapers of the three territories. The support for amalgamation among the whites was so overwhelming that the solitary anti-amalgamationist voices were seldom able to make themselves heard under the avalanche of pro-amalgamationist editorials and readers' letters to newspaper editors. During their four and one half months tour of British Central Africa--six weeks in Southern

---

[6] March 1938. P.R.O./C.O./795/103/45234/1938. Rangeley came to North Western Rhodesia as a Magistrate and legal adviser in 1902 after joining the Bechuanaland Border Police (1896) and the British South Africa Police in Salisbury (1897) and serving as a Police Court Prosecutor (1898). He died in 1953.

[7] 31 May, 1938, col. 248.

[8] 27 May, 1938. Cited in Gray, op. cit., p. 189.

Rhodesia, three in Nyasaland and five in Northern Rhodesia--the Commission heard evidence, oral and written, in private and in public, from groups and individuals, as well as from representatives of various organisations and associations among all the racial communities in the three territories. In most instances African evidence was heard through the medium of interpreters. It was in all respects an arduous and a gruelling tour involving long journeys on uncomfortable roads to remote rural villages. Years later, writing in a mood of extreme disappointment over the Government's failure to act on his Commission's recommendations, Lord Bledisloe was to state that "in the course of a long and extremely busy life" he had never "had a more strenuous, a more difficult or a more truly disappointing experience than this Royal Commission involved."[9] The hearings themselves soon became monotonous. "During this [sic] few weeks," wrote Mainwaring to Creech Jones from Livingstone, "there has been nothing but rather tiresome repetition of what had already been placed before us at length on previous occasions."[10]

One feature of these hearings which Mainwaring noted was the inability of most witnesses, Africans as well as Europeans, to put up a good case for the plea that they were presenting. The African witnesses were "content merely to express their fears of the South. Elaboration of an argument or case," he said, "is beyond them."[11] Beyond a vague objection to amalgamation they did not appear to have any positive proposition or an alternative scheme to offer. He was rather astonished by the attitude of some of the Southern Rhodesian Africans who, he said, "went so far as to advocate Union with the South."[12] One such person was S. Jolalapi who pointed out to Creech Jones with obvious exaggeration that "All well-educated Natives" in Southern Rhodesia who gave evidence before the Commission preferred to see the Colony joined to South Africa rather than be amalgamated with Northern Rhodesia since an enlarged Rhodesia would be granted full Dominion status. This in turn would "mean abolition or whittling down of the Imperial Veto" and would give the Rhodesian Government "complete and unrestrained control" over the Africans. That exactly the same thing would happen if Southern Rhodesia were joined to the Union did not seem to bother him. As he explained to Creech Jones,

---

[9] Bledisloe to Oliver Stanley, 27 October, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./795/128/45104/1944.

[10] 10 August, 1938. The Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, 22/1/53.

[11] *Ibid*.

> Much is written at times regarding alleged harsh treatment of Natives in the Union, but those Rhodesia Natives who do go to the Union realise that Natives there are ruled by White men who have grown up with them and understand them. Even the uneducated Rhodesia Natives readily and voluntarily go to the Union to work, so much so that in fact, [sic] now enacting legislation to stop such migration.[13]

He was, however, severely critical of the Southern Rhodesian native policy. It should be pointed out that there were other "educated" Southern Rhodesia Africans who opposed amalgamation without expressing preference for union with South Africa.[14]

To Creech Jones, the most important fact was that a number of

---

[12] Mainwaring to Creech Jones, 14 July, 1938. Ibid., 22/2/69-72.

[13] Jolalapi to Creech Jones, 15 November, 1938. Ibid., 22/5/160/165.

[14] See Charles Mzingeli to the Secretaries of State for Dominions Affairs and for the Colonies, 1 May, 1940, in which he described the Report's rejection of amalgamation as "well justified". P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940.

African groups had at least been able to express to the Commission "their vague hopes and fears if not any particularly constructive ideas."[15] The Royal Commission was of special significance to Creech Jones in view of the special interest he had already developed in the affairs of the colonial Empire, particularly the welfare of the native peoples. In 1935, the year in which he was first elected to Parliament to represent the Shipley Division of Yorkshire, he was appointed to the Colonial Office Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies and remained on it until 1945. Mainwaring's presence on the Commission was of even greater importance to him in view of the fact that he had as yet had no first hand acquaintance with the problems of the African Empire generally or of Central Africa in particular. As he pointed out to him,

> I have certain views in regard to the problems before the Commission but they are somewhat immature, possibly not well-founded, based somewhat on sentiment, arrived at not from practical experience, but only from reading, and therefore, of little consequence.

He then reminded Mainwaring of the "special responsibility" resting on his shoulders as the only socialist on the Commission.

> You are in a position of special responsibility and your declaration of policy will be followed with the closest attention and scrutiny by not only coloured and black people the world over, but also by socialists and progressive people in this country as well. Your views will come in for considerable criticism either from the right or from the left and therefore I appreciate your anxiety that your declarations should be able to stand as permanent land-marks in the development and in the progress of the African people.[16]

---

[15] Creech Jones to Mainwaring, 26 July, 1938. The Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, 22/2/69-72.

[16] Creech Jones to Mainwaring, 25 August, 1938. Ibid., 22/1/53.

Mainwaring came to Central Africa prepared to learn as much as he could about its problems. It was for this reason that on the Commission's return to England he decided to visit the Rand to see the condition of the African miners as well as the Transkei in order to take a closer look at the development of Native Councils there.

The insinuations made by the Rhodesian settlers, including Huggins, after the publication of the report that Mainwaring came to Rhodesia with his mind already made up were unjustified. Soon after his arrival in Rhodesia he described the views which he had formulated before coming out as "rather immature" although towards the end of the tour he felt that most of them had been "developed and confirmed".[17] On 14 July he wrote to Creech Jones, "Up to now I have refused to form any conclusions upon what we have seen and heard--at least upon the matters submitted to us," but as the complex problem of the relations between the three territories began to unfold he became convinced that there was "no simple solution based upon a decision for or against Amalgamation." He now began to realise that behind the complex issue of amalgamation there lurked an even greater problem as far as Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were concerned which required immediate attention regardless of what their form of Government might be. "The 'Colour Bar' is a very grave issue," he wrote to Creech Jones, "but not the only one by any means, and even that evil is not either removed or controlled simply by saying 'There shall be no amalgamation'."[18] In his view the Northern Rhodesian Government had not done much to justify itself and much to his great regret he felt that Southern Rhodesia could lay claim to greater achievement.

---

[17] Mainwaring to Creech Jones, 10 August, 1938. Ibid.

[18] Mainwaring to Creech Jones, 14 July, 1938, 22/2/69-72 and 10 August, 1938. Ibid.

Mainwaring was not overly impressed by some of the people he met in Rhodesia. The Southern Rhodesian Labour Party, he wrote, was "the most distressing thing" he had yet seen. "I had not the slightest hesitation or compunction in telling Davies [Harry H. Davies] their leader, that they constituted the most reactionary party I had met in Rhodesia.... 'Small Capitalists' would aptly describe them and their outlook...."[19] Nor was he particularly impressed by the Rev. Arthur Shearly Cripps, the "eccentric" Southern Rhodesian missionary who has been described as "a Christian Socialist of unorthodox views"[20] whose complete devotion to the Southern Rhodesian Africans and close identity with their political struggle earned him the name "Chapepa" ('He who cares for people').[21] "He has great reputation as a Christian," he informed Creech Jones, "but beyond that I would say, without hesitation he is not to be relied upon. He has no practical outlook whatever, and would offer less than no practical suggestions."[22]

This rather harsh judgement on Cripps was apparently shared by some of the members of the London Group on African Affairs founded in 1930 among whose members were people like Roy McGregor, Norman Leys and W. M. MacMillan. After reading Cripps' pamphlet, Is Our Colour Bar to

---

[19] Mainwaring to Creech Jones, 14 July, 1938. Ibid.

[20] Gann, "The Southern Rhodesian Land Apportionment Act, 1930: An Essay in Trusteeship", The National Archives, Occasional Papers, no. 1, (June, 1963), p. 80.

[21] Steele, op. cit., p. 153.

[22] Mainwaring to Creech Jones, 14 July, 1938, op. cit.

Cross the Zambesi?, published in February 1942, Leys described him to Dr. Rita Hinden, a South African-born economist and founder-member of the Fabian Colonial Bureau, as "a useless person".[23] Apparently Cripps' unforgivable crime was his book, An Africa for Africans: A Plea on Behalf of Territorial Segregation Areas and of their Freedom in a South African Colony, which came out in 1927, whose publication "he bitterly regretted in later years."[24] That Mainwaring found Cripps "vague and unpractical" hardly surprised Creech Jones. He was more charitable towards him, pointing out that his intentions were sound and that most people in Southern Rhodesia saw him as the embodiment of the Christian faith who "tries to live a life of self-abnegation in the service of the people."[25]

The Report of the Royal Commission[26] was published on 21 March 1939 but the interminable correspondence between the British authorities and the African Governments concerning its recommendations followed by the long drawn talks with Huggins in London which were abruptly cut short by the outbreak of the War meant that no immediate action could be taken on it by the British Government. On the whole the Commission's Report has not fared very well with historians and deservedly so. According to one writer, "The report was authentic Whitehallism--a turgid stream of pomposity moving tortuously around a centra cypher."[27] In what was obviously a contrived effort to produce a unanimous report, the Commissioners, as A. J. Hanna points out, "blurred issues of principle, not realising that where principles are undefined policies will drift and the direction in which they will drift will be that in which they are pushed by interested parties."[28] Only in the general sense that the Report bore the joint signatures of all the Commissioners can it be regarded as unanimous. The individual Notes appended to it by the Commissioners, some of which directly refuted several of the recommendations made in the main body of the Report, did much to undermine the credibility of the whole Report even on those aspects where all the Commissioners were in full agreement. The Commissioners, as one Northern Rhodesian Elected Member put it, "agreed to agree, and then individually agreed to differ."[29] Indeed, Dr. H. S. de Boer, Director of Medical Services in Nyasaland and a staunch opponent of amalgamation, found it difficult to understand how the Commissioners could have agreed to sign the main Report visualising a future amalgamation of the three territories in view of some of the appended Notes which expressed grave misgivings on this very point.[30]

---

[23] Leys to Hinden, 28 October 1941 [1942?], Ibid., 22/6/47.

[24] Gann, "The Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act, 1930", op. cit., p. 80. In the book Cripps endorsed General Hertzog's policy of territorial segregation in South Africa.

[25] Creech Jones to Mainwaring, 26 July, 1938. The Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, 22/1/76.

[26] Cmd. 5949. Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report.

[27] Garry Allighan, The Welensky Story, (Cape Town: Purnell & Sons, 1962), p. 137.

Until a few weeks before the Report was due to come out, Lord Bledisloe appears to have expected only Mainwaring's Note of reservations regarding the main recommendations in the Report. The latter's action, however, prompted the others to append theirs as well. The Chairman and Cooper signed a joint Note while both Evans and Orr-Ewing submitted their individual Notes rather reluctantly and only because the others had already done so. In the Chairman's view these Notes were harmless and did not affect the agreed conclusions and main recommendations. "It may be thought that these 'Notes' (we each signed one of them) whittle down the value of our Joint Report," he wrote to MacDonald, "but I don't fancy you will have this view when you see them." To him the wonder was that six people starting with widely differing views on Empire problems had been able to produce "a Unanimous fairly emphatic and constructive Report at all." What the Notes revealed, he said, was merely "a little of their Authors' true selves and ideals."[31] In spite of Lord Bledisloe's attempt to play down the significance of these Notes, it is clear, however, as will presently become evident, that they were not as innocuous as he made them out to be. Indeed in refusing to act on the key recommendation in the Report, namely, that the British Government should declare its acceptance of the principle of amalgamation, British authorities made much of the fact that in their appended Notes some of the Commissioners had expressed serious reservations regarding this proposal. Looking closely at these Notes one gets the impression that the Commissioners took great pains to produce a unanimous Report so as to avoid a repetition of the Hilton Young Report of 1929, but having done that two of them, Mainwaring and Cooper, felt unhappy with themselves regarding some of the Report's recommendations.

---

[28] The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, (London: Faber and Faber, 1960), p. 247.

[29] Legislative Council Debates, Captain Campbell, 6 June, 1939, col. 489.

[30] See enclosure in Mackenzie-Kennedy to MacDonald, 23 June, 1939, Confidential, "Memorandum by Dr. H. S. de Boer, M.C. Director of Medical Service". P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939, Part I.

In their Report the Commissioners unanimously agreed that "close and continuous co-ordination of effort" between the three Territories was desirable but rejected federation as a means of achieving this due to the wide disparity in their development as well as the fact that Southern Rhodesia already enjoyed responsible government while Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were still under the direct control of the Colonial Office. At the same time they expressed the view that the three territories would become "more and more closely interdependent in all their activities, and that identity of interests will lead them sooner or later to political unity." For this reason they urged the British Government to take an early opportunity of stating its acceptance of the principle of amalgamation between them. Such a statement, the Commissioners said, would be welcomed by the "majority" of people in the three territories. It would help to remove uncertainty regarding their future and would also assist them in framing their policies and in working towards a joint policy of practical application. From further statements in the Report it is patently clear that what was meant by "majority" in this instance was the European settlers.

---

[31] Bledisloe to MacDonald, 19 February, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/13/1939, Part II.

Furthermore, such a statement would, in the Commission's view, "constitute a justly-earned acknowledgement of the progress made by Southern Rhodesia" since her attainment of responsible government in 1923 and would, at the same time, provide her with an "incentive" to co-operate fully in the development of the two northern Protectorates. Lastly, such a declaration would also "help to increase the sense of responsibility amongst the European minority in the Territories in relation to the preponderant African majority and would facilitate the working out of a scheme of complementary development in the mutual interest of both races." This was of course a restatement of Amery's view that the more power was given to the white settlers, the more liberal they would become in their attitude towards Africans.

This proposal turned out to be the most controversial in the entire Report and, as far as Huggins was concerned, the only thing of significant value that was worth salvaging from what he otherwise considered to be "an extremely disappointing Report."[32] It became the central issue in the London discussions between Huggins and British authorities on the Report which were held later in the year. Although this momentous recommendation occurs in the main body of the Report which was signed by all the members of the Commission, the appended Notes show very clearly that there were fundamental differences of view on this point. In their Joint Note, the Chairman and Cooper fully favoured a British Government commitment to the principle of amalgamation and went on to recommend the early appointment of one Governor for all the three territories or, alternatively, the appointment of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia as High Commissioner for the unified Northern Protectorates.[33] Evans, on the other hand, expressed himself cautiously on this point. He found the native policy of Southern Rhodesia difficult in some respects to reconcile with the declared policy of the British Government and although he regarded the Southern Rhodesian policy as still in an experimental stage, he saw it as presenting certain difficulties to people like himself who were in favour of the principle of amalgamation.[34] In his Note Orr-Ewing, while believing amalgamation to be a desirable goal, did not regard it as inevitable.[35]

---

[32] Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, 16 May, 1939, col. 330.

[33] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, p. 248.

[34] Ibid., p. 249.

Mainwaring and Fitzgerald, on their part, adopted a distinctly negative attitude on this point. While urging the British Government to announce its readiness to encourage and facilitate closer co-operation between the three territories, Fitzgerald strongly opposed the view that it should commit itself to the principle of amalgamation. Further developments in native policy were, in his opinion, still too indefinite to enable him to join in with his colleagues in their belief that political unity between the three territories was inevitable. "I feel it would be unwise for Your Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom," he wrote, "to commit itself in principle, at the present time, to the idea of amalgamation," a policy which he felt might be difficult to implement in the future in view of the British Government's special responsibility for the interests of the African inhabitants. In addition Fitzgerald saw no likelihood that Southern Rhodesia might be ready to modify her policy of parallel development or segregation.[36]

Mainwaring went even further. While he expressed himself in substantial agreement with the general nature of the Report, he found himself "unable to accept several of the conclusions" reached by his colleagues. As he pointed out, it was not at all difficult to shoestring what apparently were good reasons in favour of closer relations or even complete unity between the three territories, but for him the question of amalgamation was not simply a matter of binding together three separate administrative units of uniform character. The question of native policy was, in his view, fundamental to the whole issue.

---

[35] _Ibid._, p. 259. At the same time Orr-Ewing did not share the view that amalgamation was essential in order to rescue Southern Rhodesia from South Africa. "I do not support amalgamation from any desire to prevent Southern Rhodesia being absorbed into the Union of South Africa," he wrote in a private unpublished memorandum dated 20 October, 1938 which was circulated to the other members of the Commission. If Southern Rhodesians wished to be absorbed into the Union, amalgamation, in his view, was unlikely to stop them from doing so. His main reason for supporting amalgamation was that its "ultimate results would be beneficial to the native population and the white settlers." See P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/2/1939. Part III. The memorandum, twenty-eight pages long, is untitled.

[36] _Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report_, p. 250.

> The possibility of the three Territories being united and one day attaining Dominion status, ultimately leading, no matter what reservations are suggested as immediate safe-guards, to a situation similar to that which exists in the Union of South Africa, is one that I view with anxiety until and unless the question of native policy is finally decided. If the principle of trusteeship and self-government is accepted in full, there must be a policy consistent with that aim and responsibility, and care must be exercised lest that policy be surrendered by handing over control to some other authority.[37]

For this reason Mainwaring disagreed with the Report's recommendation that the British Government should take an early opportunity of stating their acceptance of the principle of amalgamation. At the same time he urged the British Government to take their responsibility with regard to the two northern Protectorates "much more seriously" and pointed to the urgent need to assist them in improving the African economy so that "the native population should not be left to serve merely as a supply of cheap labour for others."[38] Mainwaring's Note earned him praise from Green, a former Colonial Office official and now a member of the Labour Party's Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions. "I am impressed by Mainwaring's work on the Commission," he wrote to Creech Jones, "His appended note is admirable."[39]

---

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 253.

[38] *Ibid.*, p. 255.

[39] 16 July, 1939, Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, 22/2/28.

All the members of the Commission were, however, unanimous in rejecting immediate amalgamation even though they accepted it "as an ultimate objective to be kept in view."[40] Firstly, they pointed to the divergence in the native policy of Southern Rhodesia, which was based on "Parallel Development", from that of the two northern Protectorates which was founded on the principle of trusteeship. The Southern Rhodesian native policy, they said, was in some respects restrictive and cited the case of the Industrial Conciliation Act of 1934 which excluded Africans from skilled employment in certain vocations and the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 which disproportionately divided land between the two races with the most fertile, mineral-rich and well serviced land being given to the whites. They pointed out, for instance, that of the 1,350 miles of railway in the Colony, only 60 miles transversed African land and that the position regarding road communications was not any better.[41] This, however, did not deter them from referring to the two policies as being in an "experimental stage" which thus made it difficult to pass a final judgement regarding their relative merits. They even spoke of a possible

---

[40] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, p. 215.

[41] Ibid., p. 171. Under the Act roughly 49 million acres out of a total area of 96 million acres of land in Southern Rhodesia was assigned for occupation by 50,000 Europeans (they already occupied 31,000 acres), and about 27 million acres was set aside for the 966,000 Africans. Besides Forest Areas and land set aside for other purposes, the remainder was left unassigned. A Select Committee report of 1957 found the European areas to be grossly under-used. For the assessment of the Land Apportionment Act see Gann, "The Southern Rhodesia Land Apportionment Act, 1930", op. cit., pp. 58-91; A. C. Jennings, "Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxxiv, (July, 1935), pp. 296-312; W. M. MacMillan, "The Development of Africa: Impressions from Rhodesia", The Political Quarterly, vol. 3, (1932), pp. 552-569; and Philip Mason, "Land Policy", in Richard Gray, The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, (Oxford University Press, 1960), pp. 43-72.

"blending" of the two policies some time in the future.

The Commission's erroneous view that Southern Rhodesia's policy of segregation originated only in 1935 when Huggins unfolded his master plan of Parallel Development completely ignored the fact that in spite of the Colony's non-racial Constitution with its provision for Imperial reservation in case of any laws which differentiated against Africans, discriminatory legislation was, in fact, enacted soon after the grant of responsible government in 1923 which "recalled some aspects of the differential legislation of the Union of South Africa."[42] It is interesting to note here that the origins of the Carter Commission of 1925 whose recommendations formed the basis of the Land Apportionment Act of 1930, modelled on the South African Land Act of 1913, are to be found in the discussions of 1921 between the Southern Rhodesian delegation and Winston Churchill regarding the grant of responsible government to the Colony.[43] On both points, however, Mainwaring disagreed completely with his colleagues. There were, in his view, already too many examples of greater regard for European prosperity to view Southern Rhodesia's native policy as being in an experimental stage. Neither did he find any justification for doubting which of the two native policies was in the best interest of the Africans. He rejected the inference from the Report that the solution to native problems in the three territories was to be left to "a policy of drift" over a period of time while creating in the meanwhile one or two bodies whose activities or inactivities would make amalgamation inevitable without any account being taken of the welfare of the Africans.[44]

---

[42] Lord Hailey, African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara, (Oxford University Press, 1957), (Revised 1956), p. 183.

[43] See Cmd. 1573, Southern Rhodesia. Despatch to the High Commissioner for South Africa.... January, 1922, p. 5.

Secondly, the Commissioners pointed to what they considered to be an inadequate appreciation of the full implications of amalgamation among all sections of the population of the three territories. They pointed out, for instance, that while amalgamation as an abstract theory, with all its merits and demerits, appears to have been widely discussed among its advocates, no thought seems to have been given to the practical means by which it could be effected or to the problems which it was inevitably going to give rise to. As far as most Europeans were concerned, amalgamation was viewed as a simple matter of applying the Southern Rhodesian Constitution to the amalgamated territory and thus achieving, as far as the Northern Rhodesian settlers saw it, a speedy means of escape from Colonial Office control.

Thirdly, the Commissioners referred to the "striking unanimity in the northern Territories of native opposition to amalgamation" based on their dislike of Southern Rhodesian native policy and the fear of being taken out of the "protection" of the British Government. If so large a section of the population of the three territories were brought unwillingly under a unified administration, they stated, all chances of co-operation would be seriously prejudiced. In what one writer has described as "muddled reasoning"[45] the Commissioners then went on to state

---

[44] _Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report_, pp. 252-3.

[45] Aihe, _op_. _cit_., p. 41.

> We do not mean to suggest that amalgamation must necessarily be postponed until such time as a positive demand for it arises amongst the natives of all the Territories, but we are agreed in doubting the practical wisdom of such a step until ... the fears and suspicions at present prevalent among the natives have been substantially removed, and they are themselves in a better position to form a considered judgement on these issues.[46]

The last point in this statement was based on the dubious view expressed in the Report that the average African was "ill-equipped to form a proper appreciation of amalgamation, either in his own position or on the prospects of the Territories," an argument that was later employed to justify the imposition of federation fourteen years later.[47] Fitzgerald, however, dissented from this view pointing out that it was unwise to assume that African opposition to amalgamation was based on ignorance, prejudice or instinctive dread of change. The African, he said, "possesses a knowledge and shrewdness, in matters affecting his welfare, with which he is not always credited."[48]

Lastly, the Report referred to the "inequality in the degrees of stability and development" among the three territories which they felt constituted a further reason for regarding immediate amalgamation as undesirable.[49] However, in the firm belief that the time would come when amalgamation would be recognised as desirable in the best interest of the three territories, the Commissioners went on to suggest a number of proposals which they felt should govern the Constitution of the amalgamated territory. These included a single Governor for the three constituent territories, the inclusion of reservation clauses in the Constitution, and representation of African interests in the Legislature by Europeans selected by the Governor until the Africans were in a position to represent themselves. In his appended Note Mainwaring, however, expressed several important reservations regarding African representation in the Legislature. Amongst other things he felt that the right of Africans to represent themselves should be more positively asserted and that a common electoral roll similar to the one already in existence under the Southern Rhodesian Constitution should be included. Although not referred to in his Note, Orr-Ewing, in his unpublished private memorandum, expressed strong disagreement with the whole idea of attempting to lay down specific stipulations for a "hypothetical constitution", particularly in respect of Imperial veto. "There is no yard stick," he said, "which can be poked into the future to measure either progress or retreat in the human mind."[50]

---

[46] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, p. 218.

[47] Compare Lord Chandos' (Oliver Lyttelton) view in reference to African opposition to federation that "Most of the peoples concerned were illiterate; there is no word for federation in any of the native languages, as far as I can ascertain." The Memoirs of Lord Chandos, Bodley Head, (London; 1962), p. 384.

[48] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, p. 250.

[49] Ibid., pp. 218-9.

Having rejected immediate amalgamation as impracticable, the Commissioners recommended instead the immediate establishment of an Inter-Territorial Council along the lines of Lord Milner's Inter-Colonial Council of 1904 in South Africa, whose main purpose would be to facilitate co-ordination among the three territories and to draw up plans for joint economic development. The latter task was to be entrusted to two Standing Boards made up of Official and Unofficial members from each territory.

---

[50] See P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/2/1939, Part III.

The Inter-Territorial Council was to be equipped with a permanent Secretariat whose running cost was to be proportionally shared among the three territories.[51] Once again Mainwaring expressed disagreement with certain aspects of this arrangement. In his view the establishment of an Inter-Territorial Council was to be preceded by the formation of a Development Board for the amalgamated Protectorate of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Orr-Ewing, on the other hand, accepted the Council but made it clear that he did not view it "as part of a process which, once begun, must be pressed forward to the sole, formal and inevitable stage of amalgamation." Rather he saw it as an experiment upon whose results the British Government and the inhabitants of the three territories could decide at some future date whether or not amalgamation was in fact desirable.[52] Another recommendation of the Commission about which Lord Bledisloe was later to pester the Colonial Office regarding its implementation was the amalgamation of Nyasaland, subject to a satisfactory settlement of her debt to the Imperial Treasury (the British Government was asked to write it off), with Northern Rhodesia which was to take place simultaneously with the establishment of the Inter-Territorial Council.

Before taking any action on the Commission's recommendations the British Government wanted to assess the local response to the Report and the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were accordingly asked to furnish the Colonial Secretary with their views on the Report as well as those of the various interests affected by its proposals, including African interests. The Northern Rhodesian settlers' response to the Report was extremely unfavourable and as a personal protest against it Moore precipitously resigned his seat in the Legislative Council. He was returned unopposed in the ensuing by-election pledged to oppose the Government "tooth and nail" until amalgamation was won. This petulant action, taken without consulting his colleagues, cost Moore his position of seniority in the Legislative Council as well as the Leadership of the Unofficial Members of the Council. After this his influence in Northern Rhodesian politics swiftly declined until he was finally rejected by his constituency in the general elections of 1941. Disappointment among the Elected Members was particularly strong in view of the fact that immediate amalgamation had been rejected by the Commission after having apparently built up a good case for it on the basis of a close identity of interests among the three territories and their long history of economic interdependence. However, it was the political aspects of amalgamation that made it most attractive to the Northern Rhodesian settlers. As Sir John Maybin pointed out, "They realise that if this Territory remains a separate administrative unit the paucity of their numbers rules out the possibility of a grant of responsible Government."[53] There was also disappointment with the Commission's failure to recommend the annexation of Northern Rhodesia to the Crown which was viewed as "a condition precedent to responsible government or amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia."[54] Much of the general disappointment with the

---

[51] According to Tait, the detailed proposals concerning the Inter-Territorial Council were apparently incorporated into the Report at the last moment by the Commission without any prior consultation with the three territorial Governments. See his memorandum of February, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1941.

[52] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, p. 259.

---

[53] Maybin to MacDonald, 13 July, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939, Part II.

[54] Livingstone Mail, 8 April, 1939.

Commission's Report arose from the fact that many people in the Rhodesias had been expecting "cut and dried solutions" from it.[55]

The general view among the Elected Members was that the Report as a whole had been unduly influenced by African evidence and there were also insinuations that the African evidence had been "directly or indirectly inspired." African interpreters and District Officers, it was alleged, had influenced African witnesses to speak out against amalgamation before the Commission.[56] Both allegations were denied by the Governor who pointed out to the Secretary of State that a large number of Northern Rhodesian Africans had at one time or another worked in Southern Rhodesia and were very familiar with conditions prevailing there. As he put it, "though their views may not have been formed with the clarity of a jurist or the profundity of a political philosopher, they were held none the less stoutly" and were a genuine expression of their opposition to amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. "I am convinced," the Governor went on, "that these opinions cannot be set aside as unworthy of consideration."[57]

There were, however, persistent attempts by the Northern Rhodesian settlers to belittle the value of African evidence. It was constantly pointed out that Africans were incapable of comprehending so complex an issue as amalgamation. Most typical of this view was Moore's statement in the Legislative Council during the debate on the Report:

---

[55] S. Herbert Frankel, "Some Observations on the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report", The South African Journal of Economics, vol. 7, (1939), p. 198.

[56] See statement by E. H. Cholmeley, Member for the Midland Electoral Area, in the Legislative Council, 6 June, 1939, col. 507.

[57] Maybin to MacDonald, 13 July, 1939. P.R.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part II.

> We know what Native opinion is worth. There is not one intelligent Native in this country. Their opinion is not worth anything at all. In fact they do not understand the problem which was shown in the evidence they gave. They do not know anything at all about it. They [the Commissioners] put it off on the grounds that the Natives would not like it. Well, the Natives have got no grounds for liking it or disliking it; we are running the show, and we shall be running it for at least a generation and possibly two or three.[58]

Only Gore-Browne fully appreciated the sincerity and seriousness of African opposition to amalgamation. He pointed out that a large number of them, "more numerous than we generally realise", could not have been unaware of the fact that one of the reasons advanced by the Europeans in favour of amalgamation was the desire to be secured against African competition. He did not, therefore, consider it unreasonable that Africans should prefer to remain "under a system of Government which gives them unlimited opportunities."[59]

Reference was also made to the fact that except for Fitzgerald, none of the members of the Commission possessed any first-hand knowledge of Africa and that none had ever visited the three territories concerned. They were, in the words of one Elected Member, "strangers in a strange land." Moore considered them "quite unqualified for the job, and ought never to have been entrusted with it." The three Parliamentary representatives, he said, had been selected only because none better could be found, having been chosen from those who were available rather than those who were suitable. He in fact dismissed the Commission as having been "a waste of time and money by a lot of men who did not know what they were doing, never should have been sent out, were badly selected, and quite unfitted for the job."[60] There were, in fact many who shared Moore's view that the appointment of the Commission had been nothing more than a political expedient--the old Imperial Government stratagem, when faced with a difficult question which it could not answer on the spot, of resorting to a Royal Commission with members usually chosen so as to reflect the views of the Government. It is difficult to imagine what Moore would have said had he but known about the behind the scenes discussions in London concerning the Commission's terms of reference.

---

[58] Ibid., col. 501. Coming from a man who had spent thirty-five years in the territory, this statement is remarkable. On more than one occasion Moore cheerfully admitted in the Legislative Council that he did not know the Africans very well (29 May, 1933, col. 85 and 9 July, 1937, col. 251). In his view the Africans were not the concern of the Legislative Council. "They are governed by the people of this country," he once declared, "not governed in the sense that they are legislated for by the people, but they are governed by the people who employ them...." Ibid., 20th July, 1927, col. 143.

[59] Ibid., col. 458.

In Gore-Browne's view the Commission had simply funked the main issue. Their view that the Southern Rhodesian policy of Parallel Development and the Colonial policy of trusteeship were still at an experimental stage, and that only time would show which of the two was in the best interest of the African or that a "blending" of the two policies was still possible, was to him a mis-statement of the actual situation. As he pointed out to MacDonald, the two policies were "fundamentally irreconcileable [sic]" and that as time went on the differences between them could only increase rather than diminish. He could not visualise Southern Rhodesia giving up her native policy, while for the British Government to give way to Southern Rhodesia would, he

R

---

[60] *Ibid*., cols. 496-7.

said, be considered "something very much like a betrayal of the natives to whom you have promised equal opportunities."[61] The validity of Gore-Browne's criticism of the Report on this point was readily acknoledged by Seel at the Colonial Office. "There is undoubtedly much force in his criticism of the view taken by the Commissioners," he wrote after being shown Gore-Browne's letter, "that the divergence of native policy between Southern Rhodesia and the Northern territories will solve itself by effluxion."[62] Gore-Browne's suggestion was to hold a referendum in the three territories to determine whether or not the majority of the Europeans were in favour of amalgamation. If they were, the next step would be to appoint a small local committee under an independent Chairman--and here he mentioned Lord Hailey as the likely person--"to endeavour to arrive at some means of safeguarding the Northern Rhodesian natives without clashing with Southern Rhodesian "parralell [sic] development".[63]

Following the publication of the Royal Commission Report, Gore-Browne began to find it increasingly difficult to reconcile his two roles in the Legislative Council as the Member nominated to represent African interests and as Leader of the Elected Members, a position which he had assumed following Moore's loss of seniority in the Council. His stand on the issue of amalgamation became more ambiguous as the views of the two communities began to diverge sharply after the visit of the Royal Commission. He now found himself in the anomalous position of having to combine his role as a spokesman for the Elected Members, all of whom were in favour of amalgamation, with his other position as the representative of the Northern Rhodesian Africans in the Legislative Council, practically all of whom were opposed to amalgamation.[64] As he pointed out to MacDonald, "I find my own position as representing native interests and at the same time trying to consider what is right for the white people and best for the country as a whole, not an easy one."[65] As time went on his position became even more burdensome and in 1941 he publicly complained that he had now become "the object of suspicion to both sides." A resolution passed by the Nkana Non-Party Political Assocation on 27 June, 1939 expressed strong disapproval "of the Elected Members sitting under the leadership of the Nominated Representative of the Natives" particularly in view of the fact that Gore-Browne was "a declared Partitionist and is not at all in favour of Amalgamation."[66]

---

[61] Gore-Browne to MacDonald, Personal, 11 June, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part I.

[62] Seel's minute of 21 June, 1939. Ibid.

[63] Gore-Browne to MacDonald, 11 June, 1939. Ibid. See also his speech in the Legislative Council, 6 June, 1939, cols. 459-60.

The Northern Rhodesian Elected Members also expressed strong disagreement with the Commission's proposal for the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with what Moore called the "practically derelict protectorate of Nyasaland." In their view this would only serve to retard Northern Rhodesia's progress towards self-government in much the same way as Southern Rhodesia had rejected amalgamation with her in 1917 for fear that it would delay the Colony's attainment of responsible government. Cholmeley was also concerned that amalgamation with Nyasaland where the Colonial Office native policy was "more deeply rooted" would have bad influence on Northern Rhodesia.[67] The only condition on which the Elected Members were prepared to accept amalgamation between the two Protectorates was if it were accompanied by amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.

---

[64] Officially, Gore-Browne was only expected to convey to the Legislative Council what he considered to be in the best interest of the Africans rather than what the Africans themselves thought was in their best interest.

[65] Ibid.

[66] See Geo. P. Buchanan, the Association Secretary, to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 July, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/ 1939. Part I.

Despite the general disappointment with the Report's failure to recommend immediate amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, there were some among the Elected Members who viewed the Commission's proposal for the establishment of an Inter-Territorial Council as "the next best thing". Its formation, said Page, was of primary importance and a long step towards eventual amalgamation. Others like Welensky were, however, prepared to accept it only if it were made clear that its purpose was to bring about amalgamation. Similarly, the Commission's pronouncement in favour of the ultimate amalgamation of the three territories and its advice to the British Government to make a public declaration to this effect, was received with warm approval even though the reservations expressed by some of the Commissioners in their appended Notes did much to detract from the value of this recommendation. On the whole, the general view of the Elected Members was that it was better to accept as much of the Report as was possible rather than reject it outright.

As far as the Northern Rhodesian public was concerned, the general effect of the Report was to heighten the racial tension between the Africans and the settlers which had begun to build up since the early thirties. Gore-Browne described the situation in the territory following the publication of the Report as "definitely disquieting". He referred specifically to the development of marked hostility towards the Government as well as to what he termed the "insidious and dangerous ill-feeling between white and black" which was "very much on the increase." He pointed to the recent formation of the European Protection League whose threatening and derogatory resolutions were beginning to "worry enlightened Africans". The territory was inundated with resolutions passed by several branches of the League and by the various Political Associations which were to be found in almost all the Electoral Areas of Northern Rhodesia deploring the Commission's failure to recommend the immediate amalgamation of the three territories. Copies of some of these resolutions were sent to British Members of Parliament .[68] The Commission was also criticised by the Broken Hill Political Association for its failure to advance any concrete proposals by which the divergences in the native policies of Southern Rhodesia and the two northern Protectorates, which were deemed to constitute a serious obstacle to immediate amalgamation, could be overcome and a common policy developed.[69] The only notable public expression against amalgamation among the Europeans came from all the Missionary Societies working in the territory with the exception of the Dutch Reformed Church.

---

[67] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 6 June, 1939, col. 486.

---

[68] See an undated Memorandum issued by the European Protection League of Northern Rhodesia demanding complete amalgamation of the three territories "within a maximum of three years" and possibly less. Ibid., Part III. For an illustration of an extremely anti-African and anti-Asian European attitude see a memorandum of 27 July drawn up by the Luanshya branch of the European Protection Leage in P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1/1939.

[69] This was one of five Resolutions passed at a public meeting held on 18 May, 1939 which was addressed by Gore-Brown and Welensky. Ibid.

The Commission's Report also came under another heavy attack from the Governor, Sir John Maybin--but for totally different reasons to those advanced by the settler community. Unlike his immediate predecessor or his colleague in Nyasaland, Maybin was resolutely opposed to the amalgamation of the three territories and his general impression of the Report was that the Commissioners had greatly over-stressed the identity of interests among them. To him the question of native policy was fundamental to the whole issue of amalgamation. He was unable to see how the British Government could accept the principle of the inevitability of union between the three territories unless they were prepared to accept the application of the Southern Rhodesian native policy to Northern Rhodesia. Nor was he able to see how native policy in the two Northern Protectorates could be entrusted to a united settler Government "unless and until some guarantee that the present policy here would not be abandoned could be devised." As he further pointed out,

> If unification is inevitable it can only be so on the ground that the native question is not a bar, and, if that were conceded, I can see nothing in the other objections put forward to make a postponement of amalgamation necessary.[70]

Maybin was severely critical of Southern Rhodesia's policy of segregation and was very doubtful about its long term success in a country where the European was dependent on African labour and the African on European wages. Besides, he considered the Colony's native policy grossly unjust:

> I also consider it unjust to throw the public services into the 'white area' and debar the native from anything

---

[70] Maybin Boyd s.o. P. & P., 30 April, 1939. Ibid., Part I.

> but menial employment in it.... If the native is essential to industrial development, I can see no justice in debarring him from rising to such a position in the industrial world as his talents may justify.[71]

The Governor's attitude towards Southern Rhodesia was a complete contrast with that of his immediate predecessor, Sir Hubert Young, whose avowed intention in matters affecting "the relationship between the two races" was to try "to gain by the experience of the Government of Southern Rhodesia, and work out something which can be accepted by everybody as the proper policy."[72]

Maybin was equally opposed to the Inter-Territorial Council recommended by the Commission. He considered it both complex and cumbersome. In his view what was needed was simplification, not elaboration. The whole scheme, he said, was certain to cause congestion of work, forcing changes that could only lead to amalgamation--"as we could not go back we should have to go forward--to amalgamation." Maybin was also under no illusion as to what the "blending" of the two policies which the proposed machinery was expected to accomplish meant. It would, he said, mean "the scrapping of our native policy without reference to its merits." A simpler way of achieving co-operation among the three territories in his view was through the Governors' Conference and periodical meetings of Heads of Departments. Concerning the Commission's proposal of a merger between Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Maybin felt that any benefits that might accrue from such a merger would be negligible. He felt that the objections voiced by the Colonial Office when a similar suggestion had been made by the late Governor of Nyasaland in 1935 still held good.

---

[71] Ibid.

[72] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 5 December, 1935, col. 389.

Maybin also expressed strong disagreement with the Commission's recommendation that the British Government should commit itself to an acceptance of the principle of amalgamation while the differences in native policy between the three territories still existed. He noted that the Commissioners were themselves divided on this point. His suggestion was that the British Government should first examine all the issues involved in this question and, if after such an examination they felt satisfied that amalgamation was, indeed, desirable, they could then issue a statement indicating that if and when the divergent native policies were reconciled along the lines of which they themselves approved, they might be prepared to authorise the amalgamation of the three territories. If this suggestion were accepted, Maybin advised the appointment of a local Committee to look into the question of ways and means of reaching an agreement on a common native policy for all the three territories. With the experience of the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission still fresh in his mind, Maybin was very specific about the type of a Chairman for such a Committee. "I would deprecate the appointment of a Chairman from outside the Territories," he said, "unless he had a personal knowledge of the question and its implications."[73] Like Sir Hubert Young before him, he was anxious to see the question of amalgamation resolved so that the territory could settle down and devote its undivided attention to problems of development spelt out in most unflattering terms by the Pim-Milligan Financial Commission Report. "The

---

[73] Maybin to MacDonald, 13 July, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/45104/ 1939. Part II.

Territory," he said, "badly needs ... a period of peace and freedom from distraction in order that we may concentrate on its development"; but this seemed hardly possible until its political future became "less obscure". The only hope of reaching a definite decision on the subject of amalgamation in his view lay in a "thorough examination of the question of native policy." If such an attempt failed, Maybin saw no way by which the British Government could "divest itself of the responsibility which it has assumed as trustee for the natives of the Territory."[74]

Maybin's observations on the Report left no doubt as to where he stood on the question of amalgamation. "One cannot, however, but be impressed by the thoroughness of his antipathy to most of the Report's recommendations", observed Seel after reading the Governor's semi-official despatch of April, adding that "No one who has any long acquaintance, from the Colonial Office point of view, with the issues involved can help sharing his feelings to some extent."[75] Nevertheless, Seel felt that there were wider considerations of Imperial policy involved in the issue of amalgamation of which the Governor appeared to be unaware. These, he said,

> revolve around the questions whether, unless Southern Rhodesia is encouraged to look north, she will throw herself into the arms of her southern neighbour; and whether, unless the undoubted energy and efficiency with which Southern Rhodesia is developing her own resources are brought in aid as far as possible to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, those two Territories will make progress which will sufficiently justify our retention of them before an increasingly critical world.[76]

---

[74] *Ibid.*

[75] Minute of 15 May, 1939. *Ibid.*, Part I.

[76] *Ibid.*

Evidently, Seel was not altogether discounting the possibility of some form of closer political alignment between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern Protectorates as Maybin was inclined to. Viewed from Seel's "broader" perspective, Maybin's concern about the effects of amalgamation on Northern Rhodesia's native policy seemed rather trivial.

From the Government of Nyasaland, however, the Royal Commission Report received a very favourable response. Mackenzie-Kennedy enthusiastically welcomed the Commission's conclusions regarding the need for closer and continuous co-operation among the three territories and felt that the proposed machinery for co-ordination should immediately be followed by something more effective than the establishment of an Inter-Territorial Council. In his view an early unification of the social and developmental services was certain to bring the three territories nearer to each other than any number of conferences, boards and communications. Without some form of central control, and as long as each territory was left free to accept or reject the conclusions of any consultative body or Boards which might be set up, he said, closer unity would remain little more than a pious hope. While immediate amalgamation might be regarded as premature, he felt that the difficulties in the way towards its achievement should be tackled at once.[77]

In direct contrast with Maybin's view, Mackenzie-Kennedy thought that the Commission had over-stressed the divergence of native policy and exaggerated the difficulties created thereby in relation to amalgamation. In any case, he was convinced that closer contact between the three territories would in the course of the next few decades lead to a modification of their respective native policies and to a gradual emergence of a system of government acceptable to both the Europeans and the Africans. In his opinion the existing differences were capable of reconciliation. It is significant that the Nyasaland Governor saw no need to seek African opinion on the Report and readily accepted the view of his Unofficial advisers that "when the native community can express an opinion with an intelligent appreciation of the issues involved, then the question of agreement or disagreement might be allowed to affect the question." In the Governor's view, the time was still "too far distant for it to be taken into consideration at the moment."[78] Mackenzie-Kennedy was also favourable to the Commission's recommendation regarding the appointment of a single Governor for the three territories. But for the time being he thought that this should be deferred and that political amalgamation should be preceded by a large measure of provincial decentralisation which would ultimately make it unnecessary to retain separate Governors for each of the three units.

---

[77] Mackenzie-Kennedy to MacDonald, 23 June, 1939. Ibid.

The Governor's favourable view of the Report was not shared by his Director of Medical Services. Dr. H. S. de Boer was very critical of Southern Rhodesia's native policy which he described as "little different to that of the Dominion of South Africa," and could not see how the British Government would "desire that South African native policy should be permitted to crush the future development of the African populations of two further British African dependents."[79] He viewed it as rather unfortunate that the Commission had not included officers experienced in African administration and appeared to have uncritically accepted the views of the Southern Rhodesian Government officials regarding the value of the social services provided for the Africans in the Colony. Dr. de Boer was particularly critical of the fact that only a passing reference was made in the Report to the exclusion of Africans from Government service in Southern Rhodesia and that no attempt had been made to comment at length on this policy. "The Commission," he said, "has looked over this fence and apparently decided to avoid it."[80] After reading Dr. de Boer's anti-amalgamationist Memorandum, Seel described him as "clearly an adherent of the 'White Paper' view in its more rigid form...."[81]

---

[78] Ibid.

[79] See his Memorandum in Mackenzie-Kennedy to Boyd, 23 June, 1939. Ibid.

In Southern Rhodesia Huggins found the Report extremely disappointing both from the Imperial and the British Central African point of view. The attitude displayed by three of the Commissioners during their visit to the Colony, he said, had, however, convinced him that they would never recommend amalgamation.[82] Like Mackenzie-Kennedy, Huggins considered the question of differences in native policy between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern Protectorates too trivial to be allowed to stand in the way of amalgamation which he expected to bring substantial benefit to all the inhabitants of the three territories, particularly to the Africans. As he put the question to Harding in a letter written while he was in London to discuss the Report, was it just to hold back the social welfare and prosperity of the Africans in the two northern territories "for the sake of maintaining a few pious differences in native policy--if indeed there were really any differences at all?"

---

[80] Ibid.

[81] Minute of 4 July, 1939. Ibid.

[82] Southern Rhodesia, Legislative Assembly Debates, 16 May, 1939, col. 331.

> To put it crudely is it following the policy of 'Trusteeship of the native' to keep the bulk of the population in a semi scorbutic condition, half starved and with most inadequate medical services for the sake of maintaining theoretical differences that enable 1,800 natives to be employed in Government Offices while preventing the cure of the major problem?[83]

Huggins extreme contempt for the British policy of colonial trusteeship is nowhere better demonstrated than in this letter.

Huggins, however, found compensation in the joint Note appended to the Report by the Chairman and Cooper. "These people," he said, "with wider knowledge, appending this particular note is a matter of very great satisfaction--I think about the only piece of satisfaction that one can gain from the report."[84] He, however, did not think that the objections raised by the Commission against amalgamation were likely to be final since, in his view, the differences in native policy were not so great as to be irreconciliable. He was also critical of the Commissioners for having displayed what he termed "a childlike belief in the native witnesses". He was, however, confident that "in the end it would come round to our policy of parallel development." The Railway Strip in Northern Rhodesia, he said, would certainly become "a white area" and those areas of Nyasaland like Limbe and Blantyre where the Europeans were settled in large numbers would become "white islands". At the same time he pointed out that Southern Rhodesians were not prepared to wait until African opinion in the northern Protectorates could be so educated as to be able to understand all the possible implications of amalgamation.

---

[83] Huggins to Harding, 28 July, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./109/45104/ 1939. Part I.

[84] Legislative Assembly Debates, 16 May, 1939, col. 331.

The most valuable part of the entire Report, as far as Huggins was concerned, was the recommendation that the British Government should declare its acceptance of the principle of amalgamation.

> I think from our point of view that is the most important thing in the whole report because I consider that unless this principle is accepted by the United Kingdom we are justified in saying that all the previous statements of the Imperial Government in connection with the matter were merely to delude us.[85]

With the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation by the British Government, he went on, the Inter-Territorial Council proposed in the Report could be useful in bringing the three territories together through a unification of their services. It was for the same reason that he enthusiastically welcomed the joint recommendation by the Chairman and Cooper for the appointment of a single Governor for all the three territories.

As Huggins prepared to leave for London to discuss the Report with the British authorities, following his resounding victory in the April general elections, his strategy was to concentrate all his efforts in getting the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation by the British Government as well as the establishment of the Inter-Territorial Council, though not necessarily along the lines suggested by the Royal Commission. He seemed to believe that the British Government was bound in honour to accept these two recommendations "unless," as he said, "they have been pulling our legs." However, in the light of his London discussions with MacDonald in 1937 and the correspondence that followed between them regarding the Commission's term of reference, Huggins' statement that British authorities were bound by their previous statements to accept the principle of amalgamation was a deliberate distortion of the facts. Besides, even among those members of the Commission who viewed the amalgamation of the three territories as desirable, there was no indication in their appended Notes of the time within which they felt this development could take place. The main Report went no further than merely pointing out that amalgamation was the objective to be kept in view.

---

[85] _Ibid._, cols. 333-4.

Meanwhile, both the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office began to prepare their own strategy regarding the line of policy which they should take in their discussions with Huggins. They were, of course, already aware of the points which Huggins was going to press for since he had already indicated them in his Budget speech in the Southern Rhodesian Legislature. For this purpose a joint Memorandum was drawn up by the two departments on 20 June dealing with the various issues raised in the Commission's Report.[86] Regarding the Commission's main recommendation that the British Government should state their acceptance of the principle of amalgamation, it was felt that the indeterminate nature of the Report together with the lack of unanimity among the members of the Commission on this crucial proposal made it very difficult to estimate the time when amalgamation might be regarded as practicable. Moreover, it did not seem likely that the increase in the settler population of Northern Rhodesia was going to be rapid. The African population, on the other hand, was growing at a very rapid rate and, more significantly, was also becoming articulate. And judging from the experience in the High Commission Territories where African opposition had made it practically impossible to carry out their transfer to South Africa as envisaged in the South Africa Act, it could be anticipated that similar difficulties would also arise with respect to the amalgamation of the two northern Protectorates with Southern Rhodesia.

---

[86] See "Memorandum drawn up in the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office in preparation for the discussions between United Kingdom Ministers and Mr. Huggins in July". P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part I.

It was further pointed out in the Memorandum that as the settler population of Southern Rhodesia increased, the retention of the Imperial reservations in the Colony's Constitution would progressively become more difficult to maintain. But without such reservations the amalgamation of the three territories would be impossible to contemplate. At the same time the prospects of reconciling the Southern Rhodesian native policy with that of British Government did not seem promising. The Southern Rhodesian native policy, as pointed out in the Commission's Report, was based on the principle of territorial segregation. According to this policy the African was only to be admitted in the European areas "on the understanding that there he should merely assist, and not compete with, the white man." There were no suggestions in the Report as to how this policy was to be reconciled with that of the Colonial Office whose objective was that the African should be given free opportunity for economic development in all fields and should ultimately be able to take his place in the central legislature. For these reasons it was felt that "the possibility of amalgamation within any forseeable period of time" could not yet be determined and even if the Commission's view that the identity of interests between the three territories would inevitably lead to political unity were accepted, it seemed needlessly embarrassing for the British Government to bind itself to a definite acceptance of the principle of amalgamation at the present time.

The line of action which appeared most suitable was the one suggested by Orr-Ewing in his appended Note which was to accept the Inter-Territorial Council proposed by the Commission, but only as a testing ground for closer co-operation between the three territories as an experiment in the light of which some definite conclusion regarding the question of amalgamation might be reached at some time in the future. In favouring this line of approach, the authors of the Memorandum found themselves in complete agreement with Lord Hailey's remarks on the Report made in a radio broadcast on 3 April in which, he considered it inadvisable for the British Government to accept the amalgamation of the three territories until further experience of the way in which the two systems of native administration worked out in practice had been gained. Indeed, Lord Hailey felt that even the principle of amalgamation should not be decided upon at present but should be left for future consideration in the light of further developments.

There was, however, great concern that if the British Government was not willing to make a declaration in favour of the principle of amalgamation, the Southern Rhodesian Government might be reluctant to participate in the setting up of the Inter-Territorial Council recommended by the Commission. As a result matters would remain where they presently stood, with the intermittent conferences between the three Governors and the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister as the only instrument of co-ordination between the three territories. In the view of the authors of the Memorandum, such a development was greatly to be regretted since the Commission's proposal seemed likely to provide the best means of demonstrating the advantages of co-operation and the need for closer political association--if that should become necessary. For these reasons it was considered essential that the Commission's proposal should be given a trial. But to achieve this it would be necessary to assure the Southern Rhodesian Government that participation in the Council would not prejudice the Colony's autonomy in much the same way as it would also be necessary to assure the British Government that their control over general policy in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would remain unaffected. On both points it was felt that there was ample room for discussion once the principle of a permanent machinery for co-operation had been accepted by all the parties concerned.

With regard to the suggestion made by Lord Bledisloe and Ashley Cooper in their joint Note for the appointment of a single Governor for the three territories or, alternatively, the constitution of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia as High Commissioner for the combined northern Protectorates which Huggins had singled out as "almost of equal importance" to the proposal regarding the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation, the authors of the Memorandum showed no particular enthusiasm. In their view so long as the three territories retained their separate political status, the difficulty of combining the constitutional position of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia with that of the executive head of the two northern Protectorates which were still under the direct control of the Colonial Office in all aspects of their administration appeared insurmountable.

At the inter-departmental meeting held on 30 June to discuss the Memorandum, the question of facilitating closer co-operation between the three territories was brought up. Sir Edward Harding considered this a matter of such major importance that he felt the experiment of a single Governor for all the three territories worth trying in addition to the creation of an Inter-Territorial Council. The constitutional complications involved in such an arrangement as well as the probability of

African opposition to the removal of their direct personal link with the Crown were, however, pointed out to him as reasons why such an arrangement could not be contemplated. While deferring to these objections, Harding expressed the hope that such fusion was not definitely being ruled out and might still be considered if co-operation through other means could not be secured.[87]

Harding did not believe, as the Commissioners did, that the differences in native policies between Southern Rhodesia and the two Northern Protectorates would simply "wither away" in the general course of time. He thought it necessary to consider whether any positive step could be taken which would at least prevent a still more difficult situation arising than the present one. One possible solution to this problem, he suggested, would be to define Northern Rhodesia, exclusive of the Railway Strip and the Copper belt, and Nyasaland as native areas and then make it clear that whatever might happen in the other areas, the British Government would insist that no restriction of native opportunity would be contemplated in the designated native areas. He was convinced that if European settlement in Northern Rhodesia increased to any considerable degree, it would ultimately become difficult for the British Government to insist upon a policy greatly different from that obtaining in the European areas in Southern Rhodesia.

In the course of the discussion the difficulties in the way of this arrangement were indicated. Such a scheme, it was stated, would encounter opposition in Parliament since it would be viewed as a tacit acceptance of the Southern Rhodesian native policy for those areas of

---

[87] "Note of a discussion in Sir C. Parkinson's room 30/6/39". P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part I.

Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland which were defined as non-native. Sir Eric Machtig warned, however, that if there was real doubt that the Colonial Office could hold the existing policy indefinitely in respect of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland the result of leaving matters alone might well cause some serious trouble in the future regarding the protection of African interests.[88]

Thus as the two Secretaries of State, Sir Thomas Inskip for the Dominions, and Malcolm MacDonald for the Colonies, readied themselves for talks with Huggins on the Royal Commission Report, there were two main items on which the discussions were expected to focus. These were the question of acceptance of the principle of amalgamation by the British Government and the subject of native policy which had been singled out in the Report as the main obstacle in the way of immediate amalgamation of the three territories. Both men were in complete agreement that an acceptance of the principle of amalgamation would involve "a substantial departure from the attitude which His Majesty's Government have hitherto felt obliged to maintain."[89] Reference was made to the fact that when the appointment of the Commission was discussed, it was made abundantly clear that this was not to be viewed as meaning that there was any likelihood of the British Government being able to depart in the near future from their view regarding the necessity of maintaining their present responsibility in relation to native policy in each of the three territories. An additional problem was the fact that although this recommendation formed part of the main body of the Report which had been signed by all the members of the Commission, three of them had in effect disassociated themselves from it in their Notes appended to the Report.

---

[88] Ibid.

[89] "Note prepared after discussion in S of S's room", 10 July, 1939. Ibid. Meanwhile, Lord Harlech (Ormsby-Gore), who was Colonial Secretary at the time of the appointment of the Commission in 1938, expressed himself strongly against any acceptance of the principle of amalgamation by the British Government. Recalling the famous declaration of the doctrine of African paramountcy by the Duke of Devonshire in 1923, he warned against the pitfalls of making "fine sounding declarations" which were difficult to implement in practice. Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, vol. 114, 31 July, 1939, col. 722.

Although the eventual amalgamation of the three territories was deemed advantageous--if it should prove practicable, the problems in its way indicated in the Report made it extremely difficult to estimate the time when it might become a reality. For these reasons it was considered not unreasonable that there should be such reticence on the part of the British Government concerning the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation. At the same time the two Ministers considered it essential that a machinery of co-operation should be set up in the belief that "a more effective co-ordination of common services between the territories would afford a means of determining whether or not the difficulties are of a fundamental and necessarily permanent character." To this end the machinery recommended by the Commission could be improved in the light of local knowledge. What was of urgent importance was that co-operation by this means should be "pursued vigorously and in good faith" and regardless of the form of the machinery which might finally be decided upon, it was considered to be in the interest of the three territorial Governments to ensure that such machinery worked "in such a way as progressively to diminish the present difficulties."[90] The question of modifying the native policy presently being applied to the

---

[90] "Note prepared after discussion in S of S's room", 10 July, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part I.

2

two northern Protectorates in order to accommodate that of Southern Rhodesia was regarded as one which the British Government would have to weigh very carefully in view of the possible effect of such an action not only upon the Africans in the two territories, but also upon those in other African dependencies. There was also the fear of Parliamentary criticism which such a step would certainly arouse.

Huggins' visit to London early in July was watched with keen interest in both Southern Rhodesia and Great Britain. On the eve of his departure to press for the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation by the British Government, a fervent appeal was issued by tje Rev. A. S. Cripps through the British press against such a step.

> I want to make an appeal on behalf of African interests out here against such an appeal as Mr. Huggins may be likely to make at home--urging that a pledge of amalgamation be accorded. I appeal for a non-committal attitude at home with regard to the vexed question of amalgamation. I believe that there are many in Great Britain who may share my own distrust of any proposal to amalgamate territories at present under the Colonial Office with Southern Rhodesia.[91]

He referred to the prolonged negotiations between the British Government and the Government of South Africa for the incorporation of the three High Commission Territories as an "impressive warning against any impulsive acceptance of the principle of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia for either Nyasaland or Northern Rhodesia territories which are now under Britain's own policy of disinterested trusteeship."[92] According to Mzingeli, the news of Huggins' visit to London was also viewed "with much concern" by "thoughtful Africans".[93] There was also concern among the British Labour Party supporters about the coming talks between Huggins and British authorities.[94] Creech Jones was, however, assured by MacDonald that before any statement of the Government's policy on amalgamation was made, the leaders of the Opposition parties would be consulted.[95]

---

[91] *Manchester Guardian*, 6 July, 1939.

[92] *Ibid*.

Huggins arrived in London on 4 July determined to fight for the acceptance of the principle of amalgamation by the British Government and in his task he was given ample support and tactical advice by Sir Herbert Stanley. Like Huggins, Stanley was greatly disappointed with the Commission's failure to recommend immediate amalgamation. Indefinite delay in bringing it about, he wrote to Harding, could only mean further increase in the difficulties along its path. As far as the issue of the divergent native policies between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern Protectorates was concerned, Stanley felt that "the real alternative" was not

> between the theoretically liberal policy of the Passfield White Paper and the theoretically less liberal policy of Southern Rhodesia, but between the Southern Rhodesian policy (in the event of amalgamation) and the very much less liberal policy of the Union of South Africa (if, as seems inevitable in the absence of amalgamation, the three separate Territories are absorbed by the Union, one by one, on such conditions as the Union might decide to impose).[96]

---

[93] Mzingeli to the Secretary of State for Dominion Affairs and Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 May, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940.

[94] See Roy McGregor's letter of 18 June, 1939 to Creech Jones in the Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, 22/5/183.

[95] Creech Jones to Green, 17 July, 1939. Ibid., 22/2/136.

[96] Stanley to Harding, 25 March, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part I.

The view that amalgamation was going to save the Africans in the two northern Protectorates from South Africa now became Stanley's new theme after the publication of the Royal Commission Report. If amalgamation was not achieved soon, he wrote to Machtig in July 1940, the Africans in the two Protectorates, "in all human probability will have been saved from the supposed frying pan of Southern Rhodesia only in order to fall into the flames of a Union native policy fanned by the rising breeze of exclusive nationalism."[97] In Stanley's view there was no "incontestable force" in the arguments advanced by the Commission "to justify the interposition of an immediate period of half-measures."[98]

Disappointed though Stanley was with the Report as a whole, he saw "some cause for satisfaction and encouragement" in the fact that the Commission had succeeded in producing a unanimous Report "whose proposals, if adopted, would produce a definite advance over the position as defined hitherto in the relevant pronouncements of the Imperial Government."[99] Although the unanimity of the Report was nullified somewhat by some of the appended Notes, Stanley found ample compensation for this in the joint Note signed by the Chairman and Ashley Cooper which he saw as a reinforcement and extension of the Report's advocacy of closer union--and in his opinion it was the views of these two men which were most likely to carry weight in official circles in London. He described their proposal for the establishment of a single Governorship for all the territories as "a momentous recommendation".

---

[97] Stanley to Machtig, 10 July, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/17/1940. Stanley's fears of Southern Rhodesian absorption by the Union were never taken seriously in the Dominions Office and from his discussions with the Union Ministers in 1940, Lord Hailey found no evidence of any South African desire to annex the Colony. "We have always felt here," minuted Tait, one of the Assistant Secretaries in the Dominions Office, "that Sir H. Stanley exaggerated this danger." 13 August, 1940. "Yes," scribbled Machtig on the margin of Tait's minute, "he has a 'bee in his bonnet' on this!"

[98] Stanley to Huggins, 30 April, 1939. The Stanley Correspondence.

[99] Ibid.

Although Stanley was fully aware that the immediate amalgamation of the three territories was out of the question, he, nevertheless, advised Huggins, "as a matter of policy and negotiation, not to concede this point at the outset of any discussions with the Imperial Government but rather to contend that the objections seen by the Commission need not, and should not, be regarded as conclusive."[100] Huggins should, therefore, argue that the differences in native policy between Southern Rhodesia were "neither as great nor as difficult of reconciliation as the Commissioners appear to have thought." At the same time he advised him to try to discredit the African views against amalgamation by contending that the fears expressed by African witnesses before the Commission were "either wholly unfounded or, so far as not wholly unfounded, grossly exaggerated." Lastly, he advised Huggins to stress to the British authorities that an indefinite postponement of amalgamation, particularly if the principle of amalgamation were not explicitly conceded by the Imperial Government, would inevitably lead to a piecemeal absorption of the two Rhodesias and probably Nyasaland as well into the Union of South Africa.

If the Imperial Government should prove obdurate on this point Stanley felt that the advancement of the claim for immediate amalgamation might, nevertheless, have the effect of "facilitating the extraction of an undertaking to make the all-important statement of 'acceptance of the principle that identity of interests will lead the three Territories sooner or later to political unity'." In his view a concession on this point would be of no mean significance.

---

[100] *Ibid.*

> Without such a statement, we shall be left in *status quo ante*. With such a statement, the course will be set in the right direction. Half the battle will have been won, and the force of circumstances will bring complete victory sooner rather than later.[101]

Stanley's influence on Huggins which stemmed from close personal ties between them is nowhere better illustrated than on the issue of amalgamation as well as that of native policy, particularly their joint pressure on the Imperial Government for the termination of the common franchise in the Colony's Constitution. His views on these two issues forced him at times to depart rather drastically from the constitutional impartiality which his position demanded. Sir Edgar Whitehead's statement to Claire Palley that Stanley asked "for more on behalf of the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister than he ever did on behalf of the British Government" is hardly an exaggeration.[102]

Once this statement had been "extracted" from the Imperial Government, the next point to be urged was the appointment of a single Governor for all the three territories or two if the Commission's proposal to amalgamate the two northern Protectorates were accepted. Subject to the disposal of Nyasaland's debt in the manner suggested by the Commission, that is, writing it off, Stanley thought it wise for Huggins to support the proposal for the amalgamation of the two Protectorates. "It would," he said, "be easier eventually to amalgamate with one other Administration than with two, and our dependence on Nyasaland labour makes it desirable to keep that Territory within our orbit." Only if the unified territories were to be saddled with Nyasaland's debt would it be necessary to oppose this proposal since amalgamation under such circumstances "would entail our participation in a liability unacceptable even when allowance is made for the prospective growth of the revenue of Northern Rhodesia concurrently with the expected further expansion of the production of copper."[103]

---

[101] *Ibid*.

[102] Palley, *op*. *cit*., p. 240, fn. 5.

A week before the talks began, Huggins wrote Stanley to inform him that as far as he could gather unofficially there did not appear to be any hope of the Imperial Government's acceptance of the principle of amalgamation and added that if this indeed was the case "then all talks will be off".[104] In his reply, Stanley came up with further advice on how the situation could be dealt with. If the Imperial Government was adamant in its refusal to make an explicit statement in favour of the principle of amalgamation, Stanley said, "you might perhaps think it worth your while to endeavour to extract from them an arrangement which, without involving a declaration of policy in terms, would in practice prove equivalent in effect--I mean the combination of the three Governorships in a personal union." This, he said, would constitute "a real and probably irrevocable, advance towards Amalgamation." He assured Huggins that if he could secure the consent of the British Government on this point his journey would not have been wasted. "If you could secure that you would not return from London empty-handed, even though you had failed to get anything more."[105]

---

[103] Stanley to Huggins, 30 April, 1939. The Stanley Correspondence.

[104] Huggins to Stanley, 12 July, 1939. Ibid.

In Stanley's view the personal union of the three territories under a single Governorship was "an indispensable corollary of the establishment of an inter-territorial Council." Without it, he said, the Council would be nothing more than a debating society. In a memorandum enclosed with his letter which he took the precaution of concealing from his superiors--"I am not sending a copy to the Dominions Office, or mentioning it in that quarter...."--Stanley gave a brief outline of what he considered to be "a workable scheme" for such an arrangement. In respect of Southern Rhodesia the Governor would continue to act, as at present, under Ministerial advice while in relation to the two northern Protectorates he would be subject to the authority of the Secretary of State for the Colonies. The Governor's position would thus be analogous to that of the Governor-General of South Africa or the Governor of the Transvaal during the pre-Union period. Another analogy given by Stanley was the arrangement under which the late Sir Drummond Chaplin acted as joint Administrator of the two Rhodesias from 1921 to 1924 when Southern Rhodesia had an Unofficial majority in the Legislative Council while Northern Rhodesia only had an Advisory Council. Regarding past objections by British authorities that this arrangement would place the Governor in an invidious position since he would stand in official subordination to two different authorities, a situation that, incidentally, never arose in the examples he had given, Stanley felt that this difficulty could easily be overcome by the establishment of the machinery for consultation between the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office recommended by the Commission.[106]

---

[105] Stanley to Huggins, 25 July, 1939. Ibid.

The talks between Huggins and British authorities headed by Sir Thomas Inskip, in the Chair, and Malcolm MacDonald, opened on 17 July. The discussion mainly focussed on the issue of divergence between the native policy of Southern Rhodesia and that of the two northern Protectorates.[107] Huggins strongly emphasised the similarity in the native policies of the three territories. Where differences existed, he said, these were rather insignificant and he pointed out that the younger generation in the Colony was prepared to take up a more liberal attitude towards Africans. He predicted that in the course of time the two races would come closer together and that the European objection to working with Africans would gradually disappear even if social differences remained. Asked by MacDonald whether the Southern Rhodesian native policy could be said to have the same ultimate goal as that of the Colonial Office, namely, "complete native self-government in the native areas, when the white official would be limited to a purely advisory function or might disappear altogether," Huggins stated that he could not go so far as to contemplate a complete removal of white officials from African areas. At the same time he stressed that the Southern Rhodesian native policy, like that of the Colonial Office, was aimed at training Africans for self-government in the native areas.

---

[106] Ibid.

[107] Confidential. "Note of a discussion between the Secretaries of State for Dominions Affairs and for the Colonies and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia on the Report of the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Commission, 17th July, 1939". P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part II.

MacDonald then pointed out the strong unlikelihood of the British Parliament ever accepting amalgamation upon any basis which would mean that a European majority in the National Legislature would always outvote an African minority on matters of common concern. For this reason he felt the British Government could not commit themselves to amalgamation unless Parliament could be assured that the Africans would not be subject to the "dictatorship of a European majority" nor would the European community be "overwhelmed by the numerical superiority of the natives." Huggins, on his part, brought up the idea of the urgency of amalgamation harping on the now familiar theme that if no immediate steps were taken towards amalgamation, the three territories would inevitably drift further apart in much the same way as Southern Rhodesia had drifted away from the Union. In his view the difficulties over the native question were far out-weighed by the urgency of amalgamation, particularly from an economic point of view. MacDonald was not, however, prepared to allow himself to be outmaneouvered in this way. To him the crux of the matter was native policy and he suggested a conference comprising of representatives from the three territories and the Colonial Office to work out a common native policy acceptable to all the parties concerned.

In the second meeting held on 24 July the discussion centred on the issue of the ultimate objectives of native policy in Southern Rhodesia and the two Protectorates. MacDonald began by pointing out that although there appeared to be no great differences in practice between Southern Rhodesia's native policy and that operating in the two northern territories, there were fundamental differences in their ultimate objectives. Huggins refused to be pinned down to a definition of the ultimate goal of Southern Rhodesia's native policy on the grounds that it was bound to be affected by experience and changing circumstances. MacDonald, on the other hand, felt that if the British Government were to be asked to make a definite statement in favour of amalgamation, it was not unreasonable for them to ask Huggins to make a similar statement regarding the ultimate objective of Southern Rhodesia's native policy. But barring such a statement, he said, the British Government would prefer to take the same non-committal line with respect to amalgamation as Huggins had taken in respect of Southern Rhodesia's native policy, namely, that a definite statement in favour of amalgamation was impracticable at the present time and that the best thing to do would be to wait and see how matters developed in the light of actual experience.

MacDonald further pointed out that public opinion in the United Kingdom would be strongly opposed to any statement committing the British Government to amalgamation unless certain conditions, particularly with regard to native policy, were attached to it. He then suggested that a statement be drawn up acceptable to public opinion in Great Britain and the three territories which would provide a working basis for co-operation. Huggins was obviously not satisfied with this proposal and pointed out that a simple statement to the effect that the British Government accepted amalgamation in principle would not necessarily be regarded as an irrevocable and binding pledge. MacDonald, however, rejected this suggestion outright pointing out that from a political point of view it would be disastrous if at a later stage it should appear that the British Government regarded any statement which they had made after full deliberation as having no binding force. Such a course, he said, might have a transitory value in appeasing public opinion in the Rhodesias for the present, but would only be storing up serious trouble for the future.

In this statement may perhaps be seen the difference in political morality between the two men. Inskip concurred with MacDonald in rejecting the suggestion that the British Government should commit itself to the principle of amalgamation in the pious hope that the problem of native policy would hopefully solve itself. The best approach, he said, was to try to reach an agreement on a declaration of the aims of native policy which would be acceptable to all the parties concerned. This could then be followed up by some definite practical steps towards amalgamation. Huggins' contention that if no immediate steps were taken in the direction of amalgamation serious trouble was likely to occur among the white settlers in the Rhodesias as they would feel that they had been sacrificed in favour of the Africans, failed to move the two British statesmen.

As a compromise, MacDonald's proposal was that a statement should be drawn up acknowledging the desirability of amalgamation in certain circumstances and, at the same time, laying down as a necessary condition that before amalgamation could be considered certain difficulties, including those related to the divergence of native policy, should first be resolved; that for the present the British Government could not agree to commit itself to the principle of amalgamation but were anxious that some form of inter-territorial machinery should be set up as soon as possible with a view to overcoming these difficulties. Huggins was agreeable to this proposal but felt that the Council should be specifically directed to consider means for the development of South Central Africa on the basis that this could best be done only if the three territories were a single unit. Furthermore, such a Council should be provided with a strong Secretariat. At MacDonald's suggestion it was felt best to leave the question of the Council's terms of reference and its composition until after an agreement had been reached on the proposed general statement. It was then agreed that the Dominion and Colonial Offices should prepare a draft for such a statement and circulate it before the next meeting which was scheduled for 1st August.[108]

Up to this point the talks had gone decidedly against Huggins. "I am not getting on at all with the Bledisloe business," he dejectedly wrote to Stanley after the second meeting. "We are now looking for a formula that will satisfy me and at the same time be as non-committal as possible." He was particularly disenchanted with MacDonald. "It is very tragic," he went on, "Malcolm in confidence has said he agrees with me but he could not get it through the House...."[109] Huggins was in fact anxious to return to Salisbury but because more talks were scheduled for September he did not think he would be able to leave before 14th September. This rather dreary picture of the way in which the negotiations were proceeding was confirmed by another letter written by Laurence Smith, Huggins' Private Secretary, who was present throughout these meetings. The talks, he said, were going badly. "The two discussions we have had have been simply on interminable wrangle over the native, mixed, when the talks have become too dangerous, with a bit of discussion on the inter-territorial council."[110]

He described Inskip as "not particularly interested."

> He takes the chair at the discussions and relies entirely on his lawyer's art to try and dig out a few pertinent

---

[108] Confidential. "Note of a discussion between the Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs and for the Colonies and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia ... 24th July, 1939. Ibid.

[109] Huggins to Stanley, 25 July, 1939. The Stanley Correspondence.

[110] Smith to Stanley, 27 July, 1939. Ibid.

> questions to ask out of the points that arise during the discussion. It is perfectly clear that he will follow Malcolm's lead over this.[111]

In fairness to Inskip it should be pointed out that he was completely unfamiliar with the whole history of the issue of amalgamation having only been brought over to the Dominions Office from his previous post as Minister for Co-ordination of Defence in January 1939 to replace MacDonald who, in what the Economist referred to as "the perpetual game of musical chairs," was returned to the Colonial Office. He publicly admitted his inadequacy at a luncheon given by the Rhodesian Group of Overseas League in Huggins' honour on 25 July when he reportedly stated that he was still "undergoing a process of education by the kind and helpful Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia which, he hoped might ultimately lead his colleagues and himself and Parliament to a right decision."[112]

Smith laid the blame for the poor progress of the talks on MacDonald who he felt was not personally opposed to amalgamation but was rather afraid of "political repercussions".

> Malcolm knows very well the advantages of amalgamation both to the European and the native, but all he is concerned with is finding a formula which will either enable him to pigeon-hole the report, or accept it, he does not mind which, provided there are no political repercussions. He is the embodiment of all that is bad in the professional politician.
>
> He said quite frankly that unless the political future of the natives was assured the Commons would never agree to amalgamation.

Smith was, however, convinced that a large number of people in the United Kingdom, including the members of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines

---

[111] Ibid.

[112] The Times, 26 July, 1939, The African World, 29 July, 1939.

Protection Society, were terrified by the prospect of Southern Rhodesia joining the Union and that any argument based on Imperial interest or strengthening the Empire was certain to be "received with acclamation." As he put it, "At the moment one could get away with murder provided it was done under Imperial cloak."[113]

The third meeting on 1st August dealt mainly with the Joint Dominions and Colonial Offices' "Draft Formula" which, as MacDonald explained, was to indicate in a tentative way the British Government's recognition that amalgamation between the three territories was desirable and was certain to bring a number of advantages to them and to point out at the same time the particular difficulty presented by native policy and to suggest a procedure which might be adopted in an attempt to overcome this difficulty. While making no committment on behalf of the British Government, he felt that the document went a fair way towards showing that amalgamation was indeed a desirable objective. He was hopeful that this would enable Huggins to agree to the setting up of the co-ordinating machinery recommended by the Commission.

In order to deal with the problem of the divergent native policies between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern territories, a suggestion was made in the "Draft Formula" for a further enquiry or enquiries to determine whether the native policies of the three territories could be "co-ordinated on a basis which, in the event of amalgamation, would maintain the principle of trusteeship for the native population, and at the same time effectively safeguard the legitimate interests of all other sections of the population."[114] Huggins was very favourable to the idea of an enquiry into the whole question of native policy and stressed that it should be an exhaustive one. He was equally favourable to the proposal for setting up an effective machinery to overcome the difficulties arising out of differences in native policy which in any case he felt existed more on paper than in practice. Such an enquiry, he said, was not only important but fundamental since it would indicate the right method of adjusting the relations between the whites and the blacks.

---

[113] Smith to Stanley, 27 July, 1939. The Stanley Correspondence.

[114] "Joint Dominion Office and Colonial Office Draft 'Formula'. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part II.

For the enquiry to be successful MacDonald felt that it should satisfy three conditions. Firstly, it should be conducted with as little publicity as possible since publicity would invite controversy and the whole atmosphere would become prejudicial and native feeling might be aroused. Secondly, it should make a comprehensive report or reports for the confidential information of the Governments concerned. He pointed out that he did not want people writing a report with an eye on the public gallery all the time. Thirdly, he preferred the enquiry to be carried out by the three local Governments and the actual investigation to be conducted not by amateurs but by people who really knew what they were talking about and who were going to be responsible for the native policy. MacDonald, however, admitted that only the third condition could be satisfied--the first one, he said, would be difficult to meet and he was doubtful regarding the second. The kind of an enquiry which MacDonald had in mind was one which would indicate what in fact were the divergences between Southern Rhodesia and the two Protectorates in the area of native policy and at the same time recommend methods by which these divergences could be reconciled.

Sir Thomas Inskip was not very keen on the idea of another enquiry which he imagined might take a long time to complete. At one point during the discussion he directed some pointed questions to

MacDonald. What would happen, for instance, if the enquiry reached a conclusion that certain features of Southern Rhodesia's native policy were not acceptable? MacDonald replied that it was precisely for this reason that he preferred the report or reports to be confidential. The Governments concerned would then have to try to come to an agreement among themselves on native policy before making a public announcement. But what if the outcome of the enquiry suggested some modifications in the native policy of the two Protectorates? MacDonald's answer was that if such modifications were deemed necessary in order to make the Colonial Office native policy uniform with that of Southern Rhodesia, and he was personally convinced that this might become necessary, he would be willing to accept such recommendations provided he felt he could get the consent of Parliament. He completely ruled out any possibility of a union based on both systems of native policy running concurrently. At the same time he intimated that he would not rule out the possibility of a federal basis for the three territories. Huggins also pointed out that under amalgamation Northern Rhodesia's system would have to be modified. An amalgamated government, he said, could not run the Copperbelt without some sort of central control or organisation.

MacDonald was most anxious that the establishment of the machinery for co-operation should go ahead without waiting for what was certain to be a protracted enquiry into the political as well as economic aspects of native policy. This would serve as an act of appeasement to those who favoured amalgamation as well as a means of avoiding the creation of an impression that the British Government was only concerned with the ultimate effect of amalgamation on the Africans. The meeting closed with an undertaking by Inskip and MacDonald to give further consideration to the question of an enquiry after obtaining the views of the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.[115] Before any definite proposals could be formulated the Cabinet was also to be consulted. Another meeting was scheduled for 5th September.[116]

Once more Huggins found the discussion on the reconciliation of native policies discouraging and began to prepare for his return to Southern Rhodesia, possibly on 7th September.[117] "The Bledisloe report on conciliation has been a plague," he wrote to Stanley. He was particularly irritated by the number of letters in the British press which were critical of Southern Rhodesia's native policy and he even took some time off to write a rebuttal. "I have concocted a letter with O'Keefe, [the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London], for the Times," he told Stanley, "it has given me a chance of a dig at Margery [Perham] who has gone completely academic on Native."[118] As more letters continued to pour in, Huggins became more upset. "There have been some more letters in the Times on the Bledisloe report," he wrote again to Stanley, adding that "it is going to be a very slow business I fear."[119]

---

[115] Both Governors were favourable to the suggested enquiry but Maybin felt that the proposed machinery for co-operation should await the result of the enquiry on the native policy while Mackenzie-Kennedy, with the experience of the Bledisloe Commission still fresh in his mind, considered it unwise "to take more native evidence or indeed any formal evidence at all." Mackenzie-Kennedy to Secretary of State for the Colonies and Parkinson, 24 August, 1939, and Maybin to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 September, 1939. Ibid.

[116] Confidential. "Note of a discussion between the Secretaries of State for Dominion Affairs and for the Colonies and the Prime Minister of Southern Rhodesia ... 1st August, 1939". Ibid.

[117] Although tension in Europe was approaching a breaking point, Huggins was firmly of the opinion that there would be no war.

[118] Huggins to Stanley, 5 August, 1939. The Stanley Correspondence.

[119] Huggins to Stanley, 15 August, 1939. Ibid.

The next round of talks scheduled for 5 September never materialised. On 1 September Hitler pounced on Poland and two days later Great Britain declared war on Germany. The talks on amalgamation came to a screeching stop. What took place instead was an informal discussion in the Colonial Office on the morning of 5 September when Huggins came by to bid MacDonald good-bye before his return to Southern Rhodesia on the 7th.[120] By now Huggins had come to realise that no early decision on the Bledisloe Report was to be expected. MacDonald was keen on a short press statement explaining that in view of the outbreak of the War it had not been possible to pursue the discussions but that they had not been suspended indefinitely; both the British Government and the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister had agreed that they should be resumed "as soon as circumstances permit."[121] Asked in the House of Commons whether the phrase "as soon as circumstances permit" meant the end of the War, Anthony Eden, Secretary of State for the Dominions Affairs, September, 1939-May, 1940, replied that this was not the case.

> It means that we hope that the postponement is for a comparatively short duration. We thought we must have an opportunity to consider the position in the light of existing circumstances.[122]

Huggins was then shown a draft statement which had been prepared for this purpose. This appeared in the press on 8 September.

MacDonald was most likely persuaded to this course of action by a conversation which he had had with Gore-Browne in which he was told by the latter that although no one could reasonably expect a final decision on amalgamation in view of the war situation, it would, nevertheless, be advisable from the point of view of the European public in the Rhodesias if some interim statement could be made concerning the British Government's attitude towards the main recommendations of the Commission's Report and particularly on the subject of amalgamation.[123] In the course of his discussion with Huggins, MacDonald further explained that after the initial period of strain consequent upon the outbreak of the war had passed, it might be possible to resume negotiations by correspondence with the various Governments concerned. In the meanwhile he felt that the proposed enquiry into the question of native policy which had been brought up in the 1st August meeting should be proceeded with as soon as possible and he expressed himself as much attracted by Huggins' suggestion that some one individual of first-class ability should be entrusted with this task.

---

[120] See Boyd's minute of 5 September, 1939. Ibid.

[121] Ibid.

[122] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, v. 352, 10 October, 1939, col. 138.

What was required, MacDonald pointed out to Huggins, was a man who could command the confidence of all the three African Governments and would be able to conduct an "unobstrusive investigation in an impartial and unbiased spirit." He felt that an investigation into the existing divergences in the native policy of the three territories together with recommendations as to how these could be reconciled would be very valuable. On the basis of this investigation the British Government would then be in a position to decide whether or not there was any reasonable possibility of securing some measure of conformity between the three territories in the area of native policy. In the course of this discussion Lord Hailey's name cropped up although Huggins did indicate that he might be considered suspect in certain quarters.[124] It is not improbable that Huggins knew about Lord Hailey's radio broadcast of 3rd April in which he had advised against the British acceptance of the principle of amalgamation.

---

[123] Minute by Boyd, 5 September 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part II.

The idea of an enquiry into the native policy of the three Central African territories fell in with a project which MacDonald had already conceived in his own mind for a wider enquiry into native policy in the British African dependencies in general. "It was time," he told Lord Hailey when he met him in the afternoon following his discussion with Huggins, "that we got our minds as to the objects of our native policy in Africa."

> What exactly were we driving at in our policy of 'indirect rule'? What was the next step in advance after we had set up efficient local native administrations? In Colonies where there was not only a large native population, but also a considerable European community, how was Government to be organised ultimately so that native interests were not subordinated to European interests and vice versa? In those territories how far could European legislatures be allowed to develop? And so on.[125]

These were, however, only few of the issues that Lord Hailey would be expected to deal with in his tour of Africa. MacDonald's plan, therefore, was to subordinate or rather camouflage the enquiry into the divergences of native policy in the three Central African territories under this wider investigation of the political problems associated with British colonial administration in Tropical Africa which he considered likely to become intensified as the war progressed. "Unless we had some idea of the general objects at which we were aiming" he told Lord Hailey, "we would find that we took steps in this or that direction, which we could not afterwards retrace, which would lead away from what ought to be our objective." He impressed it upon Lord Hailey that what they wanted was not a man "who would expect to be able to dictate native policy, but one who would help us with his advice."[126] Lord Hailey agreed to undertake the investigation and was furnished with background material regarding his special mission to the three Central African territories.

---

[124] Minute by Cohen, 6 October, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./847/15/47100/1/1939. Which of the two men first mentioned Lord Hailey's name is not quite clear. Although MacDonald could not remember with any certainty, he thought it was Huggins. Minute of 18 October, 1939. Ibid.

[125] MacDonald's minute, 5 September, 1939. Ibid.

Lord Bledisloe, who had already expressed bitter disappointment with the negative response accorded his Commission's Report,[127] received the news of the proposed enquiry by Lord Hailey with great relief. By now he had become convinced that the problem of the Rhodesias had been rendered more "urgent and acute" by South Africa's internal situation. In marked contrast to the position which he had taken in his speech in the House of Lords in July that the native policies of Southern Rhodesia and the two northern Protectorates were "inherently different" and that any attempt to amalgamate the three territories "on a basis of native policy which was so inherently divergent" was both impossible and undesirable,[128] he now felt that the divergences in their native policies had been over-emphasised in relation to the major issue of amalgamation. He was now concerned that if nothing were done to unite them, their native policies would widen with the passage of time. "This," he said, "is one reason why I have always been extremely keen that the United Kingdom should definitely and clearly pronounce amalgamation to be the objective towards which all internal administration should tend to bend." He also pointed out that while he would like to see "some variation in the native policy of Southern Rhodesia," that of Northern Rhodesia would also require material revision "if very serious trouble is to be avoided in the Copperbelt in the early future."[129]

---

[126] Ibid.

[127] See Gore-Browne to MacDonald, 18 July, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part II.

[128] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, vol. 114, 31 July, 1939, col. 704.

In order to avoid any controversy over the financing of Hailey's African tour similar to the one that nearly marred the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission, the Colonial Office made certain this time that the Exchequer was consulted well in advance regarding the mission and the expenditure involved which was estimated at £2,000 for a twelve-month period. The purpose of the mission was also fully explained and as an indication of British official thinking regarding post-War colonial policy in Africa, MacDonald's letter to the Exchequer is worth quoting at length.

> If the war lasts for any length of time it is certain to leave its mark on Tropical Africa, and some of the problems which have been facing us in recent years may become more difficult as the strain in each territory is intensified. The war is likely to create a demand in Africa for a quickening in the pace of the development towards self-governing institutions for Africans, as well as for the comparatively small but vocal and influential European communities there. Whilst proceeding cautiously, we shall be wise to anticipate this demand by having ready carefully thought-out plans for a proper

---

[129] Bledisloe to Eden, 1 December, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part II.

> advance in this direction. I for one--and I know you will agree--am anxious that we should pursue a slowly but surely developing policy of training the Africans to look after many of their own affairs.[130]

In MacDonald's assessment of the situation, this anticipated demand for "development towards self-governing institutions" was to be answered through "indirect rule".

In the colonies where the policy of "indirect rule" was already in force MacDonald was certain that the question "what next" was inevitably going to be asked. In view of the discussions on colonial policy which were likely to arise when the time for peace-making came, MacDonald felt that it was "now even more desirable that we should get our own ideas on it sorted." One of the main problems which he thought would demand immediate attention was that of adjusting the constitutional relations between the different racial communities in territories like Kenya where there was a substantial settlement of European and Indian settlers alongside an indigenous population. "We ought to get a clearer picture now of what our ultimate objective in the way of political government is," he said.[131] If post-War British Colonial policy often appeared out of step with African political realities, MacDonald's letter shows at least that what was basically wrong was not the prognosis. It was the prescription.

In MacDonald's view, Lord Hailey, "with his experience and ability, and lack of prejudice on African affairs," would be able to furnish the Government "with his considered judgement on the ultimate objectives and on the next practical steps of advance." His African Survey, published in 1938, had confirmed him as an undisputed authority of issues of African colonial administration.[132] An investigation of these problems by a Royal Commission would, MacDonald felt, "arouse controversy in a most undesirable way; it would have a most upsetting effect in Africa," and for this reason he felt that this task could best be undertaken by a single fully qualified person. Tucked away at the very end of this long letter was a brief reference to Lord Hailey's other mission to the Rhodesias, namely, "a further confidential enquiry ... to decide whether a reconciliation of the native policies of the Northern and Southern Territories was in fact feasible."

---

[130] MacDonald to Sir John Smith, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Ibid.

[131] Ibid.

After the arrangements for Lord Hailey's visit to Africa had been completed, there followed an interminable discussion regarding the wording of the text of a public statement announcing Lord Hailey's Rhodesian mission. On the one hand, Huggins wanted total absence of publicity and, recognising this to be impracticable, he wished to see no reference made in the announcement which would link Lord Hailey's visit with the question of amalgamation.[133] Maybin, on the other hand, while acknowledging the importance of avoiding publicity regarding Hailey's Rhodesian mission, felt it essential to include in the proposed announcement some reference to the effect that advantage would be taken of Lord Hailey's visit to Africa "to seek his advice on the possibility of reconciling the native policies" of the three territories in relation to the amalgamation question. It was important, he said, to let the public know that some action was being undertaken on the matter even in war time.[134] In a semi-official letter to A. J. Dawe, Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Governor pointed out that any attempted concealment of the nature of Hailey's mission would be fatal and might even ruin the whole mission.[135] Any statement which made no reference to amalgamation might give an impression that the native policies of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were being examined as a separate case and that Southern Rhodesia was outside the enquiry. The Northern Rhodesian settlers might then conclude that a decision against amalgamation had already been taken by the British Government.

---

[132] "Hailey's monumental Report is rapidly becoming a sort of bible of African administration", wrote C. J. Jeffries in the Colonial Office. "We are using it a great deal in our day-to-day work here and the Colonial Governments, who have taken some thousands of copies are doing the same." Jeffries to Hale, 14 January, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./847/14/47002/8/1939.

[133] Governor of Southern Rhodesia to the Dominions Office, 11 December, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part III.

The Colonial Office readily acknowledged the force of Maybin's arguments but felt that a specific reference in the proposed announcement to the possibility of reconciling the native policies of the three territories might, by the same token, convey an impression that the British Government had already accepted the principle of amalgamation and were now merely seeking ways and means of giving effect to it.[136] In the compromise formula that was finally adopted it was pointed out that the comparison in native administrations which Lord Hailey was going to carry out during his African tour would be "of value when further consideration is being given to the questions of native policy in the Rhodesias and

---

[134] Maybin to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 January, 1940. Ibid.

[135] Maybin to Dawe, 8 January, 1940. Ibid.

[136] Secretary of State for the Colonies to Maybin, 14 January, 1940. Ibid.

Nyasaland to which attention has been directed in the recent Report of the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission."[137]

This rather tedious correspondence regarding the wording of the announcement about Lord Hailey's Rhodesian mission raises the question, 'What exactly was Lord Hailey being sent to the Rhodesias to do?' At various stages during the discussions concerning Lord Hailey's Rhodesian mission, though not in the official announcement, the words "co-ordinating" and "reconciling" of the native policies of the three territories were frequently used.[138] In an interview with R. C. Tredgold, then Southern Rhodesian Minister of Justice and Defence, on 23 January 1940, MacDonald went so far as to state that "further investigation would probably indicate that there was less divergency in practice than was commonly supposed, and that the real difference was one of ultimate objectives" and that "it was possible that even these might be modified in such a way as to enable reconciliation to be brought about."[139]

As far as Lord Hailey was concerned, however, the purpose of his visit to Southern Rhodesia was, as he pointed out in his Report, "to advise whether there is such a divergence between its native policy and that of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland as to present an obstacle to amalgamation with those territories."[140] Even before setting out on his mission, Hailey clearly realised the futility of trying to reconcile the two native policies. "The most that might be possible," he said, "would be to link up the two systems by a piece of constitutional carpentry."[141] As Boyd had pointed out in reference to the criticism voiced by the Broken Hill Political Assocation against the Commission's failure to advance any "concrete proposals" by which the two divergent native policies could be reconciled, it was difficult to see how this could be done "unless either HMG abandons its general native policy, or S.R. its policy of segregation."[142]

---

[137] For the full text of the announcement regarding Lord Hailey's African tour see P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940. It was released to the Press on 27 January, 1940.

[138] See MacDonald to Simon, 26 October, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./847/15/47100/1939 and Eden to Bledisloe, 26 January, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940.

[139] "Note of meeting between the Secretary of State and Mr. Tredgold," 23 January, 1940. Ibid.

The use of the terms "co-ordination" and "reconciliation" in connection with Lord Hailey's enquiry into the native policies of the three territories can thus be regarded as an indication of a "softening up" of attitude by British authorities towards the question of closer political union between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern Protectorates which the climate of war and strategic considerations were soon to hasten. In fact the "Draft Formula" discussed in the third meeting with Huggins on 1st August, although described as being "in the nature of a trial shot" to which no one was committed, was the earliest indication of this changing attitude. In transmitting this document to the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Sir Cosmo Parkinson, Permanent Under-

---

[140] "Note on the Bearing of Native Policy on the Proposed Amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland", Colonial Office, 1941, p. 3.

[141] Extract from record of discussion--held on 5th January, 1940". P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part III.

[142] Minute of 5 June, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1/1939.

Secretary of State for the Colonies, pointed out that in substance the "Formula" was "an admission by His Majesty's Government of the advantages in many respects of eventual amalgamation, while it avoids an unqualified acceptance of the principle of amalgamation" until there had been

> further enquiry into the possibility of co-ordinating native policy in the three territories on a basis which, in the event of amalgamation, would maintain the principle of trusteeship for the native population and at the same time effectively safeguard the interests of all other sections of the population.[143]

Evidently all the previous pronouncements to the effect that amalgamation was inconsistent with the maintenance of British trusteeship for the Africans in the two northern Protectorates were about to undergo a process of modification. The muted note of retreat was faintly audible.

The announcement of Lord Hailey's mission to the Rhodesias was received with special interest by Lord Bledisloe who was becoming restless about the British Government's apparent failure to act on his Commission's recommendations and was also getting concerned about the political position of the three Central African territories vis-à-vis the Union.

> The lack of any definite official action, following the Report of my Royal Commission has indeed been something of a nightmare to me for several months. The necessity of taking at least the first steps in forming a co-ordinated 'bloc' of British territories north of the Limpopo has, in my judgement, become more insistent since the outbreak of war, especially in view of the state of political opinion in the Union of South Africa.[144]

---

[143] Parkinson to Maybin and Mackenzie-Kennedy, 8 August, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./705/108/45104/1949. Part II.

[144] Bledisloe to Eden, 26 January, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940.

Gore-Browne in Northern Rhodesia also welcomed the announcement of Hailey's visit with great enthusiasm. He in fact had been the first person to suggest the idea of a further enquiry by Lord Hailey following the publication of the Bledisloe Report.[145] In his view, no further step could be taken on the subject of amalgamation "which is otherwise so desirable," until the question of native policy in the three territories had been thoroughly investigated. There was, he told MacDonald, "an awful lot of prejudice and sloppy thinking mixed up with this very vital matter."[146]

While the war raged on in North and East Africa, the Rhodesian settlers awaited the outcome of Lord Hailey's mission (he left at the end of January) in the firm belief that his conclusions were merely going to confirm what they had been contending all along, namely, that the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report had grossly over-estimated the differences in the native policies of the three territories, that where differences existed, these were minor and by no means insurmountable and could not, therefore, be regarded as constituting a serious obstacle to immediate amalgamation. Now at last it seemed that the time had come to put to a test the often repeated boast that "Southern Rhodesia can confidently invite scrutiny of her native policy,"[147] without any cause to feel ashamed of her record and without any fear of being found wanting. In the view of Lord Harlech (Ormsby-Gore) the native policy of Southern Rhodesia had been "almost revolutionised by Mr. Huggins" and was "among the most progressive and almost enlightened in Africa...."[148] Indeed, Stanley had enthusiastically welcomed Hailey's visit in the confident belief that "some of the misapprehensions under which our critics labour may be removed eventually by Lord Hailey's report."[149]

---

[145] See his speech in the Legislative Council, 6 June, 1939, col. 460, and his letter to MacDonald, 11 June, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part I.

[146] Gore-Browne to MacDonald, 23 February, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940.

[147] Tawse Jollie, "Greater Rhodesia", United Empire, XXII, (September, 1931), p. 495.

---

[148] Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, vol. 114, 31 July, 1939, col. 723.

[149] Stanley to Machtig, 10 July, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940.

Chapter 6

THE AMALGAMATION ISSUE, 1940-1945.

The abrupt end of the London talks on the Bledisloe Report, due to the outbreak of the war, left several of the issues arising out of the Report hanging in the air. The view had been expressed, however, that although further negotiations had been indefinitely suspended they would be resumed by correspondence "as soon as circumstances permit" which meant, as MacDonald explained to Lord Bledisloe, "as soon as the initial period of stress and strain" caused by the war had passed.[1] The fact that the issue of amalgamation had not, therefore, been "put into cold storage" for the entire duration of the war was particularly gratifying to the Rhodesian settlers. There were fears of course that the war would have an adverse effect on the actual progress towards its achievement but, as East Africa and Rhodesia correctly pointed out, such a conclusion "would be unnecessarily pessimistic." In its view, the war "might, indeed, very well be more favourable than it would otherwise have been, for when discussions are resumed Rhodesia will be able to point to important new services to the Imperial cause."[2] It was generally understood that until Lord Hailey had presented his conclusions on the native policies of the three territories no practical steps could be taken concerning the establishment of the machinery for co-operation between the three territories in which MacDonald had expressed special interest. The vastness of the area included in Lord Hailey's tour, West, East and

---

[1] MacDonald to Bledisloe, 7 September 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45104/1939. Part II.

[2] The editorial, 26 October, 1939.

Central Africa, including Southern Rhodesia, made it abundantly clear that it would be quite some time before his report would be ready.

In the meantime the problem of co-operation between the three territories became more acute from the beginning of 1940 and this meant that decisions had to be taken on some of the issues raised in the Bledisloe Report before there had been any opportunity for their full consideration and without any prior consultation of Parliament. The fact that these decisions had to be taken under the heavy pressure of war in order to meet military requirements greatly compromised the British Government's position with regard to the wider question of amalgamation. For this reason the years 1940 to 1945 may thus be viewed as the turning point in the political relations between the three territories. By the end of 1945 when British colonial policy began to lean heavily towards large regional groupings within the Colonial Empire, significant steps in the direction of closer political union between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland had already been taken, ostensibly in the interest of military requirements and general war demands, to a point where any reversal of the process had become practically impossible.

It is true that amalgamation never actually materialised--after 1948 the demand for amalgamation was finally, if reluctantly, abandoned by the Rhodesian settlers in favour of federation.[3] But the British Government emerged from the war in no position to seriously resist settler pressure for closer political association between the three territories. It finally capitulated in 1953 and sanctioned the creation of the Central African Federation which the settlers accepted as "a good second best" alternative. The outbreak of the war must therefore be seen as the most decisive event in shaping British policy towards the three Central African territories.

---

[3] For an account of how this change came about see Don Taylor, The Rhodesian. The Life of Sir Roy Welensky, (London: Museum Press Ltd., 1955), pp. 103-107; Harry Franklin, Unholy Wedlock The Failure of the Central African Federation, (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), pp. 30-35.

The first important issue that came up for consideration during the first year of the war was the proposal made at the East African Governors' Conference in Nairobi on 1 August, 1940 for the formation of an East African Economic Council. The purpose of the suggested Council was to provide its members with a machinery which could be used for reconciling and resolving inter-territorial differences in cases where the existing arrangements for consultation were considered inadequate. The Council was also expected, "to achieve the speed and decision necessary in time of war" for maintaining under continuous review matters related to production and trade, as well as the disposal of exportable surpluses in order to meet military requirements. The delegates from Kenya, Tanganyika, Uganda and Zanzibar readily accepted this proposal, but those from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland wished to consult their respective Governments first.[4]

After discussing the matter with his advisers, Sir John Maybin reported to the Colonial Office that while Northern Rhodesia would be prepared to assist the Council in all possible ways and would even send representatives to attend its meetings if necessary, the view of the Government was that the territory "should not become member of East African Council as this might impinge on present close and trade relations with Southern Territories."[5] This was followed by the Governor's request for a conference between Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia to consider the possibility of setting up an Economic Council of their own in order to deal with the economic needs of the three territories such as co-ordination of import control and maintenance of supplies.[6] Maybin's proposal received full backing from Sir Donald Mackenzie-Kennedy in Nyasaland, himself a staunch advocate of amalgamation. In his view time and distance made it extremely difficult for Nyasaland to provide material assistance in matters which were the main pre-occupation of the East African Economic Council. At the same time he felt that Nyasaland was not likely to derive much benefit from the decisions of the Council. As he pointed out, "however admirable the concept of a Council representative of all the East African territories, the implementation of a policy based upon it might," in so far as Nyasaland was concerned, "result in nothing but the reiteration of pious aspirations."[7]

---

[4] Sir P. Mitchell, Secretary to the Conference and Governor of Uganda, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 August, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/113/45007/1940.

In the decision by the Government of Northern Rhodesia not to join the East African Economic Council, as well as the Governor's proposal to set up a similar organisation for the three Central African territories instead, may be seen yet another determined effort by the Northern Rhodesian settlers not to allow the territory to be drawn too closely into the orbit of the East African dependencies lest this might hinder amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. "For years past," observed Boyd, "the white unofficial element in the Territory has been desirous of closer economic and trade relationship with Southern Rhodesia and the union of South Africa."[8] All this, of course, was well within the spirit of the Bledisloe Report which had pointed out that "Apart from the question of communications, other economic factors point to the association of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia rather than with East Africa."[9]

---

[5] Maybin to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 September, 1940. Ibid.

[6] Maybin to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 21 September, 1940. Ibid.

[7] Mackenzie-Kennedy to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 26 October, 1940. Ibid.

The second issue of major consideration during the early part of the war was the proposal by the Governor of Nyasaland concerning the subject of co-ordinating the war effort of the three territories which was first brought up at the Conference of the three Governors held at Salisbury on 3rd October. In view of the circumstances of the war Mackenzie-Kennedy felt that the best means of securing co-operation among the three territories and of co-ordinating their war effort was to enlarge the scope of the present Governors' Conference and to set up a small permanent Secretariat at Salisbury. For this purpose, he suggested that the Governors' Conference should be regarded as being in perpetual session even though the attendance of the Governors might only be required at rare intervals.[10]

In presenting this proposal to the Secretary of State, Mackenzie

---

[8] Minute of 7 September, 1940. Ibid.

[9] Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report, (1939), p. 127.

[10] See the enclosure in Mackenzie-Kennedy to Lord Lloyd of Dolobran, 16 November, 1940. "Record of the Proceedings at a Conference, held at Salisbury on the 3rd October, 1940...." P.R.O./C.O./795/113/45007/1940.

Kennedy stated that the time had come when "we should take a further step towards testing how far the two Protectorate Governments can effectively co-operate with the Government of Southern Rhodesia in those matters which are of common and vital interest to us all."[11] The idea of a permanent Secretariat for the Governors' Conference received strong backing from Stanley who saw it as "a useful and ... wholly unobjectionable means" by which co-operation and co-ordination between the three territories "could be introduced forthwith." In doing so, however, he reiterated his firm belief in the urgency of amalgamation. "Personally," he said, "in the light of experience gained since the outbreak of the war, I am more than ever convinced that the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland was and is desirable on Imperial even more than on local grounds."[12]

The proposals of the two Governors presented the Colonial Office with a difficult problem. Sidney Caine, a member of the Colonial Office Economic Department, readily acknowledged the strong economic ties existing between the three territories but felt that the proposal to set up a Central African Economic Council was "primarily a political question."[13] Similarly Boyd also felt that although the proposed Rhodesia-Nyasaland Economic Council was undoubtedly intended as a wartime measure, the real problem lay in that it would be "difficult to terminate the arrangement when peace comes, as the Unofficials in the three territories will almost certainly press for its continuance." He agreed with Caine that the project could be discouraged on political grounds but, in his view, the main consideration was whether in fact a unified body for the three territories for purposes of discussing economic policy, with particular reference to the war in East Africa, would be of any advantage to the British war effort. And on this consideration Boyd felt that Maybin should be allowed to proceed with the arrangement for a conference.[14] There was, Boyd said, "an admitted necessity for closer co-ordination of the war effort of the three countries," and to him this was "the overriding consideration."[15]

---

[11] Mackenzie-Kennedy to Lord Lloyd, 26 October, 1940. Ibid.

[12] Stanley to Machtig, 19 December, 1940. Copy in P.R.O./C.O./795/120/45007/1941.

[13] Minute of 2 October, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/113/45007/1940. Caine later became Director of the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Before a final reply was given to the two Governors, the wider implications of their proposals had to be weighed very carefully. From a closer look at the Governors' proposals, as well as the minutes of the October Governors' Conference in Salisbury, it is evident that what was contemplated was something more ambitious and more elaborate than just a Central African Economic Council and that the war was merely being used as a convenient platform. Mackenzie-Kennedy's despatch of 26 October made it quite clear that his proposal was in reality a constitutional experiment designed to test how far the two Protectorates could effectively co-operate with Southern Rhodesia within the context of the recommendations of the Bledisloe Report. However, when the discussions with Huggins on the Report were abruptly terminated following the outbreak of the war, it was made clear that the British Government could not commit itself to amalgamation before a further investigation into the native policies of the three territories had been undertaken. Hence Lord Hailey's special mission to the Rhodesias early in 1940. Until the question of native policy had been considered, which would not be until Lord Hailey had submitted his findings, it was felt that the proposed conference would have to limit itself to the subject of co-ordination of war effort. Matters involving native policy would have to be excluded from its purview. This was, at least, the view of C. E. Lambert in the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department.[16]

---

[14] Minute of 3 October, 1940. Ibid.

[15] Minute of 27 December, 1940. Ibid.

On the subject of a Standing Governors' Conference proposed by Mackenzie-Kennedy, a clear divergence of views between the Dominions Office and the Colonial Office began to emerge. Even though opinion within the latter office was by no means uniform, there was at least a strong reluctance to go along with this proposal. H. N. Tait, Assistant Secretary in the Dominions Office, took the line that the exclusion of native policy from the scope of the Conference as suggested by Lambert would be impracticable since the question of inter-territorial migration of African labour had always been one of the main topics of discussion at the Governors' Conference. Moreover, he felt that Maybin's proposal fell within the spirit of the Royal Commission Report. "I thought we were all agreed," he said, "that effective machinery for securing as much co-operation as possible between the Territories was desirable." He added that this was also the view of the Bledisloe Report.[17] Lambert, on the other hand, pointed out that while there was indeed general agreement regarding the need for a machinery for co-operation recommended in the Bledisloe Report, his own impression was that its formation was to be deferred until the result of the enquiry into native policy had been received.[18] This view had also been urged by Maybin who felt that the degree and nature of co-ordination of aims between the three territories would depend on the decision on amalgamation which in turn would depend on the decision on native policy.[19] The Colonial Office was in fact very reluctant to see Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland completely breaking their ties with the East African Governors' Conference.[20]

---

[16] Minute of 1 November, 1940. Ibid.

[17] Minute of 7 November, 1940. Ibid. Since the outbreak of the war the Dominions Office as a whole suddenly became more sympathetic towards a more formal association between Southern Rhodesia and the two northern Protectorates.

The debate on the two Governors' proposals dragged on until the middle of 1941. D. C. Watherston, temporary secondment to the East African Department of the Colonial Office, saw no reason why the Secretary of State should refuse to grant his approval to a scheme which was aimed at co-ordinating the war effort of the three territories. As he pointed out,

> Conditions have changed since the decision, taken by the S. of S. a year ago, to defer further consideration of the recommendation in the Bledisloe Report, that an Inter-Territorial Council should be set up, until Lord Hailey's report of native policy in Southern Rhodesia becomes available. War requirements are now paramount and are likely to be increasingly so during the coming year. That aspect of the matter must I think, override all others.

In his view the Secretary of State could signify his approval of the

---

[18] Minute of 12 November, 1940. Ibid.

[19] Maybin to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1 September, 1939. P.R.O./C.O./795/108/45007/1939. Part II.

[20] See "Note by Mr. Edwards", a member of the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department, 1 November, 1940. P.R.O./C.O./795/113/45007/1940.

Governors' proposals, but stipulate at the same time that "while native labour problems will undoubtedly continue to call for discussion, native policy proper should not be discussed." Concerning the view that if the plan turned out to be a success it would be difficult to abandon once the war was over unless a still closer form of co-operation between the three territories were devised, Watherston pointed out that "it could be specifically laid down that the arrangement was an experiment primarily for the co-ordination of the war effort and that it would be liable to review at the end of the war."[21]

To A. J. Dawe, an Assistant Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, it was obvious that the machinery proposed by Mackenzie-Kennedy was intended "to forward the idea of closer union between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland", and for this reason he considered it "dangerous". In view of the fact that the Government had not yet come to a decision regarding "the wide issues of future policy" indicated in the Bledisloe Report, Dawe felt that no step ought to be taken which might tend "to prejudice this matter of high policy" until Lord Hailey's report had been received. "It is," he said, "a controversial one and rouses a good deal of feeling in certain quarters." Like Watherston, he felt that it should be stipulated from the start that the new Conference machinery was to be "regarded as designed simply for the temporary object of furthering war effort and for no wider purpose."[22]

Throughout this rather tedious debate over the two proposals for the establishment of a Central Economic Council and a Standing

---

[21] Minute of 10 December, 1940. Ibid.

[22] Minute of 3 January, 1941. Ibid.

Governors' Conference equipped with a permanent Secretariat, the Dominions Office advisers expressed themselves in favour of outright acceptance. Both Machtig and Tait were astonished when they were informed at a meeting of 8 January held in Sir Cosmo Parkinson's room, that Lord Lloyd[23] "disliked the proposal for a Standing Governors' Conference at Salisbury." The reason for his objection was that

> there was a very real danger that the South African Dutch element in Southern Rhodesia, which was steadily increasing year by year, might in time gain political control in the Colony, in which case absorption by the Union of South Africa would be the inevitable outcome

and that any proposals for closer co-operation between the two northern Protectorates and Southern Rhodesia ought, therefore, to be treated with great circumspection.[24] The question requiring consideration was whether the present proposals could be rejected outright without giving considerable offence to the Government of Southern Rhodesia and public opinion in the Colony.

To Machtig and Tait Lord Lloyd's observation came as a complete surprise. In their view the position which the Dominions Office was likely to take was that the outright rejection of the present proposals would be "extremely disconcerting to Mr. Huggins and his Government more particularly as the Colony had made, and was making, such an outstanding contribution to the Empire's war effort." Like other members of the British Empire, Southern Rhodesia immediately rallied behind Great Britain at the outbreak of the war. Southern Rhodesians, both black and white, fought in the East and North African campaigns. Southern Rhodesia's most invaluable contribution to the British war effort, however, and one that greatly endeared her to the Dominions Office, was the setting up of the Royal Air Force training school at Belvedere, near Salisbury, which opened in 1940. It was operated jointly with the British Air Ministry. Southern Rhodesia's location away from the theatre of war and her clear skies proved ideal for the project. "The air training scheme in fact formed Southern Rhodesia's greatest individual contribution to the war."[25]

---

[23] Secretary of State for the Colonies from May 1940 until his death on 4 February, 1941.

[24] For the proceedings of this meeting see Boyd's minute of 8 January, 1941. Ibid.

It was finally agreed that the Colonial Office should send an interim communication to the two northern Governors indicating that the whole question was still under consideration, and that the agreement reached at Salisbury raised political issues closely related to those discussed in the Bledisloe Report. Both Governors were to be reminded that no decision had been reached yet on those issues and that it was important that they should not be prejudiced in any way by decisions taken to meet wartime requirements. They were also to be told that it was likely to be some time before a decision on their proposals could be reached. For its own part, the Dominions Office was asked to consider the whole question in the light of Lord Lloyd's observations and advise whether from their standpoint there were any serious objections to dropping the plan for a Standing Governors' Conference. If this should be the case, the best policy would be to play for time and delay a decision in the hope that a successful outcome of the present campaign in North Africa might remove the necessity of creating such an elaborate machinery for co-ordinating war effort among the three territories as was being suggested.[26]

---

[25] Gann and Gelfand, op. cit., p. 153.

In transmitting the conclusions of the meeting to the two Governors, it was pointed out that the agreement reached at the Salisbury Conference appeared "to have gone a good deal beyond" what the Secretary of State had contemplated. Certain passages in the Nyasaland despatch of 26 October seemed to indicate that the proposals were "being conceived as a further step towards the establishment of closer political relations between the three countries of the kind contemplated in the Royal Commission Report." The question of closer political relations between the three territories, the two Governors were informed, "gives rise to political controversy here."[27] In their joint reply the two Governors, while expressing full appreciation of the points raised in the Secretary of State's communication, emphasised the need for a Secretariat in order to deal with wartime economic problems which they said were becoming more difficult to handle. They also pointed to the need for a supply Board for the three territories similar to the one already in existence among the four East African territories and they felt that the proposed Salisbury Secretariat could also be entrusted with this responsibility. If the two Protectorates were not joined to some large supply organisation, they argued, there was a serious danger of their supply needs not being met. "We consider this wartime association with Southern Rhodesia essential," pleaded the two Governors,

---

[26] P.R.O./C.O./795/113/45007/1940.

[27] Secretary of State for the Colonies to Maybin and Mackenzie-Kennedy, 9 January, 1941. Ibid. This was sent through the Governor of Kenya in Nairobi where the two Governors were attending a meeting of the East African Governors' Conference.

"and would urge that early authority be given to proceed with it."[28]

Sir H. Moore, the Secretary of the East African Governors' Conference and Governor of Kenya, supported the two Governors. He pointed out that the growth of South African influence in the East African territories during the war could best be countered by fostering closest co-operation in both administrative and economic areas between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland, on the one hand, and Tanganyika, Kenya and Uganda, on the other, "without raising political issues which might be embarrassing to H.M.G."[29] There was still skepticism within the Colonial Office regarding the two Governors' proposals, even after the reception of this latest communication which to Boyd seemed to indicate that the new machinery was "now urged purely on economic and military grounds." People like A. C. T. Edwards in the Tanganyika and Somaliland Department, and Caine were still wary about the project. In Caine's view the wartime economic problems of the two Protectorates were not as pressing as those of most other dependencies and he was also uncertain as to what extent these problems could be described as Central African. He was in fact very doubtful whether there was any common factor between the Protectorates and Southern Rhodesia which was not also common with the East African territories. The dilemma facing the Colonial Office was whether or not a proposal for which there seemed to be some justification on economic grounds should be accepted even though there was a strong possibility that it might be used as a spring-board for political union with Southern Rhodesia. "I should certainly not actively support the proposed joint economic body," Caine stated, "though I shall not oppose it on economic grounds."[30]

---

[28] Acting Governor, Nyasaland, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 22 January, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/120/45007/1941.

[29] See Watherston's note, "Rhodesias-Nyasaland Governors' Conference", dated 28 January, 1941. Ibid.

Even on military grounds the general view in the Colonial Office was that the existing arrangement by which Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were included in the East African Command was most adequate and that co-operation with Southern Rhodesia could still be carried out by means of ad hoc consultations. Calder saw no reason why the two Protectorates could not advantageously participate as full members of the East African Governors' Conference and the East African Economic Council for the duration of the war. "The opposition," he observed, "comes from Sir Donald Mackenzie, Sir Herbert Stanley and others, who for political reasons are anxious for some form of union of the three southern territories."[31] In Dawe's view, the recent proposal of the two Governors for a supplies Board seemed to weaken rather than strengthen the case for a Standing Governors' Conference as a wartime measure since Provision Offices were now being established in each of the African Commands in order to deal with questions of supply. Besides, Dawe thought that the conclusion of the war in East Africa might "be a good deal nearer now than was expected at the time when the new Conference idea was mooted." He was particularly concerned about the political aspects of the Governors' proposals:

> The political importance of these considerations lies in the fact that we were proposing to justify the establishment of the Conference on the ground that it is a practical, limited war-time expedient, should it be criticized by those political elements in this

---

[30] Minute of 25 January, 1941. Ibid.

[31] Minute of 26 January, 1941. Ibid.

> country which are opposed to closer union on the ground that the step prejudices the decision on the Bledisloe Report before there has been any announcement of Government policy or any opportunity for debate in Parliament.[32]

In taking this stand the Colonial Office would, however, have to contend with mounting pressure from Huggins and the Dominions Office for the creation of the new machinery.

Huggins was already showing signs of impatience and even irritation at the long delay by the Colonial Office in signifying their decision on the proposals of the two Northern Governors which had been submitted four months before. As Stanley pointed out,

> My Prime Minister cannot conceive that any serious objection could be seen to a proposal so obviously serviceable for the purpose of the war and conformable moreover with the declared policy of His Majesty's Government in promoting co-operation between the territories affected.

Huggins then requested the Dominions Office to make representations on behalf of his Government to Lord Moyne, the new Secretary of State for the Colonies, "that desired approval may now be given."[33] The Dominions Office's stand on this issue was clearly stated in a Memorandum written by Tait[34] which set out to demonstrate that since 1931 successive British Governments had consistently sought to bring about closer co-operation between the three territories. Tait also pointed out that in the announcement of the appointment of the Royal Commission and in its terms of reference special stress was laid on the possibility of promoting closer "co-operation or association" between the three territories. He referred to the machinery recommended by the Commission Report designed to achieve this goal as well as the unanimous view of the Commissioners concerning the need for close and continuous co-ordination of effort between the three territories in certain areas of their activity. Lastly, he pointed to the tentative "Draft Formula" on the Report which clearly acknowledged the advantages of eventual amalgamation although refraining from actually accepting the principle of amalgamation.

---

[32] Minute of 26 February, 1941. Ibid.

[33] Governor of Southern Rhodesia to the Dominions Office, 28 February, 1941. Ibid.

[34] "Memo by D.O." February, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1941.

To Tait it thus seemed "reasonable to regard the proposal [for a Standing Conference] as arising out of the circumstances of the war and not as an attempt to give effect to anything in the Report of the Bledisloe Commission." Indeed, he was almost certain that the Southern Rhodesian Government attached no political significance to the proposal and would, in any case, view it "as a very meagre implementation of anything in the Report of the Royal Commission." At the same time Tait was seriously concerned about the effect which an outright rejection of the proposal would have on Southern Rhodesia particularly if it were based on the ground that it involved a greater degree of co-operation between the three territories than the British Government were prepared to accept. In such a case, he said, the Southern Rhodesian Government might then regard this as indicating

> a complete withdrawal from the undertaking given as far back as 1931 to facilitate co-operation between the Territories, and also as a disheartening outcome of the Report of the Royal Commission and the somewhat encouraging attitude shown towards Sir G. Huggins by United Kingdom Ministers during the talks with him in the summer of 1939.

In his view the main issue was not amalgamation but whether or not the "moderate degree of further co-operation between the Territories" embodied in Mackenzie-Kennedy's proposal could be said to involve "any real danger or serious threat."

From Tait's Memorandum it is evident that the Dominions Office was anxious to see that nothing was done to alienate the Rhodesian settlers and was willing to authorise the Standing Council as an act of appeasement pending a final decision on amalgamation. The Dominions Office view, Tait said, was that

> it is difficult to take a completely uncompromising line where there is a strongly expressed view on the part of an oversea Government like Southern Rhodesia, which in this case finds considerable support amongst the European community in Northern Rhodesia, and that an offer to facilitate co-operation is a convenient form of at least apparent compromise which gives nothing of substance away.[35]

To the Dominions Office the intransigent attitude of the Colonial Office seemed most illogical in view of the fact that since 1931 the British Government had clearly committed itself to a policy of furthering closer co-operation between the two Rhodesias. Lord Cranborne, Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs,[36] expressed himself in complete agreement with the views contained in Tait's Memorandum and wished the Colonial Office to be informed that he would be in favour of setting up the proposed Secretariat on condition that it was regarded as a purely wartime arrangement designed to ensure co-operation during the war and provided it was not represented as a step towards the implementation of the Bledisloe Report.[37]

---

[35] *Ibid*.

[36] October 1940 to February 1942 and again from September 1943 to August 1945. For a brief period from February to November 1942 he was Secretary of State for the Colonies.

[37] Machtig's minute of 21 February, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/120/45007/1941.

At this point the Colonial Office decided to send out another communication to the two northern Governors in which they were asked to justify the necessity for the creation of the suggested Central African Supplies Board.[38] Once more their replies failed to satisfy the Colonial Office. Mackenzie-Kennedy admitted that there was no real necessity for a Central African Supplies Board but that since Southern Rhodesia proposed to maintain a separate local Provision Office and War Supplies Committee of her own, Nyasaland would prefer to be closely associated with this arrangement. He also expressed his general dissatisfaction with the existing arrangements in dealing with wartime economic issues. The setting up of a permanent organisation for the three territories, he said, would have a "psychological effect" on Nyasaland since "we shall be more readily listened to as partners than as occasional supplicants." Furthermore, Mackenzie-Kennedy felt that there was a strong need for permanent liaison between Zomba, Lusaka and Salisbury to replace the "present cumbersome triangular exchanges for day-to-day consideration of questions" affecting all the three territories. He vigorously denied the view that their proposals were "a preliminary to political amalgamation."[39]

Within the Colonial Office Boyd expressed full agreement with Mackenzie-Kennedy's last point and stated that this was "by far the strongest argument which has yet been brought to bear for the establishment of permanent consultative machinery between the Rhodesias and

---

[38] Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia, 28 February, 1941. Repeated to the Governor of Nyasaland. Ibid.

[39] Mackenzie-Kennedy to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 7 March, 1941. Ibid.

Nyasaland." At the same time he acknowledged "the obvious danger that once the permanent Secretariat has been set up it would be virtually impossible to terminate it at the end of the war." He, however, agreed with Lambert's suggestion that some further discussion between the three Governors should be allowed on the matter. Tait, however, was not too pleased with this last proposal. In his view since Southern Rhodesian Government had already pressed for the acceptance of the proposed Secretariat as an urgent matter "we ought to indicate forthwith that we have no objection in principle ... provided the three Govts. are still satisfied that the arrangement will serve a useful war time purpose." He felt that if acceptance were to be delayed until the three Governors had met, this might cause "some irritation" to Southern Rhodesia.[40]

To this argument the Colonial Office gave in. Dawe agreed that a further meeting between the three Governors was pointless, but judging from the latest communications from the two northern Governors he felt that the wartime argument was "wearing rather thin and that it would be difficult to convince the opponents of amalgamation that the Conference machinery, if established, is not an insidious and tendencious move in the directions of unification."[41] Certainly the reference to the subject of "re-employment of military personnel after the war" in Maybin's telegram[42] as well as to "permanent liaison" in Mackenzie-Kennedy's seemed to indicate that what was contemplated was something more ambitious than just a wartime machinery.

---

[40] Minute of 13 March, 1941. Ibid.

[41] Minute of 14 March, 1941. Ibid.

[42] Maybin to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 6 March, 1941. Ibid.

G. H. Hall, Parliamentary Under-Secretary in the Colonial Office, May 1940 to February 1942, thought it best for the Colonial Office not to raise any further objections to the setting up of the Secretariat, subject to the conditions already indicated by Lord Cranborne. He was still, however, unhappy about the whole arrangement relative to the broader issue of amalgamation:

> I must confess, however, that I am somewhat apprehensive on the question of amalgamation. There are many problems common to all three territories, particularly in war time, but in my view the fundamental difference of treatment, as between Southern Rhodesia on the one hand, and Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland on the other, of the question of native labour policy, would in itself make political amalgamation impossible.[43]

This line of action received full approval from Lord Moyne who pointed out that "Unless and until a permanent satisfactory labour policy can be guaranteed for Northern Rhodesia we must in no way be committed to amalgamation." Even if the Secretariat were to be eventually replaced by some organisation similar to that of the East African Governors' Conference, he was confident that this would not necessarily lead to political union any more than the East African Governors' Conference had. Besides, liaison with the latter organisation would need to be maintained.

On 2 April approval "in principle" was accordingly given to the establishment of a Standing Governors' Conference equipped with a Secretariat but only "for the limited purpose of securing more effective co-ordination of the war effort of the three territories." This was also subject to further consultations between the three Governments to determine whether there was indeed "sufficient need from a practical point of view of this further piece of machinery," a rather pointless stipulation seeing that all the three Governments had already expressed an urgent need for it. The point was strongly emphasised that the new machinery was to be regarded purely "as an experiment necessitated by existing war conditions" and was to be reviewed once these conditions ceased to exist. While the two Governors were given wide discretion in deciding on matters that could be brought before the Conference, they were required to consult the Secretary of State on all matters of policy before notice of ratification of agreements reached at the Conference was given to Southern Rhodesia. It was also laid down that the new machinery was not to be allowed to affect the existing contacts between the two Protectorates and the East African dependencies.[44]

---

[43] Minute of 21 March, 1941. Ibid.

However, just when it appeared that the whole issue of the Standing Governors' Conference had finally been settled a telegram from W. M. Logan, the Officer Administering the Government in Northern Rhodesia,[45] arrived expressing disagreement with the view that a Secretariat was needed. According to Logan, just before his death Maybin had written a long minute pointing out that a permanent Secretariat was unnecessary and that the existing machinery was adequate to handle all wartime activities. Logan further stated that at the last Governors' Conference held in Salisbury (7 May) he had expressed these views but had been completely out-gunned by the other members.[46]

An attempt by the Colonial Office to delay final approval for the creation of the new machinery on the basis of Logan's communication was successfully resisted by the Dominions Office. From the point of view of British relations with Southern Rhodesia, Tait felt "it would be awkward to continue to raise difficulties about the proposal for a Secretariat." He was also doubtful ~~as to~~ whether there was any sufficient reason for doing so "even if it is not, from the purely practical point of view, the best scheme that could be devised."[47] Both Dawe and Sir Cosmo Parkinson, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, quickly realised the futility of trying at this late stage to prevent the establishment of the new organisation and were quite resigned to this fact. "However much we try to lay it down that the machinery is to be regarded only as a war-time measure," Dawe pointed out, "I am quite confident that once a Secretariat is set up the Conference will become a permanent feature of the landscape."[48] The fact that the new machinery was being established mainly to appease Southern Rhodesia was particularly rankling to Parkinson. "I believe we shall be driven to set up this Governors' Conference Secretariat in order to placate S. Rhodesia, if for no other reason."[49]

---

[44] Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 2 April, 1941. Ibid.

[45] He assumed this position following the sudden death of Maybin on 9 April.

[46] Officer Administering the Government, Northern Rhodesia, to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 20 May, 1941. Ibid.

It was finally decided to grant formal approval to the setting up of the Secretariat even though Caine still saw no real justification for it. "I suppose we must agree but it still seems to me extraordinarily difficult to extract from any of the local authorities concerned any clear picture of just what co-ordination of supplies is going to amount to."[50] The most bitter person of all about the new arrangement was Dawe whose fulmination against the scheme and those behind it shows how fully he understood its full political implications. He denounced Mackenzie-Kennedy as "an out-and-out advocate of amalgamation" and his Deputy, K. L. Hall, as "very much tarred with the same brush."

---

[47] Minute of 23 May, 1941. Ibid.

[48] Minute of 26 May, 1941. Ibid.

[49] Minute of 26 May, 1941. Ibid. Tait, however, strongly denied the view that the new arrangement was being set up in order to "placate" Southern Rhodesia.

> I quite see that we may have to swallow it: but I find it very unpalatable. I believe that Mr. Logan is right: that there is no need for a permanent Secretariat on administrative merits: and that the whole thing is really a political and tendencious move. If we are going to take the line of least resistance with Southern Rhodesia over this let us do it with our eyes open. It is idle to pretend that if we set up a permanent Secretariat it will be a mere war-time arrangement. We may attach that stipulation but it can be nothing more than a paper figment. Once this Secretariat gets going it will flourish like a green bay tree. It will be a powerful lever in the hands of Southern Rhodesia for imposing Southern Rhodesian ideas upon Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland. If we feel that we must placate Southern Rhodesia now we shall have to go on placating over innumerable day-to-day questions of administration which will arise once the permanent machinery is established.

Taking a long view of the whole issue, and with an amazing clarity of vision, Dawe felt that this new development was not going to work to the benefit of the Africans or even of British interests.[51] Dawe was also concerned about the criticism which the new scheme was certain to arouse in Parliament, particularly from the "left wing" element, in view of the earlier undertaking given by the Government not to take any action on amalgamation without consulting the House. "But if we sell the pass by unobtrusively setting up this permanent Secretariat shall we not," he asked, "be exposed to the criticism that we are not playing fair with Parliament?"

---

[50] Minute of 7 June, 1941. Ibid.

[51] Minute of 10 June, 1941. Ibid. "I think it is fairly clear that this process is not going to redound to the interest of the natives," he said, "and it is very dubious whether, on a long-term view, it is going to serve British interests in Africa."

The Dominions Office countered these remarks by pointing out that the proposals for a Standing Governors' Conference and a Secretariat originated not with Southern Rhodesia but with the Governor of Nyasaland even though Huggins had naturally welcomed them. In their view the British Government was already committed by the statement of 1931 to a policy of facilitating co-operation between the three territories and had implicitly indicated its readiness to consider further means of co-operation by appointing the Royal Commission of 1938. Moreover, a Governors' Conference for the three Territories was already in existence and there seemed no reasons to fear that the creation of a permanent Secretariat would necessarily lead to eventual amalgamation as the East African Governors' Conference had shown. Writing from a Dominions Office point of view, Machtig felt that "having got so far as we have in the direction of approving this proposal, we ought now not to withdraw from it."[52]

On 23 June the Colonial Office finally gave its formal approval to the proposals, but did so grudgingly. It was pointed out that the arrangement was to be reviewed within a period of six months after the end of the war.[53] Even Lord Cranborne was under no illusions regarding the significance of this step. While insisting that the Secretariat was to be viewed only as a wartime measure, he pointed out to his advisers that "we must recognise in our minds that once the organisation is set up it will probably be impossible to jettison it directly the war is over." By including a provision for its review, however, he felt "we shall keep our hands free to deal as we think best with the problem after the war."[54]

---

[52] Minute of 11 June, 1941. Ibid.

[53] Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Nyasaland, 23 June, 1941 and repeated to the Officer Administering the Government of Northern Rhodesia. Ibid.

The Nyasaland, Northern and Southern Rhodesia Territorial Conference was inaugurated on 18 August 1941. Hall gave up his position as Nyasaland's Chief Secretary to become the Secretary for the new organisation. The cost of running the Conference was proportionately distributed among the three territories with Southern Rhodesia shouldering 52 per cent of the burden, Northern Rhodesia 28 per cent, and Nyasaland 20 per cent. MacKenzie-Kennedy explained the somewhat high share of the cost borne by Nyasaland by pointing out that of the three territories Nyasaland stood "to gain considerably" from the new organisation and he thought it "only proper" that she "should bear a rather higher proportion than may at first sight seem fair."[55]

* *

No sooner had the new Conference been set up than there were attempts to extend its functions beyond those originally contemplated. Stanley lost no time in pressing for its use in dealing with a variety of subjects which as he himself stated "could not be represented as having, in present circumstances, a bearing of some kind on our war-effort," and he hoped that the Secretary of State for the Colonies would not raise any objections to this. Although the Conference Secretariat had been created mainly for the purpose of "securing more effective co-ordination of the war effort of the three Territories," Stanley pointed out that "such a literal interpretation could hardly have been contemplated when the instructions were drafted," and he referred specifically to a recent proposal to convene a meeting of the Directors of Native Education in the three territories to discuss the subject of African education. As he stated to Machtig,

---

[54] Minute of 17 June, 1941. Ibid.

[55] Mackenzie-Kennedy to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 July, 1941. Ibid.

> We quite recognize that the establishment of the Secretariat has been sanctioned only as an experiment for the duration of the war, and its continuance thereafter has not been promised, but while it is in existence, there would seem to be nothing to be gained, and something to be lost, by a refusal to allow us to make full use of it for purposes arising out of, or incidental to, our inter-territorial Conferences themselves. Alternatively we may find ourselves landed in a series of hairsplitting arguments as to whether this or that subject can by any stretch of definition be regarded as connected with some purpose of securing more effective co-ordination of the war-effort of the three Territories.[56]

That Stanley would try to transform the Conference Secretariat into a permanent arrangement was perhaps not unexpected, but that he should do so soon after its establishment and while the Colonial Office was still in a surly mood about the whole affair, can be explained by the fact that his term of office was drawing to a close and he had to act in a hurry in order to effect the change.

As was to be expected, the Colonial Office advisers were not too pleased with Stanley's manoeuvres. There was still a large number of the "unconverted" in the Department. Even after the inauguration of the new Conference Secretariat, J. W. Davies was still unable to see any economic merits of the new arrangement.[57] Although Lambert was willing to concede that matters related to manpower and inter-territorial communications in their wartime aspects, could legitimately be dealt with by the Secretariat, he was at a loss as to how questions of native education could be said to be within the scope of an organisation which had been established for the limited purpose of co-ordinating war effort.[58] To Dawe, Stanley's letter merely helped to confirm his expressed fears regarding the political implications of the new machinery. "We have always foreseen," he wrote, "that once this plant was established in the soil every effort would be made to nourish and cultivate it to amalgamationist ideas." He was particularly concerned about the reaction of Parliament if it leaked out that the Government had knowingly allowed the Conference to expand beyond its original purpose. For this reason he felt that the Colonial Office should adhere to the conditions that had been laid down when the Conference Secretariat was sanctioned.[59]

---

[56] Stanley to Machtig, 10 November, 1941. See also his previous letter to Machtig dated 8 November, 1941. Ibid.

The Dominions Office, on the other hand, adopted a sympathetic attitude towards Stanley's view. The Secretariat, argued Tait, was within the spirit of the British Government's policy of promoting closer co-operation between the three territories. "I have always felt therefore that we were on somewhat weak ground in making difficulties over the scheme," he declared, "and I should have preferred if possible to accept the view expressed in Sir Herbert Stanley's letter." Although the war was the immediate reason for the establishment of the Secretariat, Tait did not think the Secretariat should be debarred from dealing with matters which had formed the subject of discussion between the three Governments prior to the war.[60] C. W. Dixon, another member of the Dominions Office, also felt that in adopting a restrictive policy towards the Secretariat the Government would not be taking up "a very dignified position." Besides, it might look as though the Government regarded the case against amalgamation as very weak if it had to resort to an expedient of this kind in order to prevent it. Parliament, he said, could be told that "if there is a piece of machinery which can be used for a purpose, there is sometimes advantage in using it for that purpose even if it is not the purpose for which the machinery was intended."[61]

---

[57] Minute of 7 September, 1941. Ibid. He was a member of the Economic Department in the Colonial Office.

[58] Minute of 7 January, 1942. Ibid.

[59] Minute of 15 January, 1942. Ibid.

On this point, however, Lord Cranborne completely disagreed with his advisers. His Parliamentary conscience was deeply outraged by Dixon's remarks:

> We have made it quite clear in Parliament that the functions of the Secretariat were to be limited to questions connected with the conduct of war. How is it possible to include education in this category? It is suggested that we shall look undignified if we refuse to agree to this extension. Why? We have given an assurance to Parliament. I see nothing undignified about standing by our assurance. It might of course be argued that no one in this country would find out what we had done. That is quite possible. But it would not alter the fact that we should have given an assurance and then gone back on it, hoping that it wouldn't be found out. I cannot feel that that would be a very dignified or indeed justifiable position for us to take up.

In his view it was of utmost importance not to do anything which might be construed as prejudicing the ultimate solution of the more delicate problem of the amalgamation of the three territories. This, he said, could be explained to Huggins without concealing anything "but explaining to him the difficult situation in which we are placed by our assurance."[62]

---

[60] Minute of 24 January, 1942. Ibid.

[61] Minute of 24 January, 1942. Ibid.

In the end instructions were sent to the three Central African Governors to exclude from their discussions any matters of joint interest which were not related to their war effort.[63] This, however, was not the end of the controversy regarding the jurisdiction of the Conference Secretariat. It erupted again when Sir Edmund Richards, the new Governor of Nyasaland, submitted to the Colonial Office the agenda for the Conference meeting which was due to meet in Salisbury on 3 March, 1943. The two items which the Colonial Office was not too happy about referred to postwar development of aviation and the establishment of secondary industries. After another tiresome round of consultation between the two Departments and exchange of correspondence with the Governors, both items were finally deleted from the agenda much to the chagrin of the Dominions Office's advisers.

The significance of the establishment of the Conference Secretariat has generally been ignored by the historians of this period.[64]

---

[62] Minute of 10 February, 1942. Ibid.

[63] Dominions Office to Sir Evelyn Baring (Governor of Southern Rhodesia, 1942 to 1944), 20 February, 1942, Secretary of State for the Colonies to Sir John Waddington (Northern Rhodesia) and Mackenzie-Kennedy, 2 March, 1942. Ibid.

[64] Gann mentions it briefly in his book, A History of Northern Rhodesia, pp. 353-4 and Rotberg, The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa, does not refer to it all.

More attention has been devoted to the Central African Council which was formed in 1945 to replace it. However, the importance of this event can hardly be exaggerated. The intensity of the debate between the Dominions and the Colonial Offices alone indicates quite clearly that there was more at stake than just the question of the co-ordination of wartime effort. The discussion surrounding the establishment of the Secretariat marked the first clear conflict of views between the two Departments since the subject of closer union between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland had come up for consideration during the 1930's. Following the outbreak of the war in 1939 the Dominions Office became more sympathetic towards closer association of the three territories and was also eager to appease Huggins and the Southern Rhodesian settlers.[65]

Until the appointment of Colonel Oliver Stanley as Secretary of State for the Colonies in November 1942, the Colonial Office made gallant but vain efforts to resist the Dominions Office pressure for a more formal association between the three territories. However, it found itself in a very weak position since it had always accepted the principle of closer co-operation between the two Rhodesias without clearly defining the limits within which such co-operation should go. With the establishment of the Conference Secretariat the defences of the Colonial Office had now been breached and it became only a question of time and circumstances before more pressure was applied by the Rhodesian settlers in the direction of closer political association between the three territories.

* *

While the question of the Conference Secretariat was still under consideration the Northern Rhodesian Unofficial Members made a determined bid to revive the issue of amalgamation, lest the war should be made a convenient excuse to pigeonhole it. In spite of the constitutional reforms granted in 1938 which Gore-Browne later described as "the first milestone on the road to self-government,"[66] most of them remained completely unappeased. The constitutional gains made by the Northern Rhodesian settlers during the war are very impressive indeed. The war "strengthened the settlers' general political position, for the Europeans' willing co-operation became essential for the successful mobilization of the country's resources."[67] Besides her contribution of fighting men in the military campaigns in East Africa, the Middle East and Burma, Northern Rhodesia became extremely valuable to the Allied war effort because of her copper production.

---

[65] Gann, _A History of Northern Rhodesia_, p. 353.

Several of the Northern Rhodesian Unofficial Members were given responsible administrative positions in the Government during the war. Hugh K. McKee, a businessman and Member for the Midland Electoral Area since 1940, was appointed Director of Civil Supplies which placed him in charge of the production and distribution of essential supplies. Thomas S. Page, a cotton and tobacco farmer in the Fort Jameson area and Member for the Eastern Electoral Area, (like Moore and Welensky, he had left school at the age of fourteen) was given the post of Price Controller. Gore-Browne became Director of War Evacuees, a position which involved supervising and administering the construction of temporary camps for European refugees, mainly Polish, who had been brought to Northern Rhodesia while permanent settlement was being sought elsehwere. Welensky was appointed to the important position of Director of Manpower which brought him into direct confrontation with the militant leaders of the Northern Rhodesian Mine Workers' Union.[68]

---

[66] "Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia Twenty Years Ago", The Northern Rhodesia Journal, vol. II, (1954), p. 42.

[67] Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 346.

In 1939 three Unofficial Members were admitted to the Executive Council as well as to the newly created Budget Committee in 1940 whose function was to assist in the preparation of the budget. In 1942 Gore-Browne and Welensky were invited to join the War Committee set up in that year which acted as a sort of a 'War Cabinet'. Even though most of these positions were only for the duration of the war, their significance can hardly be underestimated. Thus by the end of 1951 one writer was able to state that "In Northern Rhodesia, where one might expect that the writ of the Colonial Office would still run, practical power has been given to the unofficial members of the Legislature."[69] The war also strengthened the position of the white miners on the Copper Belt. Their strike in 1940 ended quickly with nearly all their wage demands being granted. (The African miners who followed immediately with a strike of their own gained only minor concessions). In 1941 the Mine Workers' Union secured, with the approval of the Colonial Office, an agreement to a 'closed shop' from the Management. This involved the exclusion from employment in the mines of any recruits who did not join the Union. Other concessions included the agreement by the Management not to 'dilute' mine labour by the use of Africans without consultation with the leaders of the Union. The white miners who had joined the war were also guaranteed the security of their jobs on their return to civilian life.

---

[68] Some of these, like Christian Schalk Willem Maeyer and Jacobus Petrus Theunissen, were openly sympathetic towards the Ossewabrandwag, a semi-secret pro-Nazi Afrikaner movement in South Africa for whose membership the present Prime Minister of South Africa, John Vorster, was once interned by Smuts. Both were later deported from the territory.

[69] Rodney Grey, "Central Africa--White or Black?" International Journal, vol. vii, (Winter, 1951-1952), p. 34.

In spite of these constitutional gains, amalgamation remained paramount on the Northern Rhodesians settlers' minds. Gore-Browne expressed the hope that the war would not be allowed to afford an excuse for a delay in considering the major issues facing the territory, one of these being amalgamation. To the Europeans amalgamation was seen as a panacea for all their problems, yet Gore-Browne was quick to point out that Africans were still strongly opposed to it and that any attempts to discount their opposition "would be humbug". The Africans, he said, feared amalgamation for the same reasons that the Europeans wanted it, and seeing some of the things that were being said and written in favour of amalgamation he felt there were good grounds for their fears.[70]

Questions were also brought up in the Legislative Council regarding the British Government's decision on the Bledisloe Report. The old ploy of coupling the demand for amalganation with requests for further constitutional concessions was also revived.[71] A new complication in the Northern Rhodesian settler political scene was the formation of the Labour Party by Welensky in 1941[72] whose supporters were described by the Acting Governor as "in the main rabid adherents of the

---

[70] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 16 January, 1940, cols. 33-36.

[71] See Maybin to Lord Lloyd, 21 January, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1941. For the Unofficial Members' Memorandum of 22 March, 1941 dealing with their constitutional demands see the enclosure in Logan to Lord Lloyd, 17 May, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/124/45170/1/1941-43.

[72] Allighan, op. cit., pp. 143-44; Taylor, op. cit., pp. 58-9.

Southern Rhodesian Native policy in regard to labour."[73] The amalgamation of the two Rhodesias was given first priority in the party's programme and it was generally expected that the Labour Party would capture several seats in the general elections slated for August 1941--in fact, it won all the five seats it contested. There was now a general fear in the Colonial Office that the new party was likely to constitute "a very troublesome element in Northern Rhodesia" and it was felt that the best way of "taming Mr. Welensky" was to give him increased responsibility.[74] This was done by appointing him a member of the War Committee.

The Northern Rhodesian Elected Members were now determined not to let the British Government defer the question of amalgamation indefinitely. "We won't let them," declared Captain A. Smith, Member for the Nkana Electoral Area, "it is an election matter and we will go to the country once again at the following election."[75] From the Colonial Office's view a statement on amalgamation was not yet possible until after Lord Hailey's report on the native policies in the three territories had been received. Although Lord Hailey had already completed his investigation his report had been delayed due to the fact that only a fortnight after his return from Africa he had been sent on another mission to the Belgian Congo.[76] It was generally felt that wartime was hardly a convenient time to make a decision on such an important matter. Raising the issue at this time, it was feared, might give an impression that the Government had already accepted amalgamation in principle.[77] Instructions were accordingly sent to the Governor asking him to adopt "a temporizing attitude" towards the Unofficial Members based on previous public statements issued by the British Government on the matter since the outbreak of the war, should the subject come up again in the Legislative Council.[78]

---

[73] Logan to Lord Lloyd, 17 May, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./124/45170/1/1941-43.

[74] Minute by Edwards, 27 June, 1941. Ibid.

[75] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 11 March 1941, col. 31.

[76] See Frederick Pedler, "The Contribution of Lord Hailey to Africa", African Affairs, vol. 69, (July, 1970), p. 271.

As in 1930, it was apparent from this reply that had the Colonial Office only the Northern Rhodesian Unofficial Members to deal with, they would probably have been content to ignore the amalgamation issue possibly until the end of the war. Huggins' intervention, however, made this impossible. Early in 1941 he began to press for a re-opening of the amalgamation question. He reminded Lord Lloyd about the assurance that had been given to him by MacDonald in September 1939 that the question of amalgamation would be taken up once the initial impact of the war was over. The war, he said, had strongly confirmed him in his view that if amalgamation were not immediately achieved Southern Rhodesia would be absorbed by the Union. He pointed to the "nests of disloyal Afrikaners" in Northern Rhodesia and Kenya and the constant economic pressures operating in the two Rhodesias. He expressed grave concern about the large disloyal Afrikaner element in South Africa which might force a republic once Smuts was gone and thus create a situation similar to that of Southern Ireland.[79]

---

[77] Minute by Lambert, 6 March, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1941.

[78] Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia and repeated to the Governor of Nyasaland, 7 March, 1941. Ibid.

To Lord Elibank, a staunch supporter of amalgamation in the House of Lords, Huggins predicted a republic in South Africa "within ten years of Smuts' influence going or his death." At the same time he confidentially expressed to him his fear that if Smuts should last well beyond the end of the war, Southern Rhodesians might want to join the Union.[80] Lastly, Huggins felt that the addition of Nyasaland, which he described as "a glorified Native reserve", and Northern Rhodesia would make it easier for Southern Rhodesia to maintain a liberal native policy. He suggested the annexation of the two Protectorates to the Crown before the war was over so as to facilitate their amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia and, at the same time, rescue them from being placed "under some fancy and hopeless international mandate, and out of the British sphere of influence." In the Legislative Assembly Huggins declared his determination to go on fighting for amalgamation since this was vital to their existence as an independent State.

To Dawe, however, this constant harping on the danger of Southern Rhodesian absorption by South Africa was unlikely to advance the cause of amalgamation. Rather he saw it as a double-edged weapon. "Those who use the argument about the South African danger," he said, "do not seem to realise that it cuts equally the other way."[81] In other words, Africans in the two northern Protectorates feared amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia for precisely the same reasons that Southern Rhodesians feared absorption by the Union. In reply to his letter to Lord Lloyd, Huggins was informed that the press statement of 8 September, 1939 involved no definite pledge that a decision on amalgamation would be reached during the war. Besides, it now appeared extremely unlikely that circumstances would permit a final settlement of this very difficult problem before the end of the war. In addition, Lord Hailey's report on the native policies of the three territories was still awaited. Stanley was asked to explain informally to Huggins the delicate nature of the situation and the danger of raising the question of amalgamation at this time since expectations might be aroused which would lay the British Government open to a baseless charge of a breach of faith.[82]

---

[79] Huggins to Lord Lloyd, 27 January, 1941. Ibid.

[80] Huggins to Lord Elibank, Private & Confidential, 25 August, 1941. Ibid.

[81] Minute of 14 November, 1941. Ibid.

It was, however, evident that Huggins was acting under heavy pressure from his followers, as well as from the Rhodesian press, as the feeling grew that the British Government was bent on deferring consideration of the amalgamation question until the war was over. There were also fears that if amalgamation were not effected before the war was over, the two northern Protectorates might be placed under an international mandate by the peace conference leaving Southern Rhodesia empty-handed. The New Rhodesia began to press for the establishment of a Dominion of Central Africa before the end of the war which, together with a Dominion of East Africa to the north and that of South Africa to the south, might eventually join together to form a British African Federation. Since the "mass opinion" of the local Europeans and administrators was in favour of it, the paper said, "The 'native' argument can be blown away at a breath."[83]

---

[82] Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, 30 April, 1941. Ibid.

The resolution passed by the Unofficial Members of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council on 14 July calling upon the Southern Rhodesian Government "to co-operate in the appointment of a Committee representative of both territories, to consider points of difference with a view to formulating a policy and procedure adaptable to an amalgamated Rhodesia" added another pressure on Huggins. It forced him to adopt a militant stand on amalgamation. In his address to the United Party Congress on 5 August, he brushed aside the Dominions Office request not to raise the issue of amalgamation during wartime and stated very bluntly that they were not prepared to be put off simply because the question might be a difficult one in the House of Commons and might even cost votes outside. Southern Rhodesians, he said, had no say in the elections of the members of the House of Commons and were therefore not interested in their reaction to the Rhodesian question. Besides, he said, there was no reason why the more enlightened people who had migrated to build up the Commonwealth should be dictated to by the insularity of those who had stayed behind.[84] As he later explained to Lord Elibank, his decision to adopt a militant attitude on amalgamation was because "the people in the other territories, because I had stuck to diplomatic language, thought I was half hearted about it...."[85] To demonstrate his eagerness for amalgamation he described the Northern Rhodesian Unofficial Members' resolution as "too milk and watery" and proposed instead a convention to be held in Salisbury in order to draft a constitution for the united three territories which would then be sent to the British Government for their acceptance.

---

[83] 18 July, 1941.

[84] The Times, 6 August, 1941.

[85] Huggins to Lord Elibank, 25 August, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1941.

Huggins was also becoming impatient with the British authorities over what he regarded as a deliberate procrastination in dealing with Lord Hailey's report which he suspected must have been pigeonholed by a junior official. He was also faced with carping criticism from the Southern Rhodesian Labour Party whose opposition to amalgamation was based on the fear that it might bring with it greater interference from London in matters of native policy. They were only prepared to accept amalgamation on the basis of complete self-government for Southern Rhodesia and the extension of the Industrial Conciliation Act and colour bar in the field of employment to the Northern Protectorates.[86] No doubt the grudging approval by the Colonial Office to the setting up of the Conference Secretariat and the stringent restrictions placed on it had convinced Huggins, as he pointed out to Lord Elibank, that there was "a definite move" to keep the three territories apart and possibly prevent their amalgamation altogether.

Not surprisingly, Huggins' "strong statement" in his address to his party Congress drew adverse comments from a variety of people. Even Mackenzie-Kennedy, an amalgamationist at heart, confessed that he was "perturbed by Huggins' recent manoeuvres" and "the Boston tea party atmosphere" which he seemed "disposed to create."[87] In the House of Commons, Labour Party members became alarmed by Huggins' recent statements on amalgamation. Creech Jones quizzed the Government Ministers on Huggins' recent statements, and Major Haden Guest asked the Under-Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs to ascertain whether or not there was "any hanky panky going on behind the scnes." In a letter to The New Statesman and Nation Creech Jones pointed out that the British Government should "not be allowed to slip into a surrender of our responsibilities in Northern Rhodesia." If amalgamation were conceded, he said, it would be "a gross betrayal."[88]

---

[86] For a frank exposition of the views of the Southern Rhodesian Labour Party leaders on native policy in relation to amalgamation see Frederick Pedler's confidential note on their evidence presented to Lord Hailey while he was in Southern Rhodesia in 1940. The note is dated 15 December, 1941. Ibid. Pedler was Hailey's secretary during his African tour.

The Economist warned against a "Munich in the colonial Empire" and called for a categorical statement from the Government to the effect that there was "no intention of handling over the three million natives of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland to a Government whose native policy is based on sharp discrimination...."[89] To Colonel Wedgewood, a repentent ex-Liberal, it looked for a moment as if the British Government was about to adopt the same policy of 'scuttle' in Rhodesia which had been applied by the Liberal Government in South Africa at the turn of the century. As he pointed out during the meeting of 14 March, 1940 between a deputation of the Anti-Slavery and Aborigines Protection Society, of which he was a member, and the two Secretaries of State for the Colonies and the Dominions,

---

[87] Mackenzie-Kennedy to Dawe, 24 October, 1941. Ibid.

[88] 23 August, 1941, p. 184.

[89] 29 November, 1941, p. 651.

> Four of us here [A reference to three other ex-Liberal Party members in the deputation] were guilty of handing over the natives of South Africa to the Boers--I hope that it haunts the others, as it does me, with the result that the position of the natives in South Africa is more miserable than that of the natives in any other part of the world.[90]

Wedgewood was particularly concerned that the expediency of the war might be used as an excuse for amalgamating the three territories. "If you amalgamate these places," he said, "you know perfectly well that it will be the white settlers who will rule, and that we shall have deserted our custodianship."[91]

Huggins' rash statements also drew unfavourable response from The League of Coloured Peoples in London which became alarmed at the rumours circulating that an agreement on amalgamation had already been reached between the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister and the British Government.[92] A similar note of concern about the issue of amalgamation was conveyed to the Colonial Office by Rev. H. M. Grace on behalf of the Conference of Missionary Societies in Great Britain and Ireland. The Anti-Slavery and the Aborigines Protection Society also became deeply disturbed by Huggins' recent outbursts and by the resolutions of the Unofficial Members of Northern Rhodesia which seemed to indicate that pressure might be exerted upon the British Government "to yield to the demand for amalgamation by the European minority in Northern and Southern Rhodesia."[93] Their views on the issue of amalgamation were set out in an 11 page memorandum which was submitted to the Colonial Office by Charles Roberts, the Society's Secretary, in December 1941. The Society's request for permission to publish the Memorandum was refused. Tait felt that its contents "would cause intense irritation in S. Rhodesia, & in view of the admirable war effort of the Colony, its publication is certainly to be deprecated." Meanwhile Southern Rhodesia's native policy came under scorching criticism in the British Press from such distinguished scholars as Professor Eric A. Walker, Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge University, and Professor A. B. Keith. The latter pleaded for a firm rejection of Huggins' efforts to secure the amalgamation of the two northern territories with Southern Rhodesia. "The issue," he said, "involves the reality of our claim that we act as trustees for the natives of these territories, and is an acid test of our sincerity."[94] Some of this criticism was sparked off not only by Huggins' aggressive statements on amalgamation, but also by the 1941 amendment to the Land Apportionment Act.[95] "The proposed land bill for Southern Rhodesia," wrote the New Statesman and Nation, "is an iniquitous instance of Nazi or South African racial discrimination."[96]

---

[90] "Deputation to the Secretaries of State, Thursday, 14th March, 1940." P.R.O./C.O./795/115/45104/1940.

[91] *Ibid*.

[92] See Dr. Harold A. Moody to Lord Moyne, 20 August, 1941. *Ibid*. Dr. Moody, the founder and President of the League was born in Jamaica in 1882. He came to England in 1904 and after completing his medical training he settled in London. One of the objects of the League, as indicated on its letterhead, was "To interest members in the welfare of Coloured Peoples in all parts of the world" and "To improve relations between the races."

"No Colour-bar north of the Zambezi" became the battle cry of the left wing press in Great Britain which now began to show keen interest in the issue of amalgamation. This was in itself a reflection of a growing public interest in colonial affairs which had been awakened by the war. Much of this interest by the press in colonial affairs was also the result of American criticism of British Imperialism.[97] Although British politicians on the whole were inclined to brush aside American criticisms of the British Empire as unworthy of any serious consideration since they viewed them as largely based on ignorance,[98] a number of people began to take a critical look at the way the colonial Empire was being administered. This critical attitude was most pronounced in the left wing press. Public conscience in Britain had also been aroused by the loyalty of, and the heroic sacrifices made by, the colonial peoples in support of the British war effort.

---

[93] Charles Roberts to Lord Moyne, 4 December, 1941. Ibid.

[94] Manchester Guardian, 9 August, 1941. See The Times, 12 and 26 August, 1941 for Professor Walker's two letters on Southern Rhodesia's native policy.

[95] For a detailed criticism of this legislation see Dr. Moody's letter to Lord Cranborne published in The New Statesman and Nation, 22 November, 1941, p. 438.

[96] 16 August, 1941, p. 150.

The cumulative effect of this criticism was that Huggins decided to take up the suggestion made by The New Rhodesia that as Prime Minister and Minister of Native Affairs, he should "make a careful and reasoned explanation of the Native policy of the Colony with its wise provision of parallel development."[99] The result was Huggins' twelve page Statement on Native Policy in Southern Rhodesia, published in Salisbury on 6

---

[97] See Wendell L. Willkie, One World, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943), pp. 65-73.

[98] "By the way," stated one British Member of Parliament, Dr. H. B. W. Morgan, "the United States is no model. Let not Mr. Wendell Willkie cr any other American statesman start to tell us how to run our Colonial Empire, because we have a very proper answer to him.... We have nothing to learn from the United States about Colonial administration. We were the pioneers, and our Colonial record is good compared with that of others...." Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 387, 16 March, 1943, col. 1124.

[99] 18 July, 1941.

November 1941. There was, as the author himself stated, nothing different in the statement from the views which he had expressed in the past other than that he now "visualised the possibility of the two parallel lines in our parallel development policy coming together in some very distant future."[100] In so far as the statement was an attempt to prove to the Colonial Office that Southern Rhodesia's native policy no longer constituted an obstacle to amalgamation and that it was, in fact, not inconsistent with that of the British Government, it failed in its objectives. The statement, remarked Pedler, "brings home how very different that policy is from the policy which is followed in the British Colonial Dependencies." There were several phrases in it, he observed, which "must give tremendous offence to any Africans who can read them."[101]

The Dominions Office was equally perturbed by Huggins' recent intemperate statements on amalgamation and at one point Lord Cranborne considered arranging for a Parliamentary Question which would give an opportunity to make "an effective, perhaps even trenchant" reply to the Southern Rhodesian Prime Minister but decided against it in the end. He did, however, advise his staff to keep a close watch for any further remarks by Huggins.[102] On 13 August the two Secretaries of State and their departmental advisers met to discuss the subject of amalgamation and were later joined by Lord Hailey.[103] Lord Moyne was particularly upset by Huggins' manoeuvres to force the issue of amalgamation at a time when it was obviously difficult to give consideration to it due to the exigencies of the war. Regarding the Dominions' proposal to invite Huggins to Great Britain so as to enable him to see the country under war conditions, Lord Moyne felt that since the views of the Government on amalgamation had not yet crystallised as Lord Hailey's report was still awaited Huggins might resent being invited to London only to be told that no progress was possible on the matter during the war. Inviting him under these circumstances would also give an impression that the Government was favourable to amalgamation. Another complicating factor was the attitude of General Smuts whose recent utterances indicated that he had expansive ambitions of his own in Africa and had already expressed the hope that no final settlement should be made regarding Abyssinia (Ethiopia) until the conclusion of the war. It was, therefore, likely that he might not take too kindly to the settlement of the amalgamation question at this time.

---

[100] Murray's view in his book The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia, p. 303, that Huggins' statement "followed Lord Hailey's adverse report" is inaccurate. The report was sent to Huggins on 14 October. Waddington in Northern Rhodesia received his (which had been sent on 15 October), on 8 January, 1942. At the most Huggins could only have received his a week or two earlier.

[101] "Note on the Statement of Native Policy in Southern Rhodesia by Sir Godfrey Huggins, 6th November, 1941", 10 January, 1942. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1941. For a detailed and well argued critique of Huggins' statement see a letter of 18 February, 1942 in the Papers of Arthur Creech Jones, 22/6/57-60, signed "A Native".

[102] See Parkinson's minute of 8 August, 1941. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1941.

Consequently, it was considered best to inform Huggins plainly that in view of wartime difficulties it was highly unlikely that any progress on amalgamation could be made but that if he wished to come over to discuss Lord Hailey's report without prejudice to this issue, British authorities would welcome such an opportunity. In the course of the discussion Lord Cranborne wondered whether there might be some

---

[103] See "Note of a meeting held in Lord Moyne's room on Wednesday, 13th August, 1941 to discuss the question of the amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland". Ibid.

"half-way house" to amalgamation such as federation, but the general consensus of opinion at the meeting was that there were certain difficulties in such a course and that federation would generally be regarded as but a stepping stone towards the ultimate objective, namely, amalgamation.

At this point Lord Hailey joined the meeting. He gave a brief preview of his coming report and pointed out that after examining the native policies of the three territories he had been driven to the conclusion that real divergences existed. Although on administrative grounds amalgamation might be desirable, he felt it would be wise to weigh this consideration against the introduction of colour bar in the northern territories and on this point Lord Moyne stated that a stand should "be made on the Zambezi." It was then agreed that Lord Hailey's report, when completed, should be published so that all the parties concerned might digest it. The invitation to Huggins could then be postponed until he had had time to consider its implications. If it should be decided that the issue could not be settled during the war it would be better to inform Huggins of this decision in London. The political difficulties of accepting amalgamation were also indicated. The British Labour Party, it was pointed out, felt very strongly about amalgamation and were unlikely to accept it.

The British Government's position was fully explained to Colonel Ernest Guest, Southern Rhodesia's Minister of Mines and Public Works and, since 1940, also head of the newly created Department of Air, during a London interview with Lord Cranborne on 2 January, 1942.[104] It was pointed out to him that raising the question of amalgamation at this time would be embarrassing to the Government and might arouse opposition in the House of Commons based not so much on the merits or demerits of the scheme as such as on the fact that constitutional issues were being raised in the midst of war. If the British Government were pressed to give a categorical answer at present, it would definitely be in the negative. Furthermore, tampering with the boundaries of Africa was certain to cause the South African Government to raise the dreaded question of the High Commission Territories while a public discussion of amalgamation might also adversely affect copper production in Northern Rhodesia which was so vital to the prosecution of the war. Colonel Guest expressed full appreciation of these difficulties, although he did not think Huggins would be impressed by the last two points. The question of the High Commission Territories, Guest said, was a Dominions Office problem which should not be allowed to affect the future of Southern Rhodesia while the question of copper production was no longer a significant factor since the Northern Rhodesian Mining Companies, according to the information received from Sir Ernest Oppenheimer, were no longer opposed to amalgamation. He agreed that Huggins should be asked to visit Great Britain.

---

[104] For a Dominions Office note on this interview see P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-3.

The question of the publication of Lord Hailey's report also came up during this interview. Lord Cranborne expressed the view that if it were decided not to publish a report, a suggestion that must have come from Colonel Guest, any statement to this effect would have to be accompanied by an explanation showing that all the Governments concerned were agreed that the question of amalgamation was not one which could be discussed any further during the course of the war. This, however, would have to be discussed with Huggins when he visited London. Up to the time Huggins received Hailey's report the two Ministers were still bent on its publication having already committed themselves to this course in Parliament. The two proposals to defer consideration of the amalgamation question until the end of the war and to invite Huggins over to London were conveyed to the British Prime Minister on 23 October[105] and he readily gave his approval to both. Huggins accepted the invitation to come to London indicating early January as the likely date. He later changed his mind, and it is not improbable that this decision had something to do with the adverse nature of Lord Hailey's report which was despatched to the three African Governments in the middle of October.

In view of the significance of Lord Hailey's observations, it is rather unfortunate that his report was never published--much of the blame for this lies with Huggins. It is even more unfortunate that until recently few historians have had access to it. Hailey approached his task as an administrator[106] and in drawing attention to the number of obstacles in the way of closer political union between the three territories he did so reluctantly and regretfully. His own predispositions, he said, based on grounds of administrative expediency were inclined towards "some form of fusion" between the three territories. "My own experience as an administrator," he wrote, "has convinced me of the disadvantages under which small governmental units labour, whether in the determination of policy or in the maintenance of the requisite standards of efficiency in their administrative or technical services."[107]

---

[105] See a joint minute by Lord Cranborne and Lord Moyne addressed to the British Prime Minister on P.R.O./795/122/45104/1941, and J. H. Peck to J. J. S. Garner, 26 October, 1941. Ibid.

[106] Lord Hailey's reputation as an able administrator was based largely on his service in India. He joined the Indian Civil Service in 1894 and was posted to the Punjab. In 1907 he became Secretary to the Punjab Government and Chief Commissioner of Delhi from 1912 to 1918. In 1919 he became a member of the Executive Council of the Governor-General and was placed in charge of the Finance Department and, later, the Home Department. He was appointed Governor of the Punjab in 1924 until 1928 when he was transferred to be Governor of the United Provinces. He retired in 1935 and immediately set out on a tour of Africa which resulted in the publication of his monumental African Survey, published in 1938.

In spite of the apparent similarities between the three territories in certain aspects of their African administration, Lord Hailey came to the conclusion that the divergences between the Southern Rhodesian system and that of the two northern Protectorates were acute enough to constitute an obstacle to their amalgamation. He referred particularly to the enforcement of the pass laws and the application of colour bar in Southern Rhodesia through such legislation as the Industrial Conciliation Act passed in 1934 "to help maintain a white standard of living" in the Colony, to use the words of the Minister of Justice at the time.[108] It was this legislation, as one Rhodesian African has pointed out, which together with the Land Apportionment Act of 1930 "constituted the foundation stones of white supremacy in Rhodesia."[109] In his written comments on the report Huggins maintained that "to remove Colour Bar completely is to put back progress in this part of the world for a [sic] indefinite time which cannot be in the ultimate interest of the native."[110]

In reference to Southern Rhodesia's vaunted claim of having provided better social services for its Africans than was the case in the two Northern Protectorates, Lord Hailey, while acknowledging the Colony's "commendable progress" in the medical field, pointed out that the real divergence between the native policies of the two Rhodesias did "not lie in the extent of the services provided by the Administrations for the betterment of the material or social conditions of their native populations." Rather it was "to be found primarily in the limits which Southern Rhodesia imposes on the employment of Africans in industry and in the administrative services, and which it would propose to apply to their association in the political institutions of the country."[111]

---

[107] "Note on the Bearing of Native Policy on the Proposed Amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland", (Confidential), (London: H.M.S.O., 1941, p. 3.

[108] Cited in Gray, op. cit., p. 102.

[109] Lawrence Vambe, From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe, (London: Heinemann, 1976), p. 63.

[110] Huggins to O'Keefe, 19 January, 1942. P.R.O./D.O./35/285/R8/281.

Lord Hailey also cast doubt on the view expressed in the Bledisloe Report that the two divergent native policies would by "effluxion of time," as Seel put it in 1939, move closer to each other. It appeared highly improbable to him that a policy which had held the field in Southern Rhodesia for such a long time could be expected to undergo any significant change "since it is the outcome of conceptions which the European community holds to be vital to the maintenance of the standard of living which it has established for itself." In other words, racialism which was the product of economic, political, and social attitudes that were deeply rooted in the settler mind, was already too deeply embedded in Southern Rhodesian society to leave room for hope that it might be modified. It had in fact become what Ian Smith later referred to as "the traditional Rhodesian path...." dating "From our earliest days, long before there was any of the present day fuss about so-called fundamental human freedoms."[112] As Hailey pointed out, the Southern Rhodesian native policy had "therefore an element of strong personal feeling behind it," and that if it was to "undergo any modification" it would "only be in response to a far-reaching alteration in the economic circumstances of the Colony, which would make it impossible for it to hope to maintain the principle of the 'civilized wage' for Europeans."[113]

---

[111] "Note on the Bearing of Native Policy...." p. 10. Gann and Gelfand's statement that Lord Hailey "penned a report which amongst other things--stressed the high quality of Southern Rhodesia's social services for Africans" is misleading. Op. cit., p. 208.

He further expressed disagreement with another view contained in the Bledisloe Report that the explicit acceptance of the principle of amalgamation by the British Government would induce a sense of responsibility among the European minority in the three territories in their dealings with the Africans. He found it difficult to see how

> a great increase in the population of Africans to Europeans would by itself convert the white community to the view that it ought to extend political privileges to Africans or allow them to enter those fields of industrial and administrative employment in the reservation of which it sees the guarantee for the maintenance of its own standards of life.[114]

Rather he foresaw a determined effort by Southern Rhodesia to extend her Industrial Conciliation Act to the Northern Rhodesian Copper Belt and to eliminate Africans in the two northern Protectorates from Government service. In considering the constitutional alternatives before the three territories, Hailey firmly rejected the federal solution, not because of any inherent difficulties in a federal union in which the constituent units differed widely in their domestic policies,--such types of federal union, he said, did in fact exist--but because of the constitutional difficulty of combining a territory enjoying responsible government with territories which were still subject to Crown Colony rule. It was "not possible," he stated, "to conceive of any type of federal machinery which would permit the control of policy and its day-to-day administration being shared between a responsible Government and the Colonial Office."[115]

---

[112] Southern Rhodesian Hansard, 2 August, 1967. Cited in Palley, "Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesia Front from 1963 to 1969", Part I, Race, vol. xii, July, 1970, pp. 20-31.

[113] "Note on the Bearing of Native Policy...," p. 11.

[114] Ibid., p. 12.

Equally, Lord Hailey dismissed outright the possibility of amalgamation subject to certain safeguards for the Colonial Office native policy in the two northern Protectorates by means of constitutional reservation. The exercise of such powers in preventing the extension of the Industrial Conciliation Act to Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, he said, would not be easy to defend in view of the fact that they were never invoked when the Act was passed in the first place.[116] At the same time he pointed to the practical difficulty of trying to keep constant vigilance over native interests since "the administration of native policy is not merely a matter of legislation; its effect on native interests depends largely on day-to-day executive action, and on the financial provision made for the promotion of social and other services."

---

[115] Ibid., pp. 3-4.

[116] See statement by J. H. Thomas, then Secretary of State for Dominions Affairs, in the House of Commons on 20 February, 1935, vol. 298, col. 343, in which he declared that "After careful consideration of the terms of the Act, as provided by the Legislature of Southern Rhodesia, I informed the Governor on the 12th June last that His Majesty would not be advised to exercise his power of disallowance."

All these considerations drove Hailey to the reluctant conclusion that the divergences between the native policy of Southern Rhodesia and that of the two northern Protectorates were indeed a serious obstacle to amalgamation. Regretfully, he wrote,

> I should have been glad if my study of the questions arising in connection with native had shown that they present no difficulty in the way of the amalgamation of the three territories. As it is, I am forced to advise that the divergence in native policies appears to me to remain a factor which, though not necessarily conclusive as an argument against amalgamation, must be taken into account in weighing the general advantages and disadvantages which the scheme presents.[117]

And as far as he could see, the African opposition to amalgamation already noted in the Bledisloe Report still existed. At the same time he advised against the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland recommended in the same Report as this would greatly increase the ratio between the Africans and the Europeans, a situation which "might react unfavourably on the aspirations entertained by unofficial Europeans in Northern Rhodesia to secure greater influence in the management of the affairs of the government." This, he said, might precipitate a more forceful demand among the settlers for amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia.[118]

Views similar to those expressed by Lord Hailey in his report regarding Southern Rhodesia's native policy were stated by Professor A. B. Keith in an article which appeared in The Round Table. He pointed out that in Southern Rhodesia, as in South Africa, the watchword was racial segregation. Between South Africa's policy of segregation practised in Southern Rhodesia and the Colonial policy of "native paramountcy," he said, there was "a deep gulf fixed, a gulf which must in some way or other be crossed before amalgamation can be effected."[119] Hailey's conclusions concerning Southern Rhodesia's native policy received endorsement from Sir John Waddington who described the report as "a delightfully phrased exposition of views of most of us who have knowledge of conditions in these territories and of the implication of the divergent native policies." He was, however, sorry that Lord Hailey had been unable to advise amalgamation subject to safeguards for the northern territories, a course which he had always advocated.[120]

---

[117] "Note on the Bearing of Native Policy...," pp. 15-16.

[118] Ibid., p. 16.

Lord Hailey's report came as a bitter disappointment to Huggins. After receiving it, he immediately telegraphed to the Dominions Office indicating the willingness of his Ministers to have the report published provided their comments on points which they felt needed "amplification or correction" were appended to it.[121] The Dominions Office advisers were, however, cool towards this suggestion especially after seeing Huggins' comments on the report sent through the Southern Rhodesian High Commissioner in London on 19 January. These were largely polemical and, as was pointed out to Huggins, their publication together with the report would immediately bring pressure on the British Government to publish their own views on the report, a situation which might lead "to just that heightening of temperature which we are anxious to avoid."[122] Of the two alternative courses indicated by Huggins, that is, publication of the report together with the comments by the Southern Rhodesian Ministers or postponement of its publication, the Dominions Office opted for the latter and Huggins intimated his agreement with this procedure. In a statement read in the House of Commons on 5 March, 1942 it was pointed out that both the British Government and Parliament found it impossible "to give the necessary consideration to the amalgamation issue in present circumstances" and that it had "therefore been agreed with the Government of Southern Rhodesia that publication of Lord Hailey's note should be deferred until due consideration of the problem of amalgamation becomes practicable."[123]

---

[119] "An African Problem", The Round Table, vol. 33, 1942-43, p. 138.

[120] Waddington to Lord Moyne, 11 January, 1942. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

[121] Government of Southern Rhodesia to the Dominions Office, 3 January, 1942. P.R.O./D.O./35/425/R8/281/1942.

[122] Dominions Office to the Government of Southern Rhodesia, 31 January, 1942. Ibid.

What this statement meant was that the issue of amalgamation had now been shelved till the end of the war. Huggins later spoke of a "gentleman's agreement" between his Government and the Dominions Office by which both parties had agreed not to discuss controversial issues during the war.[124] With amalgamation out of the way, at least for the time being, British authorities decided to take advantage of this respite to map out solid guidelines for future policy on this issue. Dawe clearly realised that "the small British minority [in Northern Rhodesia] will become more insistent in their demands for political power in the near future" and he felt it was going to be very difficult to hold the situation for long. "We are in the dilemma that the more we deny to them political power, the more we are going to force them into the arms of Southern Rhodesia, and to strengthen the demand for early amalgamation," he observed. In his view all this pointed to the urgency of coming to a decision on policy with regard to East and Central Africa.[125] Indeed, the Unofficial Members of the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council continued to press for an Unofficial majority in the Council using this as a lever to strengthen their demand for amalgamation. Heading the Colonial Office during this crucial period of revaluation of policy on amalgamation was Colonel Oliver Stanley who had replaced Lord Cranborne on 22 November, 1942. Of the ten men who held the Colonial Office portfolio between the formation of the second and the third Labour Governments in 1929 and 1945, respectively, (twelve, if one takes into account the fact that two of them, Thomas and MacDonald, held the position twice) Stanley held it the longest.

---

[123] _Ibid_.

[124] _The Times_, 2 April, 1943.

* *

It was during Stanley's term of office that a turning point in the Colonial Office attitude towards closer union among the three Central African territories was reached. From now on progress towards the attainment of this goal became rapid. By the time the Labour Party took office in July 1945 following a landslide victory at the polls which for the first time in the party's history, gave it an absolute majority in the House,[126] the trend had become virtually irreversible. Stanley's last momentous act before leaving office in August 1945 was the creation of the Central African Council in April--three months before the Labour

---

[125] Minute of 2 March, 1943. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

[126] The Crown Colonist likened the Labour Party's victory to a clergyman "whose humble prayers for a modicum of rain were answered by a tropical storm." September, 1945. Cited in Taylor, op. cit., p. 75.

Government came to power. The first indications of this change of attitude on the part of the Colonial Office are to be found in the departmental meeting of 18 March, 1943 attended by the Secretary of State and his senior advisers. The main topic of discussion was whether or not it would be advisable to amalgamate the three territories in order to form a strong single unit which, in view of the anticipated change of Government in South Africa, might be in a better position to resist absorption by the Union.[127] The question of the feasibility of federation was briefly discussed but found no support, the general view being that this would not suit Southern Rhodesia which already enjoyed self-government.

The possibility of some local move being made by the settlers to take the matter out of the hands of the British Government was brought up and it was considered better to go in first with some arrangement which would be acceptable to the settlers and the British Government. Even though the issue of amalgamation seemed dormant at the moment, there was no certainty as to how long the settler demand for an Unofficial majority in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council could be resisted. Seel thought it would be difficult to continue to flout the wishes of the settlers on this issue. The general view in the Colonial Office, as stated by Cohen, was that "if an unofficial majority was granted it should be used as a bargaining factor in connection with any proposals for closer union between the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland."[128]

---

[127] "Note of a meeting held in the Secretary of State's room on Thursday, 18th March, 1943". Ibid.

[128] Minute of 16 November, 1943. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45170/ 1941, 1942, 1943.

The future of the Standing Inter-territorial Secretariat was also discussed. Stanley wondered whether the present restriction of its use to matters strictly relating to the war effort of the three territories should be maintained any longer. His own view was that although a pledge had been given to Parliament regarding its use, in these days when joint planning was the order of the day it would not be difficult to convince Parliament that the situation in the three territories had now changed. In his view, it was imperative if the interests of the three territories were to be given proper consideration, to extend the scope of the Secretariat in order to include within its jurisdiction all problems of common interest. It could then be explained that this extension was not to be construed as a back door to amalgamation. But even with such an explanation it was acknowledged that to proceed along these lines might result in the issue of amalgamation becoming a subject of public discussion.

As a first step, Stanley proposed that "a memorandum should be drawn up setting out a possible scheme for amalgamation which, while safeguarding the interests of the natives in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, would be acceptable to Southern Rhodesia." The urgency of a definite policy on amalgamation was heightened by the publication of the British Labour Party's policy statement for the African and Pacific colonies in which specific reference was made to "the demand of certain parties or persons in Southern Rhodesia for amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Southern Rhodesia."[129] Such a demand, the statement declared, "should be resisted and ... no such transfer of territory should be agreed to unless the African inhabitants desire it and unless their social and political equality with minorities is completely assured."[130] Seel was quite perturbed by the implications of this statement:

---

[129] The Labour Party, The Colonies The Labour Party's Post-War Policy for the African and Pacific Colonies, (London: [April] 1943), p. 3.

> If this policy should be accepted at any time as the official attitude of H.M.G., then I think that the amalgamation of Southern Rhodesia with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland would be removed from the sphere of practical politics, except conceivably as the result of some kind of putsch organised either south or north of the Zambesi or on both sides of it. There is no room for any kind of negotiations with Southern Rhodesia, from a platform which requires complete social and political equality, within any period of time which we can foresee.[131]

The Labour Party's policy statement also struck terror among the Rhodesian settlers, even to people like Welensky who, in unison with Moore, never tired of advertising himself as "definitely a Socialist."[132]

Pursuant to the agreement reached at the 18 March meeting, Seel submitted a memorandum dealing with future policy in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland relative to the question of closer political union. Although amalgamation no longer appeared to be a live issue in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia, Seel felt that it was a factor which had "to be taken into account at every turn in the political situation, because the elected members continue to press their demand for a majority in the Legislative Council" and he was concerned that "a definite rejection of this demand would probably lead to an immediate revival of a demand for outright amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia."[133] For the time being the Colonial Office was only able to hold the position because the Elected Members were still digesting their recent constitutional gains, the latest being their admission to the War Committee set up in 1942.

---

[130] Ibid.

[131] Minute of 6 April, 1943. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

[132] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 9 December, 1941, col. 59. "I think it is probably well known," stated Moore in 1939, "that I am something 'Red', I am 'Left', I am 'Bolshie', I am certainly a Socialist." Ibid., 1 June, 1939, col. 252.

Even in Southern Rhodesia where Huggins and his Cabinet appeared to be observing a truce with regard to amalgamation, Seel noted that there was already a feeling that instead of the three territories drawing closer together, they seemed to be drifting further apart. Resentment was also growing over the restrictions placed by the British Government over the use of the Inter-territorial Conference Secretariat as an instrument of co-operation, while international opinion, on the other hand, appeared to be hardening against any territorial changes which were not in accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.[134]

At the same time Seel felt that the experience of the war in matters of war production and supply and the maintenance of land and air communications in Africa had vindicated as well as underlined the Royal Commission's view that the three territories would as time went on become increasingly interdependent. In his view the post-war period was certain to increase this process. The real question, therefore, was whether it was possible to achieve and maintain the desired rate of development in the two northern territories "without the active co-operation of the

---

[133] Secret "Notes on future policy in Central Africa", n.d. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

[134] He referred specifically to the American publication, The Atlantic Charter and Africa. A Study by the Committee on Africa, The War and Peace Aims, New York City 1942 whose authors maintained, contrary to Churchill's view, that the Atlantic Charter was also applicable to Africa and Asia.

European community in Southern Rhodesia", and here Seel gave the first broad hint of Colonial Office retreat from the position which it had hitherto maintained in respect of the position of the African inhabitants in the two African Protectorates. "Insistence upon the further long-range opportunities theoretically available to Africans under the native policy of His Majesty's Government," he warned, "may involve a retardation to some extent of material advancement such as might be expected from a properly controlled extension of colonial enterprise from across the Zambezi."

The old spectre of Southern Rhodesian absorption by South Africa was brought up once more and this time the threat was seen as no longer an empty one in view of what Seel described as the "northward encroachment by the Union" and the "infiltration" from the Transvaal into the Fort Victoria area by Dutch South Africans who were "more prolific than the ordinary British type of settler." He was seriously concerned "that the balance of population may conceivably at some future date alter in favour of the former." Southern Rhodesia's demand for amalgamation was thus seen as an attempt to ward off this "encroachment".

Although Seel was inclined to underplay the divergences between the Southern Rhodesian native policy and that of the two northern territories which he described as largely "ideological" rather than practical, he, nevertheless, thought it "idle" to hope for a solution involving Southern Rhodesia's abandonment of her present native policy as reflected in the Industrial Conciliation Act "as part of a bargain from which she obtained in return amalgamation with the northern territories." It was therefore necessary, he said, "if any realistic basis is to be found for considering this question, to face the issue whether

H.M.G. would or could in the last resort enforce any greatly dissimilar policy in such places as the Copperbelt where there is a considerable non-native population standing in the same economic relation to Africans." The implication here was obvious: if Southern Rhodesia could not be induced to budge from her native policy, accommodation would have to come from the British Government's side. Seel in fact did not consider it wise to regard the British Government's native policy as necessarily sacrosanct. As he put it,

> It is perhaps not always realised how dangerous it is from the point of view of intra-Imperial relations, to harp on the excellence of the United Kingdom principles of policy in relation to Africans, and make their acceptance a condition precedent to adjustments which suggest themselves on economic, defence and other grounds, when communities such as Southern Rhodesia are in a position to look over the fence and see for themselves how far the claim to pre-eminence in theory is unsubstantiated by actual performance.

At the same time Seel pointed out the serious mistake of a failure to recognise that there was "a body of opinion in the Colony which though small at present is of growing influence, and which is beginning to show a sense of responsibility towards the huge African majority and its future."

Before amalgamation was rejected or, worse still, shelved indefinitely on grounds of incompatibility of native policies, Seel thought it prudent to consider first the possibility of reaching an agreement on a formula which would preserve the African position in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and might even secure better long-term benefits for the Southern Rhodesian Africans than could at present be descried. This was another significant turnabout. In the past the Colonial Office had always opposed amalgamation partly for the fear of the adverse effects it might have on the welfare of the Africans in the two northern Protectorates. Seel was now advocating it for the possible benefits it might bestow upon the Southern Rhodesian Africans. Evidently the political wheel in Whitehall was rapidly turning full circle.

The first step in this new direction was to try to find some formula for native policy "over the whole area to which opinion, both in this country and in Southern Rhodesia, could be expected to subscribe." Seel then went on to posit broad principles upon which a scheme of closer political union among the three territories could be devised. These involved, amongst other things, the acceptance of the general principle which would allow Africans in the two northern territories participation in public affairs when they qualified; "the need for progressive education of Africans in public affairs through local native institutions and other organs of local self-government"; a "progressive admission of properly qualified Africans to local and central government services in all grades, at any rate in Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia"; the acceptance and affirmation of the present native land policy in the two northern territories, and unrestricted "opportunities for the employment of Africans in any skilled or unskilled occupation ... subject to safeguards for European workers in specified areas." The latter stipulation was, in fact, an indirect acceptance of the principle of Southern Rhodesia's Industrial Conciliation Act for the two northern Protectorates.

In considering a constitutional structure that could be devised for the combined territories, Seel was doubtful about the feasibility and even the advisability of creating a unitary state as this would mean the extension of complete self-government to the whole area. The prospects of Parliament ever agreeing to this on the basis of a compromise on native policy were very remote. Similarly, a federal arrangement involving reservations of powers in respect of certain specified subjects was ruled out by Seel on the familiar ground that it would not be acceptable to Southern Rhodesia since she would be unwilling to surrender any of the powers enjoyed by her Parliament under her self-governing Constitution to an inter-territorial authority. Some other plan had, therefore, to be found "which would be regarded by Southern Rhodesia as a positive step forward, while preserving for the northern territories a period within which African development with assistance from the Imperial Government can be extended." Here Seel went back to the scheme recommended by Lord Bledisloe and Ashley Cooper in their joint Note appended to the Royal Commission Report which involved the appointment of a single Governor for all the three territories or, alternatively, the constitution of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia as High Commissioner for the unified northern Protectorates.

In Seel's view, a solution along the lines of the second alternative should be explored. This, incidentally, is the scheme which Stanley had proposed before but which the Dominions and the Colonial Offices had summarily rejected as impracticable. Seel, however, preferred leaving the two Protectorates separate on the ground that their amalgamation would create an authority in the north whose status would make the interposition of a High Commissioner difficult to work out. The main attraction of this scheme to Seel was the fact that it would leave the present Governments of the three territories undisturbed, the only change would be a grant of an Unofficial majority in Northern Rhodesia to make the arrangement palatable to the settlers. Barotseland would also be given a separate status under a separate Commissioner responsible to the Governor of Northern Rhodesia. To supplement this arrangement, an inter-territorial council along the lines of the scheme recommended in the Bledisloe Report was to be set up in order to assist in the formulation of development and welfare services for Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland with Funds from the Colonial Development and Welfare Vote. At the end of a specified period the whole arrangement was to be reviewed to determine whether any further organic change in the direction of closer integration of the three territories was desirable. The fact that in his search for "a positive step forward", Seel had to reach back to a scheme which had already been discarded by previous Secretaries of State is indicative of the political bankruptcy of the Colonial Office regarding the issue of closer political union in British Central Africa.

Seel's scheme was essentially a compromise. Although Dawe described the memorandum as "a valiant and masterly attempt to bridge the gulf between the two sides taken on this question," he foresaw great difficulties in trying to secure its acceptance, one of these being that of convincing the anti-amalgamationists that the scheme was not a half-way house to full amalgamation. The grant of an Unofficial majority in Northern Rhodesia, he felt, would certainly be construed as a step towards putting "into the hands of the white settlers power which they will immediately use to secure a union with their southern neighbours." Amalgamationists, on the other hand, would either accept the arrangement as a half-way house towards the fulfilment of their aspirations or reject it "from the conviction that they are getting into such a strong position that they have only to wait a little longer for the whole situation to come into their hand."[135]

Another person who was skeptical about Seel's scheme was Sir G. Gater, Permanent Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies since February 1940. Unless there was a real change in Southern Rhodesia's native policy, he said, there was no hope of "maintaining a stable equilibrium between the three territories in this vital matter."

---

[135] Minute of 17 April, 1943. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

> Once Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland are put within Southern Rhodesia's arms, the embrace will become closer and closer.... The combination of the white settlers in Southern Rhodesia and Northern Rhodesia will be irresistible, and with strong sympathetic backing from the Union of South Africa no High Commissioner on the spot will be able to offer effective resistance, and interference by H.M.G. may provoke armed conflict or secession to the Union of South Africa.

In Gater's view the crux of the whole position was native policy, and unless a satisfactory solution to this problem could be reached there was no point in proceeding any further. At the same time he felt that "unless a strong rampart is erected in Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, the Union of South Africa's conception of native policy will spread northward." For this purpose he considered it vital that Southern Rhodesia should be brought "into line with H.M.G.'s conceptions as far as possible," but he made no suggestion as to how this was to be done.[136]

Seel's memorandum was discussed by the Colonial Office advisers at a departmental meeting held on 10 June to which Lord Hailey was invited.[137] The latter saw no possible danger of Southern Rhodesia's absorption by South Africa and felt that the discussion on amalgamation should proceed without reference to this factor. Lord Hailey's own view was that although the eventual amalgamation of the three territories would certainly bring considerable benefits, it would be unwise to effect it at this stage. What could be tried instead was an arrangement which would provide a settlement of the problem over a period of years and for the present he suggested a personal union of the three Territories by making the Governor of Southern Rhodesia Governor-General for all three of them, an arrangement which would still leave the three territories politically independent of each other. There would be an Advisory Council on which the three territories would be represented. His main objection to Seel's proposal for a High Commissioner was that it was nowhere nearer to a solution of the question of amalgamation.

---

[136] Minute of 1 May, 1943. Ibid.

[137] "Note of a discussion regarding the question of the amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland held in the Secretary of State's room on Thursday, 10th June, 1943. Ibid.

The next important consideration was how these proposals could be presented to Southern and Northern Rhodesia without creating an impression that they were to be regarded either "as a step towards eventual amalgamation or as an attempt to fob-off the question for a further period." As regards the first point, Stanley thought it could be stressed that the present proposals were designed to "provide for closer economic co-operation while retaining Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland within the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Colonies." Concerning the second one, he felt that the British Government "could say quite honestly that they would like to see conditions obtaining in the three territories which would permit of complete amalgamation but that these conditions did not exist at present." This being the case the next best thing was to discover how far the British Government "could go towards meeting the demand for closer union of the three territories without prejudicing eventual amalgamation one way or the other." The next important step would be to try to secure European approval of the scheme in the two Rhodesias. The key to this lay in persuading Sir Godfrey Huggins to accept it--Lord Hailey did not think the Northern Rhodesian settlers were a formidable body of opinion since they were not united and were not likely to agree among themselves. It was also felt that the

Europeans could be induced to accept the scheme by an assurance that a Development Board would be established and be granted funds from British sources for purposes of development.

Once more it is remarkable that in both Seel's memorandum and in the minutes of the meeting of the 10 June there was no reference to African opinion or to any provision for their consultation. The main concern was to get Huggins' approval of the scheme as well as that of the European settlers. The entire scheme in fact was aimed at "satisfying the desire of the Europeans in Northern and Southern Rhodesia for closer union to an extent sufficient to prevent agitation for amalgamation from interfering with the orderly development of Northern Rhodesia and particularly of its native services." There was also a general fear in the Colonial Office that Welensky's Labour Party which was pledged to amalgamation would make considerable gains in the next general elections.[138]

After some consultation between the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office, the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland were invited to give their views on the proposals which were described to them as essentially a compromise between "two fundamental difficulties, the aspirations of the majority of Europeans in the two Rhodesias for amalgamation and the objections felt in this country to any form of closer union between the Central African Territories which would not fully safeguard the interests of the native populations of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland." In view of previous undertakings to Parliament that no steps would be taken on the subject of amalgamation, the memorandum was presented to the two Governors as a "departmental document" in order to make it clear that the Secretary of State for the Colonies was not committed to its contents, and the scheme itself was described as "purely tentative".

---

[138] See the revised version of Seel's memorandum, Ibid. As it turned out these fears were rather exaggerated. After an impressive start in the general elections of 1941, scarcely two years after its birth, when it won all the five seats it contested, the Party fared dismally in 1944, winning only two seats. It was dissolved shortly afterwards.

The presentation of the proposals at this time was in anticipation of a strong demand in the two Rhodesias for a statement of Government policy on amalgamation at the end of the war. There was in fact some fear in the Colonial Office that local opinion might not wait that long.[139] In a further note to the two Governors it was pointed out that the general policy of the British Government was that post-war planning should be co-ordinated on a regional basis as was already the case in the West and East African dependencies. The point was emphasised that regardless of what constitutional arrangements might be made in Central Africa, "The economic future of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland is clearly going to be much more closely linked with Southern Rhodesia than with the East African Territories to the North."[140]

The document received an icy reception from Richards and it is not the least ironic that at this time when Colonial Office views had begun to veer towards closer political union between the three territories, Richards should come up so strongly against such a policy, whereas in the past when the Colonial Office was still firmly opposed to closer political union Richards' predecessor, Mackenzie-Kennedy, had been castigated as an amalgamationist. Opinion within the Colonial Office was now critical of Richards for his "negative" and "rather parochial" views on the new proposals. In the past Sir H. J. Stanley had been severely lambasted for under-estimating the difficulties in the way of amalgamation. Richards was now berated for over-estimating them. It was even more ironic that Stanley's successor in Southern Rhodesia, Sir Evelyn Baring, was opposed to amalgamation.

---

[139] Dawe to Waddington and Richards, 2 October, 1943. Most Secret and Personal. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

[140] Dawe to Waddington and Richards, 15 October, 1943. Most Secret and Personal. Ibid.

In Richards' view there were indeed economic and political advantages in the inclusion of Nyasaland in an amalgamation of the three territories, but they were, he said, "not on the side of Nyasaland or of Northern Rhodesia." In his view Nyasaland had been reduced to the position of "a supplier of labour to her more fortunate neighbour by retarded development...." The greatest obstacle to closer union with Southern Rhodesia, however, was the African opinion which the Governor described as "solidly and uncompromisingly against any such proposal," and he did not think constitutional safeguards would do anything to assuage their fears and suspicions.

Richards found it rather odd that the different stages in political and social development of the three territories were regarded as ruling out the idea of federation but were not considered as constituting a bar to the constitution of the Governor of the self-governing Colony of Southern Rhodesia as High Commissioner for the two northern Protectorates. In any case Nyasaland Africans would, he said, see no difference between this expedient and amalgamation and would clamour against it.

> Having all these considerations in mind, and the welfare and advancement of the Native people of Nyasaland very much at heart, I say frankly and very sincerely that I do not think for one moment that the proposed solution

> has any advantages from the economical and administrative aspects so far as Nyasaland is concerned. On the contrary, I believe that it has grave disadvantages, the greatest of which would be a breach of faith with our Natives who rely on our trusteeship and partnership.

In his view the only way in which amalgamation could ever be brought about between Nyasaland and the two Rhodesias was by "an arbitrary decision without regard for any other consideration than expediency, the reason for, or wisdom of, which is not obvious to me." Richards wanted to see Nyasaland retain her links with the East African group of territories or, better still, "retain her present constitution and separate existence."[141]

The Governor's comments on the proposals were received with bitter disappointment at the Colonial Office and most of his fears were said to be "without solid foundation" and yet these were basically the same arguments that the Colonial Office had itself employed previously in rejecting closer political union between the three territories. In spite of the objections voiced by Richards, Lambert was confident that "given a desire on the part of all concerned to make the proposals work, the difficulties that might arise in practice ought to be capable of solution."[142] Although Cohen saw the Governor's despatch as representing "a setback to any proposals for closer union between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland," he, nevertheless, felt that an attempt would have to be made when Richards came to London "to persuade him of the advantages of a regional approach to the problems of development...."[143]

---

[141] Richards' views were contained in a 19 page despatch to Dawe, 31 October, 1943. Most Secret and Personal, Ibid.

[142] Minute of 30 November, 1943. Ibid.

[143] Minute of 14 December, 1943. Ibid.

Waddington's response to the Colonial Office proposals was largely influenced by the fact that the settlers in Northern Rhodesia, with few exceptions like Gore-Browne,[144] were now resolute in their desire for amalgamation. Like Richards, Waddington felt that Southern Rhodesia's interest in amalgamation was largely dictated by motives of self-interest, "the possible wealth of the copper mines" as well as "the power to make use of the African manpower resources of N.R. to the best advantage of S.R." As he pointed out to Dawe, "I am inclined to think that Southern Rhodesia takes little interest in us except as a possible adjunct to themselves and that they would not willingly be a party to development in Northern Rhodesia unless they thought that it would ultimately be a part of their resources." The view that amalgamation was necessary in order to save Southern Rhodesia from absorption by South Africa did not particularly impress him. "Personally I have never been much influenced by this argument as I doubt whether the addition of a few thousand acres and a few thousand people would affect the situation one way or the other." If anything, South Africa would likely favour the amalgamation of the Rhodesias "so that they could take one bite instead of two." Like Richards in Nyasaland, he thought the Africans in Northern Rhodesia would regard the whole arrangement as "a prelude to amalgamation and would bitterly oppose the proposals for that reason."[145]

Unlike Richards, however, Waddington was willing to accept the grouping of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia.

---

[144] For Gore-Browne's explanation of his stand on amalgamation see "Note of a meeting held in Sir George Gater's room on Wednesday, 12th April, 1944", Secret, P.R.O./C.O./795/133/45379/1944.

[145] Waddington to Dawe, 6 December, 1943. Most Secret and Personal, P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

> I imagine that you have completely discarded any idea that we should fall into an East African group and I myself would certainly consider it to be out of the question. So willy nilly we form one of a Central African bloc together with Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland and the sooner it is decided how far we can go in co-ordination the better.

He was also agreeable to the proposal to appoint the Governor of Southern Rhodesia as High Commissioner for the two northern territories but was doubtful about the creation of an Inter-territorial Council since he was certain that an attempt would be made by the Unofficial Members and the Southern Rhodesian Ministers to give it "a political flavour". He was, however, willing to go along with the scheme.[146] Although Waddington's brief comments on the proposals were favourably received at the Colonial Office--Cohen described the Governor's despatch as an "admirably succinct and realistic appreciation of the problem from the Northern Rhodesian angle"[147]--it is evident that his cautious approval of the scheme was not based on personal conviction. It was largely conditioned by his desire to maintain amicable relations with the Elected Members whose constitutional status had rapidly grown since the beginning of the war. Moreover, his comments on the proposals had hurriedly been written only a day before he left for London where he was due to discuss the matter further. Once he got to London and had had time to reflect on the proposals, he modified his views drastically. He changed his mind, for instance, regarding the proposal to appoint the Governor of Southern Rhodesia as High Commissioner for the two northern Protectorates. At the same time he expressed his opposition as well as that of his administrative officers to amalgamation.[148]

---

[146] Ibid.

[147] Minute of 31 December, 1943. Ibid.

Meanwhile the Governor of Southern Rhodesia, independently of the other Governors and without any knowledge of the Colonial Office proposals, submitted a private memorandum to the Dominions Office expressing opposition to amalgamation. In a letter to Lord Harlech, the British High Commissioner in South Africa, he pointed out that everything that he had seen in Southern Rhodesia had confirmed his view that Lord Hailey's conclusions on amalgamation were irrefutable.[149] In view of the three Governors' opposition to amalgamation Lambert felt that perhaps the Colonial Office proposals "could be watered down while still going some way towards meeting the views of the Europeans in both Rhodesias."[150] Furthermore, the defeat of Welensky's amalgamation motion in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council on 25 November seriously weakened the argument in Seel's memorandum that if amalgamation were not granted the Europeans in the Rhodesias might stage a "putsch".

The Colonial Office proposals received another setback when the Dominions Office drew up a draft memorandum of their own for presentation to the Cabinet in which the Colonial Office suggestion concerning the appointment of the Governor of Southern Rhodesia as High Commissioner for the two northern Protectorates was completely ignored. This came as a bit of a disappointment to Cohen who felt that this omission "would make the proposals less attractive to unofficial opinion in Northern

---

[148] See "Note of a meeting held in Mr. Creasy's room on Wednesday, 8th March, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./795/128/45104/1944.

[149] See Lambert's minute of 25 June, 1943. P.R.O./C.O./795/122/45104/1942-43.

[150] Minute 30 December, 1943. Ibid.

Rhodesia which would have liked this apparent relaxation of Colonial Office control," but on further reflection he realised that there was "a good deal to be said for leaving this particular proposal."[151] The Dominions draft memorandum,[152] in fact, was particularly remarkable for its moderation. It expressed serious doubt regarding the possibility of the three territories ever developing into a self-supporting powerful British Dominion as was claimed by the advocates of amalgamation. It seemed unlikely that their combined European population, even allowing for post-war immigration, would ever produce suitable men to administer over five million Africans.

The Dominions Office was, however, concerned that if amalgamation were rejected outright this might give rise to a demand in Southern Rhodesia for the Colony's union with South Africa from people who might feel that their aspirations to the north were definitely barred. In view of this possibility, it was felt that strong efforts should be made to avoid pressing matters to a straight choice between amalgamation with Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, on the one hand, and union with South Africa, on the other. The aim, it was pointed out, should be the maintenance of "Southern Rhodesia as a State in closer connection with its two Northern neighbours, without, however, necessarily committing ourselves at this stage to the ultimate objective of amalgamation."

It was considered most undesirable for the British Government to adopt a purely negative attitude on the question of closer union between the three territories as this would be inconsistent with the policy which had led to the appointment of Royal Commission in 1938 and might also cause intense disappointment and dissatisfaction among the settlers in the two Rhodesias. In the case of Northern Rhodesia, a negative response might also put to an end the existing co-operation between the Elected Members and the Government. This would impede the development of the territory and, more particularly, the development of African services. An attempt should, therefore, be made to give fulfilment to local aspirations in so far as this could be done without departing from the general policy of the British Government regarding the development of the tropical African dependencies.

---

[151] Minute of 3 February, 1944. Ibid.

[152] "Draft Cabinet Memorandum Closer Union Between Southern Rhodesia Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland". See enclosure in Machtig to Gater, 14 March, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./795/128/45104/1944.

In the Dominions Office view the best course would be to strengthen the existing Inter-territorial Council and put it on a permanent basis in the form of a Standing Council subject to the understanding that it would be an advisory rather than an executive body. At the same time the British Government should indicate its willingness to give the Council a wide latitude in its functions so as to promote the closest possible contact and co-ordination between the three territories and even a unification of technical services wherever this was appropriate. It was also suggested that the Inter-territorial Secretariat which had been set up in 1941 in order to facilitate the co-ordination of war effort, should be placed on a permanent footing.[153]

But even with these concessions the view was expressed in the memorandum that the scheme might not be adequate to satisfy the majority of Europeans in the two Rhodesias. It might therefore be necessary to offer the Northern Rhodesian settlers an Unofficial majority in the Legislative Council as well. In the case of Southern Rhodesia the rejection of amalgamation could be made palatable by according the Colony some advance of status in the Councils of the Empire by admitting its representatives as full members rather than as observers at Empire discussions even though Huggins had shown no interest in full Dominion status or any desire to control foreign relations and appoint representatives abroad--he always maintained that Southern Rhodesia was not yet ripe to handle such responsibilities. What he appeared to be interested in, though, was the Colony's position in relation to international trade agreements.

---

[153] Ibid.

The Dominion Office draft was discussed with the Governors of Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland at a Colonial Office meeting held on 16 March, 1944.[154] Except on very minor points the views expressed in the memorandum were accepted. The only opposition came from Richards whose main criticism of the scheme was that it took no account of African opinion. He reiterated his view that Africans in Nyasaland, both educated and uneducated, were opposed to amalgamation in any form, and, as far as he was concerned, there was no joint interest between Nyasaland and Southern Rhodesia. The migrant labour question, he said, was a source of conflict of interests rather than of common interests. On 6 April the two departments submitted a Joint Memorandum to the War Cabinet on the subject of establishing a permanent Inter-territorial Council.[155]

Meanwhile Huggins, who was in London at the time, raised the subject of amalgamation during a week-end stay with Lord Cranborne. To the latter it was clear that Huggins was "tired of waiting in uncertainty and wanted a clear answer either 'yes' or 'no'."[156] On the morning of 7 June, Huggins met the two Secretaries of State and was informally told of the suggestions outlined in the Joint Cabinet Memorandum. Although Huggins was disappointed with the British Government's rejection of amalgamation, he does not appear to have taken this decision very badly and was agreeable to an early statement on the issue. Oliver Stanley got the impression that Huggins was becoming nervous about amalgamation and was beginning to feel that it might lead to the swamping of Southern Rhodesia by the two predominantly African territories in the north.[157] Before returning to Salisbury, Huggins was privately informed of the Cabinet's decision on amalgamation and the proposal to set up a permanent Standing Central African Council.[158] It was left to him and his Government to decide on the appropriate time for the announcement. It was possible, of course, that an early announcement might raise questions affecting the other British territories in Africa, whereas if the announcement were postponed until the end of the war the new arrangement might form part of a wider post-war settlement. On the other hand, the Governors of the two northern Protectorates were strongly of the opinion that an early statement on the subject would be helpful in order to put an end to the prevailing uncertainty on the issue, a view which Huggins had privately endorsed. On balance, it was felt that an early announcement would be much preferable.[159] Moreover, it seemed advantageous from the practical point of view to set up the Inter-territorial Council as soon as possible as the strict limitations of the present Secretariat to matters connected with the war had proved both inconvenient and unpopular.

---

[154] "Note of a meeting held in Mr. Creasy's room on Thursday, 16 March, 1944". Ibid.

[155] W.P. (44)191. P.R.O./CAB/66/48/1944.

---

[156] Gater's minute, "Conversations with Sir Godfrey Huggins", 6 June, 1944. Ibid.

[157] See Minute by Cohen, 7 June, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./795/128/45104/1944. Huggins' subsequent statements on amalgamation, however, do not bear out this view.

[158] Lord Cranborne to Huggins, 9 June, 1944. Ibid.

In Salisbury Huggins apparently had some difficulty in persuading his Ministers to accept the British Government's proposals but they finally did so on 27th July.[160] In conveying his Government's approval of the proposal to set up a Standing Central African Council to the Dominions Office, Huggins explained that the scheme had been given "a very mixed blessing" by his Cabinet and had only been accepted because of the fear that if it were rejected "we should soon find Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland absorbed into East Africa and ourselves absorbed by the Union of South Africa."[161] To Machtig he pointed out that in any published statement attention should be drawn to the difference between the new organization and the existing Inter-territorial Conference by stressing the point that the new Council would continue after the war and that its discussions would not be confined to questions related to the war.[162] The only amendment suggested by Huggins was that of increasing each territory's representation on the Council to three so that "no-one should lose face" if its recommendations were rejected. Huggins' other suggestions were concerned with saving his own face concerning the British Government's rejection of amalgamation. In announcing the new arrangements in the Southern Rhodesian Parliament, Huggins wished to state that "the British Government were still adamant" on the issue of amalgamation and that it was his decision that an "interterritorial advisory committee should be set up for the time being...."[163]

---

[159] W.P.(44)363. P.R.O./CAB/65/52/1944.

[160] See Waddington to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 and 27 July, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./795/128/45104/1944.

[161] Huggins to Lord Cranborne, 8 August, 1944. Ibid.

[162] Huggins to Machtig, 9 August, 1944. Ibid.

In view of the fact that the British Government wished to make it clear in the announcement that amalgamation was not practicable in the existing circumstances, Huggins considered it

> necessary that the disagreement with that view and adherence to the opinion that the advantages of an early amalgamation of the three territories outweigh the disadvantages is still the considered opinion of the Southern Rhodesia Government, be included.

Alternatively, if no reference to amalgamation were made in the announcement there would be no need to include this statement. Finally, Huggins reiterated a statement which he had made to Lord Cranborne during their last meeting in London that neither of them knew for sure what the Africans in the two northern territories might decide if they could be consulted. He went on,

> If we undertook propaganda and among other things promised not to increase their hut tax, or even reduce it, I think we could buy their vote. In the mass they are quite incapable of expressing a considered opinion on any issue greater than a reduction of hut tax.[164]

Huggins was still unrepentent in his contempt of African opinion and had obviously made no attempt to understand the reasons for African opposition to amalgamation.

---

[163] Huggins to Lord Cranborne, 8 August, 1944. Ibid.

[164] Ibid.

Huggins' suggestion that no reference to amalgamation should be made in the announcement of the new Council was considered unacceptable by British authorities since it would lead to questions being asked regarding its bearing on the amalgamation question. However, no objection was raised to the inclusion of a reference to the fact that the Southern Rhodesian Government still adhered to their view that the three territories should be amalgamated. The announcement regarding the establishment of the Central African Council as well as the grant of an unofficial majority in Northern Rhodesia was made in the British Parliament on 18 October.[165] In his House of Commons announcement, Colonel Oliver Stanley pointed out that the British Government had "after careful consideration, come to the conclusion that the amalgamation of the Territories under existing circumstances cannot be regarded as practicable" and that the new arrangement would, nevertheless, "make an important contribution, by ensuring a closer contact and co-operation to the future prosperity of the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland."

In the United Kingdom the announcement of 18 October was given a favourable reception. The League of Coloured Peoples enthusiastically welcomed it. "Will you allow me to say how much I admire your courage in the strong stand you have taken on the Rhodesias," wrote Dr. Harold A. Moody to Stanley on behalf of the organisation.[166] Another expression of approval, though by no means a warm one, came from Lord Bledisloe who received the announcement with "intense relief". He was particularly pleased that "at long last a definite official link [was] being established between the three territories" and that an Unofficial majority in the Northern Rhodesian Legislative Council was being conceded. He was gracious enough to point out that the idea of a consultative Central African Council was "possibly better (for the present) than the Inter-Territorial Council which I and my colleagues on the Royal Commission recommended." He could not, however, "help regretting that the opportunity was not grasped of either throwing Nyasaland into N. Rhodesia, or of 'dividing it between' the two Rhodesias."

---

[165] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, vol. 403, 18 October, 1944, cols. 2364-68.

[166] Moody to Stanley, 21 October, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./ 795/128/ 45104/1944.

Lord Bledisloe was very bitter about the fact that he had not been consulted during the negotiations leading to the present proposals. He also expressed himself "entirely ignorant of the reasons for the rejection of my Royal Commission's recommendations."[167] That he was still smarting under the Government's failure to act on his Commission's recommendations is evident. The preposterous idea that part of Nyasaland could be joined to Southern Rhodesia is indicative of his poor understanding of the problems of Central Africa. Judging from his statements since the publication of his Commission's Report, it is clear that Lord Bledisloe learned very little from his tour about settler politics in British Central Africa and about the political and economic disabilities under which the Africans lived. He was inclined to contrast the Africans with the Maoris in New Zealand.

> The impression I formed regarding them was that of barbarian children whom it was quite impossible, to the extent of 75 per cent of them, to treat as being, at any rate for many generations and possibly for a couple of centuries, as receptive of the same method of development as the Maoris.

---

[167] Lord Bledisloe to Stanley, 19 October, 1944. Ibid.

Furthermore, he felt that the Africans in this region were "to a large extent ... not educable" and that any attempt "either to educate them on Western European lines or to develop in their minds a sense of political responsibility" was simply a waste of time.[168]

In the Rhodesias the British Government's statement was given a very cool reception. The pronouncement on amalgamation was generally deplored by the Northern Rhodesian Elected Members for its "indeterminate nature". Most disappointing of all was the fact that no definite indication was given in the statement as to what the "circumstances" were which made immediate amalgamation "improbable" or the obstacles which would have to be removed before amalgamation could become practicable. This criticism was quite understandable in view of the British Government's failure to make its stand on amalgamation clear and unequivocable. The phrase "under existing circumstances" gave an impression that amalgamation was not being rejected, but only being postponed. In fact when pressed by Lord Winterton to make it clear that the British Government did not necessarily mean to "exclude for all time the idea of amalgamation of the African territories," Colonel Stanley's reply was in the affirmative. It had been in order to avoid this confusion that Gore-Browne had wanted a "more positive" and categorical statement regarding the question of amalgamation.[169] It was not until 1948 that a categorical rejection of amalgamation was finally conveyed to Welensky by Creech Jones who had succeeded George Hall as Secretary of State for the Colonies in

---

[168] Great Britain, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, vol. 125, 3 December, 1942, cols. 396-7.

[169] Gore-Browne to Stanley, 21 October, 1944. See also his letter to Creech Jones, 31 August, 1945. Ibid.

October, 1946.[170] The only bright spot in the British Government's statement was the creation of the Central African Council which was generally viewed as "a first instalment of amalgamation." Welensky promised to support it "with everything in my power" in the belief that it laid "the cornerstone of amalgamation." If they made a success of it, he said, it would eventually lead to amalgamation.[171] In setting up the Council great pains were taken to enlist the co-operation of the Northern Rhodesian settlers since, as Cohen pointed out, it was "absolutely essential that the Council should have the confidence of the European public in Northern Rhodesia."[172]

In Southern Rhodesia, however, the Central African Council was accepted rather grudgingly. As the Rhodesia Herald pointed out, the question was certainly going to be asked whether the new arrangement was a compromise, an evasion or merely a case of taking two bites at the cherry of amalgamation. Huggins viewed the establishment of the Council as a matter of expediency on the part of the British Government, but he made it plain that it was not what the Rhodesians had hoped for. "I hold the view that had we refused the proposal it would have been the death-knell of amalgamation in the future," he said, "as it would have annoyed our kinsman in other countries."[173] At the same time he made it clear that they were not going to accept the Council as final.

---

[170] Allighan, op. cit., pp. 154-7. In doing so, however, Creech Jones hinted that the Government would be prepared to consider a federal solution. For a discussion of the Labour Government's post-war colonial policy in relation to federation in Central Africa see Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics 1945-1961: From 'Colonial Development' to 'Wind of Change', (Oxford University Press,, 1971), pp. 214-230; James Griffiths, Pages from Memory, (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1969), chapt., 8.

[171] Northern Rhodesia, Legislative Council Debates, 16 January, 1945, col. 192.

[172] Minute of 19 January, 1945. P.R.O./C.O./795/128/45104/1944.

During the inaugural opening of the Council on 24 April, 1945 Huggins reiterated his Government's view that amalgamation was essential if the development of South Central Africa was to be brought about within a reasonable space of time. "However," he said, "the powers-that-be in London have decided otherwise and presented us with a scheme that is certainly better than nothing but which promises to be difficult rather than easy from the point of view of achieving much in regard to our desire." The new arrangement, he said, could in no way replace amalgamation which had been rejected by the British Government on grounds of "somewhat minute" differences on native policy. He admitted that he had not been "very fulsome" in his welcome to the Council because he was "genuinely disappointed at the action of the people in London" but he promised that they would do everything in their power to make the work of the Council a success, and would "leave nothing undone that might contribute to the successful co-operation and development of the three countries."[174]

At the time of its formation, the general view in the Rhodesias was that if the Council could be worked to a success a strong case for amalgamation would thereby be established. After all, as The New Rhodesia humorously pointed out, this was a typical British way of doing things;

---

[173] Cited in East Africa and Rhodesia, 11 January, 1945, p. 451.

[174] For the proceedings of the inaugural meeting of the Central African Council see the cable from Information, Salisbury, dated 25 April, 1945. P.R.O./C.O./795/133/45388/1944-45; The Times, 25 April, 1945 and East Africa and Rhodesia, 3 May, 1945, p. 818.

> the colonies keep knocking at the door, at first they are told rudely to run away and not be silly, then they are told it is no use knocking because nobody is 'at home', then they are admitted to the ante-room on the distinct understanding that no interview with the Big Noise will be allowed, then an interview is granted but it is clearly stated that no notice will be taken of what they say, and finally the original request is granted.

The moral here was obvious: Rhodesians must not allow themselves to be put off by the Colonial Office prevarications. "A little more cunning or a little more brutality will have to be employed this time," the paper said, "as the Colonial Office is not using the normal delaying action but is trying to lead us directly away from amalgamation."[175] As far as the Colonial Office was concerned, the Central African Council was, as Cohen pointed out, "intended as H.M. Government's concrete alternative suggestion to amalgamation" and was seen as a considerable improvement on the existing Governors' Conference.[176] Although the new Council was political in its origins, in announcing its formation to the House of Commons, Colonel Stanley only emphasised its economic and practical aspects. It was presented as part of the new programme of regional grouping and regional co-operation which characterised British control policy in Africa during the last years of the war in which priority was given to economic rather than political development.[177] As one writer has pointed out, "In 1944 Imperial policy veered in the direction of closer association wherever there were contiguous colonies."[178] A similar Council for the four British West African colonies was set up at the end of 1945 and discussions were already in progress for broadening the scope of the East African Governors' Conference by transforming it into an East African High Commission. This finally came into existence in December 1947 in spite of strong Asian and African opposition in Uganda and Tanganyika.[179]

---

[175] 14 April, 1945.

[176] Minute of 28 February, 1945. P.R.O./C.O./795/133/45388/1944-45.

[177] See Oliver Stanley's statement in the House of Commons Debate on Colonial Office Estimates, Parliamentary Debates, vol. 400, 6 June, 1944, cols. 1235-6. This policy was well articulated by Lord Hailey in a speech delivered in the House of Lords on 9 July, 1941. "Our attention for the moment," he said, "must be concentrated on the improvement of physical health and social standards. You cannot build up political liberties on dwarfed bodies or stunted intelligences." He [Continued on next page.]

In the years after 1945, once it became evident that the Central African Council which Huggins described as "nothing more than a sop" and "an unnecessary extravagance", was not moving fast enough towards amalgamation as was originally thought, both he and Welensky gave up all attempts to make a success of it. But while Welensky wanted to jettison it, Huggins felt that they should use it in order to demonstrate its inadequacy. "After all," he told Welensky, "if as a result of trial and error it proves to be useless, is not your position much stronger when you come to argue that you want something to replace it?"[180]

While the discussion regarding the setting up of the Central African Council was in progress, African opposition to amalgamation in Northern Rhodesia was becoming more vocal and broadly widespread. No

---

[Continued from p. 477.]
went on, " ... we may well hope the time will not come when the people of the Colonies, more particularly of those backward Colonies, will say to us 'We asked for bread and you offered us a vote'." Vol. 119, col. 721.

[178] Rotberg, "The Federation Movement in British East and Central Africa 1889-1953", op. cit., p. 149.

[179] Ibid.

[180] Cited in Taylor, op. cit., p. 72.

longer could it be maintained that this opposition was merely an expression of a handful of educated Africans. The establishment of Regional Councils towards the end of 1943[181] had created a machinery, inadequate though it was, by which African opinion, at regional level, could be gauged on certain important issues affecting the welfare of the Africans throughout the territory. One of the topics that frequently came up in the meetings of the Regional Councils throughout the period from 1943 to 1946 was the question of amalgamation. In all these meetings amalgamation was vigorously denounced both by educated and uneducated Africans, by villagers and townsmen, and by chiefs and commoners.[182]

At the meeting of the Western Province Regional Council held at Luanshya on 20 December, 1943, Harry Nkumbula, the future leader of the Northern Rhodesia African Congress, stated that the Northern Rhodesian Africans dreaded the very idea of amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia. "The South African Native Policy of economic and political discrimination and racial segregation," he said, "is adopted as the official Native policy of the Southern Rhodesian Government."[183] Similar views were expressed in the resolutions passed by other Regional Councils in the territory. "We want to know if the amalgamation of Northern Rhodesia with Southern Rhodesia means that the Government of Northern Rhodesia has failed," asked Johane Nabanyama, a Nanwala representative to the Southern Province Regional Council held at Mazabuka on 30 May, 1944. Thus as the three territories moved closer towards some form of political union, the Northern Rhodesian Africans became more vocal in their opposition to such a move. It was now clear that any form of political association with Southern Rhodesia could only take place against the expressed opinion of the Northern Rhodesian Africans.

---

[181] Waddington to Stanley, 8 February, 1944. P.R.O./C.O./795/133/45375/1944-45; Gann, A History of Northern Rhodesia, p. 351. These were formed in response to Gore-Browne's plea for "some form of parallel representation" for the Northern Rhodesian Africans through their own Councils. The Regional Councils were made up of representatives chosen by Native Authorities (Chiefs' councils), Urban Advisory Councils and African Welfare Associations. Although largely dominated by the conservative rural representatives, the Regional Councils were broadly representative of the Northern Rhodesian African population as a whole. Their meetings were held under the Chairmanship of the Provincial Commissioners of the Province concerned or, in the event of his absence, under District Commissioners.

[182] For the minutes of the various Regional Councils in the territory during this period see P.R.O./C.O./795/133/45375/1944-45 and 795/133/45375/1946.

Looking back over the whole issue of amalgamation between the two Rhodesias during the years from 1924 to 1945, several conclusions regarding British policy towards the Northern Rhodesian settlers may be drawn. Until amalgamation became a dominant political issue in Northern Rhodesian politics in the early 1930's, following the publication of Sidney Webb's White Paper on native policy in East Africa, the Colonial Office had no clearly defined policy regarding Northern Rhodesia's political destiny. Although the view had privately been expressed to Lord Buxton in 1917 that Northern Rhodesia was a 'native territory' whose destiny could not be tied up with Southern Rhodesia, it is clear that this view was influenced by the general expectation in the Colonial Office that Southern Rhodesia was going to join the Union of South Africa. However, once the Southern Rhodesians rejected entry into the Union in 1922, Northern Rhodesia's future political alignment had to be re-considered in the light of this development.

---

[183] This speech, which was later read by Gore-Browne in the Legislative Council, was in response to Welensky's amalgamation motion of 25 November, 1943.

There were now three alternative courses for Northern Rhodesia; alignment with the East African dependencies, amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia or ultimate self-government. But as far as the Colonial Office was concerned there was as yet no need to rush into a decision concerning the future of Northern Rhodesia. Kenya, rather than Northern Rhodesia, seemed to demand more immediate attention. Thus when the issue of amalgamation suddenly surfaced in 1930 as a result of Webb's White Paper on native policy, the Colonial Office was caught without any ready policy, hence nine months were to elapse before a reply could be sent to the Rhodesian settlers in response to their request for a conference to discuss the amalgamation of the two territories. The vagueness of this reply clearly reflected the basic indecisiveness of British policy towards Northern Rhodesia. British commitment to the principle of colonial trusteeship was only partly responsible for this indecisiveness. As one writer has pointed out, "The inter-war years saw the triumph of the ideal of trusteeship--though the practice was anything but triumphant."[184] Without necessarily being cynical about British commitment to colonial trusteeship, it is clear that British policy towards Northern Rhodesia largely came to be influenced by trade and military considerations. As the European horizon began to darken under the thick clouds of war, and as the European powers began to re-arm,

---

[184] Rita Hinden, Empire and After: A Study of British Imperial Attitudes, (London: Essential Books Limited, 1949), p. 126. British statesmen, on the whole, never actually acknowledged their indebtedness to the Covenant of the League of Nations for the principle of colonial trusteeship. They stated, as did Lord Milner during the discussion on the mandates at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919, that trusteeship had long been the guiding principle of British Colonial policy dating back from Burke's speech on the India Bill in 1785.

Northern Rhodesia began to loom larger on British policy-makers because of its copper resources which were vital to her economy and re-armament programme. In spite of all the talk about British trusteeship of the African inhabitants in the two northern Protectorates during the discussions on amalgamation, the desire to keep Northern Rhodesian copper mines directly under British administration seems to have been one of the powerful factors behind British refusal to sanction the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias.

During these discussions reference was also frequently made to the House of Commons as one of the reasons why the amalgamation of the two Rhodesias could not be considered by the Colonial Office and the Dominions Office--with the intervention of Southern Rhodesia in the amalgamation issue, the latter department became deeply involved in the determination of policy on this matter. The real influence of the House of Commons on colonial issues during the period covered by this study is not very easy to determine. Generally speaking, except for few troubled spots like Kenya, Palestine and Cyprus, the inter-war governments in Great Britain were primarily pre-occupied with international issues. With few exceptions, there was very little interest in colonial matters among Members of Parliament. Besides, the time allocated for colonial discussion was limited to a single day devoted to the Supply Debate each year. Few Members of Parliament were fully conversant with colonial issues, hence the debate was invariably limited to few individuals who were interested in certain areas or particular aspects of the colonial Empire. Lack of knowledge about what actually went on inside the colonies was another handicap under which Members of Commons laboured. The annual Colonial Office reports, on the whole self-complacent and self-congratulatory, were hardly adequate in helping Members of Parliament to learn more about colonial affairs. The additional fact that Colonial Office Supply Debates were suspended from 1939 to 1942 together with the publication of the annual reports, further minimized the influence of Parliament on colonial policy. There were, however, few Members of Parliament in the Labour Party, like Creech Jones, who always kept a close watch on the progress of the amalgamation issue.

Although the frequent changes of Secretaries of State for the Colonies from 1931 to 1942 were generally criticised, inside and outside Parliament,[185] there is no evidence that this factor had any great significance on British policy towards the issue of amalgamation. Since the 1931 precedent of involving the three British parties represented in the House of Commons in the formulation of policy on amalgamation, changes in personnel at the Colonial Office had no marked influence on the policy. There was a conscious effort to keep this issue as all other issues appertaining to the colonial Empire, above party lines.[186] The fact that the main British political parties were represented in both the National Government (1931-1940) and the Coalition Government (1940-1945) made this task much easier--even though the two administrations were heavily dominated by the Conservatives.[187] The change of policy towards the question of closer union between the Rhodesias and Nyasaland which took place after 1939 must be attributed more to the impact of the war than to the personnel at the Colonial Office. Although Stanley's appointment to the Colonial Office was decisive concerning British policy towards the three territories, it is nevertheless true to say that he merely accelerated a process which was already evident since the outbreak of the Second World War.

---

[185] "There have been too many Colonial Secretaries in recent years and too little colonial policy," complained the Economist in November 1942, p. 658.

[186] For an account of the collapse of a bi-partisan policy on colonial affairs after 1945 see Goldsworthy, "Parliamentary Question on Colonial Affairs: A Retrospective Analysis", Parliamentary Affairs, vol. xxiii, (Spring, 1970), pp. 141-153.

[187] It is interesting to note that the only non-Conservative Colonial Secretaries during this period were Sidney Webb (Labour), Thomas and MacDonald (both National Labour).

As far as the Northern Rhodesian settlers were concerned, the changes in the Colonial Office were important only in so far as they had welcomed the departure of Sidney Webb whom they regarded as the architect of the situation which had forced them into the amalgamation course. But once it became apparent that British policy on amalgamation was being based on consultation with the Opposition parties, their criticism of the Colonial Office continued unabated after 1931. As long as they were denied amalgamation with Southern Rhodesia, and in spite of the constitutional concessions that accompanied this denial, they remained unreconciled to Colonial Office rule. As far as Southern Rhodesia is concerned, with the advantage of hindsight, it can be stated that her decision to involve herself in the issue of amalgamation was a blunder. By opting for amalgamation instead of full self-government, she was forced to open her door to outside scrutiny of her native policy which hitherto had been generally believed to be beyond reproach. The result of this scrutiny was that she was found wanting. Consequently, her demand for amalgamation was denied. The force of her subsequent claim for full self-government, after the collapse of the Central African Federation in 1963, were denied largely because of her illiberal native policy which had been publicised by the opponents of amalgamation and federation. Had it not been for this publicity, it is not improbable that Southern Rhodesia could have stealthily moved closer to full self-government by 1945. As it was Huggins sacrificed this option in order to strengthen his demand for amalgamation. The result was that Southern Rhodesia fell between two stools; she neither got amalgamation nor full self-government. Hence U.D.I. in 1965.


MAP OF
NORTHERN RHODESIA
SHOWING
ELECTORAL AREAS
Miles
0 50 100 150 200
Chief Roads
Railways
ANGOLA
BELGIAN CONGO
TANGANYIKA TERRITORY
NYASA
LAKE NYASA
PORTUGUESE EAST AFRICA
SOUTHERN RHODESIA
CAPRIVI STRIP
LIVINGSTONE AND WESTERN AREA
NDOLA AREA
NKANA AREA
LUANSHYA AREA
BROKEN HILL AREA
MIDLAND AREA
SOUTHERN AREA
NDOLA AREA
NORTH EASTERN AREA
From Lobito Bay
Mwinilunga
Elisabethville
Mongu
Lealui
Zambezi
Victoria Falls
Livingstone
Wankie
Kafue
Mazabuka
Lusaka
Broken Hill
Ndola
Nchanga
Mufulira
Ft Rosebery
Lake Mweru
Lake Bangweulu
Abercorn
Lake Tanganyika
Kasama
Shiwa Ngandu
Luangwa
Ft Jameson
Salisbury
Tete
Blantyre
Zomba
Domira Bay

Bibliography

A. Unpublished Sources

1. Great Britain Public Record Office.
    - Colonial Office Papers C.O. 417 Series, 1916-1917.
    - C.O. 795 Series, 1924-1946.
    - C.O. 847 Series, 1938-1939,
    - Dominions Office Papers D.O. 35 Series, 1930-1945.
    - Cabinet Papers CAB 24, 65 and 66 Series, 1930-1945.

2. Private Papers
    - Papers of Arthur Creech Jones. Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
    - Papers of Sir John Chancellor. Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
    - Sidney Webb Papers. London School of Economics and Political Science Library, London.

3. Other Unpublished Sources
    - Sir Herbert James Stanley. Correspondence, 1910-41, and memoranda etc., Rhodes House Library, Oxford.
    - Beatrice Webb Diaries. London School of Economics and Political Science Library, London.
    - Hailey, William Malcolm. "Note on the Bearing of Native Policy on the Proposed Amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland" (Confidential), Colonial Office, 1941.
    - Henderson, Ian. "Labour and Politics in Northern Rhodesia, 1900-1953: A Study in the Limits of Colonial Power". Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1972.

B. Published Sources

1. Parliamentary Debates
    - Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons).
    - Northern Rhodesia. Legislative Council Debates.

2. Parliamentary Papers. Great Britain.
    - Cmd. 1273. South Africa. First Report of the Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Consider Certain Questions Relating to Rhodesia. April 1921.
    - Cmd. 1471. South Africa. Second Report of the Committee Appointed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Consider Certain Questions Relating to Rhodesia. August 1921.
    - Cmd. 1573. Southern Rhodesia. Despatch to the High Commissioner for South Africa Transmitting Draft Letters Patent Providing for the Constitution of Responsible Government in the Colony of Southern Rhodesia, and other Draft Instruction connected therewith. January 1922.

Cmd. 1914. *Rhodesia. Correspondence Regarding a Proposed Settlement of Various Outstanding Questions Relating to the British South Africa Company's Position in Southern and Northern Rhodesia*. July 1923.

Cmd. 1922. *Indians in Kenya. Memorandum*. July 1923.

Cmd. 1984. *Rhodesia. Agreement Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the British South Africa Company for the Settlement of Outstanding Questions Relating to Southern and Northern Rhodesia*. September 1923.

Cmd. 2387. *East Africa. Report of the East African Commission*. April 1925.

Cmd. 2904. *Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa*. July 1927

Cmd. 3234. *Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa*. January 1929.

Cmd. 3573. *Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa*. June 1930.

Cmd. 3574. *Statement of the Conclusions of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom as regards Closer Union in East Africa*. June 1930.

Cmd. 4093. *Report by the Financial Commissioner (Lord Moyne) on certain Questions in Kenya*. May 1932.

Cmd. 4141. *Correspondence (1931-1932) Arising from the Report of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa*. August 1932.

Cmd. 5218. *Despatch from the Governor of Southern Rhodesia Relating to the Proposed Amendment of the Southern Rhodesia Constitution*. July 1936.

Cmd. 5760. *The Colonial Empire in 1937-38. Statement to Accompany the Estimates for Colonial and Middle Eastern Services 1938*. June 1938.

Cmd. 5949. *Rhodesa-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report*. March 1939.

Cmd. 6023. *The Colonial Empire Relating to the Period 1st April, 1938, to 31st March 1939 to Accompany the Estimates for Colonial and Middle Eastern Services 1939*. May 1939.

Cmd. 6321. *Atlantic Charter*. (Joint Declaration by the President of the United States of America and Mr. Winston Churchill representing His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom). August 14, 1941.

Cmd. 7167. *The Colonial Empire (1939-1947). Presented by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to Parliament by Command of His Majesty*. July 1947.

Cmd. 8233. *Central African Territories: Report of Conference on Closer Association*. March 1951.

Cmd. 8234. *Central African Territories: Geographical, Historical and Economic Survey*. June 1951.

Cmd. 8235. *Central African Territories: Comparative Survey of Native Policy 1951*. June 1951.

Joint Committee on Closer Union in East Africa, vol. 1, *Report*. H.C. 156, 6th October, 1931.

Report of the Commission Appointed to Enquire into the Financial and Economic Position of Northern Rhodesia. Colonial No. 145, 1938.

C. Books and Pamphlets

Allighan, Garry. The Welensky Story. London: MacDonald & Co. Ltd., 1964.

Amery, L. S. Empire and Prosperity. London: Faber & Faber, 1930.

__________. My Political Life. Vol. 3: The Unforgiving Years. London: Hutchinson, 1955.

Bennet, George. "Settlers and Politics in Kenya". History of East Africa, ed. Vincent Harlow and E. M. Chilver assisted by Allison Smith. Vol. 11. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965.

Blaxland, Gregory. J. H. Thomas A Life for Unity. London: Frederick Muller Limited, 1964.

Butler, David., and Freeman, Jennie. British Political Facts 1900-1968. 3rd ed. London: Macmillan, 1969.

Carrington, C. E. The Liquidation of the British Empire. London: George Harrap, 1961.

Chandos, Lord (Oliver Lyttleton). The Memoirs of Lord Chandos. London: Bodley Head, 1962.

Chitepo, Herbert W. "Developments in Central Africa". Federalism and the New Nations of Africa, ed. David P. Currie. Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Clegg, Edward. Race and Politics: Partnership in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Oxford University Press, 1960.

Clynes, J. R. Memoirs 1924-1937. Vol. 2. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1937.

Cohen, Andrew. British Policy in Changing Africa. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1959.

Cole, Margaret, ed. Beatrice Webb's Diaries 1924-1932. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1956.

The Committee on Africa. The War and Peace Aims: The Atlantic Charter and Africa from an American Standpoint. New York City: 1942.

Cook, David F. "The Influence of Livingstonia Mission upon the Formation of Welfare Associations in Zambia, 1912-1931". Themes in the Christian History of Central Africa, ed. T. O. Ranger and John Weller. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1975.

Creighton, T. R. M. *The Anatomy of Partnership: Southern Rhodesia and the Central African Federation*. London: Faber and Faber, 1960.

Cripps, Arthur S. *An Africa for Africans: A Plea on behalf of Territorial Segregation Areas and their Freedom in a South African Colony*. London: Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd., 1927.

__________. *Is Our Colour Bar to Cross the Zambesi?* Salisbury: 1942.

Davidson, J. W. *The Northern Rhodesian Legislative Assembly*. London: Faber & Faber Limited, 1948.

Davies, M. A. G. *Incorporation in the Union of South Africa or Self-Government: Southern Rhodesia's Choice, 1922*. Pretoria: Communications of the University of South Africa, C. 58, 1965.

Drummond, Ian M. *British Economic Policy and the Empire 1919-1939*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1972.

Dundas, Charles C. F. *African Crossroads*. London: MacMillan & Co. Ltd., 1955.

Franklin, Harry. *Unholy Wedlock: The Failure of the Central African Federation*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963.

Galbraith, John S. *Crown and Charter: The Early Years of the British South Africa Company*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1974.

Gann, L. H. *The Birth of a Plural Society: The Development of Northern Rhodesia Under the British South Africa Company 1894-1914*. Manchester University Press, 1958.

__________. *A History of Northern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1953*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1964.

__________. "History of Rhodesia and Nyasaland 1889-1953". *Handbook to the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland*, ed. W. V. Brelsford. London: Casselll and Company Ltd., 1960.

__________. *A History of Southern Rhodesia: Early Days to 1934*. London: Chatto & Windus, 1965.

__________, and Gelfand, M. *Huggins of Rhodesia: The Man and His Country*. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1964.

Goldsworthy, David. *Colonial Issues in British Politics 1945-1961: From 'Colonial Development' to 'Wind of Change'*. Oxford University Press, 1971.

Gray, Richard. *The Two Nations: Aspects of the Development of Race* Relations in the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. Oxford Univeresity Press, 1960.

Gregory, Robert G. Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour's Experiment with the Doctrine of Native Paramountcy. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962.

Griffiths, James. Pages From Memory. London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd., 1969.

Hailey, William Malcolm. An African Survey: A Study of Problems Arising in Africa South of the Sahara. (Revised 1956), Oxford University Press, 1957.

__________. The Future of Colonial Peoples. Oxford University Press, 1943.

__________. Native Administration in the British African Territories. Part II. Central Africa, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, Northern Rhodesia. London: H.M.S.O., 1950.

Hall, Richard. Zambia. London: Pall Mall, 1965.

Hancock, W. K. Smuts: The Fields of Force 1919-1950. Vol. 2. Cambridge University Press, 1968.

Hanna, A. J. The Story of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland. London: Faber and Faber, 1960.

Hertslet, E. The Map of Africa by Treaty. Vol. 1. Reprint of 3rd ed. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1967.

Hinden, Rita. Empire and After: A Study of British Imperial Attitudes. London: Essential Books Limited, 1949.

Hodgson, Robert, and Stoneman, Elvyn A. The Changing Map of Africa. 2nd ed. Princeton, New Jersey: D. Van Nostrand Company Inc., 1968.

Huggins, Godfrey Martin. Statement on Native Policy in Southern Rhodesia. Salisbury: Government Printer, November, 1941.

Hyam, Ronald. The Failure of South African Expansion 1908-1948. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1972.

Jollie, Tawse E. The Real Rhodesia. London: Hutchinson & Co., 1924.

Keatley, Patric. The Politics of Partnership: Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1963.

Keith, Arthur B. The Government of the British Empire. London: Macmillan & Co. Ltd., 1935.

Keppel-Jones, A. South Africa: A Short History. 3rd ed. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1963.

Labour Party. Labour and the Nation. London: 1928.

__________. The Colonies: The Labour Party's Post-War Policy for the African and Pacific Colonies. London: 1943.

__________. *The Empire in Africa: Labour's Policy*. London: [1926].

Leys, Colins. *European Politics in Southern Rhodesia*. Oxford University Press, 1959.

__________, and Pratt, Cranford., ed. *A New Deal in Central Africa*. London: Heinemann, 1960.

Leys, Norman. *Last Chance in Kenya*. London: The Hogarth Press, 1931.

London Group on African Affairs. *Memorandum on Rights of Africans*. No. 2 *South African Native Policy: A Threat to British Tradition in other Parts of Africa*. London: [1937].

Long, B. K. *Drummond Chaplin: His Life and Times in Africa*. Oxford University Press, 1941.

Mansergh, Nicholas. *South Africa 1906-1961: The Price of Magnanimity*. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962.

Marks, Shula. *Reluctant Rebellion: The 1906-8 Disturbances in Natal*. Oxford Clarendon Press, 1970.

Martin, Kingsley. "The Webbs in Retirement". *The Webbs and their Work*, ed. Margaret Cole. London: Frederick Muller, 1949.

Meebelo, Henry S. *Reaction to Colonialism: A Prelude to the Politics of Independence in Northern Zambia 1893-1939*. Manchester University Press, 1971.

Mtshali, Vulindlela B. *Rhodesia: Background to Conflict*. London: Leslie Frewin, 1967.

Murray, D. J. *The Governmental System in Southern Rhodesia*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970.

Oliver, Sidney. *Imperial Trusteeship*. London: The Fabian Society, 1929.

Palley, Claire. *The Constitutional History and Law of Southern Rhodesia 1888-1965: With Special Reference to Imperial Control*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966.

Perham, Margery. *Colonial Sequence 1930-1949: A Chronological Commentary Upon British Colonial Policy Especially in Africa*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1967.

__________. *Colonial Sequence 1949-1969: A Chronological Commentary Upon British Colonial Policy in Africa*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1970.

Pollock, Norman H. *Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia: Corridor to the North*. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1971.

Raphael, Lois A. C. *The Cape-to-Cairo Dream: A Study of British Imperialism*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936.

Raymer, A. C. Should Chartered Administration be Abolished? Bulawayo: 1914.

Rhodesia Pamphlet no. 20. "Speech Delivered by the Right Hon. Sir Starr Jameson, P.C. (President of the British South Africa Company) in the Drill Hall, Salisbury on 22 December", 1913. London: Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office Library, 1930.

Robinson, Kenneth. The Dilemmas of Trusteeship: Aspects of British Colonial Policy Between the Wars. Oxford University Press, 1965.

Rotberg, Robert I. The Rise of Nationalism in Central Africa: The Making of Malawi and Zambia, 1873-1964. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1965.

Schmokel, Wolfe W. "The Hard Death of Imperialism: British and German Colonial Attitudes, 1919-1939". Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule, ed. Prosser Gifford and W. Roger Louis. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967.

Shiels, Drummond. "Sidney Webb as a Minister". The Webbs and their Work, ed. Margaret Cole. London: Frederick Muller, 1949.

Snowden, Philip. An Autobiography. Volume Two. 1919-1934. London: Ivor Nicholson and Watson Limited, 1934.

Steele, Murray. "'With Hope Unconquered and Unconquerable....' Arthur Shearly Cripps, 1869-1952". Themes in the Christian History of Central Africa, ed. T. O. Ranger and John Weller. London: Heinemann Educational Books, 1975.

Swinton, Lord (Philip Cunliffe-Lister). I Remember. London: Hutchinson & Co. Ltd., 1946.

Taylor, Don. The Rhodesian: The Life of Sir Roy Welensky. London: Museum Press Limited, 1955.

Thompson, L. M. The Unification of South Africa 1902-1910. Oxford University Press, 1960.

Vambe, Lawrence. An Ill-Fated People: Zimbabwe Before and After Rhodes. London: Heinemann, 1972.

__________. From Rhodesia to Zimbabwe. London: Heinemann, 1976.

Vindex [F. Verschoyle]. Cecil Rhodes: His Life and Speeches 1881-1900. London: Chapman and Hall, 1900.

Walker, Eric A. A History of Southern Africa. 3rd ed. London: Longmans Green and Co., 1957.

Wallis, J. P. R. One Man's Hand: The Story of Sir Charles Coghlan and the Liberation of Southern Rhodesia. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1950.

Walton, Edgar H. The Inner History of the National Convention of South Africa. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912.

Wedgewood, C. V. The Last of the Radicals: Josiah Wedgewood, M.P. London: Jonathan Cape, 1951.

Welensky, Roy. Welensky's 4000 Days: The Life and Death of the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. London: Collins, 1964.

Wells, H. G. Imperialism and the Open Conspiracy. London: Faber & Faber, 1929.

Wight, Martin. British Colonial Constitutions. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952.

Willkie, L. Wendell. One World. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943.

Willson, F. G. M., ed. Written and compiled by Gloria C. Passmore and Margaret I. Mitchell. Source Book of Parliamentary Elections And Referenda in Southern Rhodesia 1898-1962. Salisbury: Department of Government, University College of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 1963.

Winterton, Edward Turnour. Orders of the Day. London: Cassell and Company Ltd., 1953.

Wood, Anthony St. John. Northern Rhodesia: The Human Background. London: Pall Mall Press, 1961.

Woolf, Leonard. Downhill All the Way: An Autobiography of the Years 1919-1939. London: The Hogarth Press, 1967.

D. Periodicals

Africanus [Frank Melland]. "A Central African Confederation", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xviii, (July, 1918), pp. 276-306.

__________. "Further Thoughts on a Central African Confederation", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xix, (January, 1920), pp. 101-108.

Aihe, D. O. "The Issue of Closer Association with Southern Rhodesia in Zambia's Constitutional History", Odu, n.s., no. 8, (1972), pp. 33-60.

Amery, L. S. "The Crown and Africa", African Affairs, vol. 52, (July 1953), pp. 179-185.

__________. "Problems and Development in Africa", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxviii, (July 1929), pp. 325-339.

Atieno-Odhiambo, E. S. "The Colonial Government, the Settlers and the 'Trust' Principle in Kenya to 1939", Transafrican Journal of History, vol. 2, (1972), pp. 94-113.

Bennet, George. "Paramountcy to Partnership: J. H. Oldham and Africa", Africa, vol. 30, (January 1960), pp. 356-360.

Benson, W. "Closer Union in Africa", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxx, (October 1931), pp. 337-343.

Bonsor, Glover J. F. "The Case for Amalgamation with the South", The Crown Colonist, vol. 4, (April 1934), pp. 169-170.

Buell. R. L. "The Destiny of East Africa", Foreign Affairs, vol. 6, (April 1928), pp. 408-426.

Carbutt, C. L. "The Racial Problem in Southern Rhodesia", NADA [The Southern Rhodesia Native Affairs Department Annual], (1934), pp. 6-11.

Chancellor, John. "Progress and Development of Southern Rhodesia", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxviii, (October 1928), pp. 149-154.

Coombe, Trevor. "The Origin of Secondary Education in Zambia", 3 Parts, African Social Research, no. 3, (June 1967), pp. 173-205; no. 4, (December 1967), pp. 283-315; no. 5, (June 1968), pp. 365-405.

Denny, S. R. "Leopold Moore versus the Chartered Company: An Introduction to Federation", 2 Parts, The Northern Rhodesia Journal, vol. iv, (1960), pp. 219-230, (1960), pp. 335-346.

Downie, J. W. "Southern Rhodesia: A Home from Home', The Empire Review, vol. Liv, (November 1931), p. 311.

Drew, J. D. C. "The Four Southern Rhodesia Referendums: Their Organization and Social and Political Background", The National Archives of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Occasional Papers, (June 1963), pp. 42-57.

Dundas, C.C.F. "Central African Unification", Fortnightly Review, n.s., vol. 170, (August 1951), pp. 509-514.

Frankel, Herbert S. "Some Observations on the Rhodesia-Nyasaland Royal Commission Report", The South African Journal of Economics, vol. 7, (1939), pp. 198-206.

Gann, L. H. "The Northern Rhodesian Copper Industry and the World of Copper: 1923-1953", The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, no. xviii, (1955) pp. 1-18.

__________. "The Southern Rhodesian Land Apportionment Act, 1930: An Essay in Trusteeship", The National Archives of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, Occasional Papers, vol. 1, (June 1963), pp. 58-91.

__________. "The White Settler: A Changing Image", Race, vol. 11, (May 1961), pp. 28-40.

Gilchrist, R. D. "Rhodesia's Place in the Native Problem", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xvii, (April 1933), pp. 135-139.

Goldsworthy, David. "Conservatives and Decolonization", African Affairs, vol. 69, (July 1970), pp. 278-281.

__________. "The Debate on a Parliamentary Committee for Colonial Affairs", Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 19, (Spring 1966), pp. 191-207.

__________. "Parliamentary Questions on Colonial Affairs: A Retrospective Analysis", Parliamentary Affairs, vol. xxiii, (Spring 1970), pp. 141-153.

Gore-Browne, Stewart. "Legislative Council in Northern Rhodesia Twenty Years Ago", The Northern Rhodesia Journal, vol. 11, (1954), pp. 39-45.

__________. "The Relations of Black and White in Tropical Africa", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxxv, (October 1935), pp. 378-386.

__________. "Shiwa Ngandu", The Northern Rhodesian Journal, vol. vi, (1965), pp. 235-238.

Gregory, Robert. "Crisis for the British Empire: The East African Challenge to the Durham Tradition", The South Atlantic Quarterly, vol. 59, (1960), pp. 147-162.

Grey, Rodney. "Central Africa--White or Black?", International Journal, vol. vii, (Winter 1951-1952), pp. 30-35.

Haarer, A. E. "Another Dominion in Africa", Fortnightly Review, n.s., vol. 169, (April 1951), pp. 225-230.

Hailey, William Malcolm. "Nationalism in Africa", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxxvi, (April 1937), pp. 134-147.

Hastings, L. M. "The Infant of the Empire", The Listener, vol. xxiv, 5 September 1940), pp. 339-40.

__________. "Southern Rhodesia To-day", The Empire Review, vol. Lii, (November 1930), pp. 360-66.

Hawkins, R. C. "The Rhodesian Problem", The Contemporary Review, vol. 121, (January-June 1922), pp. 461-467.

Heisler, Helmuth. "The Creation of a Stabilized Urban Society in Northern Rhodesia/Zambia", African Affairs, vol. 70, (April 1971), pp. 125-145.

Hetherwick, A. "Nyasaland To-day and To-morrow", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xvii, (October 1917), pp. 11-19.

Hobson, R. H. "Fourteen Months: Sir Ronald Storrs in Northern Rhodesia December 1st, 1932-February 17th, 1934", 2 Parts, *The Northern Rhodesia Journal*, vol. vi, (1965), pp. 135-145, (1965), pp. 309-323.

Hofmeyr, Jan H. "The Approach to the Native Problem", *Journal of the Royal African Society*, vol. xxxvi, (July 1937), pp. 270-297.

Hooker, J. R. "Shortages Among the Surplus: European Views of African Unemployment in British Central Africa Between the Wars", *The Canadian Journal of African Studies*, vol. 3 (1969), pp. 421-429.

Horowitz, Dan. "Attitudes of British Conservatives Towards Decolonization in Africa", *African Affairs*, vol. 69, (January 1970), pp. 9-26.

__________. "The British Conservatives and the Racial Issue in the Debate on Decolonization", *Race*, vol. xii, (October 1970), pp. 169-187.

Huxley, Julian. "Why is the White Man in Africa?", *Fortnightly Review*, n.s., vol. 131, (January 1932), pp. 60-69.

Hyam, Ronald. "African Interests and the South African Act 1908-10", *Historical Journal*, vol. xiii, (1970), pp. 85-105.

Jennings, A. C. "Land Apportionment in Southern Rhodesia", *Journal of the Royal African Society*, vol. xxxiv, (July 1935), pp. 296-312.

Jollie, Tawse E. "Greater Rhodesia", *United Empire*, vol. xxii, (September 1931), pp. 492-497.

__________. "Native Administration in Southern Rhodesia", *Journal of the Royal Society of Arts*, vol. Lxxiii, (30 August, 1935), pp. 973-985.

__________. "Southern Rhodesia: A White Man's Country in the Tropics", *Geographical Review*, vol. 17, (January 1927), pp. 89-106.

Jones, Arthur Creech. "British Colonial Policy with Particular Reference to Africa", *International Affairs*, vol. xxvii, (April 1951), pp.

Keith, Arthur B. "An African Problem", *The Round Table*, vol. 33, (1942-43), pp. 134-41.

Livie-Noble, F. S. "Closer Union in Africa", *Journal of the Royal African Society*, vol. xxxi, (January 1932), pp. 77-79.

Mackee, H. K. "Northern Rhodesia and Federation", *United Empire*, vol. xliii, (July-August 1952), pp. 190-194.

MacMillan, W. H. "The Development of Africa: Impressions from Rhodesia", *The Political Quarterly*, vol. 3, (1932), pp. 552-569.

Malherbe, E. G. "The Poor White Problem", *The African Observer*, vol. iv, (April 1936), pp. 16-25.

Maugham, R. C. F. "Amalgamation of the Rhodesias and Nyasaland", United Empire, vol. xxx, (December 1939), pp. 1164-1165.

Maxwell, James Crawford. "Some Aspects of Native Policy in Northern Rhodesia", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxix, (October 1930), pp. 471-478.

McCulloch, Robert W. "Question Time in the British House of Commons", The American Political Science Review, vol. 27, (December 1933), pp. 971-977.

McIntosh, B. G. "Kenya 1923: The Political Crisis and the Missionary Dilemma", Transafrican Journal of History, vol. 1, (January 1971), pp. 103-129.

McIvor, Iver. "Future of the two Rhodesias", Fortnightly Review, n.s., vol. 113, (June 1923), pp. 920-930.

Melland, Frank. "Closer Union in East Africa", Fortnightly Review, n.s., vol. 123, (June 1928), pp. 747-759.

__________. "Northern Rhodesia: Retrospect and Prospect", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxix, (October 1930), pp. 490-498.

Moore, L. F. "Constitutional and Economic Development", The Crown Colonist, vol. 4, (April 1934), pp. 168-70.

__________. "Two Rhodesias or One", The African Observer, vol. iii, (June 1935), pp. 19-23.

Palley, Claire. "Law and the Unequal Society: Discriminatory Legislation in Rhodesia under the Rhodesian Front from 1963 to 1969", 2 Parts, Race, vol. xii, (July 1970), pp. 15-47, (October 1970), pp. 139-167.

Pedler, Frederick. "The Contribution of Lord Hailey to Africa", African Affairs, vol. 69, (July 1970), pp. 267-275.

__________. "The Rt. Hon. Lord Hailey, OM. GCSI, GCMG, GCIE, A Personal Appreciation", African Affairs, vol. 68, (October 1969), pp. 344-351.

Pollak, B. Oliver. "Black Farmers and White Politics in Rhodesia", African Affairs, vol. 74, (July 1975), pp. 263-277.

Prain, R. L. "The Problem of African Advancement on the Copperbelt of Northern Rhodesia", African Affairs, vol. 53, (April 1954), pp. 91-103.

Rotberg, Robert I. "The Federation Movement in British East and Central Africa 1889-1953", Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 2, (1963-64), pp. 141-160.

Shiels, Drummond. "The East Africa Report", The Political Quarterly, vol. 3, (1932), pp. 71-87.

Slinn, Peter. "The Role of the British South Africa Company in Northern Rhodesia 1890-1964", African Affairs, vol. 70, (October 1971), pp. 365-384.

Smith, John. "The First Session of the First Legislative Council of Northern Rhodesia, 23rd May, 1924", The Northern Rhodesia Journal, vol. iv, (1959), pp. 180-183.

Smuts, J. C. "African Settlement", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxi, (January 1930), pp. 109-131.

Stabler, John B. "The British South Africa Company Proposal for Amalgamation of the Rhodesias, 1915-1917: Northern Rhodesian Reaction", African Social Research, no. 7, (June 1969), pp. 499-528.

Stanley, Herbert J. "Progress in Northern Rhodesia", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxvi, (April 1927), pp. 209-215.

Tate, H. R. "Report of the Joint Select Committee on Closer Union in East Africa", Journal of the Royal African Society, vol. xxxi, (January 1932), pp. 38-53.

Taylor, Alan R., and Dvorin, Eugene P. "Political Development in British Central Africa 1890-1956, A Select Survey of the Literature and Background Materials", Race, vol. 1, (November 1959), pp. 61-78.

Veats, S. H. "The Rhodesias and Amalgamation", The Nineteenth Century and After, vol. 124, (September 1938), pp. 314-325.

Webb, Sidney. "The Labour Party and the Empire", The Empire Review, vol. xxxvii, (March 1932), pp. 220-232.

__________. "What Happened in 1931: A Record", The Political Quarterly, vol. 3, (1932), pp. 1-17.

Welensky, Roy. "Development of Central Africa through Federation", Optima, vol. 11, (December 1952), pp. 5-10.

__________. "Toward Federation in Central Africa", Foreign Affairs, vol. 31, (1952), pp. 142-149.

Winterbottom, J. M. "Looking Back", The Rhodes-Livingstone Journal, no. xiii, (1953), pp. 30-34.

Winterton, Edward Turnour. "Northern Rhodesia and the Future", The Empire Review, vol. Lii, (December 1930), pp. 410-417.

Wyndam, Hugh. "The Rhodesian Referendum", The Empire Review, vol. xxxvii, (January 1923), pp. 46-54.

Reference has also been made to several unsigned articles appearing in the following journals:-

The African World (London)
The Anti-Slavery Reporter and Aborigines Friend (London)
East Africa and Rhodesia (London)
The New Rhodesia (Salisbury)
The Round Table (London)
South Africa (Pretoria)

E. Newspapers

The Livingstone Mail (Livingstone)
The Bulawayo Chronicle (Bulawayo)
The Rhodesia Herald (Salisbury)
The Times (London)